01 Oct, 2005
1 commit
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Check O_DIRECT and return -EINVAL error in open. dentry_open() also checks
this but only after the open method is called. This patch optimizes away
the unnecessary upcalls in this case.It could be a correctness issue too: if filesystem has open() with side
effect, then it should fail before doing the open, not after.Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
28 Sep, 2005
1 commit
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This patch checks reserved node ID values returned by lookup and creation
operations. In case one of the reserved values is sent, return -EIO.Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
10 Sep, 2005
16 commits
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This patch removes ability to interrupt and restart operations while there
hasn't been any side-effect.The reason: applications. There are some apps it seems that generate
signals at a fast rate. This means, that if the operation cannot make
enough progress between two signals, it will be restarted for ever. This
bug actually manifested itself with 'krusader' trying to open a file for
writing under sshfs. Thanks to Eduard Czimbalmos for the report.The problem can be solved just by making open() uninterruptible, because in
this case it was the truncate operation that slowed down the progress. But
it's better to solve this by simply not allowing interrupts at all (except
SIGKILL), because applications don't expect file operations to be
interruptible anyway. As an added bonus the code is simplified somewhat.Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch adds a new FSYNCDIR request, which is sent when fsync is called
on directories. This operation is available in libfuse 2.3-pre1 or
greater.Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Don't change mtime/ctime/atime to local time on read/write. Rather invalidate
file attributes, so next stat() will force a GETATTR call. Bug reported by
Ben Grimm.Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Make data caching behavior selectable on a per-open basis instead of
per-mount. Compatibility for the old mount options 'kernel_cache' and
'direct_io' is retained in the userspace library (version 2.4.0-pre1 or
later).Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch removes a long lasting "hack" in FUSE, which used a separate
channel (a file descriptor refering to a disk-file) to transfer directory
contents from userspace to the kernel.The patch adds three new operations (OPENDIR, READDIR, RELEASEDIR), which
have semantics and implementation exactly maching the respective file
operations (OPEN, READ, RELEASE).This simplifies the directory reading code. Also disk space is not
necessary, which can be important in embedded systems.Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch adds support for the "direct_io" mount option of FUSE.
When this mount option is specified, the page cache is bypassed for
read and write operations. This is useful for example, if the
filesystem doesn't know the size of files before reading them, or when
any kind of caching is harmful.Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Check for the presence of all mandatory mount options.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch tightens the check for allowing processes to access non-privileged
mounts. The rational is that the filesystem implementation can control the
behavior or get otherwise unavailable information of the filesystem user. If
the filesystem user process has the same uid, gid, and is not suid or sgid
application, then access is safe. Otherwise access is not allowed unless the
"allow_other" mount option is given (for which policy is controlled by the
userspace mount utility).Thanks to everyone linux-fsdevel, especially Martin Mares who helped uncover
problems with the previous approach.Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch adds readpages support to FUSE.
With the help of the readpages() operation multiple reads are bundled
together and sent as a single request to userspace. This can improve
reading performace.Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch adds the extended attribute operations to FUSE.
The following operations are added:
o getxattr
o setxattr
o listxattr
o removexattrSigned-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch adds miscellaneous mount options to the FUSE filesystem.
The following mount options are added:
o default_permissions: check permissions with generic_permission()
o allow_other: allow other users to access files
o allow_root: allow root to access files
o kernel_cache: don't invalidate page cache on openSigned-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch adds the file operations of FUSE.
The following operations are added:
o open
o flush
o release
o fsync
o readpage
o commit_writeSigned-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch adds the write filesystem operations of FUSE.
The following operations are added:
o setattr
o symlink
o mknod
o mkdir
o create
o unlink
o rmdir
o rename
o linkSigned-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch adds the read-only filesystem operations of FUSE.
This contains the following files:
o dir.c
- directory, symlink and file-inode operationsThe following operations are added:
o lookup
o getattr
o readlink
o follow_link
o directory open
o readdir
o directory release
o permission
o dentry revalidate
o statfsSigned-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This adds the FUSE device handling functions.
This contains the following files:
o dev.c
- fuse device operations (read, write, release, poll)
- registers misc device
- support for sending requests to userspaceSigned-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch adds FUSE core.
This contains the following files:
o inode.c
- superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode,
clear_inode, put_super, show_options)
- registers FUSE filesystemo fuse_i.h
- private header fileRequirements
============The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is
the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace
process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the
kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated
privileges.The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must
not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious
requirements arising from this are:- mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the
help of the mounted filesystem- mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in
other users' or the super user's processes- mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from
other users' and the super user's processesThese are currently ensured with the following constraints:
1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner
can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for
directories)2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced
3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied
all access to the filesystem1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a
setuid root application doing the actual mount operation.3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel
I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph
H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into
mainline in this form.The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their
current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as
discussed in this thread).Suggested improvements that would address these limitations:
- implement shared subtrees
- allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces
first-class objects)- implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module
With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may
be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the
security requirements.Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even
to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact
order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some
ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is
not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs
setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current
approach too.Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds