15 Sep, 2011
1 commit
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Move all files associated with encrypted keys to keys/encrypted-keys.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
27 Jun, 2011
1 commit
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The 'encrypted' key type defines its own payload format which contains a
symmetric key randomly generated that cannot be used directly to mount
an eCryptfs filesystem, because it expects an authentication token
structure.This patch introduces the new format 'ecryptfs' that allows to store an
authentication token structure inside the encrypted key payload containing
a randomly generated symmetric key, as the same for the format 'default'.More details about the usage of encrypted keys with the eCryptfs
filesystem can be found in the file 'Documentation/keys-ecryptfs.txt'.Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu
Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
24 Jan, 2011
2 commits
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Rename encrypted_defined.c and encrypted_defined.h files to encrypted.c and
encrypted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Rename trusted_defined.c and trusted_defined.h files to trusted.c and
trusted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
29 Nov, 2010
2 commits
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Define a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys are kernel
generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'trusted'
symmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel.
Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.Changelog:
- bug fix: replaced master-key rcu based locking with semaphore
(reported by David Howells)
- Removed memset of crypto_shash_digest() digest output
- Replaced verification of 'key-type:key-desc' using strcspn(), with
one based on string constants.
- Moved documentation to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Replace hash with shash (based on comments by David Howells)
- Make lengths/counts size_t where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
Could not convert most lengths, as crypto expects 'unsigned int'
(size_t: on 32 bit is defined as unsigned int, but on 64 bit is unsigned long)
- Add 'const' where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
- allocate derived_buf dynamically to support arbitrary length master key
(fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered
- cleanup security/Kconfig
- Add missing 'update' keyword (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Free epayload on failure to create key (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Increase the data size limit (requested by Roberto Sassu)
- Crypto return codes are always 0 on success and negative on failure,
remove unnecessary tests.
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc()Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: David Safford
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Define a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are random
number symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM
only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria match.
Userspace can only ever see encrypted blobs.Based on suggestions by Jason Gunthorpe, several new options have been
added to support additional usages.The new options are:
migratable= designates that the key may/may not ever be updated
(resealed under a new key, new pcrinfo or new auth.)pcrlock=n extends the designated PCR 'n' with a random value,
so that a key sealed to that PCR may not be unsealed
again until after a reboot.keyhandle= specifies the sealing/unsealing key handle.
keyauth= specifies the sealing/unsealing key auth.
blobauth= specifies the sealed data auth.
Implementation of a kernel reserved locality for trusted keys will be
investigated for a possible future extension.Changelog:
- Updated and added examples to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Moved generic TPM constants to include/linux/tpm_command.h
(David Howell's suggestion.)
- trusted_defined.c: replaced kzalloc with kmalloc, added pcrlock failure
error handling, added const qualifiers where appropriate.
- moved to late_initcall
- updated from hash to shash (suggestion by David Howells)
- reduced worst stack usage (tpm_seal) from 530 to 312 bytes
- moved documentation to Documentation directory (suggestion by David Howells)
- all the other code cleanups suggested by David Howells
- Add pcrlock CAP_SYS_ADMIN dependency (based on comment by Jason Gunthorpe)
- New options: migratable, pcrlock, keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth (based on
discussions with Jason Gunthorpe)
- Free payload on failure to create key(reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Updated Kconfig and other descriptions (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion)
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() (reported by Serge Hallyn)Signed-off-by: David Safford
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: James Morris
02 Sep, 2009
1 commit
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Add garbage collection for dead, revoked and expired keys. This involved
erasing all links to such keys from keyrings that point to them. At that
point, the key will be deleted in the normal manner.Keyrings from which garbage collection occurs are shrunk and their quota
consumption reduced as appropriate.Dead keys (for which the key type has been removed) will be garbage collected
immediately.Revoked and expired keys will hang around for a number of seconds, as set in
/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay before being automatically removed. The default
is 5 minutes.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
29 Apr, 2008
1 commit
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Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys files:
(*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytesMaximum number of keys that root may have and the maximum total number of
bytes of data that root may have stored in those keys.(*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys
/proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytesMaximum number of keys that each non-root user may have and the maximum
total number of bytes of data that each of those users may have stored in
their keys.Also increase the quotas as a number of people have been complaining that it's
not big enough. I'm not sure that it's big enough now either, but on the
other hand, it can now be set in /etc/sysctl.conf.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Cc:
Cc:
Cc:
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
09 Oct, 2005
1 commit
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The attached patch splits key permissions checking out of key-ui.h and
moves it into a .c file. It's quite large and called quite a lot, and
it's about to get bigger with the addition of LSM support for keys...key_any_permission() is also discarded as it's no longer used.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
24 Jun, 2005
1 commit
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The attached patch makes the following changes:
(1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".
This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.Authorisation keys hold two references:
(a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
rendering it of no further use.(b) The "authorising process". This is either:
(i) the process that called request_key(), or:
(ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
referred to by the new authorisation key.This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.(2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
/sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.(3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
(fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
credentials.This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
to the authorising process.(4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
credentials of the authorising process.This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
to the authorising process.(5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
than the process doing the instantiation.(6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.(7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.Signed-Off-By: David Howells
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
17 Apr, 2005
1 commit
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Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.Let it rip!
