/*
   *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
   *  modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
   *  published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
   *  License.
   */

  #include <linux/export.h>

  #include <linux/nsproxy.h>

  #include <linux/slab.h>

  #include <linux/user_namespace.h>

  #include <linux/proc_ns.h>

  #include <linux/highuid.h>

  #include <linux/cred.h>

  #include <linux/securebits.h>

  #include <linux/keyctl.h>
  #include <linux/key-type.h>
  #include <keys/user-type.h>
  #include <linux/seq_file.h>
  #include <linux/fs.h>
  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
  #include <linux/ctype.h>

  #include <linux/projid.h>

  #include <linux/fs_struct.h>

  static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;

  static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);

  static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
  				struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,

  				struct uid_gid_map *map);

  static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns)
  {
  	/* Start with the same capabilities as init but useless for doing
  	 * anything as the capabilities are bound to the new user namespace.
  	 */
  	cred->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
  	cred->cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
  	cred->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET;
  	cred->cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET;
  	cred->cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET;
  #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
  	key_put(cred->request_key_auth);
  	cred->request_key_auth = NULL;
  #endif
  	/* tgcred will be cleared in our caller bc CLONE_THREAD won't be set */
  	cred->user_ns = user_ns;
  }

  /*

   * Create a new user namespace, deriving the creator from the user in the
   * passed credentials, and replacing that user with the new root user for the
   * new namespace.
   *
   * This is called by copy_creds(), which will finish setting the target task's
   * credentials.

   */

  int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)

  {

  	struct user_namespace *ns, *parent_ns = new->user_ns;

  	kuid_t owner = new->euid;
  	kgid_t group = new->egid;

  	int ret;

  	if (parent_ns->level > 32)
  		return -EUSERS;

  	/*
  	 * Verify that we can not violate the policy of which files
  	 * may be accessed that is specified by the root directory,
  	 * by verifing that the root directory is at the root of the
  	 * mount namespace which allows all files to be accessed.
  	 */
  	if (current_chrooted())
  		return -EPERM;

  	/* The creator needs a mapping in the parent user namespace
  	 * or else we won't be able to reasonably tell userspace who
  	 * created a user_namespace.
  	 */
  	if (!kuid_has_mapping(parent_ns, owner) ||
  	    !kgid_has_mapping(parent_ns, group))
  		return -EPERM;

  	ns = kmem_cache_zalloc(user_ns_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);

  	if (!ns)

  		return -ENOMEM;

  	ret = ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns);

  	if (ret) {
  		kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
  		return ret;
  	}

  	ns->ns.ops = &userns_operations;

  	atomic_set(&ns->count, 1);

  	/* Leave the new->user_ns reference with the new user namespace. */

  	ns->parent = parent_ns;

  	ns->level = parent_ns->level + 1;

  	ns->owner = owner;
  	ns->group = group;

  	/* Inherit USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from our parent */
  	mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
  	ns->flags = parent_ns->flags;
  	mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);

  	set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);

  #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
  	init_rwsem(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem);
  #endif

  	return 0;

  }

  int unshare_userns(unsigned long unshare_flags, struct cred **new_cred)
  {
  	struct cred *cred;

  	int err = -ENOMEM;

  
  	if (!(unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER))
  		return 0;
  
  	cred = prepare_creds();

  	if (cred) {
  		err = create_user_ns(cred);
  		if (err)
  			put_cred(cred);
  		else
  			*new_cred = cred;
  	}

  	return err;

  }

  void free_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)

  {

  	struct user_namespace *parent;

  	do {
  		parent = ns->parent;

  #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
  		key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
  #endif

  		ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);

  		kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
  		ns = parent;
  	} while (atomic_dec_and_test(&parent->count));

  }

  EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_user_ns);

  static u32 map_id_range_down(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id, u32 count)

  {

  	unsigned idx, extents;
  	u32 first, last, id2;

  	id2 = id + count - 1;

  	/* Find the matching extent */
  	extents = map->nr_extents;

  	smp_rmb();

  	for (idx = 0; idx < extents; idx++) {
  		first = map->extent[idx].first;
  		last = first + map->extent[idx].count - 1;
  		if (id >= first && id <= last &&
  		    (id2 >= first && id2 <= last))
  			break;
  	}
  	/* Map the id or note failure */
  	if (idx < extents)
  		id = (id - first) + map->extent[idx].lower_first;
  	else
  		id = (u32) -1;
  
  	return id;
  }
  
  static u32 map_id_down(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id)
  {
  	unsigned idx, extents;
  	u32 first, last;
  
  	/* Find the matching extent */
  	extents = map->nr_extents;

  	smp_rmb();

  	for (idx = 0; idx < extents; idx++) {
  		first = map->extent[idx].first;
  		last = first + map->extent[idx].count - 1;
  		if (id >= first && id <= last)
  			break;
  	}
  	/* Map the id or note failure */
  	if (idx < extents)
  		id = (id - first) + map->extent[idx].lower_first;
  	else
  		id = (u32) -1;
  
  	return id;
  }
  
  static u32 map_id_up(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id)
  {
  	unsigned idx, extents;
  	u32 first, last;
  
  	/* Find the matching extent */
  	extents = map->nr_extents;

  	smp_rmb();

  	for (idx = 0; idx < extents; idx++) {
  		first = map->extent[idx].lower_first;
  		last = first + map->extent[idx].count - 1;
  		if (id >= first && id <= last)
  			break;

  	}

  	/* Map the id or note failure */
  	if (idx < extents)
  		id = (id - first) + map->extent[idx].first;
  	else
  		id = (u32) -1;
  
  	return id;
  }
  
  /**
   *	make_kuid - Map a user-namespace uid pair into a kuid.
   *	@ns:  User namespace that the uid is in
   *	@uid: User identifier
   *
   *	Maps a user-namespace uid pair into a kernel internal kuid,
   *	and returns that kuid.
   *
   *	When there is no mapping defined for the user-namespace uid
   *	pair INVALID_UID is returned.  Callers are expected to test

   *	for and handle INVALID_UID being returned.  INVALID_UID

   *	may be tested for using uid_valid().
   */
  kuid_t make_kuid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t uid)
  {
  	/* Map the uid to a global kernel uid */
  	return KUIDT_INIT(map_id_down(&ns->uid_map, uid));
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL(make_kuid);
  
  /**
   *	from_kuid - Create a uid from a kuid user-namespace pair.
   *	@targ: The user namespace we want a uid in.
   *	@kuid: The kernel internal uid to start with.
   *
   *	Map @kuid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and
   *	return the resulting uid.
   *
   *	There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace.
   *
   *	If @kuid has no mapping in @targ (uid_t)-1 is returned.
   */
  uid_t from_kuid(struct user_namespace *targ, kuid_t kuid)
  {
  	/* Map the uid from a global kernel uid */
  	return map_id_up(&targ->uid_map, __kuid_val(kuid));
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kuid);
  
  /**
   *	from_kuid_munged - Create a uid from a kuid user-namespace pair.
   *	@targ: The user namespace we want a uid in.
   *	@kuid: The kernel internal uid to start with.
   *
   *	Map @kuid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and
   *	return the resulting uid.
   *
   *	There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace.
   *
   *	Unlike from_kuid from_kuid_munged never fails and always
   *	returns a valid uid.  This makes from_kuid_munged appropriate
   *	for use in syscalls like stat and getuid where failing the
   *	system call and failing to provide a valid uid are not an
   *	options.
   *
   *	If @kuid has no mapping in @targ overflowuid is returned.
   */
  uid_t from_kuid_munged(struct user_namespace *targ, kuid_t kuid)
  {
  	uid_t uid;
  	uid = from_kuid(targ, kuid);
  
  	if (uid == (uid_t) -1)
  		uid = overflowuid;
  	return uid;
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kuid_munged);
  
  /**
   *	make_kgid - Map a user-namespace gid pair into a kgid.
   *	@ns:  User namespace that the gid is in

   *	@gid: group identifier

   *
   *	Maps a user-namespace gid pair into a kernel internal kgid,
   *	and returns that kgid.
   *
   *	When there is no mapping defined for the user-namespace gid
   *	pair INVALID_GID is returned.  Callers are expected to test
   *	for and handle INVALID_GID being returned.  INVALID_GID may be
   *	tested for using gid_valid().
   */
  kgid_t make_kgid(struct user_namespace *ns, gid_t gid)
  {
  	/* Map the gid to a global kernel gid */
  	return KGIDT_INIT(map_id_down(&ns->gid_map, gid));
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL(make_kgid);
  
  /**
   *	from_kgid - Create a gid from a kgid user-namespace pair.
   *	@targ: The user namespace we want a gid in.
   *	@kgid: The kernel internal gid to start with.
   *
   *	Map @kgid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and
   *	return the resulting gid.
   *
   *	There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace.
   *
   *	If @kgid has no mapping in @targ (gid_t)-1 is returned.
   */
  gid_t from_kgid(struct user_namespace *targ, kgid_t kgid)
  {
  	/* Map the gid from a global kernel gid */
  	return map_id_up(&targ->gid_map, __kgid_val(kgid));
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kgid);
  
  /**
   *	from_kgid_munged - Create a gid from a kgid user-namespace pair.
   *	@targ: The user namespace we want a gid in.
   *	@kgid: The kernel internal gid to start with.
   *
   *	Map @kgid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and
   *	return the resulting gid.
   *
   *	There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace.
   *
   *	Unlike from_kgid from_kgid_munged never fails and always
   *	returns a valid gid.  This makes from_kgid_munged appropriate
   *	for use in syscalls like stat and getgid where failing the
   *	system call and failing to provide a valid gid are not options.
   *
   *	If @kgid has no mapping in @targ overflowgid is returned.
   */
  gid_t from_kgid_munged(struct user_namespace *targ, kgid_t kgid)
  {
  	gid_t gid;
  	gid = from_kgid(targ, kgid);
  
  	if (gid == (gid_t) -1)
  		gid = overflowgid;
  	return gid;
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kgid_munged);

  /**
   *	make_kprojid - Map a user-namespace projid pair into a kprojid.
   *	@ns:  User namespace that the projid is in
   *	@projid: Project identifier
   *
   *	Maps a user-namespace uid pair into a kernel internal kuid,
   *	and returns that kuid.
   *
   *	When there is no mapping defined for the user-namespace projid
   *	pair INVALID_PROJID is returned.  Callers are expected to test
   *	for and handle handle INVALID_PROJID being returned.  INVALID_PROJID
   *	may be tested for using projid_valid().
   */
  kprojid_t make_kprojid(struct user_namespace *ns, projid_t projid)
  {
  	/* Map the uid to a global kernel uid */
  	return KPROJIDT_INIT(map_id_down(&ns->projid_map, projid));
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL(make_kprojid);
  
  /**
   *	from_kprojid - Create a projid from a kprojid user-namespace pair.
   *	@targ: The user namespace we want a projid in.
   *	@kprojid: The kernel internal project identifier to start with.
   *
   *	Map @kprojid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and
   *	return the resulting projid.
   *
   *	There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace.
   *
   *	If @kprojid has no mapping in @targ (projid_t)-1 is returned.
   */
  projid_t from_kprojid(struct user_namespace *targ, kprojid_t kprojid)
  {
  	/* Map the uid from a global kernel uid */
  	return map_id_up(&targ->projid_map, __kprojid_val(kprojid));
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kprojid);
  
  /**
   *	from_kprojid_munged - Create a projiid from a kprojid user-namespace pair.
   *	@targ: The user namespace we want a projid in.
   *	@kprojid: The kernel internal projid to start with.
   *
   *	Map @kprojid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and
   *	return the resulting projid.
   *
   *	There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace.
   *
   *	Unlike from_kprojid from_kprojid_munged never fails and always
   *	returns a valid projid.  This makes from_kprojid_munged
   *	appropriate for use in syscalls like stat and where
   *	failing the system call and failing to provide a valid projid are
   *	not an options.
   *
   *	If @kprojid has no mapping in @targ OVERFLOW_PROJID is returned.
   */
  projid_t from_kprojid_munged(struct user_namespace *targ, kprojid_t kprojid)
  {
  	projid_t projid;
  	projid = from_kprojid(targ, kprojid);
  
  	if (projid == (projid_t) -1)
  		projid = OVERFLOW_PROJID;
  	return projid;
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kprojid_munged);

  static int uid_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
  {
  	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
  	struct uid_gid_extent *extent = v;
  	struct user_namespace *lower_ns;
  	uid_t lower;

  	lower_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);

  	if ((lower_ns == ns) && lower_ns->parent)
  		lower_ns = lower_ns->parent;
  
  	lower = from_kuid(lower_ns, KUIDT_INIT(extent->lower_first));
  
  	seq_printf(seq, "%10u %10u %10u
  ",
  		extent->first,
  		lower,
  		extent->count);
  
  	return 0;

  }

  static int gid_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)

  {

  	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
  	struct uid_gid_extent *extent = v;
  	struct user_namespace *lower_ns;
  	gid_t lower;

  	lower_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);

  	if ((lower_ns == ns) && lower_ns->parent)
  		lower_ns = lower_ns->parent;

  	lower = from_kgid(lower_ns, KGIDT_INIT(extent->lower_first));
  
  	seq_printf(seq, "%10u %10u %10u
  ",
  		extent->first,
  		lower,
  		extent->count);
  
  	return 0;
  }

  static int projid_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
  {
  	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
  	struct uid_gid_extent *extent = v;
  	struct user_namespace *lower_ns;
  	projid_t lower;
  
  	lower_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);
  	if ((lower_ns == ns) && lower_ns->parent)
  		lower_ns = lower_ns->parent;
  
  	lower = from_kprojid(lower_ns, KPROJIDT_INIT(extent->lower_first));
  
  	seq_printf(seq, "%10u %10u %10u
  ",
  		extent->first,
  		lower,
  		extent->count);
  
  	return 0;
  }

  static void *m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos,
  		     struct uid_gid_map *map)

  {
  	struct uid_gid_extent *extent = NULL;
  	loff_t pos = *ppos;
  
  	if (pos < map->nr_extents)
  		extent = &map->extent[pos];
  
  	return extent;
  }
  
  static void *uid_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos)
  {
  	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
  
  	return m_start(seq, ppos, &ns->uid_map);
  }
  
  static void *gid_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos)
  {
  	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
  
  	return m_start(seq, ppos, &ns->gid_map);
  }

  static void *projid_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos)
  {
  	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
  
  	return m_start(seq, ppos, &ns->projid_map);
  }

  static void *m_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
  {
  	(*pos)++;
  	return seq->op->start(seq, pos);
  }
  
  static void m_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
  {
  	return;
  }

  const struct seq_operations proc_uid_seq_operations = {

  	.start = uid_m_start,
  	.stop = m_stop,
  	.next = m_next,
  	.show = uid_m_show,
  };

  const struct seq_operations proc_gid_seq_operations = {

  	.start = gid_m_start,
  	.stop = m_stop,
  	.next = m_next,
  	.show = gid_m_show,
  };

  const struct seq_operations proc_projid_seq_operations = {

  	.start = projid_m_start,
  	.stop = m_stop,
  	.next = m_next,
  	.show = projid_m_show,
  };

  static bool mappings_overlap(struct uid_gid_map *new_map,
  			     struct uid_gid_extent *extent)

  {
  	u32 upper_first, lower_first, upper_last, lower_last;
  	unsigned idx;
  
  	upper_first = extent->first;
  	lower_first = extent->lower_first;
  	upper_last = upper_first + extent->count - 1;
  	lower_last = lower_first + extent->count - 1;
  
  	for (idx = 0; idx < new_map->nr_extents; idx++) {
  		u32 prev_upper_first, prev_lower_first;
  		u32 prev_upper_last, prev_lower_last;
  		struct uid_gid_extent *prev;
  
  		prev = &new_map->extent[idx];
  
  		prev_upper_first = prev->first;
  		prev_lower_first = prev->lower_first;
  		prev_upper_last = prev_upper_first + prev->count - 1;
  		prev_lower_last = prev_lower_first + prev->count - 1;
  
  		/* Does the upper range intersect a previous extent? */
  		if ((prev_upper_first <= upper_last) &&
  		    (prev_upper_last >= upper_first))
  			return true;
  
  		/* Does the lower range intersect a previous extent? */
  		if ((prev_lower_first <= lower_last) &&
  		    (prev_lower_last >= lower_first))
  			return true;
  	}
  	return false;
  }

  static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
  			 size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
  			 int cap_setid,
  			 struct uid_gid_map *map,
  			 struct uid_gid_map *parent_map)
  {
  	struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
  	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
  	struct uid_gid_map new_map;
  	unsigned idx;

  	struct uid_gid_extent *extent = NULL;

  	unsigned long page = 0;
  	char *kbuf, *pos, *next_line;
  	ssize_t ret = -EINVAL;
  
  	/*

  	 * The userns_state_mutex serializes all writes to any given map.

  	 *
  	 * Any map is only ever written once.
  	 *
  	 * An id map fits within 1 cache line on most architectures.
  	 *
  	 * On read nothing needs to be done unless you are on an
  	 * architecture with a crazy cache coherency model like alpha.
  	 *
  	 * There is a one time data dependency between reading the
  	 * count of the extents and the values of the extents.  The
  	 * desired behavior is to see the values of the extents that
  	 * were written before the count of the extents.
  	 *
  	 * To achieve this smp_wmb() is used on guarantee the write

  	 * order and smp_rmb() is guaranteed that we don't have crazy
  	 * architectures returning stale data.

  	 */

  	mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);

  
  	ret = -EPERM;
  	/* Only allow one successful write to the map */
  	if (map->nr_extents != 0)
  		goto out;

  	/*
  	 * Adjusting namespace settings requires capabilities on the target.

  	 */

  	if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))

  		goto out;
  
  	/* Get a buffer */
  	ret = -ENOMEM;
  	page = __get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
  	kbuf = (char *) page;
  	if (!page)
  		goto out;

  	/* Only allow < page size writes at the beginning of the file */

  	ret = -EINVAL;
  	if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= PAGE_SIZE))
  		goto out;
  
  	/* Slurp in the user data */
  	ret = -EFAULT;
  	if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, count))
  		goto out;
  	kbuf[count] = '\0';
  
  	/* Parse the user data */
  	ret = -EINVAL;
  	pos = kbuf;
  	new_map.nr_extents = 0;

  	for (; pos; pos = next_line) {

  		extent = &new_map.extent[new_map.nr_extents];
  
  		/* Find the end of line and ensure I don't look past it */
  		next_line = strchr(pos, '
  ');
  		if (next_line) {
  			*next_line = '\0';
  			next_line++;
  			if (*next_line == '\0')
  				next_line = NULL;

  		}

  
  		pos = skip_spaces(pos);
  		extent->first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
  		if (!isspace(*pos))
  			goto out;
  
  		pos = skip_spaces(pos);
  		extent->lower_first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
  		if (!isspace(*pos))
  			goto out;
  
  		pos = skip_spaces(pos);
  		extent->count = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
  		if (*pos && !isspace(*pos))
  			goto out;
  
  		/* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */
  		pos = skip_spaces(pos);
  		if (*pos != '\0')
  			goto out;
  
  		/* Verify we have been given valid starting values */
  		if ((extent->first == (u32) -1) ||

  		    (extent->lower_first == (u32) -1))

  			goto out;

  		/* Verify count is not zero and does not cause the
  		 * extent to wrap
  		 */

  		if ((extent->first + extent->count) <= extent->first)
  			goto out;

  		if ((extent->lower_first + extent->count) <=
  		     extent->lower_first)

  			goto out;

  		/* Do the ranges in extent overlap any previous extents? */
  		if (mappings_overlap(&new_map, extent))

  			goto out;
  
  		new_map.nr_extents++;

  
  		/* Fail if the file contains too many extents */
  		if ((new_map.nr_extents == UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS) &&
  		    (next_line != NULL))
  			goto out;

  	}

  	/* Be very certaint the new map actually exists */
  	if (new_map.nr_extents == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	ret = -EPERM;
  	/* Validate the user is allowed to use user id's mapped to. */

  	if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, ns, cap_setid, &new_map))

  		goto out;
  
  	/* Map the lower ids from the parent user namespace to the
  	 * kernel global id space.
  	 */
  	for (idx = 0; idx < new_map.nr_extents; idx++) {
  		u32 lower_first;
  		extent = &new_map.extent[idx];
  
  		lower_first = map_id_range_down(parent_map,
  						extent->lower_first,
  						extent->count);
  
  		/* Fail if we can not map the specified extent to
  		 * the kernel global id space.
  		 */
  		if (lower_first == (u32) -1)
  			goto out;
  
  		extent->lower_first = lower_first;
  	}
  
  	/* Install the map */
  	memcpy(map->extent, new_map.extent,
  		new_map.nr_extents*sizeof(new_map.extent[0]));
  	smp_wmb();
  	map->nr_extents = new_map.nr_extents;
  
  	*ppos = count;
  	ret = count;
  out:

  	mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);

  	if (page)
  		free_page(page);
  	return ret;
  }

  ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
  			   size_t size, loff_t *ppos)

  {
  	struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
  	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;

  	struct user_namespace *seq_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);

  
  	if (!ns->parent)
  		return -EPERM;

  	if ((seq_ns != ns) && (seq_ns != ns->parent))
  		return -EPERM;

  	return map_write(file, buf, size, ppos, CAP_SETUID,
  			 &ns->uid_map, &ns->parent->uid_map);
  }

  ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
  			   size_t size, loff_t *ppos)

  {
  	struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
  	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;

  	struct user_namespace *seq_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);

  
  	if (!ns->parent)
  		return -EPERM;

  	if ((seq_ns != ns) && (seq_ns != ns->parent))
  		return -EPERM;

  	return map_write(file, buf, size, ppos, CAP_SETGID,
  			 &ns->gid_map, &ns->parent->gid_map);
  }

  ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
  			      size_t size, loff_t *ppos)

  {
  	struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
  	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
  	struct user_namespace *seq_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);
  
  	if (!ns->parent)
  		return -EPERM;
  
  	if ((seq_ns != ns) && (seq_ns != ns->parent))
  		return -EPERM;
  
  	/* Anyone can set any valid project id no capability needed */
  	return map_write(file, buf, size, ppos, -1,
  			 &ns->projid_map, &ns->parent->projid_map);
  }

  static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,

  				struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,

  				struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
  {

  	const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred;

  	/* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't
  	 * be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings.
  	 */

  	if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1) &&
  	    uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) {

  		u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
  		if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
  			kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);

  			if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid))

  				return true;

  		} else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {

  			kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);

  			if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) &&
  			    gid_eq(gid, cred->egid))

  				return true;
  		}
  	}

  	/* Allow anyone to set a mapping that doesn't require privilege */
  	if (!cap_valid(cap_setid))
  		return true;

  	/* Allow the specified ids if we have the appropriate capability
  	 * (CAP_SETUID or CAP_SETGID) over the parent user namespace.

  	 * And the opener of the id file also had the approprpiate capability.

  	 */

  	if (ns_capable(ns->parent, cap_setid) &&
  	    file_ns_capable(file, ns->parent, cap_setid))

  		return true;

  	return false;

  }

  int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
  {
  	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
  	unsigned long userns_flags = ACCESS_ONCE(ns->flags);
  
  	seq_printf(seq, "%s
  ",
  		   (userns_flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) ?
  		   "allow" : "deny");
  	return 0;
  }
  
  ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
  			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
  {
  	struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
  	struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
  	char kbuf[8], *pos;
  	bool setgroups_allowed;
  	ssize_t ret;
  
  	/* Only allow a very narrow range of strings to be written */
  	ret = -EINVAL;
  	if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= sizeof(kbuf)))
  		goto out;
  
  	/* What was written? */
  	ret = -EFAULT;
  	if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, count))
  		goto out;
  	kbuf[count] = '\0';
  	pos = kbuf;
  
  	/* What is being requested? */
  	ret = -EINVAL;
  	if (strncmp(pos, "allow", 5) == 0) {
  		pos += 5;
  		setgroups_allowed = true;
  	}
  	else if (strncmp(pos, "deny", 4) == 0) {
  		pos += 4;
  		setgroups_allowed = false;
  	}
  	else
  		goto out;
  
  	/* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */
  	pos = skip_spaces(pos);
  	if (*pos != '\0')
  		goto out;
  
  	ret = -EPERM;
  	mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
  	if (setgroups_allowed) {
  		/* Enabling setgroups after setgroups has been disabled
  		 * is not allowed.
  		 */
  		if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED))
  			goto out_unlock;
  	} else {
  		/* Permanently disabling setgroups after setgroups has
  		 * been enabled by writing the gid_map is not allowed.
  		 */
  		if (ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0)
  			goto out_unlock;
  		ns->flags &= ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED;
  	}
  	mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
  
  	/* Report a successful write */
  	*ppos = count;
  	ret = count;
  out:
  	return ret;
  out_unlock:
  	mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
  	goto out;
  }

  bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
  {
  	bool allowed;

  	mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);

  	/* It is not safe to use setgroups until a gid mapping in
  	 * the user namespace has been established.
  	 */
  	allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0;

  	/* Is setgroups allowed? */
  	allowed = allowed && (ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED);

  	mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);

  
  	return allowed;
  }

  static inline struct user_namespace *to_user_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
  {
  	return container_of(ns, struct user_namespace, ns);
  }

  static struct ns_common *userns_get(struct task_struct *task)

  {
  	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
  
  	rcu_read_lock();
  	user_ns = get_user_ns(__task_cred(task)->user_ns);
  	rcu_read_unlock();

  	return user_ns ? &user_ns->ns : NULL;

  }

  static void userns_put(struct ns_common *ns)

  {

  	put_user_ns(to_user_ns(ns));

  }

  static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct ns_common *ns)

  {

  	struct user_namespace *user_ns = to_user_ns(ns);

  	struct cred *cred;
  
  	/* Don't allow gaining capabilities by reentering
  	 * the same user namespace.
  	 */
  	if (user_ns == current_user_ns())
  		return -EINVAL;

  	/* Threaded processes may not enter a different user namespace */

  	if (atomic_read(&current->mm->mm_users) > 1)
  		return -EINVAL;

  	if (current->fs->users != 1)
  		return -EINVAL;

  	if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
  		return -EPERM;
  
  	cred = prepare_creds();
  	if (!cred)
  		return -ENOMEM;
  
  	put_user_ns(cred->user_ns);
  	set_cred_user_ns(cred, get_user_ns(user_ns));
  
  	return commit_creds(cred);
  }
  
  const struct proc_ns_operations userns_operations = {
  	.name		= "user",
  	.type		= CLONE_NEWUSER,
  	.get		= userns_get,
  	.put		= userns_put,
  	.install	= userns_install,
  };

  static __init int user_namespaces_init(void)
  {
  	user_ns_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(user_namespace, SLAB_PANIC);
  	return 0;
  }

  subsys_initcall(user_namespaces_init);