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U-Boot FIT Signature Verification ================================= Introduction ------------ FIT supports hashing of images so that these hashes can be checked on loading. This protects against corruption of the image. However it does not prevent the substitution of one image for another. The signature feature allows the hash to be signed with a private key such that it can be verified using a public key later. Provided that the private key is kept secret and the public key is stored in a non-volatile place, any image can be verified in this way. See verified-boot.txt for more general information on verified boot. Concepts -------- Some familiarity with public key cryptography is assumed in this section. The procedure for signing is as follows: - hash an image in the FIT - sign the hash with a private key to produce a signature - store the resulting signature in the FIT The procedure for verification is: - read the FIT - obtain the public key - extract the signature from the FIT - hash the image from the FIT - verify (with the public key) that the extracted signature matches the hash The signing is generally performed by mkimage, as part of making a firmware image for the device. The verification is normally done in U-Boot on the device. Algorithms ---------- In principle any suitable algorithm can be used to sign and verify a hash. At present only one class of algorithms is supported: SHA1 hashing with RSA. This works by hashing the image to produce a 20-byte hash. While it is acceptable to bring in large cryptographic libraries such as openssl on the host side (e.g. mkimage), it is not desirable for U-Boot. For the run-time verification side, it is important to keep code and data size as small as possible. For this reason the RSA image verification uses pre-processed public keys which can be used with a very small amount of code - just some extraction of data from the FDT and exponentiation mod n. Code size impact is a little under 5KB on Tegra Seaboard, for example. It is relatively straightforward to add new algorithms if required. If another RSA variant is needed, then it can be added to the table in image-sig.c. If another algorithm is needed (such as DSA) then it can be placed alongside rsa.c, and its functions added to the table in image-sig.c also. |
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Creating an RSA key pair and certificate ---------------------------------------- To create a new public/private key pair, size 2048 bits: |
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$ openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out keys/dev.key \ -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_pubexp:65537 |
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To create a certificate for this containing the public key: |
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$ openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key keys/dev.key -out keys/dev.crt If you like you can look at the public key also: $ openssl rsa -in keys/dev.key -pubout Device Tree Bindings -------------------- The following properties are required in the FIT's signature node(s) to |
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allow the signer to operate. These should be added to the .its file. |
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Signature nodes sit at the same level as hash nodes and are called |
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signature-1, signature-2, etc. |
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- algo: Algorithm name (e.g. "sha1,rsa2048") |
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- key-name-hint: Name of key to use for signing. The keys will normally be in a single directory (parameter -k to mkimage). For a given key <name>, its private key is stored in <name>.key and the certificate is stored in <name>.crt. When the image is signed, the following properties are added (mandatory): - value: The signature data (e.g. 256 bytes for 2048-bit RSA) When the image is signed, the following properties are optional: - timestamp: Time when image was signed (standard Unix time_t format) - signer-name: Name of the signer (e.g. "mkimage") - signer-version: Version string of the signer (e.g. "2013.01") - comment: Additional information about the signer or image |
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- padding: The padding algorithm, it may be pkcs-1.5 or pss, if no value is provided we assume pkcs-1.5 |
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For config bindings (see Signed Configurations below), the following additional properties are optional: |
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- sign-images: A list of images to sign, each being a property of the conf node that contains then. The default is "kernel,fdt" which means that these two images will be looked up in the config and signed if present. For config bindings, these properties are added by the signer: - hashed-nodes: A list of nodes which were hashed by the signer. Each is a string - the full path to node. A typical value might be: |
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hashed-nodes = "/", "/configurations/conf-1", "/images/kernel", "/images/kernel/hash-1", "/images/fdt-1", "/images/fdt-1/hash-1"; |
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- hashed-strings: The start and size of the string region of the FIT that was hashed Example: See sign-images.its for an example image tree source file and sign-configs.its for config signing. |
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Public Key Storage ------------------ In order to verify an image that has been signed with a public key we need to have a trusted public key. This cannot be stored in the signed image, since it would be easy to alter. For this implementation we choose to store the public key in U-Boot's control FDT (using CONFIG_OF_CONTROL). Public keys should be stored as sub-nodes in a /signature node. Required properties are: |
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- algo: Algorithm name (e.g. "sha1,rsa2048") |
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Optional properties are: - key-name-hint: Name of key used for signing. This is only a hint since it is possible for the name to be changed. Verification can proceed by checking all available signing keys until one matches. - required: If present this indicates that the key must be verified for the image / configuration to be considered valid. Only required keys are normally verified by the FIT image booting algorithm. Valid values are |
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"image" to force verification of all images, and "conf" to force verification |
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of the selected configuration (which then relies on hashes in the images to verify those). Each signing algorithm has its own additional properties. For RSA the following are mandatory: - rsa,num-bits: Number of key bits (e.g. 2048) - rsa,modulus: Modulus (N) as a big-endian multi-word integer |
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- rsa,exponent: Public exponent (E) as a 64 bit unsigned integer |
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- rsa,r-squared: (2^num-bits)^2 as a big-endian multi-word integer - rsa,n0-inverse: -1 / modulus[0] mod 2^32 |
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Signed Configurations --------------------- While signing images is useful, it does not provide complete protection against several types of attack. For example, it it possible to create a FIT with the same signed images, but with the configuration changed such that a different one is selected (mix and match attack). It is also possible to substitute a signed image from an older FIT version into a newer FIT (roll-back attack). As an example, consider this FIT: / { images { |
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kernel-1 { |
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data = <data for kernel1> |
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signature-1 { |
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algo = "sha1,rsa2048"; value = <...kernel signature 1...> }; }; |
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kernel-2 { |
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data = <data for kernel2> |
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signature-1 { |
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algo = "sha1,rsa2048"; value = <...kernel signature 2...> }; }; |
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fdt-1 { |
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data = <data for fdt1>; |
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signature-1 { |
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algo = "sha1,rsa2048"; vaue = <...fdt signature 1...> }; }; |
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fdt-2 { |
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data = <data for fdt2>; |
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signature-1 { |
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algo = "sha1,rsa2048"; vaue = <...fdt signature 2...> }; }; }; configurations { |
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default = "conf-1"; conf-1 { kernel = "kernel-1"; fdt = "fdt-1"; |
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}; |
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conf-1 { kernel = "kernel-2"; fdt = "fdt-2"; |
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}; }; }; Since both kernels are signed it is easy for an attacker to add a new configuration 3 with kernel 1 and fdt 2: configurations { |
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default = "conf-1"; conf-1 { kernel = "kernel-1"; fdt = "fdt-1"; |
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}; |
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conf-1 { kernel = "kernel-2"; fdt = "fdt-2"; |
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}; |
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conf-3 { kernel = "kernel-1"; fdt = "fdt-2"; |
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}; }; With signed images, nothing protects against this. Whether it gains an advantage for the attacker is debatable, but it is not secure. |
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To solve this problem, we support signed configurations. In this case it |
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is the configurations that are signed, not the image. Each image has its own hash, and we include the hash in the configuration signature. So the above example is adjusted to look like this: / { images { |
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kernel-1 { |
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data = <data for kernel1> |
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hash-1 { |
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algo = "sha1"; value = <...kernel hash 1...> }; }; |
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kernel-2 { |
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data = <data for kernel2> |
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hash-1 { |
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algo = "sha1"; value = <...kernel hash 2...> }; }; |
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fdt-1 { |
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data = <data for fdt1>; |
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hash-1 { |
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algo = "sha1"; value = <...fdt hash 1...> }; }; |
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fdt-2 { |
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data = <data for fdt2>; |
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hash-1 { |
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algo = "sha1"; value = <...fdt hash 2...> }; }; }; configurations { |
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default = "conf-1"; conf-1 { kernel = "kernel-1"; fdt = "fdt-1"; signature-1 { |
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algo = "sha1,rsa2048"; value = <...conf 1 signature...>; }; }; |
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conf-2 { kernel = "kernel-2"; fdt = "fdt-2"; signature-1 { |
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algo = "sha1,rsa2048"; value = <...conf 1 signature...>; }; }; }; }; You can see that we have added hashes for all images (since they are no longer signed), and a signature to each configuration. In the above example, |
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mkimage will sign configurations/conf-1, the kernel and fdt that are pointed to by the configuration (/images/kernel-1, /images/kernel-1/hash-1, /images/fdt-1, /images/fdt-1/hash-1) and the root structure of the image |
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(so that it isn't possible to add or remove root nodes). The signature is |
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written into /configurations/conf-1/signature-1/value. It can easily be |
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verified later even if the FIT has been signed with other keys in the meantime. |
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Verification ------------ FITs are verified when loaded. After the configuration is selected a list of required images is produced. If there are 'required' public keys, then each image must be verified against those keys. This means that every image that might be used by the target needs to be signed with 'required' keys. This happens automatically as part of a bootm command when FITs are used. Enabling FIT Verification ------------------------- In addition to the options to enable FIT itself, the following CONFIGs must be enabled: |
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CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE - enable signing and verification in FITs |
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CONFIG_RSA - enable RSA algorithm for signing |
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WARNING: When relying on signed FIT images with required signature check the legacy image format is default disabled by not defining CONFIG_IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY |
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Testing ------- |
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An easy way to test signing and verification is to use the test script |
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provided in test/vboot/vboot_test.sh. This uses sandbox (a special version of U-Boot which runs under Linux) to show the operation of a 'bootm' command loading and verifying images. A sample run is show below: $ make O=sandbox sandbox_config $ make O=sandbox $ O=sandbox ./test/vboot/vboot_test.sh Simple Verified Boot Test ========================= Please see doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt for more information |
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/home/hs/ids/u-boot/sandbox/tools/mkimage -D -I dts -O dtb -p 2000 |
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Build keys |
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do sha1 test |
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Build FIT with signed images Test Verified Boot Run: unsigned signatures:: OK Sign images Test Verified Boot Run: signed images: OK Build FIT with signed configuration Test Verified Boot Run: unsigned config: OK Sign images Test Verified Boot Run: signed config: OK |
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check signed config on the host |
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Signature check OK |
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OK Test Verified Boot Run: signed config: OK |
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Test Verified Boot Run: signed config with bad hash: OK do sha256 test Build FIT with signed images Test Verified Boot Run: unsigned signatures:: OK Sign images Test Verified Boot Run: signed images: OK Build FIT with signed configuration Test Verified Boot Run: unsigned config: OK Sign images Test Verified Boot Run: signed config: OK |
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check signed config on the host |
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Signature check OK |
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OK Test Verified Boot Run: signed config: OK |
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Test Verified Boot Run: signed config with bad hash: OK |
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Test passed |
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Hardware Signing with PKCS#11 ----------------------------- Securely managing private signing keys can challenging, especially when the keys are stored on the file system of a computer that is connected to the Internet. If an attacker is able to steal the key, they can sign malicious FIT images which will appear genuine to your devices. An alternative solution is to keep your signing key securely stored on hardware device like a smartcard, USB token or Hardware Security Module (HSM) and have them perform the signing. PKCS#11 is standard for interfacing with these crypto device. Requirements: Smartcard/USB token/HSM which can work with the pkcs11 engine openssl libp11 (provides pkcs11 engine) p11-kit (recommended to simplify setup) opensc (for smartcards and smartcard like USB devices) gnutls (recommended for key generation, p11tool) The following examples use the Nitrokey Pro. Instructions for other devices may vary. Notes on pkcs11 engine setup: Make sure p11-kit, opensc are installed and that p11-kit is setup to use opensc. /usr/share/p11-kit/modules/opensc.module should be present on your system. Generating Keys On the Nitrokey: $ gpg --card-edit Reader ...........: Nitrokey Nitrokey Pro (xxxxxxxx0000000000000000) 00 00 Application ID ...: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Version ..........: 2.1 Manufacturer .....: ZeitControl Serial number ....: xxxxxxxx Name of cardholder: [not set] Language prefs ...: de Sex ..............: unspecified URL of public key : [not set] Login data .......: [not set] Signature PIN ....: forced Key attributes ...: rsa2048 rsa2048 rsa2048 Max. PIN lengths .: 32 32 32 PIN retry counter : 3 0 3 Signature counter : 0 Signature key ....: [none] Encryption key....: [none] Authentication key: [none] General key info..: [none] gpg/card> generate Make off-card backup of encryption key? (Y/n) n Please note that the factory settings of the PINs are PIN = '123456' Admin PIN = '12345678' You should change them using the command --change-pin What keysize do you want for the Signature key? (2048) 4096 The card will now be re-configured to generate a key of 4096 bits Note: There is no guarantee that the card supports the requested size. If the key generation does not succeed, please check the documentation of your card to see what sizes are allowed. What keysize do you want for the Encryption key? (2048) 4096 The card will now be re-configured to generate a key of 4096 bits What keysize do you want for the Authentication key? (2048) 4096 The card will now be re-configured to generate a key of 4096 bits Please specify how long the key should be valid. 0 = key does not expire <n> = key expires in n days <n>w = key expires in n weeks <n>m = key expires in n months <n>y = key expires in n years Key is valid for? (0) Key does not expire at all Is this correct? (y/N) y GnuPG needs to construct a user ID to identify your key. Real name: John Doe Email address: john.doe@email.com Comment: You selected this USER-ID: "John Doe <john.doe@email.com>" Change (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay/(Q)uit? o Using p11tool to get the token URL: Depending on system configuration, gpg-agent may need to be killed first. $ p11tool --provider /usr/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so --list-tokens Token 0: URL: pkcs11:model=PKCS%2315%20emulated;manufacturer=ZeitControl;serial=000xxxxxxxxx;token=OpenPGP%20card%20%28User%20PIN%20%28sig%29%29 Label: OpenPGP card (User PIN (sig)) Type: Hardware token Manufacturer: ZeitControl Model: PKCS#15 emulated Serial: 000xxxxxxxxx Module: (null) Token 1: URL: pkcs11:model=PKCS%2315%20emulated;manufacturer=ZeitControl;serial=000xxxxxxxxx;token=OpenPGP%20card%20%28User%20PIN%29 Label: OpenPGP card (User PIN) Type: Hardware token Manufacturer: ZeitControl Model: PKCS#15 emulated Serial: 000xxxxxxxxx Module: (null) Use the portion of the signature token URL after "pkcs11:" as the keydir argument (-k) to mkimage below. Use the URL of the token to list the private keys: $ p11tool --login --provider /usr/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so --list-privkeys \ "pkcs11:model=PKCS%2315%20emulated;manufacturer=ZeitControl;serial=000xxxxxxxxx;token=OpenPGP%20card%20%28User%20PIN%20%28sig%29%29" Token 'OpenPGP card (User PIN (sig))' with URL 'pkcs11:model=PKCS%2315%20emulated;manufacturer=ZeitControl;serial=000xxxxxxxxx;token=OpenPGP%20card%20%28User%20PIN%20%28sig%29%29' requires user PIN Enter PIN: Object 0: URL: pkcs11:model=PKCS%2315%20emulated;manufacturer=ZeitControl;serial=000xxxxxxxxx;token=OpenPGP%20card%20%28User%20PIN%20%28sig%29%29;id=%01;object=Signature%20key;type=private Type: Private key Label: Signature key Flags: CKA_PRIVATE; CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE; CKA_SENSITIVE; ID: 01 Use the label, in this case "Signature key" as the key-name-hint in your FIT. Create the fitImage: $ ./tools/mkimage -f fit-image.its fitImage Sign the fitImage with the hardware key: $ ./tools/mkimage -F -k \ "model=PKCS%2315%20emulated;manufacturer=ZeitControl;serial=000xxxxxxxxx;token=OpenPGP%20card%20%28User%20PIN%20%28sig%29%29" \ -K u-boot.dtb -N pkcs11 -r fitImage |
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Future Work ----------- - Roll-back protection using a TPM is done using the tpm command. This can be scripted, but we might consider a default way of doing this, built into bootm. Possible Future Work -------------------- - Add support for other RSA/SHA variants, such as rsa4096,sha512. - Other algorithms besides RSA - More sandbox tests for failure modes - Passwords for keys/certificates - Perhaps implement OAEP - Enhance bootm to permit scripted signature verification (so that a script can verify an image but not actually boot it) Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org 1-1-13 |