20 May, 2011

1 commit

04 Mar, 2011

1 commit

  • The security_is_socket_class() is auto-generated by genheaders based
    on classmap.h to reduce maintenance effort when a new class is defined
    in SELinux kernel. The name for any socket class should be suffixed by
    "socket" and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".

    Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao
    Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
    Acked-by: Stephen Smalley

    Harry Ciao

16 Mar, 2010

1 commit

  • Fix const warning in the genheaders script as a result of
    changes to the headers, as noted here:


    Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    James Morris

23 Nov, 2009

1 commit

  • If a permission name is long enough the selinux class definition generation
    tool will go into a infinite loop. This is because it's macro max() is
    fooled into thinking it is dealing with unsigned numbers. This patch makes
    sure the macro always uses signed number so 1 > -1.

    Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Eric Paris

19 Nov, 2009

1 commit

  • scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:20: warning: no previous prototype
    for ?usage?
    scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:26: warning: no previous prototype
    for ?stoupperx?

    Signed-off-by: Alan Cox
    Acked-by: WANG Cong
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Alan Cox

24 Oct, 2009

1 commit

07 Oct, 2009

2 commits

  • Add a simple utility (scripts/selinux/genheaders) and invoke it to
    generate the kernel-private class and permission indices in flask.h
    and av_permissions.h automatically during the kernel build from the
    security class mapping definitions in classmap.h. Adding new kernel
    classes and permissions can then be done just by adding them to classmap.h.

    Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Stephen Smalley
  • Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values
    upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery
    logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private
    class and permission indices used outside the security server and the
    policy values used within the security server.

    The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations;
    similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers
    is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The
    interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel
    vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user

    The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy
    values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes;
    thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h
    definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from
    refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going
    forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and
    classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer
    tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to
    automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the
    classmap.h definitions.

    The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and
    replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at
    policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation
    logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic.

    The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled
    when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old
    handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled
    when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able
    to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is
    automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able
    to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions
    are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1.

    avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the
    class and permission names from the kernel-private indices.

    The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the
    class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the
    kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any
    userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel
    classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match
    the kernel-private indices).

    Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Stephen Smalley

23 Sep, 2009

1 commit

05 Sep, 2008

1 commit

27 Aug, 2008

1 commit

  • In August 2006 I posted a patch generating a minimal SELinux policy. This
    week, David P. Quigley posted an updated version of that as a patch against
    the kernel. It also had nice logic for auto-installing the policy.

    Following is David's original patch intro (preserved especially
    bc it has stats on the generated policies):

    se interested in the changes there were only two significant
    changes. The first is that the iteration through the list of classes
    used NULL as a sentinel value. The problem with this is that the
    class_to_string array actually has NULL entries in its table as place
    holders for the user space object classes.

    The second change was that it would seem at some point the initial sids
    table was NULL terminated. This is no longer the case so that iteration
    has to be done on array length instead of looking for NULL.

    Some statistics on the policy that it generates:

    The policy consists of 523 lines which contain no blank lines. Of those
    523 lines 453 of them are class, permission, and initial sid
    definitions. These lines are usually little to no concern to the policy
    developer since they will not be adding object classes or permissions.
    Of the remaining 70 lines there is one type, one role, and one user
    statement. The remaining lines are broken into three portions. The first
    group are TE allow rules which make up 29 of the remaining lines, the
    second is assignment of labels to the initial sids which consist of 27
    lines, and file system labeling statements which are the remaining 11.

    In addition to the policy.conf generated there is a single file_contexts
    file containing two lines which labels the entire system with base_t.

    This policy generates a policy.23 binary that is 7920 bytes.

    (then a few versions later...):

    The new policy is 587 lines (stripped of blank lines) with 476 of those
    lines being the boilerplate that I mentioned last time. The remaining
    111 lines have the 3 lines for type, user, and role, 70 lines for the
    allow rules (one for each object class including user space object
    classes), 27 lines to assign types to the initial sids, and 11 lines for
    file system labeling. The policy binary is 9194 bytes.


    Aug 26: Added Documentation/SELinux.txt
    Aug 26: Incorporated a set of comments by Stephen Smalley:
    1. auto-setup SELINUXTYPE=dummy
    2. don't auto-install if selinux is enabled with
    non-dummy policy
    3. don't re-compute policy version
    4. /sbin/setfiles not /usr/sbin/setfiles
    Aug 22: As per JMorris comments, made sure make distclean
    cleans up the mdp directory.
    Removed a check for file_contexts which is now
    created in the same file as the check, making it

    Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn
    Signed-off-by: David Quigley
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Serge E. Hallyn