#
  # Security configuration
  #
  
  menu "Security options"

  source security/keys/Kconfig

  config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
  	bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
  	default n
  	help
  	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
  	  syslog via dmesg(8).
  
  	  If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
  	  unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
  
  	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

  config SECURITY
  	bool "Enable different security models"

  	depends on SYSFS

  	depends on MULTIUSER

  	help
  	  This allows you to choose different security modules to be
  	  configured into your kernel.
  
  	  If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
  	  model will be used.
  
  	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

  config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
  	depends on SECURITY
  	bool
  	default n

  config SECURITYFS
  	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
  	help
  	  This will build the securityfs filesystem.  It is currently used by

  	  the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider.  It is
  	  not used by SELinux or SMACK.

  
  	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

  config SECURITY_NETWORK
  	bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
  	depends on SECURITY
  	help
  	  This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
  	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
  	  implement socket and networking access controls.
  	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

  config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
  	bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
  	depends on X86_64 && !UML
  	default y
  	help
  	  This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
  	  ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
  	  into userspace.

  	  See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details.

  config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
  	bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
  	depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
  	help
  	  This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
  	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
  	  implement Infiniband access controls.
  	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

  config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
  	bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
  	depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
  	help
  	  This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
  	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
  	  implement per-packet access controls based on labels
  	  derived from IPSec policy.  Non-IPSec communications are
  	  designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
  	  to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
  	  IPSec.
  	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

  config SECURITY_PATH
  	bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
  	depends on SECURITY
  	help
  	  This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
  	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
  	  implement pathname based access controls.
  	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

  config INTEL_TXT
  	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"

  	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT

  	help
  	  This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
  	  Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
  	  Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
  	  of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
  	  will have no effect.

  	  Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and

  	  initial state as well as data reset protection.  This is used to
  	  create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
  	  helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
  	  correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
  	  of the kernel itself.
  
  	  Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
  	  confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that

  	  it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for

  	  providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
  
  	  See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
  	  about Intel(R) TXT.
  	  See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
  	  See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
  	  Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
  
  	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.

  config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR

  	int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"

  	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX

  	default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)

  	default 65536

  	help
  	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
  	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
  	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
  
  	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
  	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
  	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
  	  Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
  	  this low address space will need the permission specific to the
  	  systems running LSM.

  config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
  	bool
  	help
  	  The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
  	  validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
  	  support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.

  config HARDENED_USERCOPY
  	bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"

  	depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR

  	select BUG

  	imply STRICT_DEVMEM

  	help
  	  This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
  	  copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
  	  copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
  	  are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple

  	  separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,

  	  or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
  	  of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.

  config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
  	bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages"
  	depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY

  	depends on EXPERT

  	help
  	  When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP,
  	  hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are,
  	  however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all
  	  been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
  	  trying to find such users.

  config FORTIFY_SOURCE
  	bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
  	depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
  	help
  	  Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
  	  where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.

  config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
  	bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
  	help
  	  By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
  	  binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
  	  interface.  Some of these binaries are statically defined
  	  either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
  	  option.  However, some of these are dynamically created at
  	  runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
  	  To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
  	  calls through a single executable that can not have its name
  	  changed.
  
  	  Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
  	  "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
  	  passed to it.  If desired, this program can filter and pick
  	  and choose what real programs are called.
  
  	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
  	  disabled, choose this option and then set
  	  STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
  
  config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
  	string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
  	depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
  	default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
  	help
  	  The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
  	  program is wish to be run.  The "real" application's name will
  	  be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
  	  line.
  
  	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
  	  specify an empty string here (i.e. "").

  source security/selinux/Kconfig

  source security/smack/Kconfig

  source security/tomoyo/Kconfig

  source security/apparmor/Kconfig

  source security/loadpin/Kconfig

  source security/yama/Kconfig

  source security/integrity/Kconfig

  choice
  	prompt "Default security module"
  	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
  	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
  	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO

  	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR

  	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
  
  	help
  	  Select the security module that will be used by default if the
  	  kernel parameter security= is not specified.
  
  	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
  		bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
  
  	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
  		bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
  
  	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
  		bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y

  	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
  		bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y

  	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
  		bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
  
  endchoice
  
  config DEFAULT_SECURITY
  	string
  	default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
  	default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
  	default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO

  	default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR

  	default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC

  endmenu