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kernel/sys.c
66.1 KB
b24413180 License cleanup: ... |
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
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/* * linux/kernel/sys.c * * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds */ |
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#include <linux/export.h> |
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#include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/utsname.h> #include <linux/mman.h> |
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#include <linux/reboot.h> #include <linux/prctl.h> |
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#include <linux/highuid.h> #include <linux/fs.h> |
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#include <linux/kmod.h> |
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#include <linux/perf_event.h> |
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#include <linux/resource.h> |
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#include <linux/kernel.h> |
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#include <linux/workqueue.h> |
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#include <linux/capability.h> |
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#include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/times.h> #include <linux/posix-timers.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/dcookies.h> #include <linux/suspend.h> #include <linux/tty.h> |
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#include <linux/signal.h> |
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#include <linux/cn_proc.h> |
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#include <linux/getcpu.h> |
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#include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h> |
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#include <linux/seccomp.h> |
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#include <linux/cpu.h> |
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#include <linux/personality.h> |
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#include <linux/ptrace.h> |
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#include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
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#include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/mount.h> |
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#include <linux/gfp.h> |
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#include <linux/syscore_ops.h> |
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#include <linux/version.h> #include <linux/ctype.h> |
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#include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/mempolicy.h> |
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#include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
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#include <linux/kprobes.h> |
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
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#include <linux/time_namespace.h> |
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#include <linux/binfmts.h> |
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|
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#include <linux/sched.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/autogroup.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/loadavg.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/stat.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/mm.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/coredump.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/task.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/cputime.h> |
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#include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/uidgid.h> #include <linux/cred.h> |
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#include <linux/nospec.h> |
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#include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> |
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/* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */ #include <generated/utsrelease.h> |
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|
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#include <linux/uaccess.h> |
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#include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/unistd.h> |
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#include "uid16.h" |
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#ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL |
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# define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL |
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# define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL |
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# define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL |
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# define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL |
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# define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL |
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# define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef GET_ENDIAN |
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# define GET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef SET_ENDIAN |
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# define SET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef GET_TSC_CTL # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) #endif #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) #endif |
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#ifndef GET_FP_MODE # define GET_FP_MODE(a) (-EINVAL) #endif #ifndef SET_FP_MODE # define SET_FP_MODE(a,b) (-EINVAL) #endif |
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#ifndef SVE_SET_VL # define SVE_SET_VL(a) (-EINVAL) #endif #ifndef SVE_GET_VL # define SVE_GET_VL() (-EINVAL) #endif |
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#ifndef PAC_RESET_KEYS # define PAC_RESET_KEYS(a, b) (-EINVAL) #endif |
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#ifndef SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL # define SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(a) (-EINVAL) #endif #ifndef GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL # define GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL() (-EINVAL) #endif |
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/* * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past */ int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID; int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID; |
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid); EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid); |
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/* * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures */ int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; |
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int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWGID; |
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid); EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid); /* |
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* Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid, * or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns. * * Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe */ static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p); |
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if (uid_eq(pcred->uid, cred->euid) || uid_eq(pcred->euid, cred->euid)) |
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return true; |
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if (ns_capable(pcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) |
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return true; return false; } /* |
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* set the priority of a task * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock */ |
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static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error) { int no_nice; |
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if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) { |
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error = -EPERM; goto out; } |
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if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) { |
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error = -EACCES; goto out; } no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval); if (no_nice) { error = no_nice; goto out; } if (error == -ESRCH) error = 0; set_user_nice(p, niceval); out: return error; } |
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SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval) |
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{ struct task_struct *g, *p; struct user_struct *user; |
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const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
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int error = -EINVAL; |
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struct pid *pgrp; |
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kuid_t uid; |
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|
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if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
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goto out; /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */ error = -ESRCH; |
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if (niceval < MIN_NICE) niceval = MIN_NICE; if (niceval > MAX_NICE) niceval = MAX_NICE; |
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|
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rcu_read_lock(); |
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read_lock(&tasklist_lock); switch (which) { |
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case PRIO_PROCESS: if (who) p = find_task_by_vpid(who); else p = current; if (p) error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); break; case PRIO_PGRP: if (who) pgrp = find_vpid(who); else pgrp = task_pgrp(current); do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); break; case PRIO_USER: uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who); user = cred->user; if (!who) uid = cred->uid; else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) { user = find_user(uid); if (!user) |
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goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
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} do_each_thread(g, p) { |
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if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid) && task_pid_vnr(p)) |
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error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); } while_each_thread(g, p); if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */ break; |
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} out_unlock: read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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out: return error; } /* * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19) * to stay compatible. */ |
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who) |
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{ struct task_struct *g, *p; struct user_struct *user; |
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const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
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long niceval, retval = -ESRCH; |
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struct pid *pgrp; |
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kuid_t uid; |
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|
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if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
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return -EINVAL; |
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rcu_read_lock(); |
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read_lock(&tasklist_lock); switch (which) { |
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case PRIO_PROCESS: if (who) p = find_task_by_vpid(who); else p = current; if (p) { niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); if (niceval > retval) retval = niceval; } break; case PRIO_PGRP: if (who) pgrp = find_vpid(who); else pgrp = task_pgrp(current); do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); if (niceval > retval) retval = niceval; } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); break; case PRIO_USER: uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who); user = cred->user; if (!who) uid = cred->uid; else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) { user = find_user(uid); if (!user) goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ } do_each_thread(g, p) { |
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if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid) && task_pid_vnr(p)) { |
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niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); |
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if (niceval > retval) retval = niceval; } |
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} while_each_thread(g, p); if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */ break; |
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} out_unlock: read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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return retval; } |
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/* * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid * or vice versa. (BSD-style) * * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid. * * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing * a security audit over a program. * * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be |
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* 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
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* * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned). */ |
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#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER |
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long __sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) |
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{ |
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struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
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const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
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int retval; |
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kgid_t krgid, kegid; krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid); kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid); if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid)) return -EINVAL; if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid)) return -EINVAL; |
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|
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new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
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retval = -EPERM; |
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if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { |
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if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) || gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) || |
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ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
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new->gid = krgid; |
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else |
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goto error; |
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} if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { |
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if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) || gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) || gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) || |
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ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
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new->egid = kegid; |
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else |
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goto error; |
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} |
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|
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if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || |
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(egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid))) |
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new->sgid = new->egid; new->fsgid = new->egid; |
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retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
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return commit_creds(new); error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
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} |
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid) { return __sys_setregid(rgid, egid); } |
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/* |
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* setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS |
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* * SMP: Same implicit races as above. */ |
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long __sys_setgid(gid_t gid) |
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{ |
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struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
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const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
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int retval; |
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kgid_t kgid; kgid = make_kgid(ns, gid); if (!gid_valid(kgid)) return -EINVAL; |
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|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
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new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
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retval = -EPERM; |
111767c1d LSM: Signal to Sa... |
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if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
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new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid; else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid)) new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid; |
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else |
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goto error; |
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|
39030e135 security: Add LSM... |
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retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
430 431 432 433 434 |
return commit_creds(new); error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
435 |
} |
54e991242 sched: don't allo... |
436 |
|
e530dca58 kernel: provide k... |
437 438 439 440 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid) { return __sys_setgid(gid); } |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
441 442 443 444 |
/* * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID */ static int set_user(struct cred *new) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
445 446 |
{ struct user_struct *new_user; |
078de5f70 userns: Store uid... |
447 |
new_user = alloc_uid(new->uid); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
448 449 |
if (!new_user) return -EAGAIN; |
72fa59970 move RLIMIT_NPROC... |
450 451 452 453 454 455 456 |
/* * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming * it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the * failure to the execve() stage. */ |
78d7d407b kernel core: use ... |
457 |
if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) && |
72fa59970 move RLIMIT_NPROC... |
458 459 460 461 |
new_user != INIT_USER) current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; else current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
462 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
463 464 |
free_uid(new->user); new->user = new_user; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 |
return 0; } /* * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid * or vice versa. (BSD-style) * * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid. * * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing * a security audit over a program. * * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
481 |
* 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
482 |
*/ |
e530dca58 kernel: provide k... |
483 |
long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
484 |
{ |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
485 |
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
486 487 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
488 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 |
kuid_t kruid, keuid; kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid); keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid); if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid)) return -EINVAL; if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid)) return -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
498 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
499 500 501 502 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
503 |
retval = -EPERM; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
504 |
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
505 506 507 |
new->uid = kruid; if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) && !uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) && |
40852275a LSM: add SafeSetI... |
508 |
!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
509 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
510 511 512 |
} if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
513 514 515 516 |
new->euid = keuid; if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) && !uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) && !uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) && |
40852275a LSM: add SafeSetI... |
517 |
!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
518 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
519 |
} |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
520 |
if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid)) { |
54e991242 sched: don't allo... |
521 522 523 524 |
retval = set_user(new); if (retval < 0) goto error; } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
525 |
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 || |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
526 |
(euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid))) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
527 528 |
new->suid = new->euid; new->fsuid = new->euid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
529 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
530 531 532 |
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
533 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
534 |
return commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
535 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
536 537 538 539 |
error: abort_creds(new); return retval; } |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
540 |
|
e530dca58 kernel: provide k... |
541 542 543 544 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid) { return __sys_setreuid(ruid, euid); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
545 |
/* |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
546 547 |
* setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS * |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
548 |
* Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
549 |
* like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
550 551 552 553 |
* user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid() * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
554 |
* regain them by swapping the real and effective uid. |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
555 |
*/ |
e530dca58 kernel: provide k... |
556 |
long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
557 |
{ |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
558 |
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
559 560 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
561 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
562 563 564 565 566 |
kuid_t kuid; kuid = make_kuid(ns, uid); if (!uid_valid(kuid)) return -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
567 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
568 569 570 571 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
572 |
retval = -EPERM; |
40852275a LSM: add SafeSetI... |
573 |
if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
574 575 |
new->suid = new->uid = kuid; if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) { |
54e991242 sched: don't allo... |
576 577 578 |
retval = set_user(new); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
579 |
} |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
580 |
} else if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kuid, new->suid)) { |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
581 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
582 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
583 |
|
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
584 |
new->fsuid = new->euid = kuid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
585 586 587 588 |
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
589 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
590 |
return commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
591 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
592 593 594 |
error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
595 |
} |
e530dca58 kernel: provide k... |
596 597 598 599 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid) { return __sys_setuid(uid); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
600 601 602 603 604 |
/* * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid, * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid(). */ |
e530dca58 kernel: provide k... |
605 |
long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
606 |
{ |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
607 |
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
608 609 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
610 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 |
kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid; kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid); keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid); ksuid = make_kuid(ns, suid); if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid)) return -EINVAL; if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid)) return -EINVAL; if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(ksuid)) return -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
625 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
626 627 628 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
629 |
old = current_cred(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
630 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
631 |
retval = -EPERM; |
40852275a LSM: add SafeSetI... |
632 |
if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
633 634 |
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
635 |
goto error; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
636 637 |
if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
638 |
goto error; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
639 640 |
if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
641 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
642 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
643 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
644 |
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
645 646 |
new->uid = kruid; if (!uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) { |
54e991242 sched: don't allo... |
647 648 649 650 |
retval = set_user(new); if (retval < 0) goto error; } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
651 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
652 |
if (euid != (uid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
653 |
new->euid = keuid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
654 |
if (suid != (uid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
655 |
new->suid = ksuid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
656 |
new->fsuid = new->euid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
657 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
658 659 660 |
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
661 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
662 |
return commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
663 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
664 665 666 |
error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
667 |
} |
e530dca58 kernel: provide k... |
668 669 670 671 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid) { return __sys_setresuid(ruid, euid, suid); } |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
672 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
673 |
{ |
86a264abe CRED: Wrap curren... |
674 |
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
675 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
676 677 678 679 680 |
uid_t ruid, euid, suid; ruid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid); euid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid); suid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->suid); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
681 |
|
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
682 683 684 685 686 687 |
retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp); if (!retval) { retval = put_user(euid, euidp); if (!retval) return put_user(suid, suidp); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
688 689 690 691 692 693 |
return retval; } /* * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid. */ |
e530dca58 kernel: provide k... |
694 |
long __sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
695 |
{ |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
696 |
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
697 698 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
699 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 |
kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid; krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid); kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid); ksgid = make_kgid(ns, sgid); if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid)) return -EINVAL; if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid)) return -EINVAL; if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid)) return -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
712 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
713 714 715 716 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
717 |
retval = -EPERM; |
111767c1d LSM: Signal to Sa... |
718 |
if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
719 720 |
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
721 |
goto error; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
722 723 |
if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
724 |
goto error; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
725 726 |
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
727 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
728 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
729 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
730 |
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
731 |
new->gid = krgid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
732 |
if (egid != (gid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
733 |
new->egid = kegid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
734 |
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
735 |
new->sgid = ksgid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
736 |
new->fsgid = new->egid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
737 |
|
39030e135 security: Add LSM... |
738 739 740 |
retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
741 742 743 744 745 |
return commit_creds(new); error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
746 |
} |
e530dca58 kernel: provide k... |
747 748 749 750 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid) { return __sys_setresgid(rgid, egid, sgid); } |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
751 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgidp, gid_t __user *, egidp, gid_t __user *, sgidp) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
752 |
{ |
86a264abe CRED: Wrap curren... |
753 |
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
754 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
755 756 757 758 759 |
gid_t rgid, egid, sgid; rgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid); egid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid); sgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->sgid); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
760 |
|
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
761 762 763 764 765 766 |
retval = put_user(rgid, rgidp); if (!retval) { retval = put_user(egid, egidp); if (!retval) retval = put_user(sgid, sgidp); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 |
return retval; } /* * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access.. */ |
e530dca58 kernel: provide k... |
778 |
long __sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
779 |
{ |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
780 781 782 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; uid_t old_fsuid; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 |
kuid_t kuid; old = current_cred(); old_fsuid = from_kuid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsuid); kuid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, uid); if (!uid_valid(kuid)) return old_fsuid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
791 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
792 793 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
794 |
return old_fsuid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
795 |
|
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
796 797 |
if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) || |
40852275a LSM: add SafeSetI... |
798 |
ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
799 800 |
if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) { new->fsuid = kuid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
801 802 |
if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) goto change_okay; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
803 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
804 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
805 806 |
abort_creds(new); return old_fsuid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
807 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
808 809 |
change_okay: commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
810 811 |
return old_fsuid; } |
e530dca58 kernel: provide k... |
812 813 814 815 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid) { return __sys_setfsuid(uid); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
816 |
/* |
f42df9e65 general: convert ... |
817 |
* Samma på svenska.. |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
818 |
*/ |
e530dca58 kernel: provide k... |
819 |
long __sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
820 |
{ |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
821 822 823 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; gid_t old_fsgid; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 |
kgid_t kgid; old = current_cred(); old_fsgid = from_kgid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsgid); kgid = make_kgid(old->user_ns, gid); if (!gid_valid(kgid)) return old_fsgid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
832 833 834 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
835 |
return old_fsgid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
836 |
|
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
837 838 |
if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) || |
111767c1d LSM: Signal to Sa... |
839 |
ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
840 841 |
if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) { new->fsgid = kgid; |
39030e135 security: Add LSM... |
842 843 |
if (security_task_fix_setgid(new,old,LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) goto change_okay; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
844 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
845 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
846 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
847 848 849 850 851 |
abort_creds(new); return old_fsgid; change_okay: commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
852 853 |
return old_fsgid; } |
e530dca58 kernel: provide k... |
854 855 856 857 858 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid) { return __sys_setfsgid(gid); } |
2813893f8 kernel: condition... |
859 |
#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
860 |
|
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 |
/** * sys_getpid - return the thread group id of the current process * * Note, despite the name, this returns the tgid not the pid. The tgid and * the pid are identical unless CLONE_THREAD was specified on clone() in * which case the tgid is the same in all threads of the same group. * * This is SMP safe as current->tgid does not change. */ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpid) { return task_tgid_vnr(current); } /* Thread ID - the internal kernel "pid" */ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(gettid) { return task_pid_vnr(current); } /* * Accessing ->real_parent is not SMP-safe, it could * change from under us. However, we can use a stale * value of ->real_parent under rcu_read_lock(), see * release_task()->call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct). */ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getppid) { int pid; rcu_read_lock(); pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent)); rcu_read_unlock(); return pid; } SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getuid) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()); } SYSCALL_DEFINE0(geteuid) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_euid()); } SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getgid) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_gid()); } SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getegid) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_egid()); } |
ca2406ed5 times(2): move co... |
921 |
static void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms) |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
922 |
{ |
5613fda9a sched/cputime: Co... |
923 |
u64 tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime; |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
924 |
|
e80d0a1ae cputime: Rename t... |
925 |
thread_group_cputime_adjusted(current, &tgutime, &tgstime); |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
926 927 |
cutime = current->signal->cutime; cstime = current->signal->cstime; |
5613fda9a sched/cputime: Co... |
928 929 930 931 |
tms->tms_utime = nsec_to_clock_t(tgutime); tms->tms_stime = nsec_to_clock_t(tgstime); tms->tms_cutime = nsec_to_clock_t(cutime); tms->tms_cstime = nsec_to_clock_t(cstime); |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
932 |
} |
58fd3aa28 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
933 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
934 |
{ |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
935 936 |
if (tbuf) { struct tms tmp; |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
937 938 |
do_sys_times(&tmp); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
939 940 941 |
if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms))) return -EFAULT; } |
e3d5a27d5 Allow times and t... |
942 |
force_successful_syscall_return(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
943 944 |
return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64()); } |
ca2406ed5 times(2): move co... |
945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 |
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT static compat_clock_t clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(clock_t x) { return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(clock_t_to_jiffies(x)); } COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct compat_tms __user *, tbuf) { if (tbuf) { struct tms tms; struct compat_tms tmp; do_sys_times(&tms); /* Convert our struct tms to the compat version. */ tmp.tms_utime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_utime); tmp.tms_stime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_stime); tmp.tms_cutime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_cutime); tmp.tms_cstime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_cstime); if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) return -EFAULT; } force_successful_syscall_return(); return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(jiffies); } #endif |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 |
/* * This needs some heavy checking ... * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it. * * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91 * |
98611e4e6 exec: kill task_s... |
979 |
* !PF_FORKNOEXEC check to conform completely to POSIX. |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
980 |
*/ |
b290ebe2c [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
981 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
982 983 |
{ struct task_struct *p; |
ee0acf90d [PATCH] setpgid: ... |
984 |
struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
985 986 |
struct pid *pgrp; int err; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
987 988 |
if (!pid) |
b488893a3 pid namespaces: c... |
989 |
pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
990 991 992 993 |
if (!pgid) pgid = pid; if (pgid < 0) return -EINVAL; |
950eaaca6 pid: make setpgid... |
994 |
rcu_read_lock(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 |
/* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM */ write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); err = -ESRCH; |
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
1002 |
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 |
if (!p) goto out; err = -EINVAL; if (!thread_group_leader(p)) goto out; |
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
1009 |
if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) { |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1010 |
err = -EPERM; |
41487c65b [PATCH] pid: repl... |
1011 |
if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1012 1013 |
goto out; err = -EACCES; |
98611e4e6 exec: kill task_s... |
1014 |
if (!(p->flags & PF_FORKNOEXEC)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1015 1016 1017 |
goto out; } else { err = -ESRCH; |
ee0acf90d [PATCH] setpgid: ... |
1018 |
if (p != group_leader) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 |
goto out; } err = -EPERM; if (p->signal->leader) goto out; |
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
1025 |
pgrp = task_pid(p); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1026 |
if (pgid != pid) { |
b488893a3 pid namespaces: c... |
1027 |
struct task_struct *g; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1028 |
|
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
1029 1030 |
pgrp = find_vpid(pgid); g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID); |
41487c65b [PATCH] pid: repl... |
1031 |
if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader)) |
f020bc468 [PATCH] sys_setpg... |
1032 |
goto out; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1033 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1034 1035 1036 |
err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid); if (err) goto out; |
1b0f7ffd0 pids: kill signal... |
1037 |
if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp) |
83beaf3c6 pids: sys_setpgid... |
1038 |
change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1039 1040 1041 1042 1043 |
err = 0; out: /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */ write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
950eaaca6 pid: make setpgid... |
1044 |
rcu_read_unlock(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1045 1046 |
return err; } |
192c58073 kernel: add do_ge... |
1047 |
static int do_getpgid(pid_t pid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1048 |
{ |
12a3de0a9 pids: sys_getpgid... |
1049 1050 1051 1052 1053 |
struct task_struct *p; struct pid *grp; int retval; rcu_read_lock(); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
1054 |
if (!pid) |
12a3de0a9 pids: sys_getpgid... |
1055 |
grp = task_pgrp(current); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
1056 |
else { |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1057 |
retval = -ESRCH; |
12a3de0a9 pids: sys_getpgid... |
1058 1059 1060 1061 1062 1063 1064 1065 1066 1067 |
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); if (!p) goto out; grp = task_pgrp(p); if (!grp) goto out; retval = security_task_getpgid(p); if (retval) goto out; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1068 |
} |
12a3de0a9 pids: sys_getpgid... |
1069 1070 1071 1072 |
retval = pid_vnr(grp); out: rcu_read_unlock(); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1073 |
} |
192c58073 kernel: add do_ge... |
1074 1075 1076 1077 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid) { return do_getpgid(pid); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1078 |
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP |
dbf040d9d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1079 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1080 |
{ |
192c58073 kernel: add do_ge... |
1081 |
return do_getpgid(0); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1082 1083 1084 |
} #endif |
dbf040d9d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1085 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1086 |
{ |
1dd768c08 pids: sys_getsid:... |
1087 1088 1089 1090 1091 |
struct task_struct *p; struct pid *sid; int retval; rcu_read_lock(); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
1092 |
if (!pid) |
1dd768c08 pids: sys_getsid:... |
1093 |
sid = task_session(current); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
1094 |
else { |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1095 |
retval = -ESRCH; |
1dd768c08 pids: sys_getsid:... |
1096 1097 1098 1099 1100 1101 1102 1103 1104 1105 |
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); if (!p) goto out; sid = task_session(p); if (!sid) goto out; retval = security_task_getsid(p); if (retval) goto out; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1106 |
} |
1dd768c08 pids: sys_getsid:... |
1107 1108 1109 1110 |
retval = pid_vnr(sid); out: rcu_read_unlock(); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1111 |
} |
81dabb464 exit.c: unexport ... |
1112 1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 |
static void set_special_pids(struct pid *pid) { struct task_struct *curr = current->group_leader; if (task_session(curr) != pid) change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_SID, pid); if (task_pgrp(curr) != pid) change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_PGID, pid); } |
e2aaa9f42 kernel: add ksys_... |
1122 |
int ksys_setsid(void) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1123 |
{ |
e19f247a3 [PATCH] setpgid: ... |
1124 |
struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
e4cc0a9c8 fix setsid() for ... |
1125 1126 |
struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader); pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1127 |
int err = -EPERM; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1128 |
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
390e2ff07 [PATCH] Make sets... |
1129 1130 1131 |
/* Fail if I am already a session leader */ if (group_leader->signal->leader) goto out; |
430c62312 start the global ... |
1132 1133 |
/* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the * proposed session id. |
390e2ff07 [PATCH] Make sets... |
1134 |
*/ |
6806aac6d sys_setsid: remov... |
1135 |
if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1136 |
goto out; |
e19f247a3 [PATCH] setpgid: ... |
1137 |
group_leader->signal->leader = 1; |
81dabb464 exit.c: unexport ... |
1138 |
set_special_pids(sid); |
24ec839c4 [PATCH] tty: ->si... |
1139 |
|
9c9f4ded9 tty: Add a kref c... |
1140 |
proc_clear_tty(group_leader); |
24ec839c4 [PATCH] tty: ->si... |
1141 |
|
e4cc0a9c8 fix setsid() for ... |
1142 |
err = session; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1143 1144 |
out: write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
5091faa44 sched: Add 'autog... |
1145 |
if (err > 0) { |
0d0df599f connector: fix re... |
1146 |
proc_sid_connector(group_leader); |
5091faa44 sched: Add 'autog... |
1147 1148 |
sched_autogroup_create_attach(group_leader); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1149 1150 |
return err; } |
e2aaa9f42 kernel: add ksys_... |
1151 1152 1153 1154 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid) { return ksys_setsid(); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1155 |
DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem); |
e28cbf229 improve sys_newun... |
1156 1157 |
#ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE #define override_architecture(name) \ |
46da27664 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1158 |
(personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 && \ |
e28cbf229 improve sys_newun... |
1159 1160 1161 1162 1163 |
copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \ sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE))) #else #define override_architecture(name) 0 #endif |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1164 1165 1166 |
/* * Work around broken programs that cannot handle "Linux 3.0". * Instead we map 3.x to 2.6.40+x, so e.g. 3.0 would be 2.6.40 |
b7285b425 kernel/sys.c: Cla... |
1167 1168 |
* And we map 4.x and later versions to 2.6.60+x, so 4.0/5.0/6.0/... would be * 2.6.60. |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1169 |
*/ |
2702b1526 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1170 |
static int override_release(char __user *release, size_t len) |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1171 1172 |
{ int ret = 0; |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1173 1174 |
if (current->personality & UNAME26) { |
2702b1526 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1175 1176 |
const char *rest = UTS_RELEASE; char buf[65] = { 0 }; |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1177 1178 |
int ndots = 0; unsigned v; |
2702b1526 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1179 |
size_t copy; |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1180 1181 1182 1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 |
while (*rest) { if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3) break; if (!isdigit(*rest) && *rest != '.') break; rest++; } |
39afb5ee4 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1188 |
v = ((LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff) + 60; |
31fd84b95 use clamp_t in UN... |
1189 |
copy = clamp_t(size_t, len, 1, sizeof(buf)); |
2702b1526 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1190 1191 |
copy = scnprintf(buf, copy, "2.6.%u%s", v, rest); ret = copy_to_user(release, buf, copy + 1); |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1192 1193 1194 |
} return ret; } |
e48fbb699 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1195 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1196 |
{ |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1197 |
struct new_utsname tmp; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1198 1199 |
down_read(&uts_sem); |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1200 |
memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp)); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1201 |
up_read(&uts_sem); |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1202 1203 |
if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) return -EFAULT; |
e28cbf229 improve sys_newun... |
1204 |
|
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 |
if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) return -EFAULT; if (override_architecture(name)) return -EFAULT; return 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1210 |
} |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1211 1212 1213 1214 1215 1216 |
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME /* * Old cruft */ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name) { |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1217 |
struct old_utsname tmp; |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 |
if (!name) return -EFAULT; down_read(&uts_sem); |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1223 |
memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp)); |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1224 |
up_read(&uts_sem); |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1225 1226 |
if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) return -EFAULT; |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1227 |
|
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 |
if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) return -EFAULT; if (override_architecture(name)) return -EFAULT; return 0; |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1233 1234 1235 1236 |
} SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name) { |
5e1aada08 kernel/sys.c: avo... |
1237 |
struct oldold_utsname tmp; |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1238 1239 1240 |
if (!name) return -EFAULT; |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1241 |
|
5e1aada08 kernel/sys.c: avo... |
1242 |
memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1243 |
down_read(&uts_sem); |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1244 1245 1246 1247 1248 |
memcpy(&tmp.sysname, &utsname()->sysname, __OLD_UTS_LEN); memcpy(&tmp.nodename, &utsname()->nodename, __OLD_UTS_LEN); memcpy(&tmp.release, &utsname()->release, __OLD_UTS_LEN); memcpy(&tmp.version, &utsname()->version, __OLD_UTS_LEN); memcpy(&tmp.machine, &utsname()->machine, __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1249 |
up_read(&uts_sem); |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1250 1251 |
if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) return -EFAULT; |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1252 |
|
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1253 1254 1255 1256 1257 |
if (override_architecture(name)) return -EFAULT; if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) return -EFAULT; return 0; |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1258 1259 |
} #endif |
5a8a82b1d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1260 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1261 1262 1263 |
{ int errno; char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
bb96a6f50 userns: allow set... |
1264 |
if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1265 |
return -EPERM; |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1266 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1267 1268 |
if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) return -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1269 1270 |
errno = -EFAULT; if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1271 |
struct new_utsname *u; |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1272 |
|
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1273 1274 |
down_write(&uts_sem); u = utsname(); |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1275 1276 |
memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len); memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1277 |
errno = 0; |
499eea6bf sethostname/setdo... |
1278 |
uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_HOSTNAME); |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1279 |
up_write(&uts_sem); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1280 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1281 1282 1283 1284 |
return errno; } #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME |
5a8a82b1d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1285 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1286 |
{ |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1287 |
int i; |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1288 |
struct new_utsname *u; |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1289 |
char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN + 1]; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1290 1291 1292 1293 |
if (len < 0) return -EINVAL; down_read(&uts_sem); |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1294 1295 |
u = utsname(); i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1296 1297 |
if (i > len) i = len; |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1298 |
memcpy(tmp, u->nodename, i); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1299 |
up_read(&uts_sem); |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1300 1301 1302 |
if (copy_to_user(name, tmp, i)) return -EFAULT; return 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1303 1304 1305 1306 1307 1308 1309 1310 |
} #endif /* * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling * uname() */ |
5a8a82b1d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1311 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1312 1313 1314 |
{ int errno; char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1315 |
if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1316 1317 1318 |
return -EPERM; if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) return -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1319 1320 |
errno = -EFAULT; if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1321 |
struct new_utsname *u; |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1322 |
|
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1323 1324 |
down_write(&uts_sem); u = utsname(); |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1325 1326 |
memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len); memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1327 |
errno = 0; |
499eea6bf sethostname/setdo... |
