11 Aug, 2018
1 commit
-
The code in cap_inode_getsecurity(), introduced by commit 8db6c34f1dbc
("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities"), should use
d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias() do handle unhashed dentry
correctly. This is needed, for example, if execveat() is called with an
open but unlinked overlayfs file, because overlayfs unhashes dentry on
unlink.
This is a regression of real life application, first reported at
https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-unionfs/msg05363.htmlBelow reproducer and setup can reproduce the case.
const char* exec="echo";
const char *newargv[] = { "echo", "hello", NULL};
const char *newenviron[] = { NULL };
int fd, err;fd = open(exec, O_PATH);
unlink(exec);
err = syscall(322/*SYS_execveat*/, fd, "", newargv, newenviron,
AT_EMPTY_PATH);
if(err
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Cc: # v4.14
Signed-off-by: Eddie Horng
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
25 May, 2018
1 commit
-
A privileged user in s_user_ns will generally have the ability to
manipulate the backing store and insert security.* xattrs into
the filesystem directly. Therefore the kernel must be prepared to
handle these xattrs from unprivileged mounts, and it makes little
sense for commoncap to prevent writing these xattrs to the
filesystem. The capability and LSM code have already been updated
to appropriately handle xattrs from unprivileged mounts, so it
is safe to loosen this restriction on setting xattrs.The exception to this logic is that writing xattrs to a mounted
filesystem may also cause the LSM inode_post_setxattr or
inode_setsecurity callbacks to be invoked. SELinux will deny the
xattr update by virtue of applying mountpoint labeling to
unprivileged userns mounts, and Smack will deny the writes for
any user without global CAP_MAC_ADMIN, so loosening the
capability check in commoncap is safe in this respect as well.Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: Christian Brauner
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
11 Apr, 2018
1 commit
-
syzbot is reporting NULL pointer dereference at xattr_getsecurity() [1],
for cap_inode_getsecurity() is returning sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data) when
memory allocation failed. Return -ENOMEM if memory allocation failed.[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a55ba438506fe68649a5f50d2d82d56b365e0107
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc8e06 ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Reported-by: syzbot
Cc: stable # 4.14+
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
02 Jan, 2018
1 commit
-
If userspace attempted to set a "security.capability" xattr shorter than
4 bytes (e.g. 'setfattr -n security.capability -v x file'), then
cap_convert_nscap() read past the end of the buffer containing the xattr
value because it accessed the ->magic_etc field without verifying that
the xattr value is long enough to contain that field.Fix it by validating the xattr value size first.
This bug was found using syzkaller with KASAN. The KASAN report was as
follows (cleaned up slightly):BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88002d8741c0 by task syz-executor1/2852CPU: 0 PID: 2852 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc6-00200-gcc0aac99d977 #253
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0xe3/0x195 lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x73/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x235/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498
setxattr+0x2bd/0x350 fs/xattr.c:446
path_setxattr+0x168/0x1b0 fs/xattr.c:472
SYSC_setxattr fs/xattr.c:487 [inline]
SyS_setxattr+0x36/0x50 fs/xattr.c:483
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0x85Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Cc: # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris
14 Nov, 2017
1 commit
-
Pull general security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"TPM (from Jarkko):
- essential clean up for tpm_crb so that ARM64 and x86 versions do
not distract each other as much as before- /dev/tpm0 rejects now too short writes (shorter buffer than
specified in the command header- use DMA-safe buffer in tpm_tis_spi
- otherwise mostly minor fixes.
Smack:
- base support for overlafsCapabilities:
- BPRM_FCAPS fixes, from Richard Guy Briggs:The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing
setuid application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected
as it was supposed to be limited to when the file system actually
had capabilities in an extended attribute. It lists all
capabilities making the event really ugly to parse what is
happening. The PATH record correctly records the setuid bit and
owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on set*id.TOMOYO:
- Y2038 timestamping fixes"* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits)
MAINTAINERS: update the IMA, EVM, trusted-keys, encrypted-keys entries
Smack: Base support for overlayfs
MAINTAINERS: remove David Safford as maintainer for encrypted+trusted keys
tomoyo: fix timestamping for y2038
capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions
capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
capabilities: invert logic for clarity
capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic
capabilities: move audit log decision to function
capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes
capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic
capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status
capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
tpm, tpm_tis: use ARRAY_SIZE() to define TPM_HID_USR_IDX
tpm: fix duplicate inline declaration specifier
tpm: fix type of a local variables in tpm_tis_spi.c
tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_map_command()
tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl()
tpm-dev-common: Reject too short writes
...
20 Oct, 2017
10 commits
-
The existing condition tested for process effective capabilities set by
file attributes but intended to ignore the change if the result was
unsurprisingly an effective full set in the case root is special with a
setuid root executable file and we are root.Stated again:
- When you execute a setuid root application, it is no surprise and
expected that it got all capabilities, so we do not want capabilities
recorded.
if (pE_grew && !(pE_fullset && (eff_root || real_root) && root_priveleged) )Now make sure we cover other cases:
- If something prevented a setuid root app getting all capabilities and
it wound up with one capability only, then it is a surprise and should
be logged. When it is a setuid root file, we only want capabilities
when the process does not get full capabilities..
root_priveleged && setuid_root && !pE_fullset- Similarly if a non-setuid program does pick up capabilities due to
file system based capabilities, then we want to know what capabilities
were picked up. When it has file system based capabilities we want
the capabilities.
!is_setuid && (has_fcap && pP_gained)- If it is a non-setuid file and it gets ambient capabilities, we want
the capabilities.
!is_setuid && pA_gained- These last two are combined into one due to the common first parameter.
Related: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both real
root and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the
BPRM_FCAPS record with audit syscalls. This meant that any setuid root
applications would print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't
necessary, cluttering the event output, since the SYSCALL and PATH
records indicated the presence of the setuid bit and effective root user
id.Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the
unnecessary record.Ref: commit 3fc689e96c0c ("Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS")
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The way the logic was presented, it was awkward to read and verify.
Invert the logic using DeMorgan's Law to be more easily able to read and
understand.Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Remove a layer of conditional logic to make the use of conditions
easier to read and analyse.Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Move the audit log decision logic to its own function to isolate the
complexity in one place.Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Introduce a number of inlines to make the use of the negation of
uid_eq() easier to read and analyse.Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT
easier to read.Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Rename has_cap to has_fcap to clarify it applies to file capabilities
since the entire source file is about capabilities.Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Introduce macros cap_gained, cap_grew, cap_full to make the use of the
negation of is_subset() easier to read and analyse.Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Factor out the case of privileged root from the function
cap_bprm_set_creds() to make the latter easier to read and analyse.Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris
19 Oct, 2017
1 commit
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The pointer fs_ns is assigned from inode->i_ib->s_user_ns before
a null pointer check on inode, hence if inode is actually null we
will get a null pointer dereference on this assignment. Fix this
by only dereferencing inode after the null pointer check on
inode.Detected by CoverityScan CID#1455328 ("Dereference before null check")
Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris
25 Sep, 2017
1 commit
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Pull misc security layer update from James Morris:
"This is the remaining 'general' change in the security tree for v4.14,
following the direct merging of SELinux (+ TOMOYO), AppArmor, and
seccomp.That's everything now for the security tree except IMA, which will
follow shortly (I've been traveling for the past week with patchy
internet)"* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: fix description of values returned by cap_inode_need_killpriv
24 Sep, 2017
1 commit
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cap_inode_need_killpriv returns 1 if security.capability exists and
has a value and inode_killpriv() is required, 0 otherwise. Fix the
description of the return value to reflect this.Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris
12 Sep, 2017
1 commit
-
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"Life has been busy and I have not gotten half as much done this round
as I would have liked. I delayed it so that a minor conflict
resolution with the mips tree could spend a little time in linux-next
before I sent this pull request.This includes two long delayed user namespace changes from Kirill
Tkhai. It also includes a very useful change from Serge Hallyn that
allows the security capability attribute to be used inside of user
namespaces. The practical effect of this is people can now untar
tarballs and install rpms in user namespaces. It had been suggested to
generalize this and encode some of the namespace information
information in the xattr name. Upon close inspection that makes the
things that should be hard easy and the things that should be easy
more expensive.Then there is my bugfix/cleanup for signal injection that removes the
magic encoding of the siginfo union member from the kernel internal
si_code. The mips folks reported the case where I had used FPE_FIXME
me is impossible so I have remove FPE_FIXME from mips, while at the
same time including a return statement in that case to keep gcc from
complaining about unitialized variables.I almost finished the work to get make copy_siginfo_to_user a trivial
copy to user. The code is available at:git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git neuter-copy_siginfo_to_user-v3
But I did not have time/energy to get the code posted and reviewed
before the merge window opened.I was able to see that the security excuse for just copying fields
that we know are initialized doesn't work in practice there are buggy
initializations that don't initialize the proper fields in siginfo. So
we still sometimes copy unitialized data to userspace"* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
mips/signal: In force_fcr31_sig return in the impossible case
signal: Remove kernel interal si_code magic
fcntl: Don't use ambiguous SIG_POLL si_codes
prctl: Allow local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file
security: Use user_namespace::level to avoid redundant iterations in cap_capable()
userns,pidns: Verify the userns for new pid namespaces
signal/testing: Don't look for __SI_FAULT in userspace
signal/mips: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/sparc: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/ia64: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/alpha: Document a conflict with SI_USER for SIGTRAP
02 Sep, 2017
1 commit
-
Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
host.However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a
vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct
vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (that is, the uid_t in user
namespace which mounted the filesystem, usually init_user_ns) of the
root id in whose namespaces the file capabilities may take effect.When a task asks to write a v2 security.capability xattr, if it is
privileged with respect to the userns which mounted the filesystem, then
nothing should change. Otherwise, the kernel will transparently rewrite
the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid. This is done during the
execution of setxattr() to catch user-space-initiated capability writes.
Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as
its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns,
will run the file with capabilities.Similarly when asking to read file capabilities, a v3 capability will
be presented as v2 if it applies to the caller's namespace.If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a uid for
the xattr so long as the uid is valid in its own user namespace, and it
is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP over its namespace. The kernel will
translate that rootid to an absolute uid, and write that to disk. After
this, a task in the writer's namespace will not be able to use those
capabilities (unless rootid was 0), but a task in a namespace where the
given uid is root will.Only a single security.capability xattr may exist at a time for a given
file. A task may overwrite an existing xattr so long as it is
privileged over the inode. Note this is a departure from previous
semantics, which required privilege to remove a security.capability
xattr. This check can be re-added if deemed useful.This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and
allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving
the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent
namespace.Example using tar:
$ cp /bin/sleep sleepx
$ mkdir b1 b2
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b1
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b2
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -cf b1/sleepx.tar sleepx
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -C b2 -xf b1/sleepx.tar
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- getcap b2/sleepx
b2/sleepx = cap_sys_admin+ep
# /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/getv3xattr b2/sleepx
v3 xattr, rootid is 100001A patch to linux-test-project adding a new set of tests for this
functionality is in the nsfscaps branch at github.com/hallyn/ltpChangelog:
Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite()
Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns
(From ebiederm: mar 28 2017)
commoncap.c: fix typos - s/v4/v3
get_vfs_caps_from_disk: clarify the fs_ns root access check
nsfscaps: change the code split for cap_inode_setxattr()
Apr 09 2017:
don't return v3 cap for caps owned by current root.
return a v2 cap for a true v2 cap in non-init ns
Apr 18 2017:
. Change the flow of fscap writing to support s_user_ns writing.
. Remove refuse_fcap_overwrite(). The value of the previous
xattr doesn't matter.
Apr 24 2017:
. incorporate Eric's incremental diff
. move cap_convert_nscap to setxattr and simplify its usage
May 8, 2017:
. fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecuritySigned-off-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
02 Aug, 2017
2 commits
-
Instead of a separate function, open-code the cap_elevated test, which
lets us entirely remove bprm->cap_effective (to use the local "effective"
variable instead), and more accurately examine euid/egid changes via the
existing local "is_setid".The following LTP tests were run to validate the changes:
# ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap
# ./runltp -f securebits
# ./runltp -f cap_bounds
# ./runltp -f filecapsAll kernel selftests for capabilities and exec continue to pass as well.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Reviewed-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski -
The commoncap implementation of the bprm_secureexec hook is the only LSM
that depends on the final call to its bprm_set_creds hook (since it may
be called for multiple files, it ignores bprm->called_set_creds). As a
result, it cannot safely _clear_ bprm->secureexec since other LSMs may
have set it. Instead, remove the bprm_secureexec hook by introducing a
new flag to bprm specific to commoncap: cap_elevated. This is similar to
cap_effective, but that is used for a specific subset of elevated
privileges, and exists solely to track state from bprm_set_creds to
bprm_secureexec. As such, it will be removed in the next patch.Here, set the new bprm->cap_elevated flag when setuid/setgid has happened
from bprm_fill_uid() or fscapabilities have been prepared. This temporarily
moves the bprm_secureexec hook to a static inline. The helper will be
removed in the next patch; this makes the step easier to review and bisect,
since this does not introduce any changes to inputs nor outputs to the
"elevated privileges" calculation.The new flag is merged with the bprm->secureexec flag in setup_new_exec()
since this marks the end of any further prepare_binprm() calls.Cc: Andy Lutomirski
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
20 Jul, 2017
1 commit
-
When ns->level is not larger then cred->user_ns->level,
then ns can't be cred->user_ns's descendant, and
there is no a sense to search in parents.So, break the cycle earlier and skip needless iterations.
v2: Change comment on suggested by Andy Lutomirski.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
06 Mar, 2017
1 commit
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Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the
__lsm_ro_after_init macro).Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Kees Cook
24 Feb, 2017
1 commit
-
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user
visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will
care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show
up.From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs
ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes
prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem,
but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops.Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long
standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only
children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not
children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl
systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace
regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same
rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough
to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature.There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify
instances inside a user namespace.Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate
namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the
hierachy and properties of namespaces.Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a
network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As
in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory.Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions
on the wrong inode were being checked.I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to
be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough
credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID
in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable
executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their
mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work
better.A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now
fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates
as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget
to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission
check happened when the original filesystem was mounted.Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing
unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics
simpler which benefits CRIU.The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us
ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the
fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing
how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem
fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem
uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented"* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.
vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()
proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering
mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
introduce the walk_process_tree() helper
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
fs: Better permission checking for submounts
exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction
vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces
exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps
exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID
inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
24 Jan, 2017
3 commits
-
With previous changes every location that tests for
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it.Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
-
Now that we have user namespaces and non-global capabilities verify
the tracer has capabilities in the relevant user namespace instead
of in the current_user_ns().As the test for setting LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP is currently
ptracer_capable(p, current_user_ns()) and the new task credentials are
in current_user_ns() this change does not have any user visible change
and simply moves the test to where it is used, making the code easier
to read.Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
-
Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID in
it's user namespace. I punted on relaxing this permission check
long ago but now that I have read this code closely it is clear
it is safe to test against CAP_SETUID in the user namespace.Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
19 Jan, 2017
1 commit
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I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: John Johansen
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris
08 Oct, 2016
1 commit
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Right now, various places in the kernel check for the existence of
getxattr, setxattr, and removexattr inode operations and directly call
those operations. Switch to helper functions and test for the IOP_XATTR
flag instead.Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
24 Jun, 2016
2 commits
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If a process gets access to a mount from a different user
namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of
setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem. Prevent
this by treating mounts from other mount namespaces and those not
owned by current_user_ns() or an ancestor as nosuid.This will make it safer to allow more complex filesystems to be
mounted in non-root user namespaces.This does not remove the need for MNT_LOCK_NOSUID. The setuid,
setgid, and file capability bits can no longer be abused if code in
a user namespace were to clear nosuid on an untrusted filesystem,
but this patch, by itself, is insufficient to protect the system
from abuse of files that, when execed, would increase MAC privilege.As a more concrete explanation, any task that can manipulate a
vfsmount associated with a given user namespace already has
capabilities in that namespace and all of its descendents. If they
can cause a malicious setuid, setgid, or file-caps executable to
appear in that mount, then that executable will only allow them to
elevate privileges in exactly the set of namespaces in which they
are already privileges.On the other hand, if they can cause a malicious executable to
appear with a dangerous MAC label, running it could change the
caller's security context in a way that should not have been
possible, even inside the namespace in which the task is confined.As a hardening measure, this would have made CVE-2014-5207 much
more difficult to exploit.Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman -
Capability sets attached to files must be ignored except in the
user namespaces where the mounter is privileged, i.e. s_user_ns
and its descendants. Otherwise a vector exists for gaining
privileges in namespaces where a user is not already privileged.Add a new helper function, current_in_user_ns(), to test whether a user
namespace is the same as or a descendant of another namespace.
Use this helper to determine whether a file's capability set
should be applied to the caps constructed during exec.--EWB Replaced in_userns with the simpler current_in_userns.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
18 May, 2016
1 commit
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Pull parallel filesystem directory handling update from Al Viro.
This is the main parallel directory work by Al that makes the vfs layer
able to do lookup and readdir in parallel within a single directory.
That's a big change, since this used to be all protected by the
directory inode mutex.The inode mutex is replaced by an rwsem, and serialization of lookups of
a single name is done by a "in-progress" dentry marker.The series begins with xattr cleanups, and then ends with switching
filesystems over to actually doing the readdir in parallel (switching to
the "iterate_shared()" that only takes the read lock).A more detailed explanation of the process from Al Viro:
"The xattr work starts with some acl fixes, then switches ->getxattr to
passing inode and dentry separately. This is the point where the
things start to get tricky - that got merged into the very beginning
of the -rc3-based #work.lookups, to allow untangling the
security_d_instantiate() mess. The xattr work itself proceeds to
switch a lot of filesystems to generic_...xattr(); no complications
there.After that initial xattr work, the series then does the following:
- untangle security_d_instantiate()
- convert a bunch of open-coded lookup_one_len_unlocked() to calls of
that thing; one such place (in overlayfs) actually yields a trivial
conflict with overlayfs fixes later in the cycle - overlayfs ended
up switching to a variant of lookup_one_len_unlocked() sans the
permission checks. I would've dropped that commit (it gets
overridden on merge from #ovl-fixes in #for-next; proper resolution
is to use the variant in mainline fs/overlayfs/super.c), but I
didn't want to rebase the damn thing - it was fairly late in the
cycle...- some filesystems had managed to depend on lookup/lookup exclusion
for *fs-internal* data structures in a way that would break if we
relaxed the VFS exclusion. Fixing hadn't been hard, fortunately.- core of that series - parallel lookup machinery, replacing
->i_mutex with rwsem, making lookup_slow() take it only shared. At
that point lookups happen in parallel; lookups on the same name
wait for the in-progress one to be done with that dentry.Surprisingly little code, at that - almost all of it is in
fs/dcache.c, with fs/namei.c changes limited to lookup_slow() -
making it use the new primitive and actually switching to locking
shared.- parallel readdir stuff - first of all, we provide the exclusion on
per-struct file basis, same as we do for read() vs lseek() for
regular files. That takes care of most of the needed exclusion in
readdir/readdir; however, these guys are trickier than lookups, so
I went for switching them one-by-one. To do that, a new method
'->iterate_shared()' is added and filesystems are switched to it
as they are either confirmed to be OK with shared lock on directory
or fixed to be OK with that. I hope to kill the original method
come next cycle (almost all in-tree filesystems are switched
already), but it's still not quite finished.- several filesystems get switched to parallel readdir. The
interesting part here is dealing with dcache preseeding by readdir;
that needs minor adjustment to be safe with directory locked only
shared.Most of the filesystems doing that got switched to in those
commits. Important exception: NFS. Turns out that NFS folks, with
their, er, insistence on VFS getting the fuck out of the way of the
Smart Filesystem Code That Knows How And What To Lock(tm) have
grown the locking of their own. They had their own homegrown
rwsem, with lookup/readdir/atomic_open being *writers* (sillyunlink
is the reader there). Of course, with VFS getting the fuck out of
the way, as requested, the actual smarts of the smart filesystem
code etc. had become exposed...- do_last/lookup_open/atomic_open cleanups. As the result, open()
without O_CREAT locks the directory only shared. Including the
->atomic_open() case. Backmerge from #for-linus in the middle of
that - atomic_open() fix got brought in.- then comes NFS switch to saner (VFS-based ;-) locking, killing the
homegrown "lookup and readdir are writers" kinda-sorta rwsem. All
exclusion for sillyunlink/lookup is done by the parallel lookups
mechanism. Exclusion between sillyunlink and rmdir is a real rwsem
now - rmdir being the writer.Result: NFS lookups/readdirs/O_CREAT-less opens happen in parallel
now.- the rest of the series consists of switching a lot of filesystems
to parallel readdir; in a lot of cases ->llseek() gets simplified
as well. One backmerge in there (again, #for-linus - rockridge
fix)"* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (74 commits)
ext4: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hfsplus: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hostfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hpfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
hpfs: handle allocation failures in hpfs_add_pos()
gfs2: switch to ->iterate_shared()
f2fs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
afs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
befs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
befs: constify stuff a bit
isofs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
get_acorn_filename(): deobfuscate a bit
btrfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
logfs: no need to lock directory in lseek
switch ecryptfs to ->iterate_shared
9p: switch to ->iterate_shared()
fat: switch to ->iterate_shared()
romfs, squashfs: switch to ->iterate_shared()
more trivial ->iterate_shared conversions
...
23 Apr, 2016
1 commit
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security_settime() uses a timespec, which is not year 2038 safe
on 32bit systems. Thus this patch introduces the security_settime64()
function with timespec64 type. We also convert the cap_settime() helper
function to use the 64bit types.This patch then moves security_settime() to the header file as an
inline helper function so that existing users can be iteratively
converted.None of the existing hooks is using the timespec argument and therefor
the patch is not making any functional changes.Cc: Serge Hallyn ,
Cc: James Morris ,
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" ,
Cc: Paul Moore
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: Kees Cook
Cc: Prarit Bhargava
Cc: Richard Cochran
Cc: Thomas Gleixner
Cc: Ingo Molnar
Reviewed-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang
[jstultz: Reworded commit message]
Signed-off-by: John Stultz
11 Apr, 2016
1 commit
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro
21 Jan, 2016
1 commit
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By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:/proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
this scenario:
lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
drwx------ root root /root
drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
-rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secretTherefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Cc: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Ingo Molnar
Cc: James Morris
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn"
Cc: Andy Shevchenko
Cc: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Al Viro
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Cc: Willy Tarreau
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
05 Sep, 2015
2 commits
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Per Andrew Morgan's request, add a securebit to allow admins to disable
PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE. This securebit will prevent processes from adding
capabilities to their ambient set.For simplicity, this disables PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE entirely rather than
just disabling setting previously cleared bits.Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Kees Cook
Cc: Christoph Lameter
Cc: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Jonathan Corbet
Cc: Aaron Jones
Cc: Ted Ts'o
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan
Cc: Mimi Zohar
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn
Cc: Markku Savela
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: Michael Kerrisk
Cc: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with
a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based
on Christoph's patch.===== The status quo =====
On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To
perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that
they hold.Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP),
inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a
capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify
what capabilities can be in pE.Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a
task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI.
If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it
can remove capabilities from X.Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also
have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1].
If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP)
and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2].
File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them.A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for
the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that
binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In
the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old
value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are:pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0)
X is unchangedFor setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately
complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if
euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently
(primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot
users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP
are empty and fE is false.As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is
set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set,
LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc.This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is
dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged
program to change its security state in a way that persists cross
execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this
persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped
programs to be exploited for privilege escalation.===== The problem =====
Capability inheritance is basically useless.
If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so
your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you
can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated
capabilities if you aren't root.On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to
the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes
pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because
it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems.If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with
secure exec rules, breaking many things.This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use
capabilities for anything useful.===== The proposed change =====
This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA).
pA does what most people expect pI to do.pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not
set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from
pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities
still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so
broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and
then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore,
setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can
re-add bits to pA afterwards.The capability evolution rules are changed:
pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA)
pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
pI' = pI
pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA')
X is unchangedIf you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If
you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For
example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can
automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah!Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a
nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace)
and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less
impossible. Hallelujah!You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped
program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the
resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch.Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that
capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping
privileges will still work.It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could
possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if
we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries
and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could
leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker
*already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though --
setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so,
and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have
unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would
be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more
paranoid route. We can revisit this later.An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting
ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would
make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities
(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than
it is with this patch.===== Footnotes =====
[1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have
unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false.
The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason.[2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously
misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask;
it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who
has tried to use file capabilities.[3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter
if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking
about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly
discarded.Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality
(from Christoph):/*
* Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell
* that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities.
*
* (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter
* Released under: GPL v3 or later.
*
*
* Compile using:
*
* gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng
*
* This program must have the following capabilities to run properly:
* Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE
*
* A command to equip the binary with the right caps is:
*
* setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test
*
*
* To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes:
*
* ./ambient_test /bin/bash
*
*
* Verifying that it works:
*
* From the bash spawed by ambient_test run
*
* cat /proc/$$/status
*
* and have a look at the capabilities.
*/#include
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include/*
* Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed
* when the /usr/include files have these defined.
*/
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4static void set_ambient_cap(int cap)
{
int rc;capng_get_caps_process();
rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap);
if (rc) {
printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n");
exit(2);
}
capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);/* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */
if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) {
perror("Cannot set cap");
exit(1);
}
}int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int rc;set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE);printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n");
if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1))
perror("Cannot exec");return 0;
}Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter # Original author
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Cc: Jonathan Corbet
Cc: Aaron Jones
Cc: Ted Ts'o
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan
Cc: Mimi Zohar
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn
Cc: Markku Savela
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: Michael Kerrisk
Cc: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
12 May, 2015
1 commit
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Instead of using a vector of security operations
with explicit, special case stacking of the capability
and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and
yama hooks included as appropriate.The security_operations structure is no longer required.
Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that
allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for
list management while retaining typing. Each module
supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead
of a sparsely populated security_operations structure.
The description includes the element that gets put on
the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual
element allocation.The method for registering security modules is changed to
reflect the information available. The method for removing
a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed.
It should be generic now, however if there are potential
race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs
to be addressed by the calling module.The security hooks are called from the lists and the first
failure is returned.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: John Johansen
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris
16 Apr, 2015
1 commit
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most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
