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kernel/sys.c
56.2 KB
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/* * linux/kernel/sys.c * * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds */ |
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#include <linux/export.h> |
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#include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/utsname.h> #include <linux/mman.h> |
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#include <linux/reboot.h> #include <linux/prctl.h> |
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#include <linux/highuid.h> #include <linux/fs.h> |
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#include <linux/kmod.h> |
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#include <linux/perf_event.h> |
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#include <linux/resource.h> |
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#include <linux/kernel.h> |
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#include <linux/workqueue.h> |
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#include <linux/capability.h> |
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#include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/times.h> #include <linux/posix-timers.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/dcookies.h> #include <linux/suspend.h> #include <linux/tty.h> |
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#include <linux/signal.h> |
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#include <linux/cn_proc.h> |
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#include <linux/getcpu.h> |
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#include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h> |
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#include <linux/seccomp.h> |
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#include <linux/cpu.h> |
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#include <linux/personality.h> |
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#include <linux/ptrace.h> |
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#include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
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#include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/mount.h> |
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#include <linux/gfp.h> |
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#include <linux/syscore_ops.h> |
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#include <linux/version.h> #include <linux/ctype.h> |
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#include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
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#include <linux/kprobes.h> |
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
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#include <linux/binfmts.h> |
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|
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#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/uidgid.h> #include <linux/cred.h> |
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#include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> |
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/* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */ #include <generated/utsrelease.h> |
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|
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#include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/unistd.h> #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL |
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# define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL |
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# define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL |
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# define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL |
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# define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL |
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# define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL |
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# define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef GET_ENDIAN |
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# define GET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef SET_ENDIAN |
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# define SET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef GET_TSC_CTL # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) #endif #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) #endif |
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#ifndef MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT # define MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT(a) (-EINVAL) #endif #ifndef MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT # define MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT(a) (-EINVAL) #endif |
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/* * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past */ int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID; int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID; |
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid); EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid); |
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/* * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures */ int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid); EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid); /* |
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* Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid, * or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns. * * Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe */ static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p); |
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if (uid_eq(pcred->uid, cred->euid) || uid_eq(pcred->euid, cred->euid)) |
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return true; |
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if (ns_capable(pcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) |
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return true; return false; } /* |
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* set the priority of a task * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock */ |
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static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error) { int no_nice; |
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if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) { |
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error = -EPERM; goto out; } |
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if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) { |
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error = -EACCES; goto out; } no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval); if (no_nice) { error = no_nice; goto out; } if (error == -ESRCH) error = 0; set_user_nice(p, niceval); out: return error; } |
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SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval) |
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{ struct task_struct *g, *p; struct user_struct *user; |
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const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
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int error = -EINVAL; |
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struct pid *pgrp; |
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kuid_t uid; |
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|
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if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
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goto out; /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */ error = -ESRCH; |
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if (niceval < MIN_NICE) niceval = MIN_NICE; if (niceval > MAX_NICE) niceval = MAX_NICE; |
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|
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rcu_read_lock(); |
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read_lock(&tasklist_lock); switch (which) { |
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case PRIO_PROCESS: if (who) p = find_task_by_vpid(who); else p = current; if (p) error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); break; case PRIO_PGRP: if (who) pgrp = find_vpid(who); else pgrp = task_pgrp(current); do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); break; case PRIO_USER: uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who); user = cred->user; if (!who) uid = cred->uid; else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) { user = find_user(uid); if (!user) |
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goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
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} do_each_thread(g, p) { if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid)) error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); } while_each_thread(g, p); if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */ break; |
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} out_unlock: read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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out: return error; } /* * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19) * to stay compatible. */ |
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who) |
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{ struct task_struct *g, *p; struct user_struct *user; |
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const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
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long niceval, retval = -ESRCH; |
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struct pid *pgrp; |
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kuid_t uid; |
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|
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if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
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return -EINVAL; |
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rcu_read_lock(); |
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read_lock(&tasklist_lock); switch (which) { |
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case PRIO_PROCESS: if (who) p = find_task_by_vpid(who); else p = current; if (p) { niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); if (niceval > retval) retval = niceval; } break; case PRIO_PGRP: if (who) pgrp = find_vpid(who); else pgrp = task_pgrp(current); do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); if (niceval > retval) retval = niceval; } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); break; case PRIO_USER: uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who); user = cred->user; if (!who) uid = cred->uid; else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) { user = find_user(uid); if (!user) goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ } do_each_thread(g, p) { if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid)) { |
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niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); |
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if (niceval > retval) retval = niceval; } |
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} while_each_thread(g, p); if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */ break; |
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} out_unlock: read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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return retval; } |
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/* * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid * or vice versa. (BSD-style) * * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid. * * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing * a security audit over a program. * * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be |
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* 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
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* * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned). */ |
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid) |
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{ |
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struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
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const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
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int retval; |
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kgid_t krgid, kegid; krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid); kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid); if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid)) return -EINVAL; if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid)) return -EINVAL; |
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|
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new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
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retval = -EPERM; |
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if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { |
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if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) || gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) || |
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ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
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new->gid = krgid; |
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else |
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goto error; |
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} if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { |
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if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) || gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) || gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) || |
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ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
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new->egid = kegid; |
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else |
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goto error; |
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} |
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|
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if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || |
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(egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid))) |
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new->sgid = new->egid; new->fsgid = new->egid; return commit_creds(new); error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
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} /* |
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* setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS |
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* * SMP: Same implicit races as above. */ |
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SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid) |
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{ |
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struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
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const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
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int retval; |
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kgid_t kgid; kgid = make_kgid(ns, gid); if (!gid_valid(kgid)) return -EINVAL; |
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|
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new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
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retval = -EPERM; |
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if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
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new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid; else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid)) new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid; |
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else |
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goto error; |
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|
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return commit_creds(new); error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
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} |
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|
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/* * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID */ static int set_user(struct cred *new) |
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{ struct user_struct *new_user; |
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new_user = alloc_uid(new->uid); |
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if (!new_user) return -EAGAIN; |
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/* * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming * it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the * failure to the execve() stage. */ |
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if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) && |
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new_user != INIT_USER) current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; else current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; |
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|
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free_uid(new->user); new->user = new_user; |
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return 0; } /* * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid * or vice versa. (BSD-style) * * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid. * * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing * a security audit over a program. * * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be |
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* 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
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*/ |
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid) |
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{ |
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struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
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const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
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int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 |
kuid_t kruid, keuid; kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid); keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid); if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid)) return -EINVAL; if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid)) return -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
458 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
459 460 461 462 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
463 |
retval = -EPERM; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
464 |
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
465 466 467 |
new->uid = kruid; if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) && !uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) && |
c7b96acf1 userns: Kill nso... |
468 |
!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
469 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
470 471 472 |
} if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
473 474 475 476 |
new->euid = keuid; if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) && !uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) && !uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) && |
c7b96acf1 userns: Kill nso... |
477 |
!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
478 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
479 |
} |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
480 |
if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid)) { |
54e991242 sched: don't allo... |
481 482 483 484 |
retval = set_user(new); if (retval < 0) goto error; } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
485 |
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 || |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
486 |
(euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid))) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
487 488 |
new->suid = new->euid; new->fsuid = new->euid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
489 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
490 491 492 |
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
493 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
494 |
return commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
495 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
496 497 498 499 |
error: abort_creds(new); return retval; } |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
500 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
501 |
/* |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
502 503 |
* setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS * |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
504 |
* Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
505 |
* like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
506 507 508 509 |
* user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid() * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
510 |
* regain them by swapping the real and effective uid. |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
511 |
*/ |
ae1251ab7 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
512 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
513 |
{ |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
514 |
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
515 516 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
517 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
518 519 520 521 522 |
kuid_t kuid; kuid = make_kuid(ns, uid); if (!uid_valid(kuid)) return -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
523 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
524 525 526 527 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
528 |
retval = -EPERM; |
c7b96acf1 userns: Kill nso... |
529 |
if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
530 531 |
new->suid = new->uid = kuid; if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) { |
54e991242 sched: don't allo... |
532 533 534 |
retval = set_user(new); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
535 |
} |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
536 |
} else if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kuid, new->suid)) { |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
537 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
538 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
539 |
|
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
540 |
new->fsuid = new->euid = kuid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
541 542 543 544 |
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
545 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
546 |
return commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
547 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
548 549 550 |
error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
551 552 553 554 555 556 557 |
} /* * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid, * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid(). */ |
ae1251ab7 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
558 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
559 |
{ |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
560 |
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
561 562 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
563 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 |
kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid; kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid); keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid); ksuid = make_kuid(ns, suid); if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid)) return -EINVAL; if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid)) return -EINVAL; if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(ksuid)) return -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
578 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
579 580 581 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
582 |
old = current_cred(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
583 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
584 |
retval = -EPERM; |
c7b96acf1 userns: Kill nso... |
585 |
if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
586 587 |
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
588 |
goto error; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
589 590 |
if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
591 |
goto error; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
592 593 |
if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
594 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
595 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
596 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
597 |
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
598 599 |
new->uid = kruid; if (!uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) { |
54e991242 sched: don't allo... |
600 601 602 603 |
retval = set_user(new); if (retval < 0) goto error; } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
604 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
605 |
if (euid != (uid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
606 |
new->euid = keuid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
607 |
if (suid != (uid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
608 |
new->suid = ksuid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
609 |
new->fsuid = new->euid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
610 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
611 612 613 |
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
614 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
615 |
return commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
616 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
617 618 619 |
error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
620 |
} |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
621 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
622 |
{ |
86a264abe CRED: Wrap curren... |
623 |
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
624 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
625 626 627 628 629 |
uid_t ruid, euid, suid; ruid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid); euid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid); suid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->suid); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
630 |
|
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
631 632 633 634 635 636 |
retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp); if (!retval) { retval = put_user(euid, euidp); if (!retval) return put_user(suid, suidp); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
637 638 639 640 641 642 |
return retval; } /* * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid. */ |
ae1251ab7 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
643 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
644 |
{ |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
645 |
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
646 647 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
648 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 |
kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid; krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid); kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid); ksgid = make_kgid(ns, sgid); if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid)) return -EINVAL; if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid)) return -EINVAL; if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid)) return -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
661 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
662 663 664 665 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
666 |
retval = -EPERM; |
c7b96acf1 userns: Kill nso... |
667 |
if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
668 669 |
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
670 |
goto error; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
671 672 |
if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
673 |
goto error; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
674 675 |
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
676 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
677 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
678 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
679 |
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
680 |
new->gid = krgid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
681 |
if (egid != (gid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
682 |
new->egid = kegid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
683 |
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
684 |
new->sgid = ksgid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
685 |
new->fsgid = new->egid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
686 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
687 688 689 690 691 |
return commit_creds(new); error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
692 |
} |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
693 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgidp, gid_t __user *, egidp, gid_t __user *, sgidp) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
694 |
{ |
86a264abe CRED: Wrap curren... |
695 |
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
696 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
697 698 699 700 701 |
gid_t rgid, egid, sgid; rgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid); egid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid); sgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->sgid); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
702 |
|
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
703 704 705 706 707 708 |
retval = put_user(rgid, rgidp); if (!retval) { retval = put_user(egid, egidp); if (!retval) retval = put_user(sgid, sgidp); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 |
return retval; } /* * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access.. */ |
ae1251ab7 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
720 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
721 |
{ |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
722 723 724 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; uid_t old_fsuid; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 |
kuid_t kuid; old = current_cred(); old_fsuid = from_kuid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsuid); kuid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, uid); if (!uid_valid(kuid)) return old_fsuid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
733 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
734 735 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
736 |
return old_fsuid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
737 |
|
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
738 739 |
if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) || |
c7b96acf1 userns: Kill nso... |
740 |
ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
741 742 |
if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) { new->fsuid = kuid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
743 744 |
if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) goto change_okay; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
745 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
746 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
747 748 |
abort_creds(new); return old_fsuid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
749 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
750 751 |
change_okay: commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
752 753 754 755 |
return old_fsuid; } /* |
f42df9e65 general: convert ... |
756 |
* Samma på svenska.. |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
757 |
*/ |
ae1251ab7 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
758 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
759 |
{ |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
760 761 762 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; gid_t old_fsgid; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 |
kgid_t kgid; old = current_cred(); old_fsgid = from_kgid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsgid); kgid = make_kgid(old->user_ns, gid); if (!gid_valid(kgid)) return old_fsgid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
771 772 773 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
774 |
return old_fsgid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
775 |
|
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
776 777 |
if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) || |
c7b96acf1 userns: Kill nso... |
778 |
ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
779 780 |
if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) { new->fsgid = kgid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
781 |
goto change_okay; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
782 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
783 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
784 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
785 786 787 788 789 |
abort_creds(new); return old_fsgid; change_okay: commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
790 791 |
return old_fsgid; } |
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 |
/** * sys_getpid - return the thread group id of the current process * * Note, despite the name, this returns the tgid not the pid. The tgid and * the pid are identical unless CLONE_THREAD was specified on clone() in * which case the tgid is the same in all threads of the same group. * * This is SMP safe as current->tgid does not change. */ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpid) { return task_tgid_vnr(current); } /* Thread ID - the internal kernel "pid" */ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(gettid) { return task_pid_vnr(current); } /* * Accessing ->real_parent is not SMP-safe, it could * change from under us. However, we can use a stale * value of ->real_parent under rcu_read_lock(), see * release_task()->call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct). */ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getppid) { int pid; rcu_read_lock(); pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent)); rcu_read_unlock(); return pid; } SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getuid) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()); } SYSCALL_DEFINE0(geteuid) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_euid()); } SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getgid) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_gid()); } SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getegid) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_egid()); } |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
852 853 |
void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms) { |
0cf55e1ec sched, cputime: I... |
854 |
cputime_t tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime; |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
855 |
|
e80d0a1ae cputime: Rename t... |
856 |
thread_group_cputime_adjusted(current, &tgutime, &tgstime); |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
857 858 |
cutime = current->signal->cutime; cstime = current->signal->cstime; |
0cf55e1ec sched, cputime: I... |
859 860 |
tms->tms_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(tgutime); tms->tms_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(tgstime); |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
861 862 863 |
tms->tms_cutime = cputime_to_clock_t(cutime); tms->tms_cstime = cputime_to_clock_t(cstime); } |
58fd3aa28 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
864 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
865 |
{ |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
866 867 |
if (tbuf) { struct tms tmp; |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
868 869 |
do_sys_times(&tmp); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
870 871 872 |
if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms))) return -EFAULT; } |
e3d5a27d5 Allow times and t... |
873 |
force_successful_syscall_return(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 |
return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64()); } /* * This needs some heavy checking ... * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it. * * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91 * |
98611e4e6 exec: kill task_s... |
886 |
* !PF_FORKNOEXEC check to conform completely to POSIX. |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
887 |
*/ |
b290ebe2c [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
888 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
889 890 |
{ struct task_struct *p; |
ee0acf90d [PATCH] setpgid: ... |
891 |
struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
892 893 |
struct pid *pgrp; int err; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
894 895 |
if (!pid) |
b488893a3 pid namespaces: c... |
896 |
pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
897 898 899 900 |
if (!pgid) pgid = pid; if (pgid < 0) return -EINVAL; |
950eaaca6 pid: make setpgid... |
901 |
rcu_read_lock(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
902 903 904 905 906 907 908 |
/* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM */ write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); err = -ESRCH; |
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
909 |
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
910 911 912 913 914 915 |
if (!p) goto out; err = -EINVAL; if (!thread_group_leader(p)) goto out; |
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
916 |
if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) { |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
917 |
err = -EPERM; |
41487c65b [PATCH] pid: repl... |
918 |
if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
919 920 |
goto out; err = -EACCES; |
98611e4e6 exec: kill task_s... |
921 |
if (!(p->flags & PF_FORKNOEXEC)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
922 923 924 |
goto out; } else { err = -ESRCH; |
ee0acf90d [PATCH] setpgid: ... |
925 |
if (p != group_leader) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
926 927 928 929 930 931 |
goto out; } err = -EPERM; if (p->signal->leader) goto out; |
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
932 |
pgrp = task_pid(p); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
933 |
if (pgid != pid) { |
b488893a3 pid namespaces: c... |
934 |
struct task_struct *g; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
935 |
|
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
936 937 |
pgrp = find_vpid(pgid); g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID); |
41487c65b [PATCH] pid: repl... |
938 |
if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader)) |
f020bc468 [PATCH] sys_setpg... |
939 |
goto out; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
940 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
941 942 943 |
err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid); if (err) goto out; |
1b0f7ffd0 pids: kill signal... |
944 |
if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp) |
83beaf3c6 pids: sys_setpgid... |
945 |
change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
946 947 948 949 950 |
err = 0; out: /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */ write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
950eaaca6 pid: make setpgid... |
951 |
rcu_read_unlock(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
952 953 |
return err; } |
dbf040d9d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
954 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
955 |
{ |
12a3de0a9 pids: sys_getpgid... |
956 957 958 959 960 |
struct task_struct *p; struct pid *grp; int retval; rcu_read_lock(); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
961 |
if (!pid) |
12a3de0a9 pids: sys_getpgid... |
962 |
grp = task_pgrp(current); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
963 |
else { |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
964 |
retval = -ESRCH; |
12a3de0a9 pids: sys_getpgid... |
965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 |
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); if (!p) goto out; grp = task_pgrp(p); if (!grp) goto out; retval = security_task_getpgid(p); if (retval) goto out; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
975 |
} |
12a3de0a9 pids: sys_getpgid... |
976 977 978 979 |
retval = pid_vnr(grp); out: rcu_read_unlock(); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
980 981 982 |
} #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP |
dbf040d9d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
983 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
984 |
{ |
12a3de0a9 pids: sys_getpgid... |
985 |
return sys_getpgid(0); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
986 987 988 |
} #endif |
dbf040d9d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
989 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
990 |
{ |
1dd768c08 pids: sys_getsid:... |
991 992 993 994 995 |
struct task_struct *p; struct pid *sid; int retval; rcu_read_lock(); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
996 |
if (!pid) |
1dd768c08 pids: sys_getsid:... |
997 |
sid = task_session(current); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
998 |
else { |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
999 |
retval = -ESRCH; |
1dd768c08 pids: sys_getsid:... |
1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 |
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); if (!p) goto out; sid = task_session(p); if (!sid) goto out; retval = security_task_getsid(p); if (retval) goto out; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1010 |
} |
1dd768c08 pids: sys_getsid:... |
1011 1012 1013 1014 |
retval = pid_vnr(sid); out: rcu_read_unlock(); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1015 |
} |
81dabb464 exit.c: unexport ... |
1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 |
static void set_special_pids(struct pid *pid) { struct task_struct *curr = current->group_leader; if (task_session(curr) != pid) change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_SID, pid); if (task_pgrp(curr) != pid) change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_PGID, pid); } |
b290ebe2c [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1026 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1027 |
{ |
e19f247a3 [PATCH] setpgid: ... |
1028 |
struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
e4cc0a9c8 fix setsid() for ... |
1029 1030 |
struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader); pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1031 |
int err = -EPERM; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1032 |
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
390e2ff07 [PATCH] Make sets... |
1033 1034 1035 |
/* Fail if I am already a session leader */ if (group_leader->signal->leader) goto out; |
430c62312 start the global ... |
1036 1037 |
/* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the * proposed session id. |
390e2ff07 [PATCH] Make sets... |
1038 |
*/ |
6806aac6d sys_setsid: remov... |
1039 |
if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1040 |
goto out; |
e19f247a3 [PATCH] setpgid: ... |
1041 |
group_leader->signal->leader = 1; |
81dabb464 exit.c: unexport ... |
1042 |
set_special_pids(sid); |
24ec839c4 [PATCH] tty: ->si... |
1043 |
|
9c9f4ded9 tty: Add a kref c... |
1044 |
proc_clear_tty(group_leader); |
24ec839c4 [PATCH] tty: ->si... |
1045 |
|
e4cc0a9c8 fix setsid() for ... |
1046 |
err = session; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1047 1048 |
out: write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
5091faa44 sched: Add 'autog... |
1049 |
if (err > 0) { |
0d0df599f connector: fix re... |
1050 |
proc_sid_connector(group_leader); |
5091faa44 sched: Add 'autog... |
1051 1052 |
sched_autogroup_create_attach(group_leader); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1053 1054 |
return err; } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1055 |
DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem); |
e28cbf229 improve sys_newun... |
1056 1057 |
#ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE #define override_architecture(name) \ |
46da27664 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1058 |
(personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 && \ |
e28cbf229 improve sys_newun... |
1059 1060 1061 1062 1063 |
copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \ sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE))) #else #define override_architecture(name) 0 #endif |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1064 1065 1066 1067 |
/* * Work around broken programs that cannot handle "Linux 3.0". * Instead we map 3.x to 2.6.40+x, so e.g. 3.0 would be 2.6.40 */ |
2702b1526 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1068 |
static int override_release(char __user *release, size_t len) |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1069 1070 |
{ int ret = 0; |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1071 1072 |
if (current->personality & UNAME26) { |
2702b1526 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1073 1074 |
const char *rest = UTS_RELEASE; char buf[65] = { 0 }; |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1075 1076 |
int ndots = 0; unsigned v; |
2702b1526 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1077 |
size_t copy; |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1078 1079 1080 1081 1082 1083 1084 1085 1086 |
while (*rest) { if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3) break; if (!isdigit(*rest) && *rest != '.') break; rest++; } v = ((LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff) + 40; |
31fd84b95 use clamp_t in UN... |
1087 |
copy = clamp_t(size_t, len, 1, sizeof(buf)); |
2702b1526 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1088 1089 |
copy = scnprintf(buf, copy, "2.6.%u%s", v, rest); ret = copy_to_user(release, buf, copy + 1); |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1090 1091 1092 |
} return ret; } |
e48fbb699 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1093 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1094 1095 1096 1097 |
{ int errno = 0; down_read(&uts_sem); |
e9ff3990f [PATCH] namespace... |
1098 |
if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof *name)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1099 1100 |
errno = -EFAULT; up_read(&uts_sem); |
e28cbf229 improve sys_newun... |
1101 |
|
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1102 1103 |
if (!errno && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) errno = -EFAULT; |
e28cbf229 improve sys_newun... |
1104 1105 |
if (!errno && override_architecture(name)) errno = -EFAULT; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1106 1107 |
return errno; } |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122 |
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME /* * Old cruft */ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name) { int error = 0; if (!name) return -EFAULT; down_read(&uts_sem); if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof(*name))) error = -EFAULT; up_read(&uts_sem); |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1123 1124 |
if (!error && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) error = -EFAULT; |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1125 1126 1127 1128 1129 1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139 1140 1141 1142 1143 1144 1145 1146 1147 1148 1149 1150 1151 1152 1153 1154 1155 1156 1157 1158 |
if (!error && override_architecture(name)) error = -EFAULT; return error; } SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name) { int error; if (!name) return -EFAULT; if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, sizeof(struct oldold_utsname))) return -EFAULT; down_read(&uts_sem); error = __copy_to_user(&name->sysname, &utsname()->sysname, __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __put_user(0, name->sysname + __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __copy_to_user(&name->nodename, &utsname()->nodename, __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __put_user(0, name->nodename + __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __copy_to_user(&name->release, &utsname()->release, __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __put_user(0, name->release + __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __copy_to_user(&name->version, &utsname()->version, __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __put_user(0, name->version + __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __copy_to_user(&name->machine, &utsname()->machine, __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __put_user(0, name->machine + __OLD_UTS_LEN); up_read(&uts_sem); if (!error && override_architecture(name)) error = -EFAULT; |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1159 1160 |
if (!error && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) error = -EFAULT; |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1161 1162 1163 |
return error ? -EFAULT : 0; } #endif |
5a8a82b1d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1164 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1165 1166 1167 |
{ int errno; char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
bb96a6f50 userns: allow set... |
1168 |
if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1169 |
return -EPERM; |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1170 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 |
if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) return -EINVAL; down_write(&uts_sem); errno = -EFAULT; if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1176 1177 1178 1179 |
struct new_utsname *u = utsname(); memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len); memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1180 |
errno = 0; |
499eea6bf sethostname/setdo... |
1181 |
uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_HOSTNAME); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1182 1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 |
} up_write(&uts_sem); return errno; } #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME |
5a8a82b1d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1188 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1189 1190 |
{ int i, errno; |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1191 |
struct new_utsname *u; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1192 1193 1194 1195 |
if (len < 0) return -EINVAL; down_read(&uts_sem); |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1196 1197 |
u = utsname(); i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1198 1199 1200 |
if (i > len) i = len; errno = 0; |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1201 |
if (copy_to_user(name, u->nodename, i)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 1210 1211 1212 |
errno = -EFAULT; up_read(&uts_sem); return errno; } #endif /* * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling * uname() */ |
5a8a82b1d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1213 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1214 1215 1216 |
{ int errno; char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1217 |
if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 1223 1224 |
return -EPERM; if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) return -EINVAL; down_write(&uts_sem); errno = -EFAULT; if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1225 1226 1227 1228 |
struct new_utsname *u = utsname(); memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len); memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1229 |
errno = 0; |
499eea6bf sethostname/setdo... |
1230 |
uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_DOMAINNAME); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1231 1232 1233 1234 |
} up_write(&uts_sem); return errno; } |
e48fbb699 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1235 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1236 |
{ |
b95183453 rlimits: switch m... |
1237 1238 1239 1240 1241 1242 1243 1244 |
struct rlimit value; int ret; ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &value); if (!ret) ret = copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0; return ret; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1245 1246 1247 1248 1249 1250 1251 |
} #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT /* * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps. */ |
e48fbb699 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1252 1253 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1254 1255 1256 1257 1258 1259 1260 1261 |
{ struct rlimit x; if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) return -EINVAL; task_lock(current->group_leader); x = current->signal->rlim[resource]; task_unlock(current->group_leader); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
1262 |
if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1263 |
x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
1264 |
if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1265 |
x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1266 |
return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1267 1268 1269 |
} #endif |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1270 1271 1272 1273 1274 1275 1276 1277 1278 1279 1280 1281 1282 1283 1284 1285 1286 1287 1288 1289 1290 1291 1292 1293 1294 1295 1296 1297 1298 1299 1300 1301 |
static inline bool rlim64_is_infinity(__u64 rlim64) { #if BITS_PER_LONG < 64 return rlim64 >= ULONG_MAX; #else return rlim64 == RLIM64_INFINITY; #endif } static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64) { if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY; else rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur; if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY) rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY; else rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max; } static void rlim64_to_rlim(const struct rlimit64 *rlim64, struct rlimit *rlim) { if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_cur)) rlim->rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY; else rlim->rlim_cur = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_cur; if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_max)) rlim->rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; else rlim->rlim_max = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_max; } |
1c1e618dd rlimits: allow se... |
1302 |
/* make sure you are allowed to change @tsk limits before calling this */ |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1303 1304 |
int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1305 |
{ |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1306 |
struct rlimit *rlim; |
86f162f4c rlimits: do secur... |
1307 |
int retval = 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1308 1309 1310 |
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) return -EINVAL; |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1311 1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317 |
if (new_rlim) { if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max) return -EINVAL; if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && new_rlim->rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open) return -EPERM; } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1318 |
|
1c1e618dd rlimits: allow se... |
1319 1320 1321 1322 1323 1324 |
/* protect tsk->signal and tsk->sighand from disappearing */ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); if (!tsk->sighand) { retval = -ESRCH; goto out; } |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1325 |
rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource; |
86f162f4c rlimits: do secur... |
1326 |
task_lock(tsk->group_leader); |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1327 |
if (new_rlim) { |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1328 1329 |
/* Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until cgroups can contain all limits */ |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1330 1331 1332 1333 1334 1335 1336 1337 1338 1339 1340 1341 1342 1343 1344 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 |
if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) retval = -EPERM; if (!retval) retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk->group_leader, resource, new_rlim); if (resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim->rlim_cur == 0) { /* * The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU * expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was * never set". So let's cheat and make it one second * instead */ new_rlim->rlim_cur = 1; } } if (!retval) { if (old_rlim) *old_rlim = *rlim; if (new_rlim) *rlim = *new_rlim; |
9926e4c74 CPU time limit pa... |
1351 |
} |
7855c35da rlimits: split sy... |
1352 |
task_unlock(tsk->group_leader); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1353 |
|
d3561f78f [PATCH] RLIMIT_CP... |
1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359 |
/* * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error * code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a * very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of * applications, so we live with it */ |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1360 1361 1362 |
if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) update_rlimit_cpu(tsk, new_rlim->rlim_cur); |
ec9e16bac [PATCH] sys_setrl... |
1363 |
out: |
1c1e618dd rlimits: allow se... |
1364 |
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
2fb9d2689 rlimits: make sur... |
1365 |
return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1366 |
} |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1367 1368 1369 1370 |
/* rcu lock must be held */ static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1371 1372 |
if (current == task) return 0; |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1373 |
|
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1374 |
tcred = __task_cred(task); |
5af662030 userns: Convert p... |
1375 1376 1377 1378 1379 1380 |
if (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) && uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) && uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) && gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) && gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) && gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid)) |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1381 |
return 0; |
c4a4d6037 userns: Use cred-... |
1382 |
if (ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1383 1384 1385 |
return 0; return -EPERM; |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1386 1387 1388 1389 1390 1391 1392 1393 1394 1395 1396 1397 1398 1399 1400 1401 1402 1403 1404 1405 1406 1407 1408 1409 1410 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 |
} SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource, const struct rlimit64 __user *, new_rlim, struct rlimit64 __user *, old_rlim) { struct rlimit64 old64, new64; struct rlimit old, new; struct task_struct *tsk; int ret; if (new_rlim) { if (copy_from_user(&new64, new_rlim, sizeof(new64))) return -EFAULT; rlim64_to_rlim(&new64, &new); } rcu_read_lock(); tsk = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current; if (!tsk) { rcu_read_unlock(); return -ESRCH; } ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk); if (ret) { rcu_read_unlock(); return ret; } get_task_struct(tsk); rcu_read_unlock(); ret = do_prlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim ? &new : NULL, old_rlim ? &old : NULL); if (!ret && old_rlim) { rlim_to_rlim64(&old, &old64); if (copy_to_user(old_rlim, &old64, sizeof(old64))) ret = -EFAULT; } put_task_struct(tsk); return ret; } |
7855c35da rlimits: split sy... |
1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) { struct rlimit new_rlim; if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim))) return -EFAULT; |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1435 |
return do_prlimit(current, resource, &new_rlim, NULL); |
7855c35da rlimits: split sy... |
1436 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1437 1438 1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 |
/* * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct, * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not * measuring them yet). * |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1445 1446 1447 1448 1449 1450 1451 |
* When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping. |
2dd0ebcd2 [PATCH] Avoid tak... |
1452 |
* |
de047c1bc [PATCH] avoid tas... |
1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 |
* Locking: * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with * the siglock held. * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock. * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal-> * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple. |
2dd0ebcd2 [PATCH] Avoid tak... |
1467 |
* |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1468 |
*/ |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
1469 |
static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r) |
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1470 |
{ |
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 |
r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw; r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw; r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt; r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt; r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t); r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1478 1479 1480 1481 |
static void k_getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) { struct task_struct *t; unsigned long flags; |
0cf55e1ec sched, cputime: I... |
1482 |
cputime_t tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime; |
1f10206cf getrusage: fill r... |
1483 |
unsigned long maxrss = 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1484 |
|
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1485 |
memset((char *)r, 0, sizeof (*r)); |
648616343 [S390] cputime: a... |
1486 |
utime = stime = 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1487 |
|
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1488 |
if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) { |
e80d0a1ae cputime: Rename t... |
1489 |
task_cputime_adjusted(current, &utime, &stime); |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
1490 |
accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r); |
1f10206cf getrusage: fill r... |
1491 |
maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; |
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1492 1493 |
goto out; } |
d6cf723a1 k_getrusage: don'... |
1494 |
if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) |
de047c1bc [PATCH] avoid tas... |
1495 |
return; |
0f59cc4a3 [PATCH] simplify ... |
1496 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1497 |
switch (who) { |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1498 1499 1500 1501 1502 1503 1504 1505 1506 1507 1508 1509 1510 |
case RUSAGE_BOTH: case RUSAGE_CHILDREN: utime = p->signal->cutime; stime = p->signal->cstime; r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw; r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw; r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt; r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt; r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock; r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock; maxrss = p->signal->cmaxrss; if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1511 |
break; |
0f59cc4a3 [PATCH] simplify ... |
1512 |
|
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1513 1514 1515 1516 1517 1518 1519 1520 1521 1522 1523 1524 1525 1526 1527 1528 1529 1530 1531 1532 |
case RUSAGE_SELF: thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime); utime += tgutime; stime += tgstime; r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw; r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw; r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt; r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt; r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock; r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock; if (maxrss < p->signal->maxrss) maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; t = p; do { accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r); } while_each_thread(p, t); break; default: BUG(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1533 |
} |
de047c1bc [PATCH] avoid tas... |
1534 |
unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags); |
de047c1bc [PATCH] avoid tas... |
1535 |
|
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1536 |
out: |
0f59cc4a3 [PATCH] simplify ... |
1537 1538 |
cputime_to_timeval(utime, &r->ru_utime); cputime_to_timeval(stime, &r->ru_stime); |
1f10206cf getrusage: fill r... |
1539 1540 1541 |
if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) { struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p); |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1542 |
|
1f10206cf getrusage: fill r... |
1543 1544 1545 1546 1547 1548 |
if (mm) { setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm); mmput(mm); } } r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* convert pages to KBs */ |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1549 1550 1551 1552 1553 |
} int getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage __user *ru) { struct rusage r; |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1554 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1555 |
k_getrusage(p, who, &r); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1556 1557 |
return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0; } |
e48fbb699 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1558 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1559 |
{ |
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1560 1561 |
if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && who != RUSAGE_THREAD) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1562 1563 1564 |
return -EINVAL; return getrusage(current, who, ru); } |
8d2d5c4a2 switch getrusage(... |
1565 1566 1567 1568 1569 1570 1571 1572 1573 1574 1575 1576 1577 |
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct compat_rusage __user *, ru) { struct rusage r; if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && who != RUSAGE_THREAD) return -EINVAL; k_getrusage(current, who, &r); return put_compat_rusage(&r, ru); } #endif |
e48fbb699 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1578 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1579 1580 1581 1582 |
{ mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO); return mask; } |
3b7391de6 capabilities: int... |
1583 |
|
71fe97e18 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1584 |
static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd) |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1585 |
{ |
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1586 |
struct fd exe; |
496ad9aa8 new helper: file_... |
1587 |
struct inode *inode; |
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1588 |
int err; |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1589 |
|
96dad67ff mm: use VM_BUG_ON... |
1590 |
VM_BUG_ON_MM(!rwsem_is_locked(&mm->mmap_sem), mm); |
71fe97e18 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1591 |
|
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1592 1593 |
exe = fdget(fd); if (!exe.file) |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1594 |
return -EBADF; |
496ad9aa8 new helper: file_... |
1595 |
inode = file_inode(exe.file); |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1596 1597 1598 1599 1600 1601 1602 |
/* * Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make * sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an * overall picture. */ err = -EACCES; |
496ad9aa8 new helper: file_... |
1603 |
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || |
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1604 |
exe.file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1605 |
goto exit; |
496ad9aa8 new helper: file_... |
1606 |
err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC); |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1607 1608 |
if (err) goto exit; |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1609 |
/* |
4229fb1dc c/r: prctl: less ... |
1610 |
* Forbid mm->exe_file change if old file still mapped. |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1611 1612 |
*/ err = -EBUSY; |
4229fb1dc c/r: prctl: less ... |
1613 1614 1615 1616 1617 1618 1619 |
if (mm->exe_file) { struct vm_area_struct *vma; for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) if (vma->vm_file && path_equal(&vma->vm_file->f_path, &mm->exe_file->f_path)) |
71fe97e18 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1620 |
goto exit; |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1621 |
} |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1622 1623 1624 1625 1626 1627 |
/* * The symlink can be changed only once, just to disallow arbitrary * transitions malicious software might bring in. This means one * could make a snapshot over all processes running and monitor * /proc/pid/exe changes to notice unusual activity if needed. */ |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1628 1629 |
err = -EPERM; if (test_and_set_bit(MMF_EXE_FILE_CHANGED, &mm->flags)) |
71fe97e18 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1630 |
goto exit; |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1631 |
|
4229fb1dc c/r: prctl: less ... |
1632 |
err = 0; |
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1633 |
set_mm_exe_file(mm, exe.file); /* this grabs a reference to exe.file */ |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1634 |
exit: |
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1635 |
fdput(exe); |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1636 1637 |
return err; } |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 |
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE /* * WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful * in what is allowed for modification from userspace. */ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) { unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE; struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; int error = -EINVAL, i; static const unsigned char offsets[] = { offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_code), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_code), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_data), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_data), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_brk), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, brk), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_stack), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_start), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_end), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_start), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_end), }; /* * Make sure the members are not somewhere outside * of allowed address space. */ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(offsets); i++) { u64 val = *(u64 *)((char *)prctl_map + offsets[i]); if ((unsigned long)val >= mmap_max_addr || (unsigned long)val < mmap_min_addr) goto out; } /* * Make sure the pairs are ordered. */ #define __prctl_check_order(__m1, __op, __m2) \ ((unsigned long)prctl_map->__m1 __op \ (unsigned long)prctl_map->__m2) ? 0 : -EINVAL error = __prctl_check_order(start_code, <, end_code); error |= __prctl_check_order(start_data, <, end_data); error |= __prctl_check_order(start_brk, <=, brk); error |= __prctl_check_order(arg_start, <=, arg_end); error |= __prctl_check_order(env_start, <=, env_end); if (error) goto out; #undef __prctl_check_order error = -EINVAL; /* * @brk should be after @end_data in traditional maps. */ if (prctl_map->start_brk <= prctl_map->end_data || prctl_map->brk <= prctl_map->end_data) goto out; /* * Neither we should allow to override limits if they set. */ if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), prctl_map->brk, prctl_map->start_brk, prctl_map->end_data, prctl_map->start_data)) goto out; /* * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector. */ if (prctl_map->auxv_size) { if (!prctl_map->auxv || prctl_map->auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)) goto out; } /* * Finally, make sure the caller has the rights to * change /proc/pid/exe link: only local root should * be allowed to. */ if (prctl_map->exe_fd != (u32)-1) { struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); if (!uid_eq(cred->uid, make_kuid(ns, 0)) || !gid_eq(cred->gid, make_kgid(ns, 0))) goto out; } error = 0; out: return error; } static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data_size) { struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { .exe_fd = (u32)-1, }; unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE]; struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; int error; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct prctl_mm_map) > 256); if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE) return put_user((unsigned int)sizeof(prctl_map), (unsigned int __user *)addr); if (data_size != sizeof(prctl_map)) return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_user(&prctl_map, addr, sizeof(prctl_map))) return -EFAULT; error = validate_prctl_map(&prctl_map); if (error) return error; if (prctl_map.auxv_size) { memset(user_auxv, 0, sizeof(user_auxv)); if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)prctl_map.auxv, prctl_map.auxv_size)) return -EFAULT; /* Last entry must be AT_NULL as specification requires */ user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = AT_NULL; user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = AT_NULL; } down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd); downgrade_write(&mm->mmap_sem); if (error) goto out; /* * We don't validate if these members are pointing to * real present VMAs because application may have correspond * VMAs already unmapped and kernel uses these members for statistics * output in procfs mostly, except * * - @start_brk/@brk which are used in do_brk but kernel lookups * for VMAs when updating these memvers so anything wrong written * here cause kernel to swear at userspace program but won't lead * to any problem in kernel itself */ mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code; mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code; mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data; mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data; mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk; mm->brk = prctl_map.brk; mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack; mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start; mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end; mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start; mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end; /* * Note this update of @saved_auxv is lockless thus * if someone reads this member in procfs while we're * updating -- it may get partly updated results. It's * known and acceptable trade off: we leave it as is to * not introduce additional locks here making the kernel * more complex. */ if (prctl_map.auxv_size) memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, sizeof(user_auxv)); error = 0; out: up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); return error; } #endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1818 1819 1820 |
static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1821 |
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1822 1823 |
struct vm_area_struct *vma; int error; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1824 |
|
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1825 1826 1827 |
if (arg5 || (arg4 && (opt != PR_SET_MM_AUXV && opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP && opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE))) |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1828 |
return -EINVAL; |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1829 1830 1831 1832 |
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP || opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE) return prctl_set_mm_map(opt, (const void __user *)addr, arg4); #endif |
79f0713d4 prctl: use CAP_SY... |
1833 |
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1834 |
return -EPERM; |
71fe97e18 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 |
if (opt == PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE) { down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked(mm, (unsigned int)addr); up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); return error; } |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1841 |
|
1ad75b9e1 c/r: prctl: add m... |
1842 |
if (addr >= TASK_SIZE || addr < mmap_min_addr) |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1843 |
return -EINVAL; |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1844 |
error = -EINVAL; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1845 1846 |
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); vma = find_vma(mm, addr); |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1847 1848 |
switch (opt) { case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE: |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1849 1850 |
mm->start_code = addr; break; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1851 |
case PR_SET_MM_END_CODE: |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1852 |
mm->end_code = addr; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1853 |
break; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1854 |
case PR_SET_MM_START_DATA: |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1855 |
mm->start_data = addr; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1856 |
break; |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1857 1858 |
case PR_SET_MM_END_DATA: mm->end_data = addr; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 |
break; case PR_SET_MM_START_BRK: if (addr <= mm->end_data) goto out; |
8764b338b mm: use may_adjus... |
1864 1865 |
if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), mm->brk, addr, mm->end_data, mm->start_data)) |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 |
goto out; mm->start_brk = addr; break; case PR_SET_MM_BRK: if (addr <= mm->end_data) goto out; |
8764b338b mm: use may_adjus... |
1874 1875 |
if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), addr, mm->start_brk, mm->end_data, mm->start_data)) |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1876 1877 1878 1879 |
goto out; mm->brk = addr; break; |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 |
/* * If command line arguments and environment * are placed somewhere else on stack, we can * set them up here, ARG_START/END to setup * command line argumets and ENV_START/END * for environment. */ case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK: case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START: case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END: case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START: case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END: if (!vma) { error = -EFAULT; goto out; } |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 |
if (opt == PR_SET_MM_START_STACK) mm->start_stack = addr; else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ARG_START) mm->arg_start = addr; else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ARG_END) mm->arg_end = addr; else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ENV_START) mm->env_start = addr; else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ENV_END) mm->env_end = addr; break; /* * This doesn't move auxiliary vector itself * since it's pinned to mm_struct, but allow * to fill vector with new values. It's up * to a caller to provide sane values here * otherwise user space tools which use this * vector might be unhappy. */ case PR_SET_MM_AUXV: { unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE]; if (arg4 > sizeof(user_auxv)) goto out; up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)addr, arg4)) return -EFAULT; /* Make sure the last entry is always AT_NULL */ user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = 0; user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = 0; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)); task_lock(current); memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, arg4); task_unlock(current); return 0; } |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1938 |
default: |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1939 1940 1941 1942 |
goto out; } error = 0; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1943 1944 |
out: up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1945 1946 |
return error; } |
300f786b2 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1947 |
|
52b369415 kernel/sys.c: mak... |
1948 |
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE |
300f786b2 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1949 1950 1951 1952 |
static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr) { return put_user(me->clear_child_tid, tid_addr); } |
52b369415 kernel/sys.c: mak... |
1953 |
#else |
300f786b2 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1954 1955 1956 1957 |
static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr) { return -EINVAL; } |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1958 |
#endif |
c4ea37c26 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1959 1960 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1961 |
{ |
b6dff3ec5 CRED: Separate ta... |
1962 1963 1964 |
struct task_struct *me = current; unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)]; long error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1965 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
1966 1967 |
error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); if (error != -ENOSYS) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1968 |
return error; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
1969 |
error = 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1970 |
switch (option) { |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
1971 1972 1973 |
case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG: if (!valid_signal(arg2)) { error = -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1974 |
break; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 |
} me->pdeath_signal = arg2; break; case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG: error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2); break; case PR_GET_DUMPABLE: error = get_dumpable(me->mm); break; case PR_SET_DUMPABLE: if (arg2 != SUID_DUMP_DISABLE && arg2 != SUID_DUMP_USER) { error = -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1987 |
break; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
1988 1989 1990 |
} set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2); break; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1991 |
|
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 2041 2042 2043 2044 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050 2051 2052 2053 2054 2055 2056 2057 2058 2059 |
case PR_SET_UNALIGN: error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_UNALIGN: error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_FPEMU: error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_FPEMU: error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_FPEXC: error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_FPEXC: error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_TIMING: error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL; break; case PR_SET_TIMING: if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL) error = -EINVAL; break; case PR_SET_NAME: comm[sizeof(me->comm) - 1] = 0; if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2, sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0) return -EFAULT; set_task_comm(me, comm); proc_comm_connector(me); break; case PR_GET_NAME: get_task_comm(comm, me); if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, sizeof(comm))) return -EFAULT; break; case PR_GET_ENDIAN: error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_ENDIAN: error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_SECCOMP: error = prctl_get_seccomp(); break; case PR_SET_SECCOMP: error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3); break; case PR_GET_TSC: error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2); break; case PR_SET_TSC: error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2); break; case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE: error = perf_event_task_disable(); break; case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE: error = perf_event_task_enable(); break; case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK: error = current->timer_slack_ns; break; case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK: if (arg2 <= 0) current->timer_slack_ns = |
6976675d9 hrtimer: create a... |
2060 |
current->default_timer_slack_ns; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2061 2062 2063 2064 2065 2066 2067 2068 2069 |
else current->timer_slack_ns = arg2; break; case PR_MCE_KILL: if (arg4 | arg5) return -EINVAL; switch (arg2) { case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR: if (arg3 != 0) |
4db96cf07 HWPOISON: Add PR_... |
2070 |
return -EINVAL; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2071 |
current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS; |
4db96cf07 HWPOISON: Add PR_... |
2072 |
break; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2073 2074 2075 2076 2077 2078 2079 2080 2081 |
case PR_MCE_KILL_SET: current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS; if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY) current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY; else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE) current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY; else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT) current->flags &= ~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS); |
1087e9b4f HWPOISON: Clean u... |
2082 |
else |
259e5e6c7 Add PR_{GET,SET}_... |
2083 |
return -EINVAL; |
259e5e6c7 Add PR_{GET,SET}_... |
2084 |
break; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2085 |
default: |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2086 2087 2088 2089 2090 2091 2092 2093 2094 2095 2096 2097 2098 2099 2100 2101 2102 2103 2104 2105 2106 2107 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 |
return -EINVAL; } break; case PR_MCE_KILL_GET: if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5) return -EINVAL; if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS) error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ? PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE; else error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT; break; case PR_SET_MM: error = prctl_set_mm(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); break; case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS: error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user **)arg2); break; case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2; break; case PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: error = put_user(me->signal->is_child_subreaper, (int __user *)arg2); break; case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |
1d4457f99 sched: move no_ne... |
2114 |
task_set_no_new_privs(current); |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2115 2116 2117 2118 |
break; case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |
1d4457f99 sched: move no_ne... |
2119 |
return task_no_new_privs(current) ? 1 : 0; |
a0715cc22 mm, thp: add VM_I... |
2120 2121 2122 2123 2124 2125 2126 2127 2128 2129 2130 2131 2132 2133 2134 |
case PR_GET_THP_DISABLE: if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; error = !!(me->mm->def_flags & VM_NOHUGEPAGE); break; case PR_SET_THP_DISABLE: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; down_write(&me->mm->mmap_sem); if (arg2) me->mm->def_flags |= VM_NOHUGEPAGE; else me->mm->def_flags &= ~VM_NOHUGEPAGE; up_write(&me->mm->mmap_sem); break; |
fe3d197f8 x86, mpx: On-dema... |
2135 2136 2137 2138 2139 2140 |
case PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT: error = MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT(me); break; case PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT: error = MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT(me); break; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2141 2142 2143 |
default: error = -EINVAL; break; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2144 2145 2146 |
} return error; } |
3cfc348bf [PATCH] x86: Add ... |
2147 |
|
836f92adf [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
2148 2149 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep, struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused) |
3cfc348bf [PATCH] x86: Add ... |
2150 2151 2152 |
{ int err = 0; int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
2153 |
|
3cfc348bf [PATCH] x86: Add ... |
2154 2155 2156 2157 |
if (cpup) err |= put_user(cpu, cpup); if (nodep) err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep); |
3cfc348bf [PATCH] x86: Add ... |
2158 2159 |
return err ? -EFAULT : 0; } |
10a0a8d4e Add common orderl... |
2160 |
|
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
2161 2162 2163 2164 2165 2166 2167 2168 2169 2170 2171 |
/** * do_sysinfo - fill in sysinfo struct * @info: pointer to buffer to fill */ static int do_sysinfo(struct sysinfo *info) { unsigned long mem_total, sav_total; unsigned int mem_unit, bitcount; struct timespec tp; memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct sysinfo)); |
45c64940c kernel/sys.c:do_s... |
2172 |
get_monotonic_boottime(&tp); |
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
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info->uptime = tp.tv_sec + (tp.tv_nsec ? 1 : 0); get_avenrun(info->loads, 0, SI_LOAD_SHIFT - FSHIFT); info->procs = nr_threads; si_meminfo(info); si_swapinfo(info); /* * If the sum of all the available memory (i.e. ram + swap) * is less than can be stored in a 32 bit unsigned long then * we can be binary compatible with 2.2.x kernels. If not, * well, in that case 2.2.x was broken anyways... * * -Erik Andersen <andersee@debian.org> */ mem_total = info->totalram + info->totalswap; if (mem_total < info->totalram || mem_total < info->totalswap) goto out; bitcount = 0; mem_unit = info->mem_unit; while (mem_unit > 1) { bitcount++; mem_unit >>= 1; sav_total = mem_total; mem_total <<= 1; if (mem_total < sav_total) goto out; } /* * If mem_total did not overflow, multiply all memory values by * info->mem_unit and set it to 1. This leaves things compatible * with 2.2.x, and also retains compatibility with earlier 2.4.x * kernels... */ info->mem_unit = 1; info->totalram <<= bitcount; info->freeram <<= bitcount; info->sharedram <<= bitcount; info->bufferram <<= bitcount; info->totalswap <<= bitcount; info->freeswap <<= bitcount; info->totalhigh <<= bitcount; info->freehigh <<= bitcount; out: return 0; } SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct sysinfo __user *, info) { struct sysinfo val; do_sysinfo(&val); if (copy_to_user(info, &val, sizeof(struct sysinfo))) return -EFAULT; return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT struct compat_sysinfo { s32 uptime; u32 loads[3]; u32 totalram; u32 freeram; u32 sharedram; u32 bufferram; u32 totalswap; u32 freeswap; u16 procs; u16 pad; u32 totalhigh; u32 freehigh; u32 mem_unit; char _f[20-2*sizeof(u32)-sizeof(int)]; }; COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info) { struct sysinfo s; do_sysinfo(&s); /* Check to see if any memory value is too large for 32-bit and scale * down if needed */ |
0baae41ea kernel/sys.c: com... |
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if (upper_32_bits(s.totalram) || upper_32_bits(s.totalswap)) { |
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
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int bitcount = 0; while (s.mem_unit < PAGE_SIZE) { s.mem_unit <<= 1; bitcount++; } s.totalram >>= bitcount; s.freeram >>= bitcount; s.sharedram >>= bitcount; s.bufferram >>= bitcount; s.totalswap >>= bitcount; s.freeswap >>= bitcount; s.totalhigh >>= bitcount; s.freehigh >>= bitcount; } if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, info, sizeof(struct compat_sysinfo)) || __put_user(s.uptime, &info->uptime) || __put_user(s.loads[0], &info->loads[0]) || __put_user(s.loads[1], &info->loads[1]) || __put_user(s.loads[2], &info->loads[2]) || __put_user(s.totalram, &info->totalram) || __put_user(s.freeram, &info->freeram) || __put_user(s.sharedram, &info->sharedram) || __put_user(s.bufferram, &info->bufferram) || __put_user(s.totalswap, &info->totalswap) || __put_user(s.freeswap, &info->freeswap) || __put_user(s.procs, &info->procs) || __put_user(s.totalhigh, &info->totalhigh) || __put_user(s.freehigh, &info->freehigh) || __put_user(s.mem_unit, &info->mem_unit)) return -EFAULT; return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ |