30 Mar, 2010
1 commit
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…it slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
25 Feb, 2010
1 commit
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Apply lockdep-ified RCU primitives to key_gc_keyring() and
keyring_destroy().Cc: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney
Cc: laijs@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: dipankar@in.ibm.com
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca
Cc: josh@joshtriplett.org
Cc: dvhltc@us.ibm.com
Cc: niv@us.ibm.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
LKML-Reference:
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar
17 Dec, 2009
2 commits
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As of commit ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f ("KEYS: Add a keyctl to
install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]"), CONFIG_KEYS=y
fails to build on architectures that haven't implemented TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME yet:security/keys/keyctl.c: In function 'keyctl_session_to_parent':
security/keys/keyctl.c:1312: error: 'TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/keys/keyctl.c:1312: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
security/keys/keyctl.c:1312: error: for each function it appears in.)Make KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT depend on TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME until
m68k, and xtensa have implemented it.Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger -
Return the PTR_ERR of the correct pointer.
Signed-off-by: Roel Kluin
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
19 Nov, 2009
1 commit
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For consistency drop & in front of every proc_handler. Explicity
taking the address is unnecessary and it prevents optimizations
like stubbing the proc_handlers to NULL.Cc: Alexey Dobriyan
Cc: Ingo Molnar
Cc: Joe Perches
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
12 Nov, 2009
1 commit
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Now that sys_sysctl is a generic wrapper around /proc/sys .ctl_name
and .strategy members of sysctl tables are dead code. Remove them.Cc: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
16 Oct, 2009
1 commit
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The destination keyring specified to request_key() and co. is made available to
the process that instantiates the key (the slave process started by
/sbin/request-key typically). This is passed in the request_key_auth struct as
the dest_keyring member.keyctl_instantiate_key and keyctl_negate_key() call get_instantiation_keyring()
to get the keyring to attach the newly constructed key to at the end of
instantiation. This may be given a specific keyring into which a link will be
made later, or it may be asked to find the keyring passed to request_key(). In
the former case, it returns a keyring with the refcount incremented by
lookup_user_key(); in the latter case, it returns the keyring from the
request_key_auth struct - and does _not_ increment the refcount.The latter case will eventually result in an oops when the keyring prematurely
runs out of references and gets destroyed. The effect may take some time to
show up as the key is destroyed lazily.To fix this, the keyring returned by get_instantiation_keyring() must always
have its refcount incremented, no matter where it comes from.This can be tested by setting /etc/request-key.conf to:
#OP TYPE DESCRIPTION CALLOUT INFO PROGRAM ARG1 ARG2 ARG3 ...
#====== ======= =============== =============== ===============================
create * test:* * |/bin/false %u %g %d %{user:_display}
negate * * * /bin/keyctl negate %k 10 @uand then doing:
keyctl add user _display aaaaaaaa @u
while keyctl request2 user test:x test:x @u &&
keyctl list @u;
do
keyctl request2 user test:x test:x @u;
sleep 31;
keyctl list @u;
donewhich will oops eventually. Changing the negate line to have @u rather than
%S at the end is important as that forces the latter case by passing a special
keyring ID rather than an actual keyring ID.Reported-by: Alexander Zangerl
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Tested-by: Alexander Zangerl
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
24 Sep, 2009
1 commit
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The key garbage collector sets a timer to start a new collection cycle at the
point the earliest key to expire should be considered garbage. However, it
currently only does this if the key it is considering hasn't yet expired.If the key being considering has expired, but hasn't yet reached the collection
time then it is ignored, and won't be collected until some other key provokes a
round of collection.Make the garbage collector set the timer for the earliest key that hasn't yet
passed its collection time, rather than the earliest key that hasn't yet
expired.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
15 Sep, 2009
2 commits
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Fix a number of problems with the new key garbage collector:
(1) A rogue semicolon in keyring_gc() was causing the initial count of dead
keys to be miscalculated.(2) A missing return in keyring_gc() meant that under certain circumstances,
the keyring semaphore would be unlocked twice.(3) The key serial tree iterator (key_garbage_collector()) part of the garbage
collector has been modified to:(a) Complete each scan of the keyrings before setting the new timer.
(b) Only set the new timer for keys that have yet to expire. This means
that the new timer is now calculated correctly, and the gc doesn't
get into a loop continually scanning for keys that have expired, and
preventing other things from happening, like RCU cleaning up the old
keyring contents.(c) Perform an extra scan if any keys were garbage collected in this one
as a key might become garbage during a scan, and (b) could mean we
don't set the timer again.(4) Made key_schedule_gc() take the time at which to do a collection run,
rather than the time at which the key expires. This means the collection
of dead keys (key type unregistered) can happen immediately.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
When we exit early from keyctl_session_to_parent because of permissions or
because the session keyring is the same as the parent, we need to unlock the
tasklist.The missing unlock causes the system to hang completely when using
keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT) with a keyring shared with the parent.Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
02 Sep, 2009
7 commits
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Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.This can be tested with the following program:
#include
#include
#include#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");return 0;
}Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: aWhere the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Do some whitespace cleanups in the key management code.
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Make the file position maintained by /proc/keys represent the ID of the key
just read rather than the number of keys read. This should make it faster to
perform a lookup as we don't have to scan the key ID tree from the beginning to
find the current position.Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Add garbage collection for dead, revoked and expired keys. This involved
erasing all links to such keys from keyrings that point to them. At that
point, the key will be deleted in the normal manner.Keyrings from which garbage collection occurs are shrunk and their quota
consumption reduced as appropriate.Dead keys (for which the key type has been removed) will be garbage collected
immediately.Revoked and expired keys will hang around for a number of seconds, as set in
/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay before being automatically removed. The default
is 5 minutes.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Set the KEY_FLAG_DEAD flag on keys for which the type has been removed. This
causes the key_permission() function to return EKEYREVOKED in response to
various commands. It does not, however, prevent unlinking or clearing of
keyrings from detaching the key.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Allow keyctl_revoke() to operate on keys that have SETATTR but not WRITE
permission, rather than only on keys that have WRITE permission.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Allow keys for which the key type has been removed to be unlinked. Currently
dead-type keys can only be disposed of by completely clearing the keyrings
that point to them.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris
17 Jul, 2009
1 commit
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- is_single_threaded(task) is not safe unless task == current,
we can't use task->signal or task->mm.- it doesn't make sense unless task == current, the task can
fork right after the check.Rename it to current_is_single_threaded() and kill the argument.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
24 Jun, 2009
1 commit
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Annotate seqfile ops with __releases and __acquires to stop sparse
complaining about unbalanced locking.Signed-off-by: James Morris
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn
10 Apr, 2009
1 commit
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When request_key() is called, without there being any standard process
keyrings on which to fall back if a destination keyring is not specified, an
oops is liable to occur when construct_alloc_key() calls down_write() on
dest_keyring's semaphore.Due to function inlining this may be seen as an oops in down_write() as called
from request_key_and_link().This situation crops up during boot, where request_key() is called from within
the kernel (such as in CIFS mounts) where nobody is actually logged in, and so
PAM has not had a chance to create a session keyring and user keyrings to act
as the fallback.To fix this, make construct_alloc_key() not attempt to cache a key if there is
no fallback key if no destination keyring is given specifically.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Tested-by: Jeff Layton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
27 Feb, 2009
4 commits
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Restrict the /proc/keys and /proc/key-users output to keys
belonging to the same user namespace as the reading task.We may want to make this more complicated - so that any
keys in a user-namespace which is belongs to the reading
task are also shown. But let's see if anyone wants that
first.Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
When listing keys, do not return keys belonging to the
same uid in another user namespace. Otherwise uid 500
in another user namespace will return keyrings called
uid.500 for another user namespace.Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
If a key is owned by another user namespace, then treat the
key as though it is owned by both another uid and gid.Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
per-uid keys were looked by uid only. Use the user namespace
to distinguish the same uid in different namespaces.This does not address key_permission. So a task can for instance
try to join a keyring owned by the same uid in another namespace.
That will be handled by a separate patch.Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
18 Jan, 2009
1 commit
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Plug this leak.
Acked-by: David Howells
Cc: James Morris
Cc:
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
14 Jan, 2009
2 commits
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Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens
-
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens
01 Jan, 2009
1 commit
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Fix the following sparse warning:
CC security/keys/key.o
security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces)
security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10: expected char [noderef] *buffer
security/keys/keyctl.c:1297:10: got char *which appears to be caused by lack of __user annotation to the cast of
a syscall argument.Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: David Howells
29 Dec, 2008
1 commit
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Fix variable uninitialisation warnings introduced in:
commit 8bbf4976b59fc9fc2861e79cab7beb3f6d647640
Author: David Howells
Date: Fri Nov 14 10:39:14 2008 +1100KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument
As:
security/keys/keyctl.c: In function 'keyctl_negate_key':
security/keys/keyctl.c:976: warning: 'dest_keyring' may be used uninitialized in this function
security/keys/keyctl.c: In function 'keyctl_instantiate_key':
security/keys/keyctl.c:898: warning: 'dest_keyring' may be used uninitialized in this functionSome versions of gcc notice that get_instantiation_key() doesn't always set
*_dest_keyring, but fail to observe that if this happens then *_dest_keyring
will not be read by the caller.Reported-by: Linus Torvalds
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
14 Nov, 2008
9 commits
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Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that
all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
of no return with no possibility of failure.I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:
cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)
but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
(they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).The following sequence of events now happens:
(a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
creds that we make.(a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to
bprm->cred.This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
unnecessary, and so they've been removed.(b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in
bprm->unsafe for future reference.(c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.
(i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded,
but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
fail.(ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should
calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
Anything that might fail must be done at this point.(iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.
bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux
in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
not on the interpreter.(d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This
performs the following steps with regard to credentials:(i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
may not be covered by commit_creds().(ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
(c.i).(e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to
credentials:(i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
must be done before the credentials are changed.This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
must have been done in (c.ii).(ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
should be part of struct creds.(iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.(iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
are now immutable.(v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.(f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been
made.(2) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
(*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
(*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().(*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()
Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()
New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
second and subsequent calls.(*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
(*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This
includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not
fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
to the process; when the latter is called, they have.The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.
(3) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:(a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
the credentials-under-construction approach.(c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Separate per-task-group keyrings from signal_struct and dangle their anchor
from the cred struct rather than the signal_struct.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual
implementation.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring
arguments. Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link
the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist. This, however, can be
a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating
process can alter the credentials of the requesting process.This patch alters the behaviour such that:
(1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific
keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used.(2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the
special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings
(KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all | Instantiator |------->| Instantiator |
| | | | | |
+-----------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
request_key() request_key()This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a
ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else
then has to go and fetch. The TGT, however, should be retained in the
keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator. To make this explict
an extra special keyring constant is also added.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Disperse the bits of linux/key_ui.h as the reason they were put here (keyfs)
didn't get in.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().
Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris
07 Jun, 2008
1 commit
-
This semaphore doesn't appear to be used, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Walker
Cc: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
29 Apr, 2008
1 commit
-
Since these two source files invoke kmalloc(), they should explicitly
include .Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day
Cc: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