1328 |
uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_DOMAINNAME); |
42a0cc347 sys: don't hold u... |
1329 |
up_write(&uts_sem); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1330 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1331 1332 |
return errno; } |
e48fbb699 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1333 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1334 |
{ |
b95183453 rlimits: switch m... |
1335 1336 1337 1338 1339 1340 1341 1342 |
struct rlimit value; int ret; ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &value); if (!ret) ret = copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0; return ret; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1343 |
} |
d9e968cb9 getrlimit()/setrl... |
1344 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1364 1365 1366 1367 1368 1369 1370 1371 1372 1373 |
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim) { struct rlimit r; struct compat_rlimit r32; if (copy_from_user(&r32, rlim, sizeof(struct compat_rlimit))) return -EFAULT; if (r32.rlim_cur == COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) r.rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY; else r.rlim_cur = r32.rlim_cur; if (r32.rlim_max == COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) r.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; else r.rlim_max = r32.rlim_max; return do_prlimit(current, resource, &r, NULL); } COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim) { struct rlimit r; int ret; ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &r); if (!ret) { |
58c7ffc07 fix a braino in c... |
1374 |
struct compat_rlimit r32; |
d9e968cb9 getrlimit()/setrl... |
1375 1376 1377 1378 1379 1380 1381 1382 1383 1384 1385 1386 1387 1388 1389 1390 |
if (r.rlim_cur > COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) r32.rlim_cur = COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY; else r32.rlim_cur = r.rlim_cur; if (r.rlim_max > COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) r32.rlim_max = COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY; else r32.rlim_max = r.rlim_max; if (copy_to_user(rlim, &r32, sizeof(struct compat_rlimit))) return -EFAULT; } return ret; } #endif |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1391 1392 1393 1394 1395 |
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT /* * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps. */ |
e48fbb699 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1396 1397 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1398 1399 1400 1401 |
{ struct rlimit x; if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) return -EINVAL; |
23d6aef74 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1402 |
resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1403 1404 1405 |
task_lock(current->group_leader); x = current->signal->rlim[resource]; task_unlock(current->group_leader); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
1406 |
if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1407 |
x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
1408 |
if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1409 |
x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1410 |
return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1411 |
} |
613763a1f take compat_sys_o... |
1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 |
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim) { struct rlimit r; if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) return -EINVAL; |
23d6aef74 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1420 |
resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS); |
613763a1f take compat_sys_o... |
1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 |
task_lock(current->group_leader); r = current->signal->rlim[resource]; task_unlock(current->group_leader); if (r.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF) r.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF; if (r.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF) r.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF; if (put_user(r.rlim_cur, &rlim->rlim_cur) || put_user(r.rlim_max, &rlim->rlim_max)) return -EFAULT; return 0; } #endif |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1435 |
#endif |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1448 1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 1467 |
static inline bool rlim64_is_infinity(__u64 rlim64) { #if BITS_PER_LONG < 64 return rlim64 >= ULONG_MAX; #else return rlim64 == RLIM64_INFINITY; #endif } static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64) { if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY; else rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur; if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY) rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY; else rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max; } static void rlim64_to_rlim(const struct rlimit64 *rlim64, struct rlimit *rlim) { if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_cur)) rlim->rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY; else rlim->rlim_cur = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_cur; if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_max)) rlim->rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; else rlim->rlim_max = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_max; } |
1c1e618dd rlimits: allow se... |
1468 |
/* make sure you are allowed to change @tsk limits before calling this */ |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1469 1470 |
int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1471 |
{ |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1472 |
struct rlimit *rlim; |
86f162f4c rlimits: do secur... |
1473 |
int retval = 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1474 1475 1476 |
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) return -EINVAL; |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482 1483 |
if (new_rlim) { if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max) return -EINVAL; if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && new_rlim->rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open) return -EPERM; } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1484 |
|
1c1e618dd rlimits: allow se... |
1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 |
/* protect tsk->signal and tsk->sighand from disappearing */ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); if (!tsk->sighand) { retval = -ESRCH; goto out; } |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1491 |
rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource; |
86f162f4c rlimits: do secur... |
1492 |
task_lock(tsk->group_leader); |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1493 |
if (new_rlim) { |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1494 1495 |
/* Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until cgroups can contain all limits */ |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1496 1497 1498 1499 |
if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) retval = -EPERM; if (!retval) |
cad4ea546 rlimit: Properly ... |
1500 |
retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim); |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1501 1502 1503 1504 1505 1506 |
} if (!retval) { if (old_rlim) *old_rlim = *rlim; if (new_rlim) *rlim = *new_rlim; |
9926e4c74 CPU time limit pa... |
1507 |
} |
7855c35da rlimits: split sy... |
1508 |
task_unlock(tsk->group_leader); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1509 |
|
d3561f78f [PATCH] RLIMIT_CP... |
1510 |
/* |
24db4dd90 rlimit: Rewrite n... |
1511 1512 1513 |
* RLIMIT_CPU handling. Arm the posix CPU timer if the limit is not * infite. In case of RLIM_INFINITY the posix CPU timer code * ignores the rlimit. |
d3561f78f [PATCH] RLIMIT_CP... |
1514 |
*/ |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1515 |
if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU && |
baa73d9e4 posix-timers: Mak... |
1516 1517 |
new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1518 |
update_rlimit_cpu(tsk, new_rlim->rlim_cur); |
ec9e16bac [PATCH] sys_setrl... |
1519 |
out: |
1c1e618dd rlimits: allow se... |
1520 |
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
2fb9d2689 rlimits: make sur... |
1521 |
return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1522 |
} |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1523 |
/* rcu lock must be held */ |
791ec491c prlimit,security,... |
1524 1525 |
static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int flags) |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1526 1527 |
{ const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; |
791ec491c prlimit,security,... |
1528 |
bool id_match; |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1529 |
|
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1530 1531 |
if (current == task) return 0; |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1532 |
|
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1533 |
tcred = __task_cred(task); |
791ec491c prlimit,security,... |
1534 1535 1536 1537 1538 1539 1540 1541 |
id_match = (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) && uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) && uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) && gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) && gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) && gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid)); if (!id_match && !ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) return -EPERM; |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1542 |
|
791ec491c prlimit,security,... |
1543 |
return security_task_prlimit(cred, tcred, flags); |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1544 1545 1546 1547 1548 1549 1550 1551 1552 |
} SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource, const struct rlimit64 __user *, new_rlim, struct rlimit64 __user *, old_rlim) { struct rlimit64 old64, new64; struct rlimit old, new; struct task_struct *tsk; |
791ec491c prlimit,security,... |
1553 |
unsigned int checkflags = 0; |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1554 |
int ret; |
791ec491c prlimit,security,... |
1555 1556 |
if (old_rlim) checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_READ; |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1557 1558 1559 1560 |
if (new_rlim) { if (copy_from_user(&new64, new_rlim, sizeof(new64))) return -EFAULT; rlim64_to_rlim(&new64, &new); |
791ec491c prlimit,security,... |
1561 |
checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE; |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1562 1563 1564 1565 1566 1567 1568 1569 |
} rcu_read_lock(); tsk = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current; if (!tsk) { rcu_read_unlock(); return -ESRCH; } |
791ec491c prlimit,security,... |
1570 |
ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk, checkflags); |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1571 1572 1573 1574 1575 1576 1577 1578 1579 1580 1581 1582 1583 1584 1585 1586 1587 1588 1589 |
if (ret) { rcu_read_unlock(); return ret; } get_task_struct(tsk); rcu_read_unlock(); ret = do_prlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim ? &new : NULL, old_rlim ? &old : NULL); if (!ret && old_rlim) { rlim_to_rlim64(&old, &old64); if (copy_to_user(old_rlim, &old64, sizeof(old64))) ret = -EFAULT; } put_task_struct(tsk); return ret; } |
7855c35da rlimits: split sy... |
1590 1591 1592 1593 1594 1595 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) { struct rlimit new_rlim; if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim))) return -EFAULT; |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1596 |
return do_prlimit(current, resource, &new_rlim, NULL); |
7855c35da rlimits: split sy... |
1597 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1598 1599 1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605 |
/* * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct, * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not * measuring them yet). * |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1606 1607 1608 1609 1610 1611 1612 |
* When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping. |
2dd0ebcd2 [PATCH] Avoid tak... |
1613 |
* |
de047c1bc [PATCH] avoid tas... |
1614 1615 1616 1617 1618 1619 1620 1621 1622 1623 1624 1625 1626 1627 |
* Locking: * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with * the siglock held. * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock. * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal-> * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple. |
2dd0ebcd2 [PATCH] Avoid tak... |
1628 |
* |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1629 |
*/ |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
1630 |
static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r) |
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1631 |
{ |
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 1638 |
r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw; r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw; r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt; r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt; r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t); r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t); } |
ce72a16fa wait4(2)/waitid(2... |
1639 |
void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1640 1641 1642 |
{ struct task_struct *t; unsigned long flags; |
5613fda9a sched/cputime: Co... |
1643 |
u64 tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime; |
1f10206cf getrusage: fill r... |
1644 |
unsigned long maxrss = 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1645 |
|
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1646 |
memset((char *)r, 0, sizeof (*r)); |
648616343 [S390] cputime: a... |
1647 |
utime = stime = 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1648 |
|
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1649 |
if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) { |
e80d0a1ae cputime: Rename t... |
1650 |
task_cputime_adjusted(current, &utime, &stime); |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
1651 |
accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r); |
1f10206cf getrusage: fill r... |
1652 |
maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; |
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1653 1654 |
goto out; } |
d6cf723a1 k_getrusage: don'... |
1655 |
if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) |
de047c1bc [PATCH] avoid tas... |
1656 |
return; |
0f59cc4a3 [PATCH] simplify ... |
1657 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1658 |
switch (who) { |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 |
case RUSAGE_BOTH: case RUSAGE_CHILDREN: utime = p->signal->cutime; stime = p->signal->cstime; r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw; r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw; r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt; r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt; r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock; r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock; maxrss = p->signal->cmaxrss; if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1672 |
break; |
df561f668 treewide: Use fal... |
1673 |
fallthrough; |
0f59cc4a3 [PATCH] simplify ... |
1674 |
|
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 |
case RUSAGE_SELF: thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime); utime += tgutime; stime += tgstime; r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw; r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw; r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt; r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt; r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock; r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock; if (maxrss < p->signal->maxrss) maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; t = p; do { accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r); } while_each_thread(p, t); break; default: BUG(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1695 |
} |
de047c1bc [PATCH] avoid tas... |
1696 |
unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags); |
de047c1bc [PATCH] avoid tas... |
1697 |
|
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1698 |
out: |
bdd565f81 y2038: rusage: us... |
1699 1700 |
r->ru_utime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(utime); r->ru_stime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(stime); |
1f10206cf getrusage: fill r... |
1701 1702 1703 |
if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) { struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p); |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1704 |
|
1f10206cf getrusage: fill r... |
1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 |
if (mm) { setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm); mmput(mm); } } r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* convert pages to KBs */ |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1711 |
} |
ce72a16fa wait4(2)/waitid(2... |
1712 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1713 1714 |
{ struct rusage r; |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1715 |
|
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1716 1717 |
if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && who != RUSAGE_THREAD) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1718 |
return -EINVAL; |
ce72a16fa wait4(2)/waitid(2... |
1719 1720 1721 |
getrusage(current, who, &r); return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1722 |
} |
8d2d5c4a2 switch getrusage(... |
1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 |
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct compat_rusage __user *, ru) { struct rusage r; if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && who != RUSAGE_THREAD) return -EINVAL; |
ce72a16fa wait4(2)/waitid(2... |
1731 |
getrusage(current, who, &r); |
8d2d5c4a2 switch getrusage(... |
1732 1733 1734 |
return put_compat_rusage(&r, ru); } #endif |
e48fbb699 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1735 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1736 1737 1738 1739 |
{ mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO); return mask; } |
3b7391de6 capabilities: int... |
1740 |
|
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1741 |
static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd) |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1742 |
{ |
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1743 |
struct fd exe; |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1744 |
struct file *old_exe, *exe_file; |
496ad9aa8 new helper: file_... |
1745 |
struct inode *inode; |
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1746 |
int err; |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1747 |
|
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1748 1749 |
exe = fdget(fd); if (!exe.file) |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1750 |
return -EBADF; |
496ad9aa8 new helper: file_... |
1751 |
inode = file_inode(exe.file); |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 |
/* * Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make * sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an * overall picture. */ err = -EACCES; |
90f8572b0 vfs: Commit to ne... |
1759 |
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(&exe.file->f_path)) |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1760 |
goto exit; |
496ad9aa8 new helper: file_... |
1761 |
err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC); |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1762 1763 |
if (err) goto exit; |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1764 |
/* |
4229fb1dc c/r: prctl: less ... |
1765 |
* Forbid mm->exe_file change if old file still mapped. |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1766 |
*/ |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1767 |
exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm); |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1768 |
err = -EBUSY; |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1769 |
if (exe_file) { |
4229fb1dc c/r: prctl: less ... |
1770 |
struct vm_area_struct *vma; |
d8ed45c5d mmap locking API:... |
1771 |
mmap_read_lock(mm); |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 |
for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { if (!vma->vm_file) continue; if (path_equal(&vma->vm_file->f_path, &exe_file->f_path)) goto exit_err; } |
d8ed45c5d mmap locking API:... |
1779 |
mmap_read_unlock(mm); |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1780 |
fput(exe_file); |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1781 |
} |
4229fb1dc c/r: prctl: less ... |
1782 |
err = 0; |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 |
/* set the new file, lockless */ get_file(exe.file); old_exe = xchg(&mm->exe_file, exe.file); if (old_exe) fput(old_exe); |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1788 |
exit: |
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1789 |
fdput(exe); |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1790 |
return err; |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1791 |
exit_err: |
d8ed45c5d mmap locking API:... |
1792 |
mmap_read_unlock(mm); |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1793 1794 |
fput(exe_file); goto exit; |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1795 |
} |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1796 |
/* |
11bbd8b41 prctl_set_mm: ref... |
1797 1798 |
* Check arithmetic relations of passed addresses. * |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1799 1800 1801 |
* WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful * in what is allowed for modification from userspace. */ |
11bbd8b41 prctl_set_mm: ref... |
1802 |
static int validate_prctl_map_addr(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1803 1804 |
{ unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE; |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 |
int error = -EINVAL, i; static const unsigned char offsets[] = { offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_code), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_code), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_data), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_data), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_brk), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, brk), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_stack), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_start), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_end), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_start), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_end), }; /* * Make sure the members are not somewhere outside * of allowed address space. */ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(offsets); i++) { u64 val = *(u64 *)((char *)prctl_map + offsets[i]); if ((unsigned long)val >= mmap_max_addr || (unsigned long)val < mmap_min_addr) goto out; } /* * Make sure the pairs are ordered. */ #define __prctl_check_order(__m1, __op, __m2) \ ((unsigned long)prctl_map->__m1 __op \ (unsigned long)prctl_map->__m2) ? 0 : -EINVAL error = __prctl_check_order(start_code, <, end_code); |
a9e73998f kernel/sys.c: prc... |
1840 |
error |= __prctl_check_order(start_data,<=, end_data); |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 |
error |= __prctl_check_order(start_brk, <=, brk); error |= __prctl_check_order(arg_start, <=, arg_end); error |= __prctl_check_order(env_start, <=, env_end); if (error) goto out; #undef __prctl_check_order error = -EINVAL; /* * @brk should be after @end_data in traditional maps. */ if (prctl_map->start_brk <= prctl_map->end_data || prctl_map->brk <= prctl_map->end_data) goto out; /* * Neither we should allow to override limits if they set. */ if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), prctl_map->brk, prctl_map->start_brk, prctl_map->end_data, prctl_map->start_data)) goto out; |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1864 1865 1866 1867 |
error = 0; out: return error; } |
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
1868 |
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 |
static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data_size) { struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { .exe_fd = (u32)-1, }; unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE]; struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; int error; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct prctl_mm_map) > 256); if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE) return put_user((unsigned int)sizeof(prctl_map), (unsigned int __user *)addr); if (data_size != sizeof(prctl_map)) return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_user(&prctl_map, addr, sizeof(prctl_map))) return -EFAULT; |
11bbd8b41 prctl_set_mm: ref... |
1888 |
error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map); |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1889 1890 1891 1892 |
if (error) return error; if (prctl_map.auxv_size) { |
11bbd8b41 prctl_set_mm: ref... |
1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 |
/* * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector. */ if (!prctl_map.auxv || prctl_map.auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)) return -EINVAL; |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 |
memset(user_auxv, 0, sizeof(user_auxv)); if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)prctl_map.auxv, prctl_map.auxv_size)) return -EFAULT; /* Last entry must be AT_NULL as specification requires */ user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = AT_NULL; user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = AT_NULL; } |
ddf1d398e prctl: take mmap ... |
1909 |
if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) { |
11bbd8b41 prctl_set_mm: ref... |
1910 |
/* |
ebd6de681 prctl: Allow loca... |
1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 |
* Check if the current user is checkpoint/restore capable. * At the time of this writing, it checks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN * or CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. * Note that a user with access to ptrace can masquerade an * arbitrary program as any executable, even setuid ones. * This may have implications in the tomoyo subsystem. |
11bbd8b41 prctl_set_mm: ref... |
1917 |
*/ |
ebd6de681 prctl: Allow loca... |
1918 |
if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(current_user_ns())) |
227175b2c prctl: exe link p... |
1919 |
return -EPERM; |
11bbd8b41 prctl_set_mm: ref... |
1920 |
|
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1921 |
error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd); |
ddf1d398e prctl: take mmap ... |
1922 1923 1924 |
if (error) return error; } |
88aa7cc68 mm: introduce arg... |
1925 |
/* |
c1e8d7c6a mmap locking API:... |
1926 |
* arg_lock protects concurent updates but we still need mmap_lock for |
88aa7cc68 mm: introduce arg... |
1927 1928 |
* read to exclude races with sys_brk. */ |
d8ed45c5d mmap locking API:... |
1929 |
mmap_read_lock(mm); |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 |
/* * We don't validate if these members are pointing to * real present VMAs because application may have correspond * VMAs already unmapped and kernel uses these members for statistics * output in procfs mostly, except * |
15ec0fcff kernel/sys.c: rep... |
1937 |
* - @start_brk/@brk which are used in do_brk_flags but kernel lookups |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1938 1939 1940 1941 |
* for VMAs when updating these memvers so anything wrong written * here cause kernel to swear at userspace program but won't lead * to any problem in kernel itself */ |
88aa7cc68 mm: introduce arg... |
1942 |
spin_lock(&mm->arg_lock); |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 |
mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code; mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code; mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data; mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data; mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk; mm->brk = prctl_map.brk; mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack; mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start; mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end; mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start; mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end; |
88aa7cc68 mm: introduce arg... |
1954 |
spin_unlock(&mm->arg_lock); |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 |
/* * Note this update of @saved_auxv is lockless thus * if someone reads this member in procfs while we're * updating -- it may get partly updated results. It's * known and acceptable trade off: we leave it as is to * not introduce additional locks here making the kernel * more complex. */ if (prctl_map.auxv_size) memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, sizeof(user_auxv)); |
d8ed45c5d mmap locking API:... |
1966 |
mmap_read_unlock(mm); |
ddf1d398e prctl: take mmap ... |
1967 |
return 0; |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1968 1969 |
} #endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ |
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 |
static int prctl_set_auxv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) { /* * This doesn't move the auxiliary vector itself since it's pinned to * mm_struct, but it permits filling the vector with new values. It's * up to the caller to provide sane values here, otherwise userspace * tools which use this vector might be unhappy. */ unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE]; if (len > sizeof(user_auxv)) return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)addr, len)) return -EFAULT; /* Make sure the last entry is always AT_NULL */ user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = 0; user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = 0; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)); task_lock(current); memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, len); task_unlock(current); return 0; } |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1999 2000 2001 |
static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2002 |
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; |
11bbd8b41 prctl_set_mm: ref... |
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 |
struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { .auxv = NULL, .auxv_size = 0, .exe_fd = -1, }; |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
2008 2009 |
struct vm_area_struct *vma; int error; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2010 |
|
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
2011 2012 2013 |
if (arg5 || (arg4 && (opt != PR_SET_MM_AUXV && opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP && opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE))) |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2014 |
return -EINVAL; |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
2015 2016 2017 2018 |
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP || opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE) return prctl_set_mm_map(opt, (const void __user *)addr, arg4); #endif |
79f0713d4 prctl: use CAP_SY... |
2019 |
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2020 |
return -EPERM; |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
2021 2022 |
if (opt == PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE) return prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, (unsigned int)addr); |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
2023 |
|
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
2024 2025 |
if (opt == PR_SET_MM_AUXV) return prctl_set_auxv(mm, addr, arg4); |
1ad75b9e1 c/r: prctl: add m... |
2026 |
if (addr >= TASK_SIZE || addr < mmap_min_addr) |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2027 |
return -EINVAL; |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
2028 |
error = -EINVAL; |
bc81426f5 prctl_set_mm: dow... |
2029 2030 |
/* * arg_lock protects concurent updates of arg boundaries, we need |
c1e8d7c6a mmap locking API:... |
2031 |
* mmap_lock for a) concurrent sys_brk, b) finding VMA for addr |
bc81426f5 prctl_set_mm: dow... |
2032 2033 |
* validation. */ |
d8ed45c5d mmap locking API:... |
2034 |
mmap_read_lock(mm); |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2035 |
vma = find_vma(mm, addr); |
bc81426f5 prctl_set_mm: dow... |
2036 |
spin_lock(&mm->arg_lock); |
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
2037 2038 2039 2040 2041 2042 2043 2044 2045 2046 2047 |
prctl_map.start_code = mm->start_code; prctl_map.end_code = mm->end_code; prctl_map.start_data = mm->start_data; prctl_map.end_data = mm->end_data; prctl_map.start_brk = mm->start_brk; prctl_map.brk = mm->brk; prctl_map.start_stack = mm->start_stack; prctl_map.arg_start = mm->arg_start; prctl_map.arg_end = mm->arg_end; prctl_map.env_start = mm->env_start; prctl_map.env_end = mm->env_end; |
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
2048 |
|
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2049 2050 |
switch (opt) { case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE: |
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
2051 |
prctl_map.start_code = addr; |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
2052 |
break; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2053 |
case PR_SET_MM_END_CODE: |
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
2054 |
prctl_map.end_code = addr; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2055 |
break; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2056 |
case PR_SET_MM_START_DATA: |
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
2057 |
prctl_map.start_data = addr; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2058 |
break; |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
2059 |
case PR_SET_MM_END_DATA: |
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
2060 2061 2062 2063 |
prctl_map.end_data = addr; break; case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK: prctl_map.start_stack = addr; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2064 |
break; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2065 |
case PR_SET_MM_START_BRK: |
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
2066 |
prctl_map.start_brk = addr; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2067 |
break; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2068 |
case PR_SET_MM_BRK: |
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
2069 |
prctl_map.brk = addr; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2070 |
break; |
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
2071 2072 2073 2074 2075 2076 2077 2078 2079 2080 2081 2082 2083 2084 2085 |
case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START: prctl_map.arg_start = addr; break; case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END: prctl_map.arg_end = addr; break; case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START: prctl_map.env_start = addr; break; case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END: prctl_map.env_end = addr; break; default: goto out; } |
11bbd8b41 prctl_set_mm: ref... |
2086 |
error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map); |
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
2087 2088 |
if (error) goto out; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2089 |
|
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
2090 |
switch (opt) { |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
2091 2092 2093 2094 2095 2096 2097 2098 2099 2100 2101 2102 2103 2104 2105 2106 |
/* * If command line arguments and environment * are placed somewhere else on stack, we can * set them up here, ARG_START/END to setup * command line argumets and ENV_START/END * for environment. */ case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK: case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START: case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END: case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START: case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END: if (!vma) { error = -EFAULT; goto out; } |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2107 |
} |
4a00e9df2 prctl: more prctl... |
2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2115 2116 2117 2118 |
mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code; mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code; mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data; mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data; mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk; mm->brk = prctl_map.brk; mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack; mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start; mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end; mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start; mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2119 |
error = 0; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2120 |
out: |
bc81426f5 prctl_set_mm: dow... |
2121 |
spin_unlock(&mm->arg_lock); |
d8ed45c5d mmap locking API:... |
2122 |
mmap_read_unlock(mm); |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2123 2124 |
return error; } |
300f786b2 c/r: prctl: add a... |
2125 |
|
52b369415 kernel/sys.c: mak... |
2126 |
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE |
986b9eacb kernel/sys.c: fix... |
2127 |
static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user * __user *tid_addr) |
300f786b2 c/r: prctl: add a... |
2128 2129 2130 |
{ return put_user(me->clear_child_tid, tid_addr); } |
52b369415 kernel/sys.c: mak... |
2131 |
#else |
986b9eacb kernel/sys.c: fix... |
2132 |
static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user * __user *tid_addr) |
300f786b2 c/r: prctl: add a... |
2133 2134 2135 |
{ return -EINVAL; } |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
2136 |
#endif |
749860ce2 prctl: propagate ... |
2137 2138 2139 2140 2141 2142 2143 2144 2145 2146 2147 2148 2149 2150 2151 2152 2153 |
static int propagate_has_child_subreaper(struct task_struct *p, void *data) { /* * If task has has_child_subreaper - all its decendants * already have these flag too and new decendants will * inherit it on fork, skip them. * * If we've found child_reaper - skip descendants in * it's subtree as they will never get out pidns. */ if (p->signal->has_child_subreaper || is_child_reaper(task_pid(p))) return 0; p->signal->has_child_subreaper = 1; return 1; } |
7bbf1373e nospec: Allow get... |
2154 |
int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which) |
b617cfc85 prctl: Add specul... |
2155 2156 2157 |
{ return -EINVAL; } |
7bbf1373e nospec: Allow get... |
2158 2159 |
int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl) |
b617cfc85 prctl: Add specul... |
2160 2161 2162 |
{ return -EINVAL; } |
60500a422 ANDROID: mm: add ... |
2163 2164 2165 2166 2167 2168 2169 2170 2171 2172 2173 2174 2175 2176 2177 2178 2179 2180 2181 2182 2183 2184 2185 2186 2187 2188 2189 2190 2191 2192 2193 2194 2195 2196 2197 2198 2199 2200 2201 2202 2203 2204 2205 2206 2207 2208 2209 2210 2211 2212 2213 2214 2215 2216 2217 2218 2219 2220 2221 2222 2223 2224 2225 2226 2227 2228 2229 2230 2231 2232 2233 2234 2235 2236 2237 2238 2239 2240 2241 2242 2243 2244 2245 2246 2247 2248 2249 2250 2251 2252 2253 2254 2255 2256 2257 2258 2259 |
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU static int prctl_update_vma_anon_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **prev, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, const char __user *name_addr) { struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm; int error = 0; pgoff_t pgoff; if (name_addr == vma_get_anon_name(vma)) { *prev = vma; goto out; } pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff + ((start - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT); *prev = vma_merge(mm, *prev, start, end, vma->vm_flags, vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, pgoff, vma_policy(vma), vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx, name_addr); if (*prev) { vma = *prev; goto success; } *prev = vma; if (start != vma->vm_start) { error = split_vma(mm, vma, start, 1); if (error) goto out; } if (end != vma->vm_end) { error = split_vma(mm, vma, end, 0); if (error) goto out; } success: if (!vma->vm_file) vma->anon_name = name_addr; out: if (error == -ENOMEM) error = -EAGAIN; return error; } static int prctl_set_vma_anon_name(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long arg) { unsigned long tmp; struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev; int unmapped_error = 0; int error = -EINVAL; /* * If the interval [start,end) covers some unmapped address * ranges, just ignore them, but return -ENOMEM at the end. * - this matches the handling in madvise. */ vma = find_vma_prev(current->mm, start, &prev); if (vma && start > vma->vm_start) prev = vma; for (;;) { /* Still start < end. */ error = -ENOMEM; if (!vma) return error; /* Here start < (end|vma->vm_end). */ if (start < vma->vm_start) { unmapped_error = -ENOMEM; start = vma->vm_start; if (start >= end) return error; } /* Here vma->vm_start <= start < (end|vma->vm_end) */ tmp = vma->vm_end; if (end < tmp) tmp = end; /* Here vma->vm_start <= start < tmp <= (end|vma->vm_end). */ error = prctl_update_vma_anon_name(vma, &prev, start, tmp, (const char __user *)arg); if (error) return error; start = tmp; if (prev && start < prev->vm_end) start = prev->vm_end; error = unmapped_error; if (start >= end) return error; if (prev) vma = prev->vm_next; |
1da58ab55 ANDROID: fix up d... |
2260 |
else /* madvise_remove dropped mmap_lock */ |
60500a422 ANDROID: mm: add ... |
2261 2262 2263 2264 2265 2266 2267 2268 2269 2270 2271 2272 2273 2274 2275 2276 2277 2278 2279 2280 2281 2282 2283 2284 2285 2286 |
vma = find_vma(current->mm, start); } } static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long start, unsigned long len_in, unsigned long arg) { struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; int error; unsigned long len; unsigned long end; if (start & ~PAGE_MASK) return -EINVAL; len = (len_in + ~PAGE_MASK) & PAGE_MASK; /* Check to see whether len was rounded up from small -ve to zero */ if (len_in && !len) return -EINVAL; end = start + len; if (end < start) return -EINVAL; if (end == start) return 0; |
1da58ab55 ANDROID: fix up d... |
2287 |
mmap_write_lock(mm); |
60500a422 ANDROID: mm: add ... |
2288 2289 2290 2291 2292 2293 2294 2295 |
switch (opt) { case PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME: error = prctl_set_vma_anon_name(start, end, arg); break; default: error = -EINVAL; } |
1da58ab55 ANDROID: fix up d... |
2296 |
mmap_write_unlock(mm); |
60500a422 ANDROID: mm: add ... |
2297 2298 2299 2300 2301 2302 2303 2304 2305 2306 |
return error; } #else /* CONFIG_MMU */ static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long start, unsigned long len_in, unsigned long arg) { return -EINVAL; } #endif |
a37b0715d mm/writeback: rep... |
2307 |
#define PR_IO_FLUSHER (PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO | PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE) |
8d19f1c8e prctl: PR_{G,S}ET... |
2308 |
|
c4ea37c26 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
2309 2310 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2311 |
{ |
b6dff3ec5 CRED: Separate ta... |
2312 2313 2314 |
struct task_struct *me = current; unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)]; long error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2315 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
2316 2317 |
error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); if (error != -ENOSYS) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2318 |
return error; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
2319 |
error = 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2320 |
switch (option) { |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2321 2322 2323 |
case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG: if (!valid_signal(arg2)) { error = -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2324 |
break; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2325 2326 2327 2328 2329 2330 2331 2332 2333 2334 2335 2336 |
} me->pdeath_signal = arg2; break; case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG: error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2); break; case PR_GET_DUMPABLE: error = get_dumpable(me->mm); break; case PR_SET_DUMPABLE: if (arg2 != SUID_DUMP_DISABLE && arg2 != SUID_DUMP_USER) { error = -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2337 |
break; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2338 2339 2340 |
} set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2); break; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2341 |
|
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2342 2343 2344 2345 2346 2347 2348 2349 2350 2351 2352 2353 2354 2355 2356 2357 2358 2359 2360 2361 2362 2363 2364 2365 2366 2367 2368 2369 2370 2371 2372 2373 2374 2375 2376 2377 2378 2379 2380 2381 2382 2383 2384 2385 2386 2387 2388 2389 2390 2391 2392 2393 2394 2395 2396 2397 2398 2399 2400 2401 2402 2403 2404 |
case PR_SET_UNALIGN: error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_UNALIGN: error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_FPEMU: error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_FPEMU: error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_FPEXC: error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_FPEXC: error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_TIMING: error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL; break; case PR_SET_TIMING: if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL) error = -EINVAL; break; case PR_SET_NAME: comm[sizeof(me->comm) - 1] = 0; if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2, sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0) return -EFAULT; set_task_comm(me, comm); proc_comm_connector(me); break; case PR_GET_NAME: get_task_comm(comm, me); if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, sizeof(comm))) return -EFAULT; break; case PR_GET_ENDIAN: error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_ENDIAN: error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_SECCOMP: error = prctl_get_seccomp(); break; case PR_SET_SECCOMP: error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3); break; case PR_GET_TSC: error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2); break; case PR_SET_TSC: error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2); break; case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE: error = perf_event_task_disable(); break; case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE: error = perf_event_task_enable(); break; case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK: |
da8b44d5a timer: convert ti... |
2405 2406 2407 2408 |
if (current->timer_slack_ns > ULONG_MAX) error = ULONG_MAX; else error = current->timer_slack_ns; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2409 2410 2411 2412 |
break; case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK: if (arg2 <= 0) current->timer_slack_ns = |
6976675d9 hrtimer: create a... |
2413 |
current->default_timer_slack_ns; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2414 2415 2416 2417 2418 2419 2420 2421 2422 |
else current->timer_slack_ns = arg2; break; case PR_MCE_KILL: if (arg4 | arg5) return -EINVAL; switch (arg2) { case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR: if (arg3 != 0) |
4db96cf07 HWPOISON: Add PR_... |
2423 |
return -EINVAL; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2424 |
current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS; |
4db96cf07 HWPOISON: Add PR_... |
2425 |
break; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2426 2427 2428 2429 2430 2431 2432 2433 2434 |
case PR_MCE_KILL_SET: current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS; if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY) current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY; else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE) current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY; else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT) current->flags &= ~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS); |
1087e9b4f HWPOISON: Clean u... |
2435 |
else |
259e5e6c7 Add PR_{GET,SET}_... |
2436 |
return -EINVAL; |
259e5e6c7 Add PR_{GET,SET}_... |
2437 |
break; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2438 |
default: |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2439 2440 2441 2442 2443 2444 2445 2446 2447 2448 2449 2450 2451 2452 2453 2454 |
return -EINVAL; } break; case PR_MCE_KILL_GET: if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5) return -EINVAL; if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS) error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ? PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE; else error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT; break; case PR_SET_MM: error = prctl_set_mm(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); break; case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS: |
986b9eacb kernel/sys.c: fix... |
2455 |
error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user * __user *)arg2); |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2456 2457 2458 |
break; case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2; |
749860ce2 prctl: propagate ... |
2459 2460 2461 2462 |
if (!arg2) break; walk_process_tree(me, propagate_has_child_subreaper, NULL); |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2463 2464 2465 2466 2467 2468 2469 2470 |
break; case PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: error = put_user(me->signal->is_child_subreaper, (int __user *)arg2); break; case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |
1d4457f99 sched: move no_ne... |
2471 |
task_set_no_new_privs(current); |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2472 2473 2474 2475 |
break; case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |
1d4457f99 sched: move no_ne... |
2476 |
return task_no_new_privs(current) ? 1 : 0; |
a0715cc22 mm, thp: add VM_I... |
2477 2478 2479 |
case PR_GET_THP_DISABLE: if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |
186003323 mm: make PR_SET_T... |
2480 |
error = !!test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags); |
a0715cc22 mm, thp: add VM_I... |
2481 2482 2483 2484 |
break; case PR_SET_THP_DISABLE: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |
d8ed45c5d mmap locking API:... |
2485 |
if (mmap_write_lock_killable(me->mm)) |
17b0573d7 prctl: make PR_SE... |
2486 |
return -EINTR; |
a0715cc22 mm, thp: add VM_I... |
2487 |
if (arg2) |
186003323 mm: make PR_SET_T... |
2488 |
set_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags); |
a0715cc22 mm, thp: add VM_I... |
2489 |
else |
186003323 mm: make PR_SET_T... |
2490 |
clear_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags); |
d8ed45c5d mmap locking API:... |
2491 |
mmap_write_unlock(me->mm); |
a0715cc22 mm, thp: add VM_I... |
2492 |
break; |
fe3d197f8 x86, mpx: On-dema... |
2493 |
case PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT: |
fe3d197f8 x86, mpx: On-dema... |
2494 |
case PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT: |
f240652b6 x86/mpx: Remove M... |
2495 2496 |
/* No longer implemented: */ return -EINVAL; |
9791554b4 MIPS,prctl: add P... |
2497 2498 2499 2500 2501 2502 |
case PR_SET_FP_MODE: error = SET_FP_MODE(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_FP_MODE: error = GET_FP_MODE(me); break; |
2d2123bc7 arm64/sve: Add pr... |
2503 2504 2505 2506 2507 2508 |
case PR_SVE_SET_VL: error = SVE_SET_VL(arg2); break; case PR_SVE_GET_VL: error = SVE_GET_VL(); break; |
b617cfc85 prctl: Add specul... |
2509 2510 2511 |
case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |
7bbf1373e nospec: Allow get... |
2512 |
error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(me, arg2); |
b617cfc85 prctl: Add specul... |
2513 2514 2515 2516 |
break; case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL: if (arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |
7bbf1373e nospec: Allow get... |
2517 |
error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(me, arg2, arg3); |
b617cfc85 prctl: Add specul... |
2518 |
break; |
60500a422 ANDROID: mm: add ... |
2519 2520 2521 |
case PR_SET_VMA: error = prctl_set_vma(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); break; |
ba8308856 arm64: add prctl ... |
2522 2523 2524 2525 2526 |
case PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; error = PAC_RESET_KEYS(me, arg2); break; |
63f0c6037 arm64: Introduce ... |
2527 |
case PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: |
3e91ec89f arm64: Tighten th... |
2528 2529 |
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |
63f0c6037 arm64: Introduce ... |
2530 2531 2532 |
error = SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(arg2); break; case PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: |
3e91ec89f arm64: Tighten th... |
2533 2534 |
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |
63f0c6037 arm64: Introduce ... |
2535 2536 |
error = GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(); break; |
8d19f1c8e prctl: PR_{G,S}ET... |
2537 2538 2539 2540 2541 2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558 2559 |
case PR_SET_IO_FLUSHER: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) return -EPERM; if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; if (arg2 == 1) current->flags |= PR_IO_FLUSHER; else if (!arg2) current->flags &= ~PR_IO_FLUSHER; else return -EINVAL; break; case PR_GET_IO_FLUSHER: if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) return -EPERM; if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; error = (current->flags & PR_IO_FLUSHER) == PR_IO_FLUSHER; break; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2560 2561 2562 |
default: error = -EINVAL; break; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2563 2564 2565 |
} return error; } |
3cfc348bf [PATCH] x86: Add ... |
2566 |
|
836f92adf [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
2567 2568 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep, struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused) |
3cfc348bf [PATCH] x86: Add ... |
2569 2570 2571 |
{ int err = 0; int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
2572 |
|
3cfc348bf [PATCH] x86: Add ... |
2573 2574 2575 2576 |
if (cpup) err |= put_user(cpu, cpup); if (nodep) err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep); |
3cfc348bf [PATCH] x86: Add ... |
2577 2578 |
return err ? -EFAULT : 0; } |
10a0a8d4e Add common orderl... |
2579 |
|
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
2580 2581 2582 2583 2584 2585 2586 2587 |
/** * do_sysinfo - fill in sysinfo struct * @info: pointer to buffer to fill */ static int do_sysinfo(struct sysinfo *info) { unsigned long mem_total, sav_total; unsigned int mem_unit, bitcount; |
dc1b7b6ca sysinfo: Remove g... |
2588 |
struct timespec64 tp; |
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
2589 2590 |
memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct sysinfo)); |
dc1b7b6ca sysinfo: Remove g... |
2591 |
ktime_get_boottime_ts64(&tp); |
ecc421e05 sys/sysinfo: Resp... |
2592 |
timens_add_boottime(&tp); |
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
2593 2594 2595 2596 2597 2598 2599 2600 2601 2602 2603 2604 2605 2606 2607 2608 2609 2610 2611 2612 2613 2614 2615 2616 2617 2618 2619 2620 2621 2622 2623 2624 2625 2626 2627 2628 2629 2630 2631 2632 2633 2634 2635 2636 2637 2638 2639 2640 2641 2642 2643 2644 2645 2646 2647 2648 2649 2650 2651 2652 2653 2654 2655 2656 2657 2658 2659 2660 2661 2662 2663 2664 2665 2666 2667 2668 2669 2670 2671 2672 2673 2674 2675 2676 2677 2678 |
info->uptime = tp.tv_sec + (tp.tv_nsec ? 1 : 0); get_avenrun(info->loads, 0, SI_LOAD_SHIFT - FSHIFT); info->procs = nr_threads; si_meminfo(info); si_swapinfo(info); /* * If the sum of all the available memory (i.e. ram + swap) * is less than can be stored in a 32 bit unsigned long then * we can be binary compatible with 2.2.x kernels. If not, * well, in that case 2.2.x was broken anyways... * * -Erik Andersen <andersee@debian.org> */ mem_total = info->totalram + info->totalswap; if (mem_total < info->totalram || mem_total < info->totalswap) goto out; bitcount = 0; mem_unit = info->mem_unit; while (mem_unit > 1) { bitcount++; mem_unit >>= 1; sav_total = mem_total; mem_total <<= 1; if (mem_total < sav_total) goto out; } /* * If mem_total did not overflow, multiply all memory values by * info->mem_unit and set it to 1. This leaves things compatible * with 2.2.x, and also retains compatibility with earlier 2.4.x * kernels... */ info->mem_unit = 1; info->totalram <<= bitcount; info->freeram <<= bitcount; info->sharedram <<= bitcount; info->bufferram <<= bitcount; info->totalswap <<= bitcount; info->freeswap <<= bitcount; info->totalhigh <<= bitcount; info->freehigh <<= bitcount; out: return 0; } SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct sysinfo __user *, info) { struct sysinfo val; do_sysinfo(&val); if (copy_to_user(info, &val, sizeof(struct sysinfo))) return -EFAULT; return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT struct compat_sysinfo { s32 uptime; u32 loads[3]; u32 totalram; u32 freeram; u32 sharedram; u32 bufferram; u32 totalswap; u32 freeswap; u16 procs; u16 pad; u32 totalhigh; u32 freehigh; u32 mem_unit; char _f[20-2*sizeof(u32)-sizeof(int)]; }; COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info) { struct sysinfo s; |
ce5155c4f compat sysinfo(2)... |
2679 |
struct compat_sysinfo s_32; |
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
2680 2681 2682 2683 2684 2685 |
do_sysinfo(&s); /* Check to see if any memory value is too large for 32-bit and scale * down if needed */ |
0baae41ea kernel/sys.c: com... |
2686 |
if (upper_32_bits(s.totalram) || upper_32_bits(s.totalswap)) { |
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
2687 2688 2689 2690 2691 2692 2693 2694 2695 2696 2697 2698 2699 2700 2701 2702 |
int bitcount = 0; while (s.mem_unit < PAGE_SIZE) { s.mem_unit <<= 1; bitcount++; } s.totalram >>= bitcount; s.freeram >>= bitcount; s.sharedram >>= bitcount; s.bufferram >>= bitcount; s.totalswap >>= bitcount; s.freeswap >>= bitcount; s.totalhigh >>= bitcount; s.freehigh >>= bitcount; } |
ce5155c4f compat sysinfo(2)... |
2703 2704 2705 2706 2707 2708 2709 2710 2711 2712 2713 2714 2715 2716 2717 2718 |
memset(&s_32, 0, sizeof(s_32)); s_32.uptime = s.uptime; s_32.loads[0] = s.loads[0]; s_32.loads[1] = s.loads[1]; s_32.loads[2] = s.loads[2]; s_32.totalram = s.totalram; s_32.freeram = s.freeram; s_32.sharedram = s.sharedram; s_32.bufferram = s.bufferram; s_32.totalswap = s.totalswap; s_32.freeswap = s.freeswap; s_32.procs = s.procs; s_32.totalhigh = s.totalhigh; s_32.freehigh = s.freehigh; s_32.mem_unit = s.mem_unit; if (copy_to_user(info, &s_32, sizeof(s_32))) |
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
2719 |
return -EFAULT; |
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
2720 2721 2722 |
return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ |