13 Aug, 2010
1 commit
-
Add a dummy printk function for the maintenance of unused printks through gcc
format checking, and also so that side-effect checking is maintained too.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
30 Jul, 2010
1 commit
-
It's possible for get_task_cred() as it currently stands to 'corrupt' a set of
credentials by incrementing their usage count after their replacement by the
task being accessed.What happens is that get_task_cred() can race with commit_creds():
TASK_1 TASK_2 RCU_CLEANER
-->get_task_cred(TASK_2)
rcu_read_lock()
__cred = __task_cred(TASK_2)
-->commit_creds()
old_cred = TASK_2->real_cred
TASK_2->real_cred = ...
put_cred(old_cred)
call_rcu(old_cred)
[__cred->usage == 0]
get_cred(__cred)
[__cred->usage == 1]
rcu_read_unlock()
-->put_cred_rcu()
[__cred->usage == 1]
panic()However, since a tasks credentials are generally not changed very often, we can
reasonably make use of a loop involving reading the creds pointer and using
atomic_inc_not_zero() to attempt to increment it if it hasn't already hit zero.If successful, we can safely return the credentials in the knowledge that, even
if the task we're accessing has released them, they haven't gone to the RCU
cleanup code.We then change task_state() in procfs to use get_task_cred() rather than
calling get_cred() on the result of __task_cred(), as that suffers from the
same problem.Without this change, a BUG_ON in __put_cred() or in put_cred_rcu() can be
tripped when it is noticed that the usage count is not zero as it ought to be,
for example:kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:168!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run
CPU 0
Pid: 2436, comm: master Not tainted 2.6.33.3-85.fc13.x86_64 #1 0HR330/OptiPlex
745
RIP: 0010:[] [] __put_cred+0xc/0x45
RSP: 0018:ffff88019e7e9eb8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff880161514480 RCX: 00000000ffffffff
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: ffff880140c690c0 RDI: ffff880140c690c0
RBP: ffff88019e7e9eb8 R08: 00000000000000d0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff880140c690c0
R13: ffff88019e77aea0 R14: 00007fff336b0a5c R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f12f50d97c0(0000) GS:ffff880007400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8f461bc000 CR3: 00000001b26ce000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process master (pid: 2436, threadinfo ffff88019e7e8000, task ffff88019e77aea0)
Stack:
ffff88019e7e9ec8 ffffffff810698cd ffff88019e7e9ef8 ffffffff81069b45
ffff880161514180 ffff880161514480 ffff880161514180 0000000000000000
ffff88019e7e9f28 ffffffff8106aace 0000000000000001 0000000000000246
Call Trace:
[] put_cred+0x13/0x15
[] commit_creds+0x16b/0x175
[] set_current_groups+0x47/0x4e
[] sys_setgroups+0xf6/0x105
[] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 48 8d 71 ff e8 7e 4e 15 00 85 c0 78 0b 8b 75 ec 48 89 df e8 ef 4a 15 00
48 83 c4 18 5b c9 c3 55 8b 07 8b 07 48 89 e5 85 c0 74 04 0b eb fe 65 48 8b
04 25 00 cc 00 00 48 3b b8 58 04 00 00 75
RIP [] __put_cred+0xc/0x45
RSP
---[ end trace df391256a100ebdd ]---Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
28 May, 2010
1 commit
-
Now that nobody ever changes subprocess_info->cred we can kill this member
and related code. ____call_usermodehelper() always runs in the context of
freshly forked kernel thread, it has the proper ->cred copied from its
parent kthread, keventd.Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Acked-by: Neil Horman
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
20 May, 2010
1 commit
-
…s/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (61 commits)
KEYS: Return more accurate error codes
LSM: Add __init to fixup function.
TOMOYO: Add pathname grouping support.
ima: remove ACPI dependency
TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal
security/selinux/ss: Use kstrdup
TOMOYO: Use stack memory for pending entry.
Revert "ima: remove ACPI dependency"
Revert "TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal"
KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()
TOMOYO: Use mutex_lock_interruptible.
KEYS: Better handling of errors from construct_alloc_key()
KEYS: keyring_serialise_link_sem is only needed for keyring->keyring links
TOMOYO: Use GFP_NOFS rather than GFP_KERNEL.
ima: remove ACPI dependency
TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal
selinux: generalize disabling of execmem for plt-in-heap archs
LSM Audit: rename LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE
CRED: Holding a spinlock does not imply the holding of RCU read lock
SMACK: Don't #include Ext2 headers
...
07 May, 2010
1 commit
06 May, 2010
1 commit
22 Apr, 2010
1 commit
-
creds_are_invalid() reads both cred->usage and cred->subscribers and then
compares them to make sure the number of processes subscribed to a cred struct
never exceeds the refcount of that cred struct.The problem is that this can cause a race with both copy_creds() and
exit_creds() as the two counters, whilst they are of atomic_t type, are only
atomic with respect to themselves, and not atomic with respect to each other.This means that if creds_are_invalid() can read the values on one CPU whilst
they're being modified on another CPU, and so can observe an evolving state in
which the subscribers count now is greater than the usage count a moment
before.Switching the order in which the counts are read cannot help, so the thing to
do is to remove that particular check.I had considered rechecking the values to see if they're in flux if the test
fails, but I can't guarantee they won't appear the same, even if they've
changed several times in the meantime.Note that this can only happen if CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS is enabled.
The problem is only likely to occur with multithreaded programs, and can be
tested by the tst-eintr1 program from glibc's "make check". The symptoms look
like:CRED: Invalid credentials
CRED: At include/linux/cred.h:240
CRED: Specified credentials: ffff88003dda5878 [real][eff]
CRED: ->magic=43736564, put_addr=(null)
CRED: ->usage=766, subscr=766
CRED: ->*uid = { 0,0,0,0 }
CRED: ->*gid = { 0,0,0,0 }
CRED: ->security is ffff88003d72f538
CRED: ->security {359, 359}
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:850!
...
RIP: 0010:[] [] __invalid_creds+0x4e/0x52
...
Call Trace:
[] copy_creds+0x6b/0x23fNote the ->usage=766 and subscr=766. The values appear the same because
they've been re-read since the check was made.Reported-by: Roland McGrath
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
21 Apr, 2010
1 commit
-
Patch 570b8fb505896e007fd3bb07573ba6640e51851d:
Author: Mathieu Desnoyers
Date: Tue Mar 30 00:04:00 2010 +0100
Subject: CRED: Fix memory leak in error handlingattempts to fix a memory leak in the error handling by making the offending
return statement into a jump down to the bottom of the function where a
kfree(tgcred) is inserted.This is, however, incorrect, as it does a kfree() after doing put_cred() if
security_prepare_creds() fails. That will result in a double free if 'error'
is jumped to as put_cred() will also attempt to free the new tgcred record by
virtue of it being pointed to by the new cred record.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
15 Apr, 2010
1 commit
-
Merge reason: merge the latest fixes, update to -rc4.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar
12 Apr, 2010
1 commit
-
Unused hook. Remove.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
05 Apr, 2010
1 commit
03 Apr, 2010
1 commit
-
This is left over from commit 7c9414385e ("sched: Remove USER_SCHED"")
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan
Acked-by: Dhaval Giani
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra
Cc: David Howells
LKML-Reference:
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar
30 Mar, 2010
2 commits
-
…it slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com> -
Fix a memory leak on an OOM condition in prepare_usermodehelper_creds().
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
03 Feb, 2010
1 commit
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Free memory allocated using kmem_cache_zalloc using kmem_cache_free rather
than kfree.The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)//
@@
expression x,E,c;
@@x = \(kmem_cache_alloc\|kmem_cache_zalloc\|kmem_cache_alloc_node\)(c,...)
... when != x = E
when != &x
?-kfree(x)
+kmem_cache_free(c,x)
//Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall
Acked-by: David Howells
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Steve Dickson
Cc:
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: James Morris
24 Sep, 2009
2 commits
-
ERROR: "creds_are_invalid" [fs/cachefiles/cachefiles.ko] undefined!
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap
Cc: David Howells
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
mips allmodconfig:
include/linux/cred.h: In function `creds_are_invalid':
include/linux/cred.h:187: error: `PAGE_SIZE' undeclared (first use in this function)
include/linux/cred.h:187: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
include/linux/cred.h:187: error: for each function it appears in.)Fixes
commit b6dff3ec5e116e3af6f537d4caedcad6b9e5082a
Author: David Howells
AuthorDate: Fri Nov 14 10:39:16 2008 +1100
Commit: James Morris
CommitDate: Fri Nov 14 10:39:16 2008 +1100CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct
I think.
It's way too large to be inlined anyway.
Dunno if this needs an EXPORT_SYMBOL() yet.
Cc: David Howells
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
15 Sep, 2009
1 commit
-
put_cred() will oops if given a NULL groups list, but that is now possible with
the existence of cred_alloc_blank(), as used in keyctl_session_to_parent().Added in commit:
commit ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f
Author: David Howells
Date: Wed Sep 2 09:14:21 2009 +0100
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]Reported-by: Marc Dionne
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
02 Sep, 2009
2 commits
-
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.This can be tested with the following program:
#include
#include
#include#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");return 0;
}Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: aWhere the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Add a config option (CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS) to turn on some debug checking
for credential management. The additional code keeps track of the number of
pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that
this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct (which includes
all references, not just those from task_structs).Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, the code also checks that the security
pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid.This attempts to catch the bug whereby inode_has_perm() faults in an nfsd
kernel thread on seeing cred->security be a NULL pointer (it appears that the
credential struct has been previously released):http://www.kerneloops.org/oops.php?number=252883
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
11 May, 2009
1 commit
-
Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against foreign
intervention on a process's credential state, such as is made by ptrace(). The
attachment of a debugger to a process affects execve()'s calculation of the new
credential state - _and_ also setprocattr()'s calculation of that state.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
10 Jan, 2009
3 commits
-
…s/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
CRED: Fix commit_creds() on a process that has no mm -
The newly allocated creds in prepare_kernel_cred() must be initialised
before get_uid() and get_group_info() can access them. They should be
copied from the old credentials.Reported-by: Steve Dickson
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Steve Dickson
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Missing put_cred() in the error handling path of prepare_kernel_cred().
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Steve Dickson
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
08 Jan, 2009
1 commit
-
Fix commit_creds()'s handling of a process that has no mm (such as one that is
calling or has called daemonize()). commit_creds() should check to see if
task->mm is not NULL before calling set_dumpable() on it.Reported-by: Jiri Slaby
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
25 Nov, 2008
1 commit
-
The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct
cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise
would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are
here as well.Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply:
1. The task pins the user struct.
2. The user struct pins its user namespace.
3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it.User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns
is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code
duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user
namespaces).When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty
keyrings and a clean group_info.This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here
is his original patch description:>I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following
>changes:
>
> (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user
> namespace.
>
> (2) Fixes eCryptFS.
>
> (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent
> with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is
> superfluous.
>
> (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the
> beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts
> at allocation.
>
> (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds
> to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine
> the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred
> struct.
>
> This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the
> reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be
> transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer.
>
> (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under
> preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds().
>
>David>Signed-off-by: David Howells
Changelog:
Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments
1. leave thread_keyring alone
2. use current_user_ns() in set_user()Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn
14 Nov, 2008
7 commits
-
Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions
performed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then
using task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of
a task.This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the
cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a
potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of
credentials.This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record:
(*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum
with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files).(*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the
security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that
a task creates.The patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the
LSM functions:(1) prepare_kernel_cred()
Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on
a daemon's credentials or on init_cred. All the keyrings are cleared.(2) set_security_override()
Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security
context, assuming permission from the LSM policy.(3) set_security_override_from_ctx()
As (2), but takes the security context as a string.
(4) set_create_files_as()
Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the
same as that on a particular inode.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler [Smack changes]
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Differentiate the objective and real subjective credentials from the effective
subjective credentials on a task by introducing a second credentials pointer
into the task_struct.task_struct::real_cred then refers to the objective and apparent real
subjective credentials of a task, as perceived by the other tasks in the
system.task_struct::cred then refers to the effective subjective credentials of a
task, as used by that task when it's actually running. These are not visible
to the other tasks in the system.__task_cred(task) then refers to the objective/real credentials of the task in
question.current_cred() refers to the effective subjective credentials of the current
task.prepare_creds() uses the objective creds as a base and commit_creds() changes
both pointers in the task_struct (indeed commit_creds() requires them to be the
same).override_creds() and revert_creds() change the subjective creds pointer only,
and the former returns the old subjective creds. These are used by NFSD,
faccessat() and do_coredump(), and will by used by CacheFiles.In SELinux, current_has_perm() is provided as an alternative to
task_has_perm(). This uses the effective subjective context of current,
whereas task_has_perm() uses the objective/real context of the subject.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Document credentials and the new credentials API.
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that
all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
of no return with no possibility of failure.I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:
cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)
but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
(they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).The following sequence of events now happens:
(a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
creds that we make.(a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to
bprm->cred.This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
unnecessary, and so they've been removed.(b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in
bprm->unsafe for future reference.(c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.
(i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded,
but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
fail.(ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should
calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
Anything that might fail must be done at this point.(iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.
bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux
in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
not on the interpreter.(d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This
performs the following steps with regard to credentials:(i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
may not be covered by commit_creds().(ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
(c.i).(e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to
credentials:(i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
must be done before the credentials are changed.This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
must have been done in (c.ii).(ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
should be part of struct creds.(iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.(iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
are now immutable.(v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.(f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been
made.(2) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
(*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
(*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().(*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()
Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()
New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
second and subsequent calls.(*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
(*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This
includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not
fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
to the process; when the latter is called, they have.The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.
(3) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:(a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
the credentials-under-construction approach.(c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Separate per-task-group keyrings from signal_struct and dangle their anchor
from the cred struct rather than the signal_struct.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Detach the credentials from task_struct, duplicating them in copy_process()
and releasing them in __put_task_struct().Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris