14 Aug, 2008
1 commit
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Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
change its own flags in a different way at the same time.__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags. This
patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:
(1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one
process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
current is the parent.(2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child.In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
been changed to calls to capable().Of the places that were using __capable():
(1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
process. All of these now use has_capability().(2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above,
these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.(3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().
(4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
switched and capable() is used instead.(5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.(6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: James Morris
27 Jul, 2008
1 commit
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... and get rid of the last "let's deduce mask from nameidata->flags"
bit.Signed-off-by: Al Viro
14 Jul, 2008
2 commits
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The register security hook is no longer required, as the capability
module is always registered. LSMs wishing to stack capability as
a secondary module should do so explicitly.Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman -
Remove the dummy module and make the "capability" module the default.
Compile and boot tested.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris
28 Apr, 2008
1 commit
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Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0
based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem
support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)
possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain
privilege via (set)uid-0.Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few
user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently
prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many
applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel
will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is
desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their
privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable
sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser
from the process' tree of children.The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege
associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to
initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited
through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the
historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which
has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop
all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently
fork()'d/exec()'d children with:prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);
This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is
enabled at configure time.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]
[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Reviewed-by: James Morris
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
21 Mar, 2008
1 commit
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The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases
are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
as per the check in check_kill_permission().One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.
This patch removes cap_task_kill().
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Earlier-version-tested-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
17 Oct, 2007
2 commits
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Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimitAug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: Andrew Morgan
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security
module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the
overall security architecture.Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API
abuse.Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified
at boot.The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.
In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface
is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree
modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and
dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix]
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc]
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Chris Wright
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn"
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
09 May, 2007
1 commit
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Remove includes of where it is not used/needed.
Suggested by Al Viro.Builds cleanly on x86_64, i386, alpha, ia64, powerpc, sparc,
sparc64, and arm (all 59 defconfigs).Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
01 Jul, 2006
1 commit
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Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk
07 Jan, 2006
1 commit
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Now when kbuild passes KBUILD_MODNAME with "" do not __stringify it when
used. Remove __stringnify for all users.
This also fixes the output of:$ ls -l /sys/module/
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 pcmcia
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 pcmcia_core
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 "processor"
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 2006-01-05 14:24 "psmouse"The quoting of the module names will be gone again.
Thanks to GregKH + Kay Sievers for reproting this.Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg
17 Apr, 2005
1 commit
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Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.Let it rip!
