30 Jun, 2005
1 commit
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Currently selinux_sb_copy_data requires an entire page be allocated to
*orig when the function is called. This "requirement" is based on the fact
that we call copy_page(in_save, nosec_save) and in_save = orig when the
data is not FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA. This means that if a caller were to call
do_kern_mount with only about 10 bytes of options, they would get passed
here and then we would corrupt PAGE_SIZE - 10 bytes of memory (with all
zeros.)Currently it appears all in kernel FS's use one page of data so this has
not been a problem. An out of kernel FS did just what is described above
and it would almost always panic shortly after they tried to mount. From
looking else where in the kernel it is obvious that this string of data
must always be null terminated. (See example in do_mount where it always
zeros the last byte.) Thus I suggest we use strcpy in place of copy_page.
In this way we make sure the amount we copy is always less than or equal to
the amount we received and since do_mount is zeroing the last byte this
should be safe for all.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
26 Jun, 2005
4 commits
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kfree(NULL) is legal.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
2.6.12-rc6-mm1 has a few remaining synchronize_kernel()s, some (but not
all) in comments. This patch changes these synchronize_kernel() calls (and
comments) to synchronize_rcu() or synchronize_sched() as follows:- arch/x86_64/kernel/mce.c mce_read(): change to synchronize_sched() to
handle races with machine-check exceptions (synchronize_rcu() would not cut
it given RCU implementations intended for hardcore realtime use.- drivers/input/serio/i8042.c i8042_stop(): change to synchronize_sched() to
handle races with i8042_interrupt() interrupt handler. Again,
synchronize_rcu() would not cut it given RCU implementations intended for
hardcore realtime use.- include/*/kdebug.h comments: change to synchronize_sched() to handle races
with NMIs. As before, synchronize_rcu() would not cut it...- include/linux/list.h comment: change to synchronize_rcu(), since this
comment is for list_del_rcu().- security/keys/key.c unregister_key_type(): change to synchronize_rcu(),
since this is interacting with RCU read side.- security/keys/process_keys.c install_session_keyring(): change to
synchronize_rcu(), since this is interacting with RCU read side.Signed-off-by: "Paul E. McKenney"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch,based on sample code by Roland McGrath, adds an execheap
permission check that controls the ability to make the heap executable so
that this can be prevented in almost all cases (the X server is presently
an exception, but this will hopefully be resolved in the future) so that
even programs with execmem permission will need to have the anonymous
memory mapped in order to make it executable.The only reason that we use a permission check for such restriction (vs.
making it unconditional) is that the X module loader presently needs it; it
could possibly be made unconditional in the future when X is changed.The policy patch for the execheap permission is available at:
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execheap.patchSigned-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Cc: Ingo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch adds an execstack permission check that controls the ability to
make the main process stack executable so that attempts to make the stack
executable can still be prevented even if the process is allowed the
existing execmem permission in order to e.g. perform runtime code
generation. Note that this does not yet address thread stacks. Note also
that unlike the execmem check, the execstack check is only applied on
mprotect calls, not mmap calls, as the current security_file_mmap hook is
not passed the necessary information presently.The original author of the code that makes the distinction of the stack
region, is Ingo Molnar, who wrote it within his patch for
/proc//maps markers.
(http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=110719881508591&w=2)The patches also can be found at:
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execstack.patch
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/kernel-execstack.patchpolicy-execstack.patch is the patch that needs to be applied to the policy in
order to support the execstack permission and exclude it
from general_domain_access within macros/core_macros.te.kernel-execstack.patch adds such permission to the SELinux code within
the kernel and adds the proper permission check to the selinux_file_mprotect() hook.Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Cc: Ingo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
24 Jun, 2005
6 commits
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Export this symbol to GPL modules for eCryptfs: an out-of-tree GPL'ed
filesystem.Signed off by: Michael Halcrow
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.Signed-Off-By: David Howells
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
The attached patch uses RCU to manage the session keyring pointer in struct
signal_struct. This means that searching need not disable interrupts and get
a the sighand spinlock to access this pointer. Furthermore, by judicious use
of rcu_read_(un)lock(), this patch also avoids the need to take and put
refcounts on the session keyring itself, thus saving on even more atomic ops.Signed-Off-By: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
The attached patch makes it possible to pass a session keyring through to the
process spawned by call_usermodehelper(). This allows patch 3/3 to pass an
authorisation key through to /sbin/request-key, thus permitting better access
controls when doing just-in-time key creation.Signed-Off-By: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
The attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways:
(1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure.
(2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of
write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators.The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction
semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus
rendering the spinlock superfluous.The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks.
(3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive
keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be
taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does
not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting
keyring be pinned.(4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed
of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to
prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up.(5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It
includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It
also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be
changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the
payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data
length getting out of sync.I'm tempted to drop the key's datalen entirely, except that it's used in
conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid
of.(6) Update the keys documentation.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl:
This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid
or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed
privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is
owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended
for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked.2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped
readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove such a dump but
not access it directly. For security reasons core dumps in this mode will
not overwrite one another or other files. This mode is appropriate when
adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment.(akpm:
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable);
>
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL?No problem to me.
> > if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid)
> > current->mm->dumpable = 1;
>
> Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER?Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines
should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go
everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used
as a bool in untouched code)> Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something. Doing that
> would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too.Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat
rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic
diff because it is used all over the place.)
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
22 Jun, 2005
1 commit
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There is a memory leak during mount when SELinux is active and mount
options are specified.Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
21 Jun, 2005
1 commit
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sysfs: fix the rest of the kernel so if an attribute doesn't
implement show or store method read/write will return
-EIO instead of 0 or -EINVAL or -EPERM.Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
19 Jun, 2005
1 commit
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To retrieve the neighbour tables send RTM_GETNEIGHTBL with the
NLM_F_DUMP flag set. Every neighbour table configuration is
spread over multiple messages to avoid running into message
size limits on systems with many interfaces. The first message
in the sequence transports all not device specific data such as
statistics, configuration, and the default parameter set.
This message is followed by 0..n messages carrying device
specific parameter sets.Although the ordering should be sufficient, NDTA_NAME can be
used to identify sequences. The initial message can be identified
by checking for NDTA_CONFIG. The device specific messages do
not contain this TLV but have NDTPA_IFINDEX set to the
corresponding interface index.To change neighbour table attributes, send RTM_SETNEIGHTBL
with NDTA_NAME set. Changeable attribute include NDTA_THRESH[1-3],
NDTA_GC_INTERVAL, and all TLVs in NDTA_PARMS unless marked
otherwise. Device specific parameter sets can be changed by
setting NDTPA_IFINDEX to the interface index of the corresponding
device.Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
25 May, 2005
1 commit
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Per Steve Grubb's observation that there are some remaining cases where
avc_audit() directly logs untrusted strings without escaping them, here
is a patch that changes avc_audit() to use audit_log_untrustedstring()
or audit_log_hex() as appropriate. Note that d_name.name is nul-
terminated by d_alloc(), and that sun_path is nul-terminated by
unix_mkname(), so it is not necessary for the AVC to create nul-
terminated copies or to alter audit_log_untrustedstring to take a length
argument. In the case of an abstract name, we use audit_log_hex() with
an explicit length.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse
21 May, 2005
2 commits
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When I added the logging of pid= and comm= back to avc_audit() I
screwed it up. Put it back how it should be.Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse
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This patch changes the SELinux AVC to defer logging of paths to the audit
framework upon syscall exit, by saving a reference to the (dentry,vfsmount)
pair in an auxiliary audit item on the current audit context for processing
by audit_log_exit.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse
19 May, 2005
2 commits
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We turned this all off because the 'exe=' was causing deadlocks on
dcache_lock. There's no need to leave the pid and comm out though.
They'll all be logged correctly if full auditing is enabled, but we
should still print them in case auditing _isn't_ enabled.Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse
18 May, 2005
1 commit
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It's silly to have to add explicit entries for new userspace messages
as we invent them. Just treat all messages in the user range the same.Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse
17 May, 2005
1 commit
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This patch should fix the avc_alloc_node() oom condition that Andrew
reported when no policy is loaded in SELinux.Prior to this patch, when no policy was loaded, the SELinux "security
server" (policy engine) was only returning allowed decisions for the
requested permissions for each access check. This caused the cache to
thrash when trying to use SELinux for real work with no policy loaded
(typically, the no policy loaded state is only for bootstrapping to the
point where we can load an initial policy).This patch changes the SELinux security server to return the complete
allowed access vector at once, and then to reset the cache after the
initial policy load to flush the initial cache state created during
bootstrapping.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
14 May, 2005
1 commit
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This patch adds more messages types to the audit subsystem so that audit
analysis is quicker, intuitive, and more useful.Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb
---
I forgot one type in the big patch. I need to add one for user space
originating SE Linux avc messages. This is used by dbus and nscd.-Steve
---
Updated to 2.6.12-rc4-mm1.
-dwmw2Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse
11 May, 2005
1 commit
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Add audit_log_type to allow callers to specify type and pid when logging.
Convert audit_log to wrapper around audit_log_type. Could have
converted all audit_log callers directly, but common case is default
of type AUDIT_KERNEL and pid 0. Update audit_log_start to take type
and pid values when creating a new audit_buffer. Move sequences that
did audit_log_start, audit_log_format, audit_set_type, audit_log_end,
to simply call audit_log_type directly. This obsoletes audit_set_type
and audit_set_pid, so remove them.Signed-off-by: Chris Wright
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse
06 May, 2005
1 commit
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shutdown credential information. It creates a new message type
AUDIT_TERM_INFO, which is used by the audit daemon to query who issued the
shutdown.It requires the placement of a hook function that gathers the information. The
hook is after the DAC & MAC checks and before the function returns. Racing
threads could overwrite the uid & pid - but they would have to be root and
have policy that allows signalling the audit daemon. That should be a
manageable risk.The userspace component will be released later in audit 0.7.2. When it
receives the TERM signal, it queries the kernel for shutdown information.
When it receives it, it writes the message and exits. The message looks
like this:type=DAEMON msg=auditd(1114551182.000) auditd normal halt, sending pid=2650
uid=525, auditd pid=1685Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse
01 May, 2005
2 commits
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This patch provides finer grained permissions for the audit family of
Netlink sockets under SELinux.1. We need a way to differentiate between privileged and unprivileged
reads of kernel data maintained by the audit subsystem. The AUDIT_GET
operation is unprivileged: it returns the current status of the audit
subsystem (e.g. whether it's enabled etc.). The AUDIT_LIST operation
however returns a list of the current audit ruleset, which is considered
privileged by the audit folk. To deal with this, a new SELinux
permission has been implemented and applied to the operation:
nlmsg_readpriv, which can be allocated to appropriately privileged
domains. Unprivileged domains would only be allocated nlmsg_read.2. There is a requirement for certain domains to generate audit events
from userspace. These events need to be collected by the kernel,
collated and transmitted sequentially back to the audit daemon. An
example is user level login, an auditable event under CAPP, where
login-related domains generate AUDIT_USER messages via PAM which are
relayed back to auditd via the kernel. To prevent handing out
nlmsg_write permissions to such domains, a new permission has been
added, nlmsg_relay, which is intended for this type of purpose: data is
passed via the kernel back to userspace but no privileged information is
written to the kernel.Also, AUDIT_LOGIN messages are now valid only for kernel->user messaging,
so this value has been removed from the SELinux nlmsgtab (which is only
used to check user->kernel messages).Signed-off-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch removes the sclass argument from ipc_has_perm in the SELinux
module, as it can be obtained from the ipc security structure. The use of
a separate argument was a legacy of the older precondition function
handling in SELinux and is obsolete. Please apply.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
25 Apr, 2005
1 commit
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The SELinux hooks invoke ipv6_skip_exthdr() with an incorrect
length final argument. However, the length argument turns out
to be superfluous.I was just reading ipv6_skip_exthdr and it occured to me that we can
get rid of len altogether. The only place where len is used is to
check whether the skb has two bytes for ipv6_opt_hdr. This check
is done by skb_header_pointer/skb_copy_bits anyway.Now it might appear that we've made the code slower by deferring
the check to skb_copy_bits. However, this check should not trigger
in the common case so this is OK.Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
19 Apr, 2005
1 commit
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This fixes a deadlock on the dcache lock detected during testing at IBM
by moving the logging of the current executable information from the
SELinux avc_audit function to audit_log_exit (via an audit_log_task_info
helper) for processing upon syscall exit.For consistency, the patch also removes the logging of other
task-related information from avc_audit, deferring handling to
audit_log_exit instead.This allows simplification of the avc_audit code, allows the exe
information to be obtained more reliably, always includes the comm
information (useful for scripts), and avoids including bogus task
information for checks performed from irq or softirq.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
17 Apr, 2005
3 commits
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This patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so
that SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it. For example, security
policy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family
only. Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket
class.Note that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in
the core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files.Signed-off-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch fixes a bug in the SELinux Netlink message type detection code,
where the wrong constant was being used in a case statement. The incorrect
value is not valid for this class of object so it would not have been
reached, and fallen through to a default handler for all Netlink messages.Signed-off-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.Let it rip!
