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kernel/sys.c
60.3 KB
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/* * linux/kernel/sys.c * * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds */ |
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#include <linux/export.h> |
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#include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/utsname.h> #include <linux/mman.h> |
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#include <linux/reboot.h> #include <linux/prctl.h> |
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#include <linux/highuid.h> #include <linux/fs.h> |
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#include <linux/kmod.h> |
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#include <linux/perf_event.h> |
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#include <linux/resource.h> |
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#include <linux/kernel.h> |
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#include <linux/workqueue.h> |
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#include <linux/capability.h> |
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#include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/times.h> #include <linux/posix-timers.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/dcookies.h> #include <linux/suspend.h> #include <linux/tty.h> |
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#include <linux/signal.h> |
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#include <linux/cn_proc.h> |
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#include <linux/getcpu.h> |
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#include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h> |
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#include <linux/seccomp.h> |
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#include <linux/cpu.h> |
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#include <linux/personality.h> |
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#include <linux/ptrace.h> |
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#include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
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#include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/mount.h> |
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#include <linux/gfp.h> |
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#include <linux/syscore_ops.h> |
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#include <linux/version.h> #include <linux/ctype.h> |
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#include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/mempolicy.h> |
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#include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
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#include <linux/kprobes.h> |
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
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#include <linux/binfmts.h> |
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|
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#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/uidgid.h> #include <linux/cred.h> |
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#include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> |
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/* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */ #include <generated/utsrelease.h> |
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|
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#include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/unistd.h> #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL |
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# define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL |
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# define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL |
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# define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL |
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# define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL |
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# define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL |
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# define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef GET_ENDIAN |
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# define GET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif #ifndef SET_ENDIAN |
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# define SET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
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#endif |
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#ifndef GET_TSC_CTL # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) #endif #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) #endif |
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#ifndef MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT # define MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT(a) (-EINVAL) #endif #ifndef MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT # define MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT(a) (-EINVAL) #endif |
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#ifndef GET_FP_MODE # define GET_FP_MODE(a) (-EINVAL) #endif #ifndef SET_FP_MODE # define SET_FP_MODE(a,b) (-EINVAL) #endif |
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/* * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past */ int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID; int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID; |
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid); EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid); |
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/* * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures */ int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid); EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid); /* |
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* Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid, * or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns. * * Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe */ static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p); |
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if (uid_eq(pcred->uid, cred->euid) || uid_eq(pcred->euid, cred->euid)) |
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return true; |
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if (ns_capable(pcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) |
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return true; return false; } /* |
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* set the priority of a task * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock */ |
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static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error) { int no_nice; |
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if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) { |
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error = -EPERM; goto out; } |
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if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) { |
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error = -EACCES; goto out; } no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval); if (no_nice) { error = no_nice; goto out; } if (error == -ESRCH) error = 0; set_user_nice(p, niceval); out: return error; } |
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SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval) |
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{ struct task_struct *g, *p; struct user_struct *user; |
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const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
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int error = -EINVAL; |
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struct pid *pgrp; |
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kuid_t uid; |
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|
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if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
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goto out; /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */ error = -ESRCH; |
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if (niceval < MIN_NICE) niceval = MIN_NICE; if (niceval > MAX_NICE) niceval = MAX_NICE; |
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|
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rcu_read_lock(); |
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read_lock(&tasklist_lock); switch (which) { |
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case PRIO_PROCESS: if (who) p = find_task_by_vpid(who); else p = current; if (p) error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); break; case PRIO_PGRP: if (who) pgrp = find_vpid(who); else pgrp = task_pgrp(current); do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); break; case PRIO_USER: uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who); user = cred->user; if (!who) uid = cred->uid; else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) { user = find_user(uid); if (!user) |
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goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
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} do_each_thread(g, p) { if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid)) error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); } while_each_thread(g, p); if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */ break; |
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} out_unlock: read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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out: return error; } /* * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19) * to stay compatible. */ |
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who) |
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{ struct task_struct *g, *p; struct user_struct *user; |
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const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
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long niceval, retval = -ESRCH; |
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struct pid *pgrp; |
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kuid_t uid; |
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|
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if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
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return -EINVAL; |
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rcu_read_lock(); |
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read_lock(&tasklist_lock); switch (which) { |
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case PRIO_PROCESS: if (who) p = find_task_by_vpid(who); else p = current; if (p) { niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); if (niceval > retval) retval = niceval; } break; case PRIO_PGRP: if (who) pgrp = find_vpid(who); else pgrp = task_pgrp(current); do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); if (niceval > retval) retval = niceval; } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); break; case PRIO_USER: uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who); user = cred->user; if (!who) uid = cred->uid; else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) { user = find_user(uid); if (!user) goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ } do_each_thread(g, p) { if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid)) { |
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niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p)); |
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if (niceval > retval) retval = niceval; } |
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} while_each_thread(g, p); if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */ break; |
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} out_unlock: read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
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rcu_read_unlock(); |
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return retval; } |
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/* * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid * or vice versa. (BSD-style) * * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid. * * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing * a security audit over a program. * * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be |
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* 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
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* * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned). */ |
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#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER |
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid) |
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{ |
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struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
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const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
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int retval; |
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kgid_t krgid, kegid; krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid); kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid); if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid)) return -EINVAL; if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid)) return -EINVAL; |
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|
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new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
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retval = -EPERM; |
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if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { |
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if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) || gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) || |
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ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
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new->gid = krgid; |
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else |
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goto error; |
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} if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { |
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if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) || gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) || gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) || |
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ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
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new->egid = kegid; |
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else |
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goto error; |
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} |
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|
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if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || |
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(egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid))) |
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new->sgid = new->egid; new->fsgid = new->egid; return commit_creds(new); error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
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} /* |
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* setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS |
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* * SMP: Same implicit races as above. */ |
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SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid) |
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{ |
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struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
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const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
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int retval; |
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kgid_t kgid; kgid = make_kgid(ns, gid); if (!gid_valid(kgid)) return -EINVAL; |
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|
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new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
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retval = -EPERM; |
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if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
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new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid; else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid)) new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid; |
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else |
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goto error; |
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|
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return commit_creds(new); error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
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} |
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|
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/* * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID */ static int set_user(struct cred *new) |
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{ struct user_struct *new_user; |
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new_user = alloc_uid(new->uid); |
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if (!new_user) return -EAGAIN; |
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/* * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming * it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the * failure to the execve() stage. */ |
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if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) && |
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new_user != INIT_USER) current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; else current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; |
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|
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free_uid(new->user); new->user = new_user; |
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return 0; } /* * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid * or vice versa. (BSD-style) * * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid. * * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing * a security audit over a program. * * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be |
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* 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
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*/ |
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid) |
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{ |
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454 |
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
455 456 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
457 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 |
kuid_t kruid, keuid; kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid); keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid); if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid)) return -EINVAL; if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid)) return -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
467 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
468 469 470 471 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
472 |
retval = -EPERM; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
473 |
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
474 475 476 |
new->uid = kruid; if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) && !uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) && |
c7b96acf1 userns: Kill nso... |
477 |
!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
478 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
479 480 481 |
} if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
482 483 484 485 |
new->euid = keuid; if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) && !uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) && !uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) && |
c7b96acf1 userns: Kill nso... |
486 |
!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
487 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
488 |
} |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
489 |
if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid)) { |
54e991242 sched: don't allo... |
490 491 492 493 |
retval = set_user(new); if (retval < 0) goto error; } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
494 |
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 || |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
495 |
(euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid))) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
496 497 |
new->suid = new->euid; new->fsuid = new->euid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
498 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
499 500 501 |
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
502 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
503 |
return commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
504 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
505 506 507 508 |
error: abort_creds(new); return retval; } |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
509 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
510 |
/* |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
511 512 |
* setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS * |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
513 |
* Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
514 |
* like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
515 516 517 518 |
* user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid() * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
519 |
* regain them by swapping the real and effective uid. |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
520 |
*/ |
ae1251ab7 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
521 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
522 |
{ |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
523 |
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
524 525 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
526 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
527 528 529 530 531 |
kuid_t kuid; kuid = make_kuid(ns, uid); if (!uid_valid(kuid)) return -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
532 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
533 534 535 536 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
537 |
retval = -EPERM; |
c7b96acf1 userns: Kill nso... |
538 |
if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
539 540 |
new->suid = new->uid = kuid; if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) { |
54e991242 sched: don't allo... |
541 542 543 |
retval = set_user(new); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
544 |
} |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
545 |
} else if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kuid, new->suid)) { |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
546 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
547 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
548 |
|
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
549 |
new->fsuid = new->euid = kuid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
550 551 552 553 |
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
554 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
555 |
return commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
556 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
557 558 559 |
error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
560 561 562 563 564 565 566 |
} /* * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid, * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid(). */ |
ae1251ab7 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
567 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
568 |
{ |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
569 |
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
570 571 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
572 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 |
kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid; kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid); keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid); ksuid = make_kuid(ns, suid); if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid)) return -EINVAL; if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid)) return -EINVAL; if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(ksuid)) return -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
587 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
588 589 590 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
591 |
old = current_cred(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
592 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
593 |
retval = -EPERM; |
c7b96acf1 userns: Kill nso... |
594 |
if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
595 596 |
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
597 |
goto error; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
598 599 |
if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
600 |
goto error; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
601 602 |
if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
603 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
604 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
605 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
606 |
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
607 608 |
new->uid = kruid; if (!uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) { |
54e991242 sched: don't allo... |
609 610 611 612 |
retval = set_user(new); if (retval < 0) goto error; } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
613 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
614 |
if (euid != (uid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
615 |
new->euid = keuid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
616 |
if (suid != (uid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
617 |
new->suid = ksuid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
618 |
new->fsuid = new->euid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
619 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
620 621 622 |
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); if (retval < 0) goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
623 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
624 |
return commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
625 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
626 627 628 |
error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
629 |
} |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
630 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
631 |
{ |
86a264abe CRED: Wrap curren... |
632 |
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
633 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
634 635 636 637 638 |
uid_t ruid, euid, suid; ruid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid); euid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid); suid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->suid); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
639 |
|
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
640 641 642 643 644 645 |
retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp); if (!retval) { retval = put_user(euid, euidp); if (!retval) return put_user(suid, suidp); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
646 647 648 649 650 651 |
return retval; } /* * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid. */ |
ae1251ab7 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
652 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
653 |
{ |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
654 |
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
655 656 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
657 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 |
kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid; krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid); kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid); ksgid = make_kgid(ns, sgid); if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid)) return -EINVAL; if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid)) return -EINVAL; if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid)) return -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
670 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
671 672 673 674 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; old = current_cred(); |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
675 |
retval = -EPERM; |
c7b96acf1 userns: Kill nso... |
676 |
if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
677 678 |
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
679 |
goto error; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
680 681 |
if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
682 |
goto error; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
683 684 |
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid)) |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
685 |
goto error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
686 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
687 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
688 |
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
689 |
new->gid = krgid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
690 |
if (egid != (gid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
691 |
new->egid = kegid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
692 |
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
693 |
new->sgid = ksgid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
694 |
new->fsgid = new->egid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
695 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
696 697 698 699 700 |
return commit_creds(new); error: abort_creds(new); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
701 |
} |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
702 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgidp, gid_t __user *, egidp, gid_t __user *, sgidp) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
703 |
{ |
86a264abe CRED: Wrap curren... |
704 |
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
705 |
int retval; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
706 707 708 709 710 |
gid_t rgid, egid, sgid; rgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid); egid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid); sgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->sgid); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
711 |
|
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
712 713 714 715 716 717 |
retval = put_user(rgid, rgidp); if (!retval) { retval = put_user(egid, egidp); if (!retval) retval = put_user(sgid, sgidp); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 |
return retval; } /* * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access.. */ |
ae1251ab7 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
729 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
730 |
{ |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
731 732 733 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; uid_t old_fsuid; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 |
kuid_t kuid; old = current_cred(); old_fsuid = from_kuid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsuid); kuid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, uid); if (!uid_valid(kuid)) return old_fsuid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
742 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
743 744 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
745 |
return old_fsuid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
746 |
|
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
747 748 |
if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) || |
c7b96acf1 userns: Kill nso... |
749 |
ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
750 751 |
if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) { new->fsuid = kuid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
752 753 |
if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) goto change_okay; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
754 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
755 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
756 757 |
abort_creds(new); return old_fsuid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
758 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
759 760 |
change_okay: commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
761 762 763 764 |
return old_fsuid; } /* |
f42df9e65 general: convert ... |
765 |
* Samma på svenska.. |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
766 |
*/ |
ae1251ab7 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
767 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
768 |
{ |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
769 770 771 |
const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; gid_t old_fsgid; |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 |
kgid_t kgid; old = current_cred(); old_fsgid = from_kgid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsgid); kgid = make_kgid(old->user_ns, gid); if (!gid_valid(kgid)) return old_fsgid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
780 781 782 |
new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
783 |
return old_fsgid; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
784 |
|
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
785 786 |
if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) || |
c7b96acf1 userns: Kill nso... |
787 |
ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { |
a29c33f4e userns: Convert s... |
788 789 |
if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) { new->fsgid = kgid; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
790 |
goto change_okay; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
791 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
792 |
} |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
793 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
794 795 796 797 798 |
abort_creds(new); return old_fsgid; change_okay: commit_creds(new); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
799 800 |
return old_fsgid; } |
2813893f8 kernel: condition... |
801 |
#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
802 |
|
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 |
/** * sys_getpid - return the thread group id of the current process * * Note, despite the name, this returns the tgid not the pid. The tgid and * the pid are identical unless CLONE_THREAD was specified on clone() in * which case the tgid is the same in all threads of the same group. * * This is SMP safe as current->tgid does not change. */ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpid) { return task_tgid_vnr(current); } /* Thread ID - the internal kernel "pid" */ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(gettid) { return task_pid_vnr(current); } /* * Accessing ->real_parent is not SMP-safe, it could * change from under us. However, we can use a stale * value of ->real_parent under rcu_read_lock(), see * release_task()->call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct). */ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getppid) { int pid; rcu_read_lock(); pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent)); rcu_read_unlock(); return pid; } SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getuid) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()); } SYSCALL_DEFINE0(geteuid) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_euid()); } SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getgid) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_gid()); } SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getegid) { /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_egid()); } |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
863 864 |
void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms) { |
0cf55e1ec sched, cputime: I... |
865 |
cputime_t tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime; |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
866 |
|
e80d0a1ae cputime: Rename t... |
867 |
thread_group_cputime_adjusted(current, &tgutime, &tgstime); |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
868 869 |
cutime = current->signal->cutime; cstime = current->signal->cstime; |
0cf55e1ec sched, cputime: I... |
870 871 |
tms->tms_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(tgutime); tms->tms_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(tgstime); |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
872 873 874 |
tms->tms_cutime = cputime_to_clock_t(cutime); tms->tms_cstime = cputime_to_clock_t(cstime); } |
58fd3aa28 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
875 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
876 |
{ |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
877 878 |
if (tbuf) { struct tms tmp; |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
879 880 |
do_sys_times(&tmp); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
881 882 883 |
if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms))) return -EFAULT; } |
e3d5a27d5 Allow times and t... |
884 |
force_successful_syscall_return(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 |
return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64()); } /* * This needs some heavy checking ... * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it. * * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91 * |
98611e4e6 exec: kill task_s... |
897 |
* !PF_FORKNOEXEC check to conform completely to POSIX. |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
898 |
*/ |
b290ebe2c [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
899 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
900 901 |
{ struct task_struct *p; |
ee0acf90d [PATCH] setpgid: ... |
902 |
struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
903 904 |
struct pid *pgrp; int err; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
905 906 |
if (!pid) |
b488893a3 pid namespaces: c... |
907 |
pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
908 909 910 911 |
if (!pgid) pgid = pid; if (pgid < 0) return -EINVAL; |
950eaaca6 pid: make setpgid... |
912 |
rcu_read_lock(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
913 914 915 916 917 918 919 |
/* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM */ write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); err = -ESRCH; |
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
920 |
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
921 922 923 924 925 926 |
if (!p) goto out; err = -EINVAL; if (!thread_group_leader(p)) goto out; |
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
927 |
if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) { |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
928 |
err = -EPERM; |
41487c65b [PATCH] pid: repl... |
929 |
if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
930 931 |
goto out; err = -EACCES; |
98611e4e6 exec: kill task_s... |
932 |
if (!(p->flags & PF_FORKNOEXEC)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
933 934 935 |
goto out; } else { err = -ESRCH; |
ee0acf90d [PATCH] setpgid: ... |
936 |
if (p != group_leader) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
937 938 939 940 941 942 |
goto out; } err = -EPERM; if (p->signal->leader) goto out; |
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
943 |
pgrp = task_pid(p); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
944 |
if (pgid != pid) { |
b488893a3 pid namespaces: c... |
945 |
struct task_struct *g; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
946 |
|
4e021306c sys_setpgid(): si... |
947 948 |
pgrp = find_vpid(pgid); g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID); |
41487c65b [PATCH] pid: repl... |
949 |
if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader)) |
f020bc468 [PATCH] sys_setpg... |
950 |
goto out; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
951 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
952 953 954 |
err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid); if (err) goto out; |
1b0f7ffd0 pids: kill signal... |
955 |
if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp) |
83beaf3c6 pids: sys_setpgid... |
956 |
change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
957 958 959 960 961 |
err = 0; out: /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */ write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
950eaaca6 pid: make setpgid... |
962 |
rcu_read_unlock(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
963 964 |
return err; } |
dbf040d9d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
965 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
966 |
{ |
12a3de0a9 pids: sys_getpgid... |
967 968 969 970 971 |
struct task_struct *p; struct pid *grp; int retval; rcu_read_lock(); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
972 |
if (!pid) |
12a3de0a9 pids: sys_getpgid... |
973 |
grp = task_pgrp(current); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
974 |
else { |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
975 |
retval = -ESRCH; |
12a3de0a9 pids: sys_getpgid... |
976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 |
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); if (!p) goto out; grp = task_pgrp(p); if (!grp) goto out; retval = security_task_getpgid(p); if (retval) goto out; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
986 |
} |
12a3de0a9 pids: sys_getpgid... |
987 988 989 990 |
retval = pid_vnr(grp); out: rcu_read_unlock(); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
991 992 993 |
} #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP |
dbf040d9d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
994 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
995 |
{ |
12a3de0a9 pids: sys_getpgid... |
996 |
return sys_getpgid(0); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
997 998 999 |
} #endif |
dbf040d9d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1000 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1001 |
{ |
1dd768c08 pids: sys_getsid:... |
1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 |
struct task_struct *p; struct pid *sid; int retval; rcu_read_lock(); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
1007 |
if (!pid) |
1dd768c08 pids: sys_getsid:... |
1008 |
sid = task_session(current); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
1009 |
else { |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1010 |
retval = -ESRCH; |
1dd768c08 pids: sys_getsid:... |
1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 |
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); if (!p) goto out; sid = task_session(p); if (!sid) goto out; retval = security_task_getsid(p); if (retval) goto out; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1021 |
} |
1dd768c08 pids: sys_getsid:... |
1022 1023 1024 1025 |
retval = pid_vnr(sid); out: rcu_read_unlock(); return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1026 |
} |
81dabb464 exit.c: unexport ... |
1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 |
static void set_special_pids(struct pid *pid) { struct task_struct *curr = current->group_leader; if (task_session(curr) != pid) change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_SID, pid); if (task_pgrp(curr) != pid) change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_PGID, pid); } |
b290ebe2c [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1037 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1038 |
{ |
e19f247a3 [PATCH] setpgid: ... |
1039 |
struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
e4cc0a9c8 fix setsid() for ... |
1040 1041 |
struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader); pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1042 |
int err = -EPERM; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1043 |
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
390e2ff07 [PATCH] Make sets... |
1044 1045 1046 |
/* Fail if I am already a session leader */ if (group_leader->signal->leader) goto out; |
430c62312 start the global ... |
1047 1048 |
/* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the * proposed session id. |
390e2ff07 [PATCH] Make sets... |
1049 |
*/ |
6806aac6d sys_setsid: remov... |
1050 |
if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1051 |
goto out; |
e19f247a3 [PATCH] setpgid: ... |
1052 |
group_leader->signal->leader = 1; |
81dabb464 exit.c: unexport ... |
1053 |
set_special_pids(sid); |
24ec839c4 [PATCH] tty: ->si... |
1054 |
|
9c9f4ded9 tty: Add a kref c... |
1055 |
proc_clear_tty(group_leader); |
24ec839c4 [PATCH] tty: ->si... |
1056 |
|
e4cc0a9c8 fix setsid() for ... |
1057 |
err = session; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1058 1059 |
out: write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
5091faa44 sched: Add 'autog... |
1060 |
if (err > 0) { |
0d0df599f connector: fix re... |
1061 |
proc_sid_connector(group_leader); |
5091faa44 sched: Add 'autog... |
1062 1063 |
sched_autogroup_create_attach(group_leader); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1064 1065 |
return err; } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1066 |
DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem); |
e28cbf229 improve sys_newun... |
1067 1068 |
#ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE #define override_architecture(name) \ |
46da27664 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1069 |
(personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 && \ |
e28cbf229 improve sys_newun... |
1070 1071 1072 1073 1074 |
copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \ sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE))) #else #define override_architecture(name) 0 #endif |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1075 1076 1077 |
/* * Work around broken programs that cannot handle "Linux 3.0". * Instead we map 3.x to 2.6.40+x, so e.g. 3.0 would be 2.6.40 |
39afb5ee4 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1078 |
* And we map 4.x to 2.6.60+x, so 4.0 would be 2.6.60. |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1079 |
*/ |
2702b1526 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1080 |
static int override_release(char __user *release, size_t len) |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1081 1082 |
{ int ret = 0; |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1083 1084 |
if (current->personality & UNAME26) { |
2702b1526 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1085 1086 |
const char *rest = UTS_RELEASE; char buf[65] = { 0 }; |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1087 1088 |
int ndots = 0; unsigned v; |
2702b1526 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1089 |
size_t copy; |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1090 1091 1092 1093 1094 1095 1096 1097 |
while (*rest) { if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3) break; if (!isdigit(*rest) && *rest != '.') break; rest++; } |
39afb5ee4 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1098 |
v = ((LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff) + 60; |
31fd84b95 use clamp_t in UN... |
1099 |
copy = clamp_t(size_t, len, 1, sizeof(buf)); |
2702b1526 kernel/sys.c: fix... |
1100 1101 |
copy = scnprintf(buf, copy, "2.6.%u%s", v, rest); ret = copy_to_user(release, buf, copy + 1); |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1102 1103 1104 |
} return ret; } |
e48fbb699 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1105 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1106 1107 1108 1109 |
{ int errno = 0; down_read(&uts_sem); |
e9ff3990f [PATCH] namespace... |
1110 |
if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof *name)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1111 1112 |
errno = -EFAULT; up_read(&uts_sem); |
e28cbf229 improve sys_newun... |
1113 |
|
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1114 1115 |
if (!errno && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) errno = -EFAULT; |
e28cbf229 improve sys_newun... |
1116 1117 |
if (!errno && override_architecture(name)) errno = -EFAULT; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1118 1119 |
return errno; } |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1120 1121 1122 1123 1124 1125 1126 1127 1128 1129 1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 |
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME /* * Old cruft */ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name) { int error = 0; if (!name) return -EFAULT; down_read(&uts_sem); if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof(*name))) error = -EFAULT; up_read(&uts_sem); |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1135 1136 |
if (!error && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) error = -EFAULT; |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1137 1138 1139 1140 1141 1142 1143 1144 1145 1146 1147 1148 1149 1150 1151 1152 1153 1154 1155 1156 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 1163 1164 1165 1166 1167 1168 1169 1170 |
if (!error && override_architecture(name)) error = -EFAULT; return error; } SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name) { int error; if (!name) return -EFAULT; if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, sizeof(struct oldold_utsname))) return -EFAULT; down_read(&uts_sem); error = __copy_to_user(&name->sysname, &utsname()->sysname, __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __put_user(0, name->sysname + __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __copy_to_user(&name->nodename, &utsname()->nodename, __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __put_user(0, name->nodename + __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __copy_to_user(&name->release, &utsname()->release, __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __put_user(0, name->release + __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __copy_to_user(&name->version, &utsname()->version, __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __put_user(0, name->version + __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __copy_to_user(&name->machine, &utsname()->machine, __OLD_UTS_LEN); error |= __put_user(0, name->machine + __OLD_UTS_LEN); up_read(&uts_sem); if (!error && override_architecture(name)) error = -EFAULT; |
be27425dc Add a personality... |
1171 1172 |
if (!error && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) error = -EFAULT; |
5cacdb4ad Add generic sys_o... |
1173 1174 1175 |
return error ? -EFAULT : 0; } #endif |
5a8a82b1d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1176 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1177 1178 1179 |
{ int errno; char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
bb96a6f50 userns: allow set... |
1180 |
if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1181 |
return -EPERM; |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1182 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 |
if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) return -EINVAL; down_write(&uts_sem); errno = -EFAULT; if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1188 1189 1190 1191 |
struct new_utsname *u = utsname(); memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len); memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1192 |
errno = 0; |
499eea6bf sethostname/setdo... |
1193 |
uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_HOSTNAME); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1194 1195 1196 1197 1198 1199 |
} up_write(&uts_sem); return errno; } #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME |
5a8a82b1d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1200 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1201 1202 |
{ int i, errno; |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1203 |
struct new_utsname *u; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1204 1205 1206 1207 |
if (len < 0) return -EINVAL; down_read(&uts_sem); |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1208 1209 |
u = utsname(); i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1210 1211 1212 |
if (i > len) i = len; errno = 0; |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1213 |
if (copy_to_user(name, u->nodename, i)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1214 1215 1216 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 1223 1224 |
errno = -EFAULT; up_read(&uts_sem); return errno; } #endif /* * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling * uname() */ |
5a8a82b1d [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1225 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1226 1227 1228 |
{ int errno; char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1229 |
if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 1236 |
return -EPERM; if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) return -EINVAL; down_write(&uts_sem); errno = -EFAULT; if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { |
9679e4dd6 kernel/sys.c: imp... |
1237 1238 1239 1240 |
struct new_utsname *u = utsname(); memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len); memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1241 |
errno = 0; |
499eea6bf sethostname/setdo... |
1242 |
uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_DOMAINNAME); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1243 1244 1245 1246 |
} up_write(&uts_sem); return errno; } |
e48fbb699 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1247 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1248 |
{ |
b95183453 rlimits: switch m... |
1249 1250 1251 1252 1253 1254 1255 1256 |
struct rlimit value; int ret; ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &value); if (!ret) ret = copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0; return ret; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1257 1258 1259 1260 1261 1262 1263 |
} #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT /* * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps. */ |
e48fbb699 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1264 1265 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1266 1267 1268 1269 1270 1271 1272 1273 |
{ struct rlimit x; if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) return -EINVAL; task_lock(current->group_leader); x = current->signal->rlim[resource]; task_unlock(current->group_leader); |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
1274 |
if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1275 |
x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
756184b7d [PATCH] CodingSty... |
1276 |
if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1277 |
x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1278 |
return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1279 1280 1281 |
} #endif |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1282 1283 1284 1285 1286 1287 1288 1289 1290 1291 1292 1293 1294 1295 1296 1297 1298 1299 1300 1301 1302 1303 1304 1305 1306 1307 1308 1309 1310 1311 1312 1313 |
static inline bool rlim64_is_infinity(__u64 rlim64) { #if BITS_PER_LONG < 64 return rlim64 >= ULONG_MAX; #else return rlim64 == RLIM64_INFINITY; #endif } static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64) { if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY; else rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur; if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY) rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY; else rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max; } static void rlim64_to_rlim(const struct rlimit64 *rlim64, struct rlimit *rlim) { if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_cur)) rlim->rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY; else rlim->rlim_cur = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_cur; if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_max)) rlim->rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; else rlim->rlim_max = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_max; } |
1c1e618dd rlimits: allow se... |
1314 |
/* make sure you are allowed to change @tsk limits before calling this */ |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1315 1316 |
int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1317 |
{ |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1318 |
struct rlimit *rlim; |
86f162f4c rlimits: do secur... |
1319 |
int retval = 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1320 1321 1322 |
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) return -EINVAL; |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1323 1324 1325 1326 1327 1328 1329 |
if (new_rlim) { if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max) return -EINVAL; if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && new_rlim->rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open) return -EPERM; } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1330 |
|
1c1e618dd rlimits: allow se... |
1331 1332 1333 1334 1335 1336 |
/* protect tsk->signal and tsk->sighand from disappearing */ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); if (!tsk->sighand) { retval = -ESRCH; goto out; } |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1337 |
rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource; |
86f162f4c rlimits: do secur... |
1338 |
task_lock(tsk->group_leader); |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1339 |
if (new_rlim) { |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1340 1341 |
/* Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until cgroups can contain all limits */ |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1342 1343 1344 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 |
if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) retval = -EPERM; if (!retval) retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk->group_leader, resource, new_rlim); if (resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim->rlim_cur == 0) { /* * The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU * expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was * never set". So let's cheat and make it one second * instead */ new_rlim->rlim_cur = 1; } } if (!retval) { if (old_rlim) *old_rlim = *rlim; if (new_rlim) *rlim = *new_rlim; |
9926e4c74 CPU time limit pa... |
1363 |
} |
7855c35da rlimits: split sy... |
1364 |
task_unlock(tsk->group_leader); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1365 |
|
d3561f78f [PATCH] RLIMIT_CP... |
1366 1367 1368 1369 1370 1371 |
/* * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error * code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a * very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of * applications, so we live with it */ |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1372 1373 1374 |
if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) update_rlimit_cpu(tsk, new_rlim->rlim_cur); |
ec9e16bac [PATCH] sys_setrl... |
1375 |
out: |
1c1e618dd rlimits: allow se... |
1376 |
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
2fb9d2689 rlimits: make sur... |
1377 |
return retval; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1378 |
} |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1379 1380 1381 1382 |
/* rcu lock must be held */ static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1383 1384 |
if (current == task) return 0; |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1385 |
|
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1386 |
tcred = __task_cred(task); |
5af662030 userns: Convert p... |
1387 1388 1389 1390 1391 1392 |
if (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) && uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) && uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) && gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) && gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) && gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid)) |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1393 |
return 0; |
c4a4d6037 userns: Use cred-... |
1394 |
if (ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
fc832ad36 userns: user name... |
1395 1396 1397 |
return 0; return -EPERM; |
c022a0aca rlimits: implemen... |
1398 1399 1400 1401 1402 1403 1404 1405 1406 1407 1408 1409 1410 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 |
} SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource, const struct rlimit64 __user *, new_rlim, struct rlimit64 __user *, old_rlim) { struct rlimit64 old64, new64; struct rlimit old, new; struct task_struct *tsk; int ret; if (new_rlim) { if (copy_from_user(&new64, new_rlim, sizeof(new64))) return -EFAULT; rlim64_to_rlim(&new64, &new); } rcu_read_lock(); tsk = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current; if (!tsk) { rcu_read_unlock(); return -ESRCH; } ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk); if (ret) { rcu_read_unlock(); return ret; } get_task_struct(tsk); rcu_read_unlock(); ret = do_prlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim ? &new : NULL, old_rlim ? &old : NULL); if (!ret && old_rlim) { rlim_to_rlim64(&old, &old64); if (copy_to_user(old_rlim, &old64, sizeof(old64))) ret = -EFAULT; } put_task_struct(tsk); return ret; } |
7855c35da rlimits: split sy... |
1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) { struct rlimit new_rlim; if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim))) return -EFAULT; |
5b41535aa rlimits: redo do_... |
1447 |
return do_prlimit(current, resource, &new_rlim, NULL); |
7855c35da rlimits: split sy... |
1448 |
} |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 |
/* * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct, * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not * measuring them yet). * |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 |
* When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping. |
2dd0ebcd2 [PATCH] Avoid tak... |
1464 |
* |
de047c1bc [PATCH] avoid tas... |
1465 1466 1467 1468 1469 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 |
* Locking: * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with * the siglock held. * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock. * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal-> * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple. |
2dd0ebcd2 [PATCH] Avoid tak... |
1479 |
* |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1480 |
*/ |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
1481 |
static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r) |
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1482 |
{ |
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1483 1484 1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 |
r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw; r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw; r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt; r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt; r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t); r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t); } |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1490 1491 1492 1493 |
static void k_getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) { struct task_struct *t; unsigned long flags; |
0cf55e1ec sched, cputime: I... |
1494 |
cputime_t tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime; |
1f10206cf getrusage: fill r... |
1495 |
unsigned long maxrss = 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1496 |
|
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1497 |
memset((char *)r, 0, sizeof (*r)); |
648616343 [S390] cputime: a... |
1498 |
utime = stime = 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1499 |
|
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1500 |
if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) { |
e80d0a1ae cputime: Rename t... |
1501 |
task_cputime_adjusted(current, &utime, &stime); |
f06febc96 timers: fix itime... |
1502 |
accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r); |
1f10206cf getrusage: fill r... |
1503 |
maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; |
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1504 1505 |
goto out; } |
d6cf723a1 k_getrusage: don'... |
1506 |
if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) |
de047c1bc [PATCH] avoid tas... |
1507 |
return; |
0f59cc4a3 [PATCH] simplify ... |
1508 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1509 |
switch (who) { |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1510 1511 1512 1513 1514 1515 1516 1517 1518 1519 1520 1521 1522 |
case RUSAGE_BOTH: case RUSAGE_CHILDREN: utime = p->signal->cutime; stime = p->signal->cstime; r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw; r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw; r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt; r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt; r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock; r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock; maxrss = p->signal->cmaxrss; if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1523 |
break; |
0f59cc4a3 [PATCH] simplify ... |
1524 |
|
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1525 1526 1527 1528 1529 1530 1531 1532 1533 1534 1535 1536 1537 1538 1539 1540 1541 1542 1543 1544 |
case RUSAGE_SELF: thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime); utime += tgutime; stime += tgstime; r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw; r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw; r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt; r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt; r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock; r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock; if (maxrss < p->signal->maxrss) maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; t = p; do { accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r); } while_each_thread(p, t); break; default: BUG(); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1545 |
} |
de047c1bc [PATCH] avoid tas... |
1546 |
unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags); |
de047c1bc [PATCH] avoid tas... |
1547 |
|
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1548 |
out: |
0f59cc4a3 [PATCH] simplify ... |
1549 1550 |
cputime_to_timeval(utime, &r->ru_utime); cputime_to_timeval(stime, &r->ru_stime); |
1f10206cf getrusage: fill r... |
1551 1552 1553 |
if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) { struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p); |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1554 |
|
1f10206cf getrusage: fill r... |
1555 1556 1557 1558 1559 1560 |
if (mm) { setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm); mmput(mm); } } r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* convert pages to KBs */ |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1561 1562 1563 1564 1565 |
} int getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage __user *ru) { struct rusage r; |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
1566 |
|
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1567 |
k_getrusage(p, who, &r); |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1568 1569 |
return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0; } |
e48fbb699 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1570 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1571 |
{ |
679c9cd4a add RUSAGE_THREAD |
1572 1573 |
if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && who != RUSAGE_THREAD) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1574 1575 1576 |
return -EINVAL; return getrusage(current, who, ru); } |
8d2d5c4a2 switch getrusage(... |
1577 1578 1579 1580 1581 1582 1583 1584 1585 1586 1587 1588 1589 |
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct compat_rusage __user *, ru) { struct rusage r; if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && who != RUSAGE_THREAD) return -EINVAL; k_getrusage(current, who, &r); return put_compat_rusage(&r, ru); } #endif |
e48fbb699 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
1590 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
1591 1592 1593 1594 |
{ mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO); return mask; } |
3b7391de6 capabilities: int... |
1595 |
|
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1596 |
static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd) |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1597 |
{ |
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1598 |
struct fd exe; |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1599 |
struct file *old_exe, *exe_file; |
496ad9aa8 new helper: file_... |
1600 |
struct inode *inode; |
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1601 |
int err; |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1602 |
|
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1603 1604 |
exe = fdget(fd); if (!exe.file) |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1605 |
return -EBADF; |
496ad9aa8 new helper: file_... |
1606 |
inode = file_inode(exe.file); |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1607 1608 1609 1610 1611 1612 1613 |
/* * Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make * sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an * overall picture. */ err = -EACCES; |
496ad9aa8 new helper: file_... |
1614 |
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || |
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1615 |
exe.file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1616 |
goto exit; |
496ad9aa8 new helper: file_... |
1617 |
err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC); |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1618 1619 |
if (err) goto exit; |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1620 |
/* |
4229fb1dc c/r: prctl: less ... |
1621 |
* Forbid mm->exe_file change if old file still mapped. |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1622 |
*/ |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1623 |
exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm); |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1624 |
err = -EBUSY; |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1625 |
if (exe_file) { |
4229fb1dc c/r: prctl: less ... |
1626 |
struct vm_area_struct *vma; |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 |
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { if (!vma->vm_file) continue; if (path_equal(&vma->vm_file->f_path, &exe_file->f_path)) goto exit_err; } up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); fput(exe_file); |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1638 |
} |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 |
/* * The symlink can be changed only once, just to disallow arbitrary * transitions malicious software might bring in. This means one * could make a snapshot over all processes running and monitor * /proc/pid/exe changes to notice unusual activity if needed. */ |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1645 1646 |
err = -EPERM; if (test_and_set_bit(MMF_EXE_FILE_CHANGED, &mm->flags)) |
71fe97e18 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1647 |
goto exit; |
bafb282df c/r: prctl: updat... |
1648 |
|
4229fb1dc c/r: prctl: less ... |
1649 |
err = 0; |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 |
/* set the new file, lockless */ get_file(exe.file); old_exe = xchg(&mm->exe_file, exe.file); if (old_exe) fput(old_exe); |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1655 |
exit: |
2903ff019 switch simple cas... |
1656 |
fdput(exe); |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1657 |
return err; |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1658 1659 1660 1661 |
exit_err: up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); fput(exe_file); goto exit; |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1662 |
} |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 |
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE /* * WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful * in what is allowed for modification from userspace. */ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) { unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE; struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; int error = -EINVAL, i; static const unsigned char offsets[] = { offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_code), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_code), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_data), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_data), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_brk), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, brk), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_stack), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_start), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_end), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_start), offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_end), }; /* * Make sure the members are not somewhere outside * of allowed address space. */ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(offsets); i++) { u64 val = *(u64 *)((char *)prctl_map + offsets[i]); if ((unsigned long)val >= mmap_max_addr || (unsigned long)val < mmap_min_addr) goto out; } /* * Make sure the pairs are ordered. */ #define __prctl_check_order(__m1, __op, __m2) \ ((unsigned long)prctl_map->__m1 __op \ (unsigned long)prctl_map->__m2) ? 0 : -EINVAL error = __prctl_check_order(start_code, <, end_code); error |= __prctl_check_order(start_data, <, end_data); error |= __prctl_check_order(start_brk, <=, brk); error |= __prctl_check_order(arg_start, <=, arg_end); error |= __prctl_check_order(env_start, <=, env_end); if (error) goto out; #undef __prctl_check_order error = -EINVAL; /* * @brk should be after @end_data in traditional maps. */ if (prctl_map->start_brk <= prctl_map->end_data || prctl_map->brk <= prctl_map->end_data) goto out; /* * Neither we should allow to override limits if they set. */ if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), prctl_map->brk, prctl_map->start_brk, prctl_map->end_data, prctl_map->start_data)) goto out; /* * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector. */ if (prctl_map->auxv_size) { if (!prctl_map->auxv || prctl_map->auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)) goto out; } /* * Finally, make sure the caller has the rights to * change /proc/pid/exe link: only local root should * be allowed to. */ if (prctl_map->exe_fd != (u32)-1) { struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); if (!uid_eq(cred->uid, make_kuid(ns, 0)) || !gid_eq(cred->gid, make_kgid(ns, 0))) goto out; } error = 0; out: return error; } static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data_size) { struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { .exe_fd = (u32)-1, }; unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE]; struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; int error; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct prctl_mm_map) > 256); if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE) return put_user((unsigned int)sizeof(prctl_map), (unsigned int __user *)addr); if (data_size != sizeof(prctl_map)) return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_user(&prctl_map, addr, sizeof(prctl_map))) return -EFAULT; error = validate_prctl_map(&prctl_map); if (error) return error; if (prctl_map.auxv_size) { memset(user_auxv, 0, sizeof(user_auxv)); if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)prctl_map.auxv, prctl_map.auxv_size)) return -EFAULT; /* Last entry must be AT_NULL as specification requires */ user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = AT_NULL; user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = AT_NULL; } |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1794 |
if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1795 1796 |
error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd); down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 |
if (error) goto out; /* * We don't validate if these members are pointing to * real present VMAs because application may have correspond * VMAs already unmapped and kernel uses these members for statistics * output in procfs mostly, except * * - @start_brk/@brk which are used in do_brk but kernel lookups * for VMAs when updating these memvers so anything wrong written * here cause kernel to swear at userspace program but won't lead * to any problem in kernel itself */ mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code; mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code; mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data; mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data; mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk; mm->brk = prctl_map.brk; mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack; mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start; mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end; mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start; mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end; /* * Note this update of @saved_auxv is lockless thus * if someone reads this member in procfs while we're * updating -- it may get partly updated results. It's * known and acceptable trade off: we leave it as is to * not introduce additional locks here making the kernel * more complex. */ if (prctl_map.auxv_size) memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, sizeof(user_auxv)); error = 0; out: up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); return error; } #endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1841 1842 1843 |
static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1844 |
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1845 1846 |
struct vm_area_struct *vma; int error; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1847 |
|
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1848 1849 1850 |
if (arg5 || (arg4 && (opt != PR_SET_MM_AUXV && opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP && opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE))) |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1851 |
return -EINVAL; |
f606b77f1 prctl: PR_SET_MM ... |
1852 1853 1854 1855 |
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP || opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE) return prctl_set_mm_map(opt, (const void __user *)addr, arg4); #endif |
79f0713d4 prctl: use CAP_SY... |
1856 |
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1857 |
return -EPERM; |
6e399cd14 prctl: avoid usin... |
1858 1859 |
if (opt == PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE) return prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, (unsigned int)addr); |
b32dfe377 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1860 |
|
1ad75b9e1 c/r: prctl: add m... |
1861 |
if (addr >= TASK_SIZE || addr < mmap_min_addr) |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1862 |
return -EINVAL; |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1863 |
error = -EINVAL; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1864 1865 |
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); vma = find_vma(mm, addr); |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1866 1867 |
switch (opt) { case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE: |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1868 1869 |
mm->start_code = addr; break; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1870 |
case PR_SET_MM_END_CODE: |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1871 |
mm->end_code = addr; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1872 |
break; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1873 |
case PR_SET_MM_START_DATA: |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1874 |
mm->start_data = addr; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1875 |
break; |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1876 1877 |
case PR_SET_MM_END_DATA: mm->end_data = addr; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 |
break; case PR_SET_MM_START_BRK: if (addr <= mm->end_data) goto out; |
8764b338b mm: use may_adjus... |
1883 1884 |
if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), mm->brk, addr, mm->end_data, mm->start_data)) |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 |
goto out; mm->start_brk = addr; break; case PR_SET_MM_BRK: if (addr <= mm->end_data) goto out; |
8764b338b mm: use may_adjus... |
1893 1894 |
if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), addr, mm->start_brk, mm->end_data, mm->start_data)) |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1895 1896 1897 1898 |
goto out; mm->brk = addr; break; |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 |
/* * If command line arguments and environment * are placed somewhere else on stack, we can * set them up here, ARG_START/END to setup * command line argumets and ENV_START/END * for environment. */ case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK: case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START: case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END: case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START: case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END: if (!vma) { error = -EFAULT; goto out; } |
fe8c7f5cb c/r: prctl: exten... |
1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 |
if (opt == PR_SET_MM_START_STACK) mm->start_stack = addr; else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ARG_START) mm->arg_start = addr; else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ARG_END) mm->arg_end = addr; else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ENV_START) mm->env_start = addr; else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ENV_END) mm->env_end = addr; break; /* * This doesn't move auxiliary vector itself * since it's pinned to mm_struct, but allow * to fill vector with new values. It's up * to a caller to provide sane values here * otherwise user space tools which use this * vector might be unhappy. */ case PR_SET_MM_AUXV: { unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE]; if (arg4 > sizeof(user_auxv)) goto out; up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)addr, arg4)) return -EFAULT; /* Make sure the last entry is always AT_NULL */ user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = 0; user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = 0; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)); task_lock(current); memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, arg4); task_unlock(current); return 0; } |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1957 |
default: |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1958 1959 1960 1961 |
goto out; } error = 0; |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1962 1963 |
out: up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1964 1965 |
return error; } |
300f786b2 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1966 |
|
52b369415 kernel/sys.c: mak... |
1967 |
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE |
300f786b2 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1968 1969 1970 1971 |
static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr) { return put_user(me->clear_child_tid, tid_addr); } |
52b369415 kernel/sys.c: mak... |
1972 |
#else |
300f786b2 c/r: prctl: add a... |
1973 1974 1975 1976 |
static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr) { return -EINVAL; } |
028ee4be3 c/r: prctl: add P... |
1977 |
#endif |
247ec28ed mm: add a field t... |
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 2041 2042 2043 2044 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050 2051 2052 2053 2054 2055 2056 2057 2058 2059 2060 2061 2062 2063 2064 2065 2066 2067 2068 2069 2070 2071 2072 2073 2074 2075 2076 2077 2078 2079 2080 2081 2082 2083 2084 2085 2086 2087 2088 2089 2090 2091 2092 2093 2094 2095 2096 2097 2098 2099 2100 2101 2102 2103 2104 2105 2106 2107 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2115 2116 2117 2118 2119 2120 2121 2122 2123 |
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU static int prctl_update_vma_anon_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **prev, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, const char __user *name_addr) { struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm; int error = 0; pgoff_t pgoff; if (name_addr == vma_get_anon_name(vma)) { *prev = vma; goto out; } pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff + ((start - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT); *prev = vma_merge(mm, *prev, start, end, vma->vm_flags, vma->anon_vma, vma->vm_file, pgoff, vma_policy(vma), name_addr); if (*prev) { vma = *prev; goto success; } *prev = vma; if (start != vma->vm_start) { error = split_vma(mm, vma, start, 1); if (error) goto out; } if (end != vma->vm_end) { error = split_vma(mm, vma, end, 0); if (error) goto out; } success: if (!vma->vm_file) vma->anon_name = name_addr; out: if (error == -ENOMEM) error = -EAGAIN; return error; } static int prctl_set_vma_anon_name(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long arg) { unsigned long tmp; struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev; int unmapped_error = 0; int error = -EINVAL; /* * If the interval [start,end) covers some unmapped address * ranges, just ignore them, but return -ENOMEM at the end. * - this matches the handling in madvise. */ vma = find_vma_prev(current->mm, start, &prev); if (vma && start > vma->vm_start) prev = vma; for (;;) { /* Still start < end. */ error = -ENOMEM; if (!vma) return error; /* Here start < (end|vma->vm_end). */ if (start < vma->vm_start) { unmapped_error = -ENOMEM; start = vma->vm_start; if (start >= end) return error; } /* Here vma->vm_start <= start < (end|vma->vm_end) */ tmp = vma->vm_end; if (end < tmp) tmp = end; /* Here vma->vm_start <= start < tmp <= (end|vma->vm_end). */ error = prctl_update_vma_anon_name(vma, &prev, start, tmp, (const char __user *)arg); if (error) return error; start = tmp; if (prev && start < prev->vm_end) start = prev->vm_end; error = unmapped_error; if (start >= end) return error; if (prev) vma = prev->vm_next; else /* madvise_remove dropped mmap_sem */ vma = find_vma(current->mm, start); } } static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long start, unsigned long len_in, unsigned long arg) { struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; int error; unsigned long len; unsigned long end; if (start & ~PAGE_MASK) return -EINVAL; len = (len_in + ~PAGE_MASK) & PAGE_MASK; /* Check to see whether len was rounded up from small -ve to zero */ if (len_in && !len) return -EINVAL; end = start + len; if (end < start) return -EINVAL; if (end == start) return 0; down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); switch (opt) { case PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME: error = prctl_set_vma_anon_name(start, end, arg); break; default: error = -EINVAL; } up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); return error; } #else /* CONFIG_MMU */ static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long start, unsigned long len_in, unsigned long arg) { return -EINVAL; } #endif |
c4ea37c26 [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
2124 2125 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2126 |
{ |
b6dff3ec5 CRED: Separate ta... |
2127 |
struct task_struct *me = current; |
53e08bfbb prctl: adds PR_SE... |
2128 |
struct task_struct *tsk; |
b6dff3ec5 CRED: Separate ta... |
2129 2130 |
unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)]; long error; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2131 |
|
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
2132 2133 |
error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); if (error != -ENOSYS) |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2134 |
return error; |
d84f4f992 CRED: Inaugurate ... |
2135 |
error = 0; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2136 |
switch (option) { |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2137 2138 2139 |
case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG: if (!valid_signal(arg2)) { error = -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2140 |
break; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2141 2142 2143 2144 2145 2146 2147 2148 2149 2150 2151 2152 |
} me->pdeath_signal = arg2; break; case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG: error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2); break; case PR_GET_DUMPABLE: error = get_dumpable(me->mm); break; case PR_SET_DUMPABLE: if (arg2 != SUID_DUMP_DISABLE && arg2 != SUID_DUMP_USER) { error = -EINVAL; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2153 |
break; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2154 2155 2156 |
} set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2); break; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2157 |
|
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2158 2159 2160 2161 2162 2163 2164 2165 2166 2167 2168 2169 2170 2171 2172 2173 2174 2175 2176 2177 2178 2179 2180 2181 2182 2183 2184 2185 2186 2187 2188 2189 2190 2191 2192 2193 2194 2195 2196 2197 2198 2199 2200 2201 2202 2203 2204 2205 2206 2207 2208 2209 2210 2211 2212 2213 2214 2215 2216 2217 2218 2219 2220 2221 2222 2223 2224 2225 |
case PR_SET_UNALIGN: error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_UNALIGN: error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_FPEMU: error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_FPEMU: error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_FPEXC: error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_FPEXC: error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_TIMING: error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL; break; case PR_SET_TIMING: if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL) error = -EINVAL; break; case PR_SET_NAME: comm[sizeof(me->comm) - 1] = 0; if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2, sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0) return -EFAULT; set_task_comm(me, comm); proc_comm_connector(me); break; case PR_GET_NAME: get_task_comm(comm, me); if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, sizeof(comm))) return -EFAULT; break; case PR_GET_ENDIAN: error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); break; case PR_SET_ENDIAN: error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_SECCOMP: error = prctl_get_seccomp(); break; case PR_SET_SECCOMP: error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3); break; case PR_GET_TSC: error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2); break; case PR_SET_TSC: error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2); break; case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE: error = perf_event_task_disable(); break; case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE: error = perf_event_task_enable(); break; case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK: error = current->timer_slack_ns; break; case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK: if (arg2 <= 0) current->timer_slack_ns = |
6976675d9 hrtimer: create a... |
2226 |
current->default_timer_slack_ns; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2227 2228 2229 2230 2231 2232 2233 2234 2235 |
else current->timer_slack_ns = arg2; break; case PR_MCE_KILL: if (arg4 | arg5) return -EINVAL; switch (arg2) { case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR: if (arg3 != 0) |
4db96cf07 HWPOISON: Add PR_... |
2236 |
return -EINVAL; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2237 |
current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS; |
4db96cf07 HWPOISON: Add PR_... |
2238 |
break; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2239 2240 2241 2242 2243 2244 2245 2246 2247 |
case PR_MCE_KILL_SET: current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS; if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY) current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY; else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE) current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY; else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT) current->flags &= ~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS); |
1087e9b4f HWPOISON: Clean u... |
2248 |
else |
259e5e6c7 Add PR_{GET,SET}_... |
2249 |
return -EINVAL; |
259e5e6c7 Add PR_{GET,SET}_... |
2250 |
break; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2251 |
default: |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2252 2253 2254 2255 2256 2257 2258 2259 2260 2261 2262 2263 2264 2265 2266 2267 2268 2269 |
return -EINVAL; } break; case PR_MCE_KILL_GET: if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5) return -EINVAL; if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS) error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ? PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE; else error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT; break; case PR_SET_MM: error = prctl_set_mm(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); break; case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS: error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user **)arg2); break; |
16278b7bc prctl: fix mispla... |
2270 |
case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK_PID: |
91a845472 prctl: make PR_SE... |
2271 |
if (task_pid_vnr(current) != (pid_t)arg3 && |
16278b7bc prctl: fix mispla... |
2272 2273 2274 |
!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) return -EPERM; rcu_read_lock(); |
91a845472 prctl: make PR_SE... |
2275 |
tsk = find_task_by_vpid((pid_t)arg3); |
16278b7bc prctl: fix mispla... |
2276 2277 2278 2279 2280 2281 2282 2283 2284 2285 2286 2287 2288 2289 |
if (tsk == NULL) { rcu_read_unlock(); return -EINVAL; } get_task_struct(tsk); rcu_read_unlock(); if (arg2 <= 0) tsk->timer_slack_ns = tsk->default_timer_slack_ns; else tsk->timer_slack_ns = arg2; put_task_struct(tsk); error = 0; break; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2290 2291 2292 2293 2294 2295 2296 2297 2298 2299 |
case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2; break; case PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: error = put_user(me->signal->is_child_subreaper, (int __user *)arg2); break; case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |
1d4457f99 sched: move no_ne... |
2300 |
task_set_no_new_privs(current); |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2301 2302 2303 2304 |
break; case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |
1d4457f99 sched: move no_ne... |
2305 |
return task_no_new_privs(current) ? 1 : 0; |
a0715cc22 mm, thp: add VM_I... |
2306 2307 2308 2309 2310 2311 2312 2313 2314 2315 2316 2317 2318 2319 2320 |
case PR_GET_THP_DISABLE: if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; error = !!(me->mm->def_flags & VM_NOHUGEPAGE); break; case PR_SET_THP_DISABLE: if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; down_write(&me->mm->mmap_sem); if (arg2) me->mm->def_flags |= VM_NOHUGEPAGE; else me->mm->def_flags &= ~VM_NOHUGEPAGE; up_write(&me->mm->mmap_sem); break; |
fe3d197f8 x86, mpx: On-dema... |
2321 |
case PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT: |
e9d1b4f3c x86, mpx: Strictl... |
2322 2323 |
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |
fe3d197f8 x86, mpx: On-dema... |
2324 2325 2326 |
error = MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT(me); break; case PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT: |
e9d1b4f3c x86, mpx: Strictl... |
2327 2328 |
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |
fe3d197f8 x86, mpx: On-dema... |
2329 2330 |
error = MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT(me); break; |
9791554b4 MIPS,prctl: add P... |
2331 2332 2333 2334 2335 2336 |
case PR_SET_FP_MODE: error = SET_FP_MODE(me, arg2); break; case PR_GET_FP_MODE: error = GET_FP_MODE(me); break; |
247ec28ed mm: add a field t... |
2337 2338 2339 |
case PR_SET_VMA: error = prctl_set_vma(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); break; |
f3cbd435b sys_prctl(): codi... |
2340 2341 2342 |
default: error = -EINVAL; break; |
1da177e4c Linux-2.6.12-rc2 |
2343 2344 2345 |
} return error; } |
3cfc348bf [PATCH] x86: Add ... |
2346 |
|
836f92adf [CVE-2009-0029] S... |
2347 2348 |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep, struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused) |
3cfc348bf [PATCH] x86: Add ... |
2349 2350 2351 |
{ int err = 0; int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); |
ec94fc3d5 kernel/sys.c: whi... |
2352 |
|
3cfc348bf [PATCH] x86: Add ... |
2353 2354 2355 2356 |
if (cpup) err |= put_user(cpu, cpup); if (nodep) err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep); |
3cfc348bf [PATCH] x86: Add ... |
2357 2358 |
return err ? -EFAULT : 0; } |
10a0a8d4e Add common orderl... |
2359 |
|
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
2360 2361 2362 2363 2364 2365 2366 2367 2368 2369 2370 |
/** * do_sysinfo - fill in sysinfo struct * @info: pointer to buffer to fill */ static int do_sysinfo(struct sysinfo *info) { unsigned long mem_total, sav_total; unsigned int mem_unit, bitcount; struct timespec tp; memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct sysinfo)); |
45c64940c kernel/sys.c:do_s... |
2371 |
get_monotonic_boottime(&tp); |
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
2372 2373 2374 2375 2376 2377 2378 2379 2380 2381 2382 2383 2384 2385 2386 2387 2388 2389 2390 2391 2392 2393 2394 2395 2396 2397 2398 2399 2400 2401 2402 2403 2404 2405 2406 2407 2408 2409 2410 2411 2412 2413 2414 2415 2416 2417 2418 2419 2420 2421 2422 2423 2424 2425 2426 2427 2428 2429 2430 2431 2432 2433 2434 2435 2436 2437 2438 2439 2440 2441 2442 2443 2444 2445 2446 2447 2448 2449 2450 2451 2452 2453 2454 2455 2456 2457 2458 2459 2460 2461 2462 2463 |
info->uptime = tp.tv_sec + (tp.tv_nsec ? 1 : 0); get_avenrun(info->loads, 0, SI_LOAD_SHIFT - FSHIFT); info->procs = nr_threads; si_meminfo(info); si_swapinfo(info); /* * If the sum of all the available memory (i.e. ram + swap) * is less than can be stored in a 32 bit unsigned long then * we can be binary compatible with 2.2.x kernels. If not, * well, in that case 2.2.x was broken anyways... * * -Erik Andersen <andersee@debian.org> */ mem_total = info->totalram + info->totalswap; if (mem_total < info->totalram || mem_total < info->totalswap) goto out; bitcount = 0; mem_unit = info->mem_unit; while (mem_unit > 1) { bitcount++; mem_unit >>= 1; sav_total = mem_total; mem_total <<= 1; if (mem_total < sav_total) goto out; } /* * If mem_total did not overflow, multiply all memory values by * info->mem_unit and set it to 1. This leaves things compatible * with 2.2.x, and also retains compatibility with earlier 2.4.x * kernels... */ info->mem_unit = 1; info->totalram <<= bitcount; info->freeram <<= bitcount; info->sharedram <<= bitcount; info->bufferram <<= bitcount; info->totalswap <<= bitcount; info->freeswap <<= bitcount; info->totalhigh <<= bitcount; info->freehigh <<= bitcount; out: return 0; } SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct sysinfo __user *, info) { struct sysinfo val; do_sysinfo(&val); if (copy_to_user(info, &val, sizeof(struct sysinfo))) return -EFAULT; return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT struct compat_sysinfo { s32 uptime; u32 loads[3]; u32 totalram; u32 freeram; u32 sharedram; u32 bufferram; u32 totalswap; u32 freeswap; u16 procs; u16 pad; u32 totalhigh; u32 freehigh; u32 mem_unit; char _f[20-2*sizeof(u32)-sizeof(int)]; }; COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info) { struct sysinfo s; do_sysinfo(&s); /* Check to see if any memory value is too large for 32-bit and scale * down if needed */ |
0baae41ea kernel/sys.c: com... |
2464 |
if (upper_32_bits(s.totalram) || upper_32_bits(s.totalswap)) { |
4a22f1663 kernel/timer.c: m... |
2465 2466 2467 2468 2469 2470 2471 2472 2473 2474 2475 2476 2477 2478 2479 2480 2481 2482 2483 2484 2485 2486 2487 2488 2489 2490 2491 2492 2493 2494 2495 2496 2497 2498 2499 2500 2501 |
int bitcount = 0; while (s.mem_unit < PAGE_SIZE) { s.mem_unit <<= 1; bitcount++; } s.totalram >>= bitcount; s.freeram >>= bitcount; s.sharedram >>= bitcount; s.bufferram >>= bitcount; s.totalswap >>= bitcount; s.freeswap >>= bitcount; s.totalhigh >>= bitcount; s.freehigh >>= bitcount; } if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, info, sizeof(struct compat_sysinfo)) || __put_user(s.uptime, &info->uptime) || __put_user(s.loads[0], &info->loads[0]) || __put_user(s.loads[1], &info->loads[1]) || __put_user(s.loads[2], &info->loads[2]) || __put_user(s.totalram, &info->totalram) || __put_user(s.freeram, &info->freeram) || __put_user(s.sharedram, &info->sharedram) || __put_user(s.bufferram, &info->bufferram) || __put_user(s.totalswap, &info->totalswap) || __put_user(s.freeswap, &info->freeswap) || __put_user(s.procs, &info->procs) || __put_user(s.totalhigh, &info->totalhigh) || __put_user(s.freehigh, &info->freehigh) || __put_user(s.mem_unit, &info->mem_unit)) return -EFAULT; return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ |