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kernel/cred.c
23.3 KB
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later |
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/* Task credentials management - see Documentation/security/credentials.rst |
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* * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) |
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*/ |
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#include <linux/export.h> |
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#include <linux/cred.h> |
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#include <linux/slab.h> |
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#include <linux/sched.h> |
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#include <linux/sched/coredump.h> |
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#include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/keyctl.h> #include <linux/init_task.h> #include <linux/security.h> |
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#include <linux/binfmts.h> |
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#include <linux/cn_proc.h> |
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#include <linux/uidgid.h> |
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#if 0 |
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#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \ printk("[%-5.5s%5u] " FMT " ", \ current->comm, current->pid, ##__VA_ARGS__) |
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#else |
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#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \ do { \ if (0) \ no_printk("[%-5.5s%5u] " FMT " ", \ current->comm, current->pid, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ } while (0) |
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#endif |
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static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar; |
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/* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */ struct group_info init_groups = { .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2) }; |
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/* * The initial credentials for the initial task */ struct cred init_cred = { |
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.usage = ATOMIC_INIT(4), |
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#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS .subscribers = ATOMIC_INIT(2), .magic = CRED_MAGIC, #endif |
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.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, .suid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .sgid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, .euid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .egid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, .fsuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fsgid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, |
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.securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT, |
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.cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET, |
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.cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET, |
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.cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET, .cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET, |
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.user = INIT_USER, |
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.user_ns = &init_user_ns, |
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.group_info = &init_groups, }; |
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static inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n) { #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS atomic_set(&cred->subscribers, n); #endif } static inline int read_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *cred) { #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS return atomic_read(&cred->subscribers); #else return 0; #endif } static inline void alter_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *_cred, int n) { #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred; atomic_add(n, &cred->subscribers); #endif } |
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/* * The RCU callback to actually dispose of a set of credentials */ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) { struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu); |
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kdebug("put_cred_rcu(%p)", cred); #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC_DEAD || atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0 || read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0) panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with" " mag %x, put %p, usage %d, subscr %d ", cred, cred->magic, cred->put_addr, atomic_read(&cred->usage), read_cred_subscribers(cred)); #else |
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if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0) panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d ", cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage)); |
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#endif |
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security_cred_free(cred); |
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key_put(cred->session_keyring); key_put(cred->process_keyring); |
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key_put(cred->thread_keyring); key_put(cred->request_key_auth); |
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if (cred->group_info) put_group_info(cred->group_info); |
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free_uid(cred->user); |
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put_user_ns(cred->user_ns); |
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kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred); |
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} /** * __put_cred - Destroy a set of credentials |
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* @cred: The record to release |
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* * Destroy a set of credentials on which no references remain. */ void __put_cred(struct cred *cred) { |
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kdebug("__put_cred(%p{%d,%d})", cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage), read_cred_subscribers(cred)); |
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BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0); |
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#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0); cred->magic = CRED_MAGIC_DEAD; cred->put_addr = __builtin_return_address(0); #endif BUG_ON(cred == current->cred); BUG_ON(cred == current->real_cred); |
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if (cred->non_rcu) put_cred_rcu(&cred->rcu); else call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu); |
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} EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred); |
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/* * Clean up a task's credentials when it exits */ void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct cred *cred; kdebug("exit_creds(%u,%p,%p,{%d,%d})", tsk->pid, tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred, atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage), read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred)); cred = (struct cred *) tsk->real_cred; tsk->real_cred = NULL; validate_creds(cred); alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1); put_cred(cred); cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred; tsk->cred = NULL; validate_creds(cred); alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1); put_cred(cred); |
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#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE |
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key_put(tsk->cached_requested_key); tsk->cached_requested_key = NULL; |
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#endif |
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} |
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/** * get_task_cred - Get another task's objective credentials * @task: The task to query * * Get the objective credentials of a task, pinning them so that they can't go * away. Accessing a task's credentials directly is not permitted. * * The caller must also make sure task doesn't get deleted, either by holding a * ref on task or by holding tasklist_lock to prevent it from being unlinked. */ const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *task) { const struct cred *cred; rcu_read_lock(); do { cred = __task_cred((task)); BUG_ON(!cred); |
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} while (!get_cred_rcu(cred)); |
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rcu_read_unlock(); return cred; } |
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_task_cred); |
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/* * Allocate blank credentials, such that the credentials can be filled in at a * later date without risk of ENOMEM. */ struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void) { struct cred *new; new = kmem_cache_zalloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL); if (!new) return NULL; |
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atomic_set(&new->usage, 1); |
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#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS new->magic = CRED_MAGIC; #endif |
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if (security_cred_alloc_blank(new, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0) |
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goto error; |
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return new; error: abort_creds(new); return NULL; |
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} |
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/** * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification * * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification. A task's creds * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by * calling commit_creds(). * |
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* Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification. * |
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* Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise. * * Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up. */ struct cred *prepare_creds(void) { struct task_struct *task = current; const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
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validate_process_creds(); |
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new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL); if (!new) return NULL; |
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kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new); |
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old = task->cred; memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred)); |
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new->non_rcu = 0; |
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atomic_set(&new->usage, 1); |
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set_cred_subscribers(new, 0); |
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get_group_info(new->group_info); get_uid(new->user); |
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get_user_ns(new->user_ns); |
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#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS |
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key_get(new->session_keyring); key_get(new->process_keyring); |
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key_get(new->thread_keyring); key_get(new->request_key_auth); |
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#endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY new->security = NULL; #endif |
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if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0) |
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goto error; |
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validate_creds(new); |
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return new; error: abort_creds(new); return NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds); /* |
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* Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve() |
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* - The caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex |
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*/ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void) { |
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struct cred *new; |
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new = prepare_creds(); |
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if (!new) |
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return new; |
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#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS /* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */ key_put(new->thread_keyring); new->thread_keyring = NULL; |
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/* inherit the session keyring; new process keyring */ |
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key_put(new->process_keyring); new->process_keyring = NULL; |
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#endif |
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new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid; new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid; |
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return new; } /* |
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* Copy credentials for the new process created by fork() |
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* * We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new * set. |
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* * The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its * objective and subjective credentials |
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*/ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags) { |
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struct cred *new; |
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int ret; |
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#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE p->cached_requested_key = NULL; #endif |
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if ( #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS !p->cred->thread_keyring && #endif clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD ) { |
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p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred); |
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get_cred(p->cred); |
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alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2); kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})", p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage), read_cred_subscribers(p->cred)); |
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atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes); return 0; } new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) |
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return -ENOMEM; |
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if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) { ret = create_user_ns(new); if (ret < 0) goto error_put; } |
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#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS |
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/* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already * had one */ if (new->thread_keyring) { key_put(new->thread_keyring); new->thread_keyring = NULL; if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new); } |
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/* The process keyring is only shared between the threads in a process; * anything outside of those threads doesn't inherit. */ |
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if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) { |
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key_put(new->process_keyring); new->process_keyring = NULL; |
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} #endif |
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atomic_inc(&new->user->processes); |
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p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new); |
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alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2); validate_creds(new); |
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return 0; |
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error_put: put_cred(new); return ret; |
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} |
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static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set, const struct cred *subset) { const struct user_namespace *set_ns = set->user_ns; const struct user_namespace *subset_ns = subset->user_ns; /* If the two credentials are in the same user namespace see if * the capabilities of subset are a subset of set. */ if (set_ns == subset_ns) return cap_issubset(subset->cap_permitted, set->cap_permitted); /* The credentials are in a different user namespaces * therefore one is a subset of the other only if a set is an * ancestor of subset and set->euid is owner of subset or one * of subsets ancestors. */ for (;subset_ns != &init_user_ns; subset_ns = subset_ns->parent) { if ((set_ns == subset_ns->parent) && uid_eq(subset_ns->owner, set->euid)) return true; } return false; } |
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/** * commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task * @new: The credentials to be assigned * * Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace |
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* the old set. Both the objective and the subjective credentials pointers are * updated. This function may not be called if the subjective credentials are * in an overridden state. |
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* * This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials. * * Always returns 0 thus allowing this function to be tail-called at the end * of, say, sys_setgid(). */ int commit_creds(struct cred *new) { struct task_struct *task = current; |
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const struct cred *old = task->real_cred; |
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kdebug("commit_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new, atomic_read(&new->usage), read_cred_subscribers(new)); BUG_ON(task->cred != old); #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(old) < 2); validate_creds(old); validate_creds(new); #endif |
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BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1); |
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get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */ |
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/* dumpability changes */ |
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if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) || !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) || !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) || !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) || |
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!cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) { |
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if (task->mm) set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable); |
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task->pdeath_signal = 0; |
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/* * If a task drops privileges and becomes nondumpable, * the dumpability change must become visible before * the credential change; otherwise, a __ptrace_may_access() * racing with this change may be able to attach to a task it * shouldn't be able to attach to (as if the task had dropped * privileges without becoming nondumpable). * Pairs with a read barrier in __ptrace_may_access(). */ |
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smp_wmb(); |
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} |
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/* alter the thread keyring */ |
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if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid)) |
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key_fsuid_changed(new); |
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if (!gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid)) |
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key_fsgid_changed(new); |
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/* do it |
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* RLIMIT_NPROC limits on user->processes have already been checked * in set_user(). |
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*/ |
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alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2); |
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if (new->user != old->user) atomic_inc(&new->user->processes); |
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rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new); |
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rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new); if (new->user != old->user) atomic_dec(&old->user->processes); |
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alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2); |
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/* send notifications */ |
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if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid) || !uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) || !uid_eq(new->suid, old->suid) || !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid)) |
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proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_UID); |
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if (!gid_eq(new->gid, old->gid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->egid) || !gid_eq(new->sgid, old->sgid) || !gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid)) |
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proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID); |
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/* release the old obj and subj refs both */ put_cred(old); |
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put_cred(old); |
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return 0; } |
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds); /** * abort_creds - Discard a set of credentials and unlock the current task * @new: The credentials that were going to be applied * * Discard a set of credentials that were under construction and unlock the * current task. */ void abort_creds(struct cred *new) { |
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kdebug("abort_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new, atomic_read(&new->usage), read_cred_subscribers(new)); #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(new) != 0); #endif |
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BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1); put_cred(new); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds); /** |
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* override_creds - Override the current process's subjective credentials |
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* @new: The credentials to be assigned * |
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* Install a set of temporary override subjective credentials on the current * process, returning the old set for later reversion. |
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*/ const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new) { const struct cred *old = current->cred; |
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kdebug("override_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new, atomic_read(&new->usage), read_cred_subscribers(new)); validate_creds(old); validate_creds(new); |
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/* * NOTE! This uses 'get_new_cred()' rather than 'get_cred()'. * * That means that we do not clear the 'non_rcu' flag, since * we are only installing the cred into the thread-synchronous * '->cred' pointer, not the '->real_cred' pointer that is * visible to other threads under RCU. * * Also note that we did validate_creds() manually, not depending * on the validation in 'get_cred()'. */ get_new_cred((struct cred *)new); |
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alter_cred_subscribers(new, 1); rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new); alter_cred_subscribers(old, -1); kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%d,%d}", old, atomic_read(&old->usage), read_cred_subscribers(old)); |
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return old; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds); /** |
3b11a1dec
|
554 |
* revert_creds - Revert a temporary subjective credentials override |
d84f4f992
|
555 556 |
* @old: The credentials to be restored * |
3b11a1dec
|
557 558 |
* Revert a temporary set of override subjective credentials to an old set, * discarding the override set. |
d84f4f992
|
559 560 561 562 |
*/ void revert_creds(const struct cred *old) { const struct cred *override = current->cred; |
e0e817392
|
563 564 565 566 567 568 569 |
kdebug("revert_creds(%p{%d,%d})", old, atomic_read(&old->usage), read_cred_subscribers(old)); validate_creds(old); validate_creds(override); alter_cred_subscribers(old, 1); |
d84f4f992
|
570 |
rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old); |
e0e817392
|
571 |
alter_cred_subscribers(override, -1); |
d84f4f992
|
572 573 574 |
put_cred(override); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds); |
d89b22d46
|
575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 |
/** * cred_fscmp - Compare two credentials with respect to filesystem access. * @a: The first credential * @b: The second credential * * cred_cmp() will return zero if both credentials have the same * fsuid, fsgid, and supplementary groups. That is, if they will both * provide the same access to files based on mode/uid/gid. * If the credentials are different, then either -1 or 1 will * be returned depending on whether @a comes before or after @b * respectively in an arbitrary, but stable, ordering of credentials. * * Return: -1, 0, or 1 depending on comparison */ int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *a, const struct cred *b) { struct group_info *ga, *gb; int g; if (a == b) return 0; if (uid_lt(a->fsuid, b->fsuid)) return -1; if (uid_gt(a->fsuid, b->fsuid)) return 1; if (gid_lt(a->fsgid, b->fsgid)) return -1; if (gid_gt(a->fsgid, b->fsgid)) return 1; ga = a->group_info; gb = b->group_info; if (ga == gb) return 0; if (ga == NULL) return -1; if (gb == NULL) return 1; if (ga->ngroups < gb->ngroups) return -1; if (ga->ngroups > gb->ngroups) return 1; for (g = 0; g < ga->ngroups; g++) { if (gid_lt(ga->gid[g], gb->gid[g])) return -1; if (gid_gt(ga->gid[g], gb->gid[g])) return 1; } return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(cred_fscmp); |
d84f4f992
|
628 629 630 631 632 633 |
/* * initialise the credentials stuff */ void __init cred_init(void) { /* allocate a slab in which we can store credentials */ |
5d097056c
|
634 635 |
cred_jar = kmem_cache_create("cred_jar", sizeof(struct cred), 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL); |
d84f4f992
|
636 |
} |
3a3b7ce93
|
637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 |
/** * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference * * Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service. This can then be used to * override a task's own credentials so that work can be done on behalf of that * task that requires a different subjective context. * * @daemon is used to provide a base for the security record, but can be NULL. * If @daemon is supplied, then the security data will be derived from that; * otherwise they'll be set to 0 and no groups, full capabilities and no keys. * * The caller may change these controls afterwards if desired. * * Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory. |
3a3b7ce93
|
653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 |
*/ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon) { const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL); if (!new) return NULL; |
e0e817392
|
662 |
kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new); |
3a3b7ce93
|
663 664 665 666 |
if (daemon) old = get_task_cred(daemon); else old = get_cred(&init_cred); |
e0e817392
|
667 |
validate_creds(old); |
43529c971
|
668 |
*new = *old; |
d7852fbd0
|
669 |
new->non_rcu = 0; |
fb2b2a1d3
|
670 671 |
atomic_set(&new->usage, 1); set_cred_subscribers(new, 0); |
3a3b7ce93
|
672 |
get_uid(new->user); |
0093ccb68
|
673 |
get_user_ns(new->user_ns); |
3a3b7ce93
|
674 675 676 |
get_group_info(new->group_info); #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS |
3a50597de
|
677 678 |
new->session_keyring = NULL; new->process_keyring = NULL; |
3a3b7ce93
|
679 |
new->thread_keyring = NULL; |
3a50597de
|
680 |
new->request_key_auth = NULL; |
3a3b7ce93
|
681 682 683 684 685 686 |
new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY new->security = NULL; #endif |
84029fd04
|
687 |
if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0) |
3a3b7ce93
|
688 |
goto error; |
3a3b7ce93
|
689 |
put_cred(old); |
e0e817392
|
690 |
validate_creds(new); |
3a3b7ce93
|
691 692 693 694 |
return new; error: put_cred(new); |
0de336814
|
695 |
put_cred(old); |
3a3b7ce93
|
696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 |
return NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred); /** * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials * @new: The credentials to alter * @secid: The LSM security ID to set * * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. */ int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override); /** * set_security_override_from_ctx - Set the security ID in a set of credentials * @new: The credentials to alter * @secctx: The LSM security context to generate the security ID from. * * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. The * security ID is specified in string form as a security context to be * interpreted by the LSM. */ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx) { u32 secid; int ret; ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid); if (ret < 0) return ret; return set_security_override(new, secid); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx); /** * set_create_files_as - Set the LSM file create context in a set of credentials * @new: The credentials to alter * @inode: The inode to take the context from * * Change the LSM file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same * as the object context of the specified inode, so that the new inodes have * the same MAC context as that inode. */ int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) { |
5f65e5ca2
|
748 749 |
if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid)) return -EINVAL; |
3a3b7ce93
|
750 751 752 753 754 |
new->fsuid = inode->i_uid; new->fsgid = inode->i_gid; return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as); |
e0e817392
|
755 756 |
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS |
74908a000
|
757 758 759 760 |
bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred) { if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC) return true; |
74908a000
|
761 762 |
return false; } |
764db03fe
|
763 |
EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid); |
74908a000
|
764 |
|
e0e817392
|
765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 |
/* * dump invalid credentials */ static void dump_invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *label, const struct task_struct *tsk) { printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: %s credentials: %p %s%s%s ", label, cred, cred == &init_cred ? "[init]" : "", cred == tsk->real_cred ? "[real]" : "", cred == tsk->cred ? "[eff]" : ""); printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->magic=%x, put_addr=%p ", cred->magic, cred->put_addr); printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->usage=%d, subscr=%d ", atomic_read(&cred->usage), read_cred_subscribers(cred)); printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*uid = { %d,%d,%d,%d } ", |
c9235f487
|
786 787 788 789 |
from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->uid), from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->euid), from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->suid), from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid)); |
e0e817392
|
790 791 |
printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*gid = { %d,%d,%d,%d } ", |
c9235f487
|
792 793 794 795 |
from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->gid), from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->egid), from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid), from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid)); |
e0e817392
|
796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 |
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security is %p ", cred->security); if ((unsigned long) cred->security >= PAGE_SIZE && (((unsigned long) cred->security & 0xffffff00) != (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))) printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security {%x, %x} ", ((u32*)cred->security)[0], ((u32*)cred->security)[1]); #endif } /* * report use of invalid credentials */ void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *file, unsigned line) { printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid credentials "); printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u ", file, line); dump_invalid_creds(cred, "Specified", current); BUG(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__invalid_creds); /* * check the credentials on a process */ void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *tsk, const char *file, unsigned line) { if (tsk->cred == tsk->real_cred) { if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 2 || creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred))) goto invalid_creds; } else { if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->real_cred) < 1 || read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 1 || creds_are_invalid(tsk->real_cred) || creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred))) goto invalid_creds; } return; invalid_creds: printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid process credentials "); printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u ", file, line); dump_invalid_creds(tsk->real_cred, "Real", tsk); if (tsk->cred != tsk->real_cred) dump_invalid_creds(tsk->cred, "Effective", tsk); else printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Effective creds == Real creds "); BUG(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__validate_process_creds); /* * check creds for do_exit() */ void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk) { kdebug("validate_creds_for_do_exit(%p,%p{%d,%d})", tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred, atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage), read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred)); __validate_process_creds(tsk, __FILE__, __LINE__); } #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS */ |