09 Sep, 2015
1 commit
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Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:- PKCS#7 support added to support signed kexec, also utilized for
module signing. See comments in 3f1e1bea.** NOTE: this requires linking against the OpenSSL library, which
must be installed, e.g. the openssl-devel on Fedora **- Smack
- add IPv6 host labeling; ignore labels on kernel threads
- support smack labeling mounts which use binary mount data- SELinux:
- add ioctl whitelisting (see
http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/vanderstoep.pdf)
- fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change- Seccomp:
- add ptrace options for suspend/resume"* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (57 commits)
PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them
Documentation/Changes: Now need OpenSSL devel packages for module signing
scripts: add extract-cert and sign-file to .gitignore
modsign: Handle signing key in source tree
modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key
Move certificate handling to its own directory
sign-file: Fix warning about BIO_reset() return value
PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test module
Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured
sign-file: Document dependency on OpenSSL devel libraries
PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type
KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7
PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder
modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file
sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7
PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652]
X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer
PKCS#7: Check content type and versions
MAINTAINERS: The keyrings mailing list has moved
...
02 Sep, 2015
1 commit
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Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"This finishes up the changes to ensure proc and sysfs do not start
implementing executable files, as the there are application today that
are only secure because such files do not exist.It akso fixes a long standing misfeature of /proc//mountinfo that
did not show the proper source for files bind mounted from
/proc//ns/*.It also straightens out the handling of clone flags related to user
namespaces, fixing an unnecessary failure of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)
when files such as /proc//environ are read while is calling
unshare. This winds up fixing a minor bug in unshare flag handling
that dates back to the first version of unshare in the kernel.Finally, this fixes a minor regression caused by the introduction of
sysfs_create_mount_point, which broke someone's in house application,
by restoring the size of /sys/fs/cgroup to 0 bytes. Apparently that
application uses the directory size to determine if a tmpfs is mounted
on /sys/fs/cgroup.The bind mount escape fixes are present in Al Viros for-next branch.
and I expect them to come from there. The bind mount escape is the
last of the user namespace related security bugs that I am aware of"* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0.
userns,pidns: Force thread group sharing, not signal handler sharing.
unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm
nsfs: Add a show_path method to fix mountinfo
mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid if !SB_I_NOEXEC
vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
26 Aug, 2015
1 commit
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While in most cases commit b1d9e6b064 ("LSM: Switch to lists of hooks")
retained previous error returns, in three cases it altered them without
any explanation in the commit message. Restore all of them - in the
security_old_inode_init_security() case this led to reiserfs using
uninitialized data, sooner or later crashing the system (the only other
user of this function - ocfs2 - was unaffected afaict, since it passes
pre-initialized structures).Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Signed-off-by: James Morris
28 Jul, 2015
1 commit
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Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded
config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main
Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since
distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively
a no-op change.Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris
10 Jul, 2015
1 commit
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Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
28 Jun, 2015
1 commit
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Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"The main change in this kernel is Casey's generalized LSM stacking
work, which removes the hard-coding of Capabilities and Yama stacking,
allowing multiple arbitrary "small" LSMs to be stacked with a default
monolithic module (e.g. SELinux, Smack, AppArmor).See
https://lwn.net/Articles/636056/This will allow smaller, simpler LSMs to be incorporated into the
mainline kernel and arbitrarily stacked by users. Also, this is a
useful cleanup of the LSM code in its own right"* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
tpm, tpm_crb: fix le64_to_cpu conversions in crb_acpi_add()
vTPM: set virtual device before passing to ibmvtpm_reset_crq
tpm_ibmvtpm: remove unneccessary message level.
ima: update builtin policies
ima: extend "mask" policy matching support
ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition
ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()
Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj()
selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFS
selinux: Remove unused permission definitions
selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files
selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.
selinux: update netlink socket classes
signals: don't abuse __flush_signals() in selinux_bprm_committed_creds()
selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs
Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap
Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs
ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation()
ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure
integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter
...
12 May, 2015
3 commits
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Instead of using a vector of security operations
with explicit, special case stacking of the capability
and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and
yama hooks included as appropriate.The security_operations structure is no longer required.
Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that
allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for
list management while retaining typing. Each module
supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead
of a sparsely populated security_operations structure.
The description includes the element that gets put on
the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual
element allocation.The method for registering security modules is changed to
reflect the information available. The method for removing
a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed.
It should be generic now, however if there are potential
race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs
to be addressed by the calling module.The security hooks are called from the lists and the first
failure is returned.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: John Johansen
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Introduce two macros around calling the functions in the
security operations vector. The marco versions here do not
change any behavior.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: John Johansen
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The security.h header file serves two purposes,
interfaces for users of the security modules and
interfaces for security modules. Users of the
security modules don't need to know about what's
in the security_operations structure, so pull it
out into it's own header, lsm_hooks.hSigned-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: John Johansen
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris
11 May, 2015
2 commits
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inode_follow_link now takes an inode and rcu flag as well as the
dentry.inode is used in preference to d_backing_inode(dentry), particularly
in RCU-walk mode.selinux_inode_follow_link() gets dentry_has_perm() and
inode_has_perm() open-coded into it so that it can call
avc_has_perm_flags() in way that is safe if LOOKUP_RCU is set.Calling avc_has_perm_flags() with rcu_read_lock() held means
that when avc_has_perm_noaudit calls avc_compute_av(), the attempt
to rcu_read_unlock() before calling security_compute_av() will not
actually drop the RCU read-lock.However as security_compute_av() is completely in a read_lock()ed
region, it should be safe with the RCU read-lock held.Signed-off-by: NeilBrown
Signed-off-by: Al Viro -
No ->inode_follow_link() methods use the nameidata arg, and
it is about to become private to namei.c.
So remove from all inode_follow_link() functions.Signed-off-by: NeilBrown
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
16 Apr, 2015
1 commit
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most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
12 Apr, 2015
2 commits
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro
21 Mar, 2015
1 commit
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This reverts commit ca10b9e9a8ca7342ee07065289cbe74ac128c169.
No longer needed after commit eb8895debe1baba41fcb62c78a16f0c63c21662a
("tcp: tcp_make_synack() should use sock_wmalloc")When under SYNFLOOD, we build lot of SYNACK and hit false sharing
because of multiple modifications done on sk_listener->sk_wmem_allocSince tcp_make_synack() uses sock_wmalloc(), there is no need
to call skb_set_owner_w() again, as this adds two atomic operations.Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
16 Feb, 2015
1 commit
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Pull char / misc patches from Greg KH:
"Here's the big char/misc driver update for 3.20-rc1.Lots of little things in here, all described in the changelog.
Nothing major or unusual, except maybe the binder selinux stuff, which
was all acked by the proper selinux people and they thought it best to
come through this tree.All of this has been in linux-next with no reported issues for a while"
* tag 'char-misc-3.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (90 commits)
coresight: fix function etm_writel_cp14() parameter order
coresight-etm: remove check for unknown Kconfig macro
coresight: fixing CPU hwid lookup in device tree
coresight: remove the unnecessary function coresight_is_bit_set()
coresight: fix the debug AMBA bus name
coresight: remove the extra spaces
coresight: fix the link between orphan connection and newly added device
coresight: remove the unnecessary replicator property
coresight: fix the replicator subtype value
pdfdocs: Fix 'make pdfdocs' failure for 'uio-howto.tmpl'
mcb: Fix error path of mcb_pci_probe
virtio/console: verify device has config space
ti-st: clean up data types (fix harmless memory corruption)
mei: me: release hw from reset only during the reset flow
mei: mask interrupt set bit on clean reset bit
extcon: max77693: Constify struct regmap_config
extcon: adc-jack: Release IIO channel on driver remove
extcon: Remove duplicated include from extcon-class.c
Drivers: hv: vmbus: hv_process_timer_expiration() can be static
Drivers: hv: vmbus: serialize Offer and Rescind offer
...
26 Jan, 2015
1 commit
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Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.
The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement
controls over binder IPC. The security hooks include support for
controlling what process can become the binder context manager
(binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process
to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction),
controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to
another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability
of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file).These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3.
(Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver,
changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and
to add inline documentation for the hooks).Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich
Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
21 Jan, 2015
1 commit
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Since "BDI: Provide backing device capability information [try #3]" the
backing_dev_info structure also provides flags for the kind of mmap
operation available in a nommu environment, which is entirely unrelated
to it's original purpose.Introduce a new nommu-only file operation to provide this information to
the nommu mmap code instead. Splitting this from the backing_dev_info
structure allows to remove lots of backing_dev_info instance that aren't
otherwise needed, and entirely gets rid of the concept of providing a
backing_dev_info for a character device. It also removes the need for
the mtd_inodefs filesystem.Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig
Reviewed-by: Tejun Heo
Acked-by: Brian Norris
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe
10 Sep, 2014
1 commit
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security_file_set_fowner always returns 0, so make it f_setown and
__f_setown void return functions and fix up the error handling in the
callers.Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig
26 Jul, 2014
2 commits
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The "security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook" patch defined a
new security hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built
into the kernel.This patch defines ima_fw_from_file(), which is called from the new
security hook, to measure and/or appraise the loaded firmware's
integrity.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook -
In order to validate the contents of firmware being loaded, there must be
a hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel
itself. Without this, there is a risk that a root user could load malicious
firmware designed to mount an attack against kernel memory (e.g. via DMA).Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai
24 Jun, 2014
1 commit
14 Apr, 2014
1 commit
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…lls/linux-fs into next
01 Apr, 2014
2 commits
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If flags contain RENAME_EXCHANGE then exchange source and destination files.
There's no restriction on the type of the files; e.g. a directory can be
exchanged with a symlink.Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara
Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields -
Add flags to security_path_rename() and security_inode_rename() hooks.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields
15 Mar, 2014
1 commit
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Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm
parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the
permissions mask flags used in key->perm.Whilst we're at it:
(1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions
with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h.(2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit
it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related
directly to that.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Tested-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
10 Mar, 2014
1 commit
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security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.CC: Paul Moore
CC: Dave Jones
CC: Steffen Klassert
CC: Fan Du
CC: David S. Miller
CC: LSM list
CC: SELinux listSigned-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert
22 Oct, 2013
1 commit
19 Sep, 2013
1 commit
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Conflicts:
security/selinux/hooks.cPull Eric's existing SELinux tree as there are a number of patches in
there that are not yet upstream. There was some minor fixup needed to
resolve a conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c:selinux_set_mnt_opts()
between the labeled NFS patches and Eric's security_fs_use()
simplification patch.
26 Jul, 2013
1 commit
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The xfrm_state_alloc_security() LSM hook implementation is really a
multiplexed hook with two different behaviors depending on the
arguments passed to it by the caller. This patch splits the LSM hook
implementation into two new hook implementations, which match the
LSM hooks in the rest of the kernel:* xfrm_state_alloc
* xfrm_state_alloc_acquireAlso included in this patch are the necessary changes to the SELinux
code; no other LSMs are affected.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
25 Jul, 2013
1 commit
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Since everybody sets kstrdup()ed constant string to "struct xattr"->name but
nobody modifies "struct xattr"->name , we can omit kstrdup() and its failure
checking by constifying ->name member of "struct xattr".Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Reviewed-by: Joel Becker [ocfs2]
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore
Tested-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
09 Jun, 2013
4 commits
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The existing NFSv4 xattr handlers do not accept xattr calls to the security
namespace. This patch extends these handlers to accept xattrs from the security
namespace in addition to the default NFSv4 ACL namespace.Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust -
There is no way to differentiate if a text mount option is passed from user
space or the kernel. A flags field is being added to the
security_sb_set_mnt_opts hook to allow for in kernel security flags to be sent
to the LSM for processing in addition to the text options received from mount.
This patch also updated existing code to fix compilation errors.Acked-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust -
The interface to request security labels from user space is the xattr
interface. When requesting the security label from an NFS server it is
important to make sure the requested xattr actually is a MAC label. This allows
us to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of
something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM.Acked-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust -
There is a time where we need to calculate a context without the
inode having been created yet. To do this we take the negative dentry and
calculate a context based on the process and the parent directory contexts.Acked-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust
01 May, 2013
1 commit
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Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
"Just some minor updates across the subsystem"* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: eliminate passing d_name.name to process_measurement()
TPM: Retry SaveState command in suspend path
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Add small comment about return value of __i2c_transfer
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c: Add OF attributes type and name to the of_device_id table entries
tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Remove duplicate inclusion of header files
tpm: Add support for new Infineon I2C TPM (SLB 9645 TT 1.2 I2C)
char/tpm: Convert struct i2c_msg initialization to C99 format
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi: use strlcpy instead of strncpy
tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: formatting and white space changes
Smack: include magic.h in smackfs.c
selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch
seccomp: allow BPF_XOR based ALU instructions.
Fix NULL pointer dereference in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir()
Smack: add support for modification of existing rules
smack: SMACK_MAGIC to include/uapi/linux/magic.h
Smack: add missing support for transmute bit in smack_str_from_perm()
Smack: prevent revoke-subject from failing when unseen label is written to it
tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
tomoyo: use DEFINE_SRCU() to define tomoyo_ss
10 Apr, 2013
1 commit
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Commit 90ba9b1986b5ac (tcp: tcp_make_synack() can use alloc_skb())
broke certain SELinux/NetLabel configurations by no longer correctly
assigning the sock to the outgoing SYNACK packet.Cost of atomic operations on the LISTEN socket is quite big,
and we would like it to happen only if really needed.This patch introduces a new security_ops->skb_owned_by() method,
that is a void operation unless selinux is active.Reported-by: Miroslav Vadkerti
Diagnosed-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet
Cc: "David S. Miller"
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: James Morris
Tested-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
02 Apr, 2013
1 commit
-
I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the
same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the
second context= option is ignored. For instance:# mount server:/export /mnt/test1
# mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
# ls -dZ /mnt/test1
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test1
# ls -dZ /mnt/test2
drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0 /mnt/test2When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock,
it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an
existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and
presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from
the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this
case cannot take effect.This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int
return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has
been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on
the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return
success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the
admin why the second mount failed.Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on
being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount
filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts,
then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways.For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the
server:# mount server:/ /mnt/test1
# mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually
walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch.
The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already
present with the wrong context.OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work,
because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is
discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into
that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons:# cd /mnt/test1/scratch/
-bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busyThe story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that
this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data
under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one.Cc: Steve Dickson
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
15 Jan, 2013
1 commit
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This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced
with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the
multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its
associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the
device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted
for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent
devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause
the tun device to lose its SELinux label.We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the
tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g.
SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun
device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new
approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook,
security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a
TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE.The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the
other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes
use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to
restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux
policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission
the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according
to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Tested-by: Jason Wang
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
14 Dec, 2012
1 commit
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With the addition of the new kernel module syscall, which defines two
arguments - a file descriptor to the kernel module and a pointer to a NULL
terminated string of module arguments - it is now possible to measure and
appraise kernel modules like any other file on the file system.This patch adds support to measure and appraise kernel modules in an
extensible and consistent manner.To support filesystems without extended attribute support, additional
patches could pass the signature as the first parameter.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell