20 Jun, 2020
1 commit
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…kvm/kvm") into android-mainline
Baby steps on the way to 5.8-rc1.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: I5962e12546d3d215c73c3d74b00ad6263d96f64e
03 Jun, 2020
1 commit
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Pull lockdown update from James Morris:
"An update for the security subsystem to allow unprivileged users
to see the status of the lockdown feature. From Jeremy Cline"Also an added comment to describe CAP_SETFCAP.
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
capabilities: add description for CAP_SETFCAP
lockdown: Allow unprivileged users to see lockdown status
15 May, 2020
1 commit
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A number of userspace tools, such as systemtap, need a way to see the
current lockdown state so they can gracefully deal with the kernel being
locked down. The state is already exposed in
/sys/kernel/security/lockdown, but is only readable by root. Adjust the
permissions so unprivileged users can read the state.Fixes: 000d388ed3bb ("security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM")
Cc: Frank Ch. Eigler
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline
Signed-off-by: James Morris
04 Feb, 2020
1 commit
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This reverts commit 59438b46471ae6cdfb761afc8c9beaf1e428a331.
This unblocks the booting of Android on newer kernels. It is a temporary
workaround and the correct fix is to add new core sepolicy.Bug: 148822198
Change-Id: Ic521cb760c867c12dfcb7d2752280fbb0eddb82c
Signed-off-by: Alistair Delva
10 Dec, 2019
1 commit
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Implement a SELinux hook for lockdown. If the lockdown module is also
enabled, then a denial by the lockdown module will take precedence over
SELinux, so SELinux can only further restrict lockdown decisions.
The SELinux hook only distinguishes at the granularity of integrity
versus confidentiality similar to the lockdown module, but includes the
full lockdown reason as part of the audit record as a hint in diagnosing
what triggered the denial. To support this auditing, move the
lockdown_reasons[] string array from being private to the lockdown
module to the security framework so that it can be used by the lsm audit
code and so that it is always available even when the lockdown module
is disabled.Note that the SELinux implementation allows the integrity and
confidentiality reasons to be controlled independently from one another.
Thus, in an SELinux policy, one could allow operations that specify
an integrity reason while blocking operations that specify a
confidentiality reason. The SELinux hook implementation is
stricter than the lockdown module in validating the provided reason value.Sample AVC audit output from denials:
avc: denied { integrity } for pid=3402 comm="fwupd"
lockdown_reason="/dev/mem,kmem,port" scontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0
tcontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tclass=lockdown permissive=0avc: denied { confidentiality } for pid=4628 comm="cp"
lockdown_reason="/proc/kcore access"
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tclass=lockdown permissive=0Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Reviewed-by: James Morris
[PM: some merge fuzz do the the perf hooks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
01 Dec, 2019
1 commit
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Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:
"Highlights:- Infrastructure for secure boot on some bare metal Power9 machines.
The firmware support is still in development, so the code here
won't actually activate secure boot on any existing systems.- A change to xmon (our crash handler / pseudo-debugger) to restrict
it to read-only mode when the kernel is lockdown'ed, otherwise it's
trivial to drop into xmon and modify kernel data, such as the
lockdown state.- Support for KASLR on 32-bit BookE machines (Freescale / NXP).
- Fixes for our flush_icache_range() and __kernel_sync_dicache()
(VDSO) to work with memory ranges >4GB.- Some reworks of the pseries CMM (Cooperative Memory Management)
driver to make it behave more like other balloon drivers and enable
some cleanups of generic mm code.- A series of fixes to our hardware breakpoint support to properly
handle unaligned watchpoint addresses.Plus a bunch of other smaller improvements, fixes and cleanups.
Thanks to: Alastair D'Silva, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V,
Anthony Steinhauser, Cédric Le Goater, Chris Packham, Chris Smart,
Christophe Leroy, Christopher M. Riedl, Christoph Hellwig, Claudio
Carvalho, Daniel Axtens, David Hildenbrand, Deb McLemore, Diana
Craciun, Eric Richter, Geert Uytterhoeven, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Greg
Kurz, Gustavo L. F. Walbon, Hari Bathini, Harish, Jason Yan, Krzysztof
Kozlowski, Leonardo Bras, Mathieu Malaterre, Mauro S. M. Rodrigues,
Michal Suchanek, Mimi Zohar, Nathan Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Nayna
Jain, Nick Desaulniers, Oliver O'Halloran, Qian Cai, Rasmus Villemoes,
Ravi Bangoria, Sam Bobroff, Santosh Sivaraj, Scott Wood, Thomas Huth,
Tyrel Datwyler, Vaibhav Jain, Valentin Longchamp, YueHaibing"* tag 'powerpc-5.5-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (144 commits)
powerpc/fixmap: fix crash with HIGHMEM
x86/efi: remove unused variables
powerpc: Define arch_is_kernel_initmem_freed() for lockdep
powerpc/prom_init: Use -ffreestanding to avoid a reference to bcmp
powerpc: Avoid clang warnings around setjmp and longjmp
powerpc: Don't add -mabi= flags when building with Clang
powerpc: Fix Kconfig indentation
powerpc/fixmap: don't clear fixmap area in paging_init()
selftests/powerpc: spectre_v2 test must be built 64-bit
powerpc/powernv: Disable native PCIe port management
powerpc/kexec: Move kexec files into a dedicated subdir.
powerpc/32: Split kexec low level code out of misc_32.S
powerpc/sysdev: drop simple gpio
powerpc/83xx: map IMMR with a BAT.
powerpc/32s: automatically allocate BAT in setbat()
powerpc/ioremap: warn on early use of ioremap()
powerpc: Add support for GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP
powerpc/fixmap: Use __fix_to_virt() instead of fix_to_virt()
powerpc/8xx: use the fixmapped IMMR in cpm_reset()
powerpc/8xx: add __init to cpm1 init functions
...
31 Oct, 2019
1 commit
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The driver exposes EFI runtime services to user-space through an IOCTL
interface, calling the EFI services function pointers directly without
using the efivar API.Disallow access to the /dev/efi_test character device when the kernel is
locked down to prevent arbitrary user-space to call EFI runtime services.Also require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to open the chardev to prevent unprivileged
users to call the EFI runtime services, instead of just relying on the
chardev file mode bits for this.The main user of this driver is the fwts [0] tool that already checks if
the effective user ID is 0 and fails otherwise. So this change shouldn't
cause any regression to this tool.[0]: https://wiki.ubuntu.com/FirmwareTestSuite/Reference/uefivarinfo
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett
Cc: Linus Torvalds
Cc: Peter Zijlstra
Cc: Thomas Gleixner
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-7-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar
28 Oct, 2019
1 commit
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Xmon should be either fully or partially disabled depending on the
kernel lockdown state.Put xmon into read-only mode for lockdown=integrity and prevent user
entry into xmon when lockdown=confidentiality. Xmon checks the lockdown
state on every attempted entry:(1) during early xmon'ing
(2) when triggered via sysrq
(3) when toggled via debugfs
(4) when triggered via a previously enabled breakpoint
The following lockdown state transitions are handled:
(1) lockdown=none -> lockdown=integrity
set xmon read-only mode(2) lockdown=none -> lockdown=confidentiality
clear all breakpoints, set xmon read-only mode,
prevent user re-entry into xmon(3) lockdown=integrity -> lockdown=confidentiality
clear all breakpoints, set xmon read-only mode,
prevent user re-entry into xmonSuggested-by: Andrew Donnellan
Signed-off-by: Christopher M. Riedl
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190907061124.1947-3-cmr@informatik.wtf
10 Sep, 2019
1 commit
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No reason for these not to be const.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Suggested-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
20 Aug, 2019
20 commits
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Print the content of current->comm in messages generated by lockdown to
indicate a restriction that was hit. This makes it a bit easier to find
out what caused the message.The message now patterned something like:
Lockdown: : is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Tracefs may release more information about the kernel than desirable, so
restrict it when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by
preventing open().(Fixed by Ben Hutchings to avoid a null dereference in
default_file_open())Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware)
Cc: Ben Hutchings
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Disallow opening of debugfs files that might be used to muck around when
the kernel is locked down as various drivers give raw access to hardware
through debugfs. Given the effort of auditing all 2000 or so files and
manually fixing each one as necessary, I've chosen to apply a heuristic
instead. The following changes are made:(1) chmod and chown are disallowed on debugfs objects (though the root dir
can be modified by mount and remount, but I'm not worried about that).(2) When the kernel is locked down, only files with the following criteria
are permitted to be opened:- The file must have mode 00444
- The file must not have ioctl methods
- The file must not have mmap(3) When the kernel is locked down, files may only be opened for reading.
Normal device interaction should be done through configfs, sysfs or a
miscdev, not debugfs.Note that this makes it unnecessary to specifically lock down show_dsts(),
show_devs() and show_call() in the asus-wmi driver.I would actually prefer to lock down all files by default and have the
the files unlocked by the creator. This is tricky to manage correctly,
though, as there are 19 creation functions and ~1600 call sites (some of
them in loops scanning tables).Signed-off-by: David Howells
cc: Andy Shevchenko
cc: acpi4asus-user@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
cc: Matthew Garrett
cc: Thomas Gleixner
Cc: Greg KH
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Disallow the use of certain perf facilities that might allow userspace to
access kernel data.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
Cc: Peter Zijlstra
Cc: Ingo Molnar
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow
private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel
has been locked down in confidentiality mode.Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: Chun-Yi Lee
cc: Alexei Starovoitov
Cc: Daniel Borkmann
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Disallow the creation of perf and ftrace kprobes when the kernel is
locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing their registration.
This prevents kprobes from being used to access kernel memory to steal
crypto data, but continues to allow the use of kprobes from signed
modules.Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
Cc: Naveen N. Rao
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Disallow access to /proc/kcore when the kernel is locked down to prevent
access to cryptographic data. This is limited to lockdown
confidentiality mode and is still permitted in integrity mode.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked
down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space. This is
a runtime check rather than buildtime in order to allow configurations
where the same kernel may be run in both locked down or permissive modes
depending on local policy.Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware)
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
cc: Thomas Gleixner
cc: Steven Rostedt
cc: Ingo Molnar
cc: "H. Peter Anvin"
cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware
parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed
dma buffers and other types).Suggested-by: Alan Cox
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
Cc: Jessica Yu
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq
settings on a serial port. This only appears to be an issue for the serial
drivers that use the core serial code. All other drivers seem to either
ignore attempts to change port/irq or give an error.Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
cc: Jiri Slaby
Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the
kernel is locked down.Suggested-by: Dominik Brodowski
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making
it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading.
Disable it if the kernel is locked down.Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since
it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based on a
patch by Kees Cook.Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner
cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO
register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary
DMA, so lock it down by default.This also implicitly locks down the KDADDIO, KDDELIO, KDENABIO and
KDDISABIO console ioctls.Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning
from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model,
so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the
kernel is locked down.Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
Cc: pavel@ucw.cz
cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary
code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It
makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation.This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a
signature on the image to be booted.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Acked-by: Dave Young
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible
for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and
also to steal cryptographic information.Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has
been locked down to prevent this.Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and
thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.I have adjusted the errors generated:
(1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG,
ENOKEY), then:(a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned.
(b) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is
locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with
other lockdown cases).(2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails
the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we
return the error we got.Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not
be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet.[Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA integration. This will
be replaced with integration with the IMA architecture policy
patchset.]Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
Cc: Jessica Yu
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy,
distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward
static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to
reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured
at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or
build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David
Howells.Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook
Cc: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
