/*
   * linux/kernel/seccomp.c
   *
   * Copyright 2004-2005  Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
   *

   * Copyright (C) 2012 Google, Inc.
   * Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
   *
   * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing facility.
   *
   * Mode 1 uses a fixed list of allowed system calls.
   * Mode 2 allows user-defined system call filters in the form
   *        of Berkeley Packet Filters/Linux Socket Filters.

   */

  #include <linux/atomic.h>

  #include <linux/audit.h>

  #include <linux/compat.h>

  #include <linux/sched.h>
  #include <linux/seccomp.h>

  
  /* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */

  
  #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
  #include <asm/syscall.h>
  #include <linux/filter.h>

  #include <linux/ptrace.h>

  #include <linux/security.h>
  #include <linux/slab.h>
  #include <linux/tracehook.h>
  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
  
  /**
   * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
   *
   * @usage: reference count to manage the object lifetime.
   *         get/put helpers should be used when accessing an instance
   *         outside of a lifetime-guarded section.  In general, this
   *         is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks.
   * @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter
   * @len: the number of instructions in the program
   * @insns: the BPF program instructions to evaluate
   *
   * seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev
   * pointer.  For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting
   * with current->seccomp.filter, the most recently attached or inherited filter.
   * However, multiple filters may share a @prev node, by way of fork(), which
   * results in a unidirectional tree existing in memory.  This is similar to
   * how namespaces work.
   *
   * seccomp_filter objects should never be modified after being attached
   * to a task_struct (other than @usage).
   */
  struct seccomp_filter {
  	atomic_t usage;
  	struct seccomp_filter *prev;
  	unsigned short len;  /* Instruction count */
  	struct sock_filter insns[];
  };
  
  /* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
  #define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))

  /**
   * get_u32 - returns a u32 offset into data
   * @data: a unsigned 64 bit value
   * @index: 0 or 1 to return the first or second 32-bits
   *
   * This inline exists to hide the length of unsigned long.  If a 32-bit
   * unsigned long is passed in, it will be extended and the top 32-bits will be
   * 0. If it is a 64-bit unsigned long, then whatever data is resident will be
   * properly returned.
   *
   * Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage
   * as per the specific architecture.
   */
  static inline u32 get_u32(u64 data, int index)
  {
  	return ((u32 *)&data)[index];
  }
  
  /* Helper for bpf_load below. */
  #define BPF_DATA(_name) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, _name)
  /**
   * bpf_load: checks and returns a pointer to the requested offset
   * @off: offset into struct seccomp_data to load from
   *
   * Returns the requested 32-bits of data.
   * seccomp_check_filter() should assure that @off is 32-bit aligned
   * and not out of bounds.  Failure to do so is a BUG.
   */
  u32 seccomp_bpf_load(int off)
  {
  	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
  	if (off == BPF_DATA(nr))
  		return syscall_get_nr(current, regs);
  	if (off == BPF_DATA(arch))
  		return syscall_get_arch(current, regs);
  	if (off >= BPF_DATA(args[0]) && off < BPF_DATA(args[6])) {
  		unsigned long value;
  		int arg = (off - BPF_DATA(args[0])) / sizeof(u64);
  		int index = !!(off % sizeof(u64));
  		syscall_get_arguments(current, regs, arg, 1, &value);
  		return get_u32(value, index);
  	}
  	if (off == BPF_DATA(instruction_pointer))
  		return get_u32(KSTK_EIP(current), 0);
  	if (off == BPF_DATA(instruction_pointer) + sizeof(u32))
  		return get_u32(KSTK_EIP(current), 1);
  	/* seccomp_check_filter should make this impossible. */
  	BUG();
  }
  
  /**
   *	seccomp_check_filter - verify seccomp filter code
   *	@filter: filter to verify
   *	@flen: length of filter
   *
   * Takes a previously checked filter (by sk_chk_filter) and
   * redirects all filter code that loads struct sk_buff data
   * and related data through seccomp_bpf_load.  It also
   * enforces length and alignment checking of those loads.
   *
   * Returns 0 if the rule set is legal or -EINVAL if not.
   */
  static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
  {
  	int pc;
  	for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) {
  		struct sock_filter *ftest = &filter[pc];
  		u16 code = ftest->code;
  		u32 k = ftest->k;
  
  		switch (code) {
  		case BPF_S_LD_W_ABS:
  			ftest->code = BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W;
  			/* 32-bit aligned and not out of bounds. */
  			if (k >= sizeof(struct seccomp_data) || k & 3)
  				return -EINVAL;
  			continue;
  		case BPF_S_LD_W_LEN:
  			ftest->code = BPF_S_LD_IMM;
  			ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
  			continue;
  		case BPF_S_LDX_W_LEN:
  			ftest->code = BPF_S_LDX_IMM;
  			ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
  			continue;
  		/* Explicitly include allowed calls. */
  		case BPF_S_RET_K:
  		case BPF_S_RET_A:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_K:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_ADD_X:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_K:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_SUB_X:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_K:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_MUL_X:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_X:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_AND_K:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_AND_X:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_OR_K:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_OR_X:

  		case BPF_S_ALU_XOR_K:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_XOR_X:

  		case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_K:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_LSH_X:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_K:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_RSH_X:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_NEG:
  		case BPF_S_LD_IMM:
  		case BPF_S_LDX_IMM:
  		case BPF_S_MISC_TAX:
  		case BPF_S_MISC_TXA:
  		case BPF_S_ALU_DIV_K:
  		case BPF_S_LD_MEM:
  		case BPF_S_LDX_MEM:
  		case BPF_S_ST:
  		case BPF_S_STX:
  		case BPF_S_JMP_JA:
  		case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_K:
  		case BPF_S_JMP_JEQ_X:
  		case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_K:
  		case BPF_S_JMP_JGE_X:
  		case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_K:
  		case BPF_S_JMP_JGT_X:
  		case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_K:
  		case BPF_S_JMP_JSET_X:
  			continue;
  		default:
  			return -EINVAL;
  		}
  	}
  	return 0;
  }
  
  /**
   * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @syscall
   * @syscall: number of the current system call
   *
   * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
   */
  static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
  {
  	struct seccomp_filter *f;

  	u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
  
  	/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
  	if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
  		return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;

  	/*
  	 * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return

  	 * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).

  	 */
  	for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) {

  		u32 cur_ret = sk_run_filter(NULL, f->insns);
  		if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
  			ret = cur_ret;

  	}
  	return ret;
  }
  
  /**
   * seccomp_attach_filter: Attaches a seccomp filter to current.
   * @fprog: BPF program to install
   *
   * Returns 0 on success or an errno on failure.
   */
  static long seccomp_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
  {
  	struct seccomp_filter *filter;
  	unsigned long fp_size = fprog->len * sizeof(struct sock_filter);
  	unsigned long total_insns = fprog->len;
  	long ret;
  
  	if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)
  		return -EINVAL;
  
  	for (filter = current->seccomp.filter; filter; filter = filter->prev)
  		total_insns += filter->len + 4;  /* include a 4 instr penalty */
  	if (total_insns > MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH)
  		return -ENOMEM;
  
  	/*
  	 * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task have
  	 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs.
  	 * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
  	 * behavior of privileged children.
  	 */
  	if (!current->no_new_privs &&
  	    security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
  				     CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
  		return -EACCES;
  
  	/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
  	filter = kzalloc(sizeof(struct seccomp_filter) + fp_size,
  			 GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN);
  	if (!filter)
  		return -ENOMEM;
  	atomic_set(&filter->usage, 1);
  	filter->len = fprog->len;
  
  	/* Copy the instructions from fprog. */
  	ret = -EFAULT;
  	if (copy_from_user(filter->insns, fprog->filter, fp_size))
  		goto fail;
  
  	/* Check and rewrite the fprog via the skb checker */
  	ret = sk_chk_filter(filter->insns, filter->len);
  	if (ret)
  		goto fail;
  
  	/* Check and rewrite the fprog for seccomp use */
  	ret = seccomp_check_filter(filter->insns, filter->len);
  	if (ret)
  		goto fail;
  
  	/*
  	 * If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its
  	 * task reference.
  	 */
  	filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter;
  	current->seccomp.filter = filter;
  	return 0;
  fail:
  	kfree(filter);
  	return ret;
  }
  
  /**
   * seccomp_attach_user_filter - attaches a user-supplied sock_fprog
   * @user_filter: pointer to the user data containing a sock_fprog.
   *
   * Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise.
   */
  long seccomp_attach_user_filter(char __user *user_filter)
  {
  	struct sock_fprog fprog;
  	long ret = -EFAULT;
  
  #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
  	if (is_compat_task()) {
  		struct compat_sock_fprog fprog32;
  		if (copy_from_user(&fprog32, user_filter, sizeof(fprog32)))
  			goto out;
  		fprog.len = fprog32.len;
  		fprog.filter = compat_ptr(fprog32.filter);
  	} else /* falls through to the if below. */
  #endif
  	if (copy_from_user(&fprog, user_filter, sizeof(fprog)))
  		goto out;
  	ret = seccomp_attach_filter(&fprog);
  out:
  	return ret;
  }
  
  /* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of the filter on @tsk */
  void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
  {
  	struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
  	if (!orig)
  		return;
  	/* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */
  	atomic_inc(&orig->usage);
  }
  
  /* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of tsk->seccomp.filter */
  void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
  {
  	struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
  	/* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
  	while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
  		struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
  		orig = orig->prev;
  		kfree(freeme);
  	}
  }

  
  /**
   * seccomp_send_sigsys - signals the task to allow in-process syscall emulation
   * @syscall: syscall number to send to userland
   * @reason: filter-supplied reason code to send to userland (via si_errno)
   *
   * Forces a SIGSYS with a code of SYS_SECCOMP and related sigsys info.
   */
  static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
  {
  	struct siginfo info;
  	memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
  	info.si_signo = SIGSYS;
  	info.si_code = SYS_SECCOMP;
  	info.si_call_addr = (void __user *)KSTK_EIP(current);
  	info.si_errno = reason;
  	info.si_arch = syscall_get_arch(current, task_pt_regs(current));
  	info.si_syscall = syscall;
  	force_sig_info(SIGSYS, &info, current);
  }

  #endif	/* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */

  
  /*
   * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
   * To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit
   * to limit the stack allocations too.
   */
  static int mode1_syscalls[] = {
  	__NR_seccomp_read, __NR_seccomp_write, __NR_seccomp_exit, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn,
  	0, /* null terminated */
  };

  #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT

  static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
  	__NR_seccomp_read_32, __NR_seccomp_write_32, __NR_seccomp_exit_32, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32,
  	0, /* null terminated */
  };
  #endif

  int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)

  {
  	int mode = current->seccomp.mode;

  	int exit_sig = 0;
  	int *syscall;

  	u32 ret;

  
  	switch (mode) {

  	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:

  		syscall = mode1_syscalls;

  #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
  		if (is_compat_task())

  			syscall = mode1_syscalls_32;
  #endif
  		do {
  			if (*syscall == this_syscall)

  				return 0;

  		} while (*++syscall);

  		exit_sig = SIGKILL;

  		ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;

  		break;

  #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER

  	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: {
  		int data;

  		struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);

  		ret = seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall);
  		data = ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;

  		ret &= SECCOMP_RET_ACTION;
  		switch (ret) {

  		case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
  			/* Set the low-order 16-bits as a errno. */

  			syscall_set_return_value(current, regs,

  						 -data, 0);
  			goto skip;

  		case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
  			/* Show the handler the original registers. */

  			syscall_rollback(current, regs);

  			/* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */
  			seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, data);
  			goto skip;

  		case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
  			/* Skip these calls if there is no tracer. */

  			if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) {
  				syscall_set_return_value(current, regs,
  							 -ENOSYS, 0);

  				goto skip;

  			}

  			/* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */
  			ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data);
  			/*
  			 * The delivery of a fatal signal during event
  			 * notification may silently skip tracer notification.
  			 * Terminating the task now avoids executing a system
  			 * call that may not be intended.
  			 */
  			if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
  				break;

  			if (syscall_get_nr(current, regs) < 0)
  				goto skip;  /* Explicit request to skip. */

  			return 0;

  		case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
  			return 0;
  		case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
  		default:
  			break;
  		}

  		exit_sig = SIGSYS;
  		break;

  	}

  #endif

  	default:
  		BUG();
  	}
  
  #ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
  	dump_stack();
  #endif

  	audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret);

  	do_exit(exit_sig);

  #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER

  skip:
  	audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret);

  #endif

  	return -1;

  }

  
  long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
  {
  	return current->seccomp.mode;
  }

  /**
   * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
   * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
   * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
   *
   * This function may be called repeatedly with a @seccomp_mode of
   * SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER to install additional filters.  Every filter
   * successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order) for each system
   * call the task makes.
   *
   * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
   *
   * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
   */
  long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)

  {

  	long ret = -EINVAL;

  	if (current->seccomp.mode &&
  	    current->seccomp.mode != seccomp_mode)

  		goto out;

  	switch (seccomp_mode) {
  	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
  		ret = 0;

  #ifdef TIF_NOTSC
  		disable_TSC();
  #endif

  		break;
  #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
  	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
  		ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter);
  		if (ret)
  			goto out;
  		break;
  #endif
  	default:
  		goto out;

  	}

  	current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
  	set_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP);
  out:

  	return ret;
  }