17 Jul, 2019
1 commit
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Now that the latex_documents are handled automatically, we can
remove those extra conf.py files.Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab
15 Jul, 2019
1 commit
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The content of this file is user-faced.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab
Acked-by: Andrew Donnellan
27 Jun, 2019
1 commit
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Add documentation for Spectre vulnerability and the mitigation mechanisms:
- Explain the problem and risks
- Document the mitigation mechanisms
- Document the command line controls
- Document the sysfs filesCo-developed-by: Andi Kleen
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen
Co-developed-by: Tim Chen
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet
19 Mar, 2019
2 commits
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Use tabs to indent SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF definition, for consistency
with other items in this list.Signed-off-by: Jakub Wilk
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet -
Signed-off-by: Jakub Wilk
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet
30 Jan, 2019
1 commit
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With the default SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP/SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL mode,
the TIF_SSBD bit will be inherited when a new task is fork'ed or cloned.
It will also remain when a new program is execve'ed.Only certain class of applications (like Java) that can run on behalf of
multiple users on a single thread will require disabling speculative store
bypass for security purposes. Those applications will call prctl(2) at
startup time to disable SSB. They won't rely on the fact the SSB might have
been disabled. Other applications that don't need SSBD will just move on
without checking if SSBD has been turned on or not.The fact that the TIF_SSBD is inherited across execve(2) boundary will
cause performance of applications that don't need SSBD but their
predecessors have SSBD on to be unwittingly impacted especially if they
write to memory a lot.To remedy this problem, a new PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC argument for the
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL option of prctl(2) is added to allow applications
to specify that the SSBD feature bit on the task structure should be
cleared whenever a new program is being execve'ed.Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
Cc: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Jonathan Corbet
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin"
Cc: Andi Kleen
Cc: David Woodhouse
Cc: Jiri Kosina
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf
Cc: Tim Chen
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed
Cc: Peter Zijlstra
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547676096-3281-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com
03 Jan, 2019
1 commit
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Pull seccomp updates from James Morris:
- Add SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF
- seccomp fixes for sparse warnings and s390 build (Tycho)
* 'next-seccomp' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
seccomp, s390: fix build for syscall type change
seccomp: fix poor type promotion
samples: add an example of seccomp user trap
seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace
seccomp: switch system call argument type to void *
seccomp: hoist struct seccomp_data recalculation higher
12 Dec, 2018
1 commit
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This patch introduces a means for syscalls matched in seccomp to notify
some other task that a particular filter has been triggered.The motivation for this is primarily for use with containers. For example,
if a container does an init_module(), we obviously don't want to load this
untrusted code, which may be compiled for the wrong version of the kernel
anyway. Instead, we could parse the module image, figure out which module
the container is trying to load and load it on the host.As another example, containers cannot mount() in general since various
filesystems assume a trusted image. However, if an orchestrator knows that
e.g. a particular block device has not been exposed to a container for
writing, it want to allow the container to mount that block device (that
is, handle the mount for it).This patch adds functionality that is already possible via at least two
other means that I know about, both of which involve ptrace(): first, one
could ptrace attach, and then iterate through syscalls via PTRACE_SYSCALL.
Unfortunately this is slow, so a faster version would be to install a
filter that does SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, which triggers a PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP.
Since ptrace allows only one tracer, if the container runtime is that
tracer, users inside the container (or outside) trying to debug it will not
be able to use ptrace, which is annoying. It also means that older
distributions based on Upstart cannot boot inside containers using ptrace,
since upstart itself uses ptrace to monitor services while starting.The actual implementation of this is fairly small, although getting the
synchronization right was/is slightly complex.Finally, it's worth noting that the classic seccomp TOCTOU of reading
memory data from the task still applies here, but can be avoided with
careful design of the userspace handler: if the userspace handler reads all
of the task memory that is necessary before applying its security policy,
the tracee's subsequent memory edits will not be read by the tracer.Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen
CC: Kees Cook
CC: Andy Lutomirski
CC: Oleg Nesterov
CC: Eric W. Biederman
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn"
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
CC: Christian Brauner
CC: Tyler Hicks
CC: Akihiro Suda
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
28 Nov, 2018
1 commit
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Add the PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH option for the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL and
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctls to allow fine grained per task control of
indirect branch speculation via STIBP and IBPB.Invocations:
Check indirect branch speculation status with
- prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0);Enable indirect branch speculation with
- prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);Disable indirect branch speculation with
- prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);Force disable indirect branch speculation with
- prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);See Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar
Cc: Peter Zijlstra
Cc: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Linus Torvalds
Cc: Jiri Kosina
Cc: Tom Lendacky
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli
Cc: David Woodhouse
Cc: Andi Kleen
Cc: Dave Hansen
Cc: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Asit Mallick
Cc: Arjan van de Ven
Cc: Jon Masters
Cc: Waiman Long
Cc: Greg KH
Cc: Dave Stewart
Cc: Kees Cook
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.866780996@linutronix.de
07 Jun, 2018
1 commit
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Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Another reasonable chunk of audit changes for v4.18, thirteen patches
in total.The thirteen patches can mostly be broken down into one of four
categories: general bug fixes, accessor functions for audit state
stored in the task_struct, negative filter matches on executable
names, and extending the (relatively) new seccomp logging knobs to the
audit subsystem.The main driver for the accessor functions from Richard are the
changes we're working on to associate audit events with containers,
but I think they have some standalone value too so I figured it would
be good to get them in now.The seccomp/audit patches from Tyler apply the seccomp logging
improvements from a few releases ago to audit's seccomp logging;
starting with this patchset the changes in
/proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged should apply to both the
standard kernel logging and audit.As usual, everything passes the audit-testsuite and it happens to
merge cleanly with your tree"[ Heh, except it had trivial merge conflicts with the SELinux tree that
also came in from Paul - Linus ]* tag 'audit-pr-20180605' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: Fix wrong task in comparison of session ID
audit: use existing session info function
audit: normalize loginuid read access
audit: use new audit_context access funciton for seccomp_actions_logged
audit: use inline function to set audit context
audit: use inline function to get audit context
audit: convert sessionid unset to a macro
seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when logging
seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctl
seccomp: Configurable separator for the actions_logged string
seccomp: Separate read and write code for actions_logged sysctl
audit: allow not equal op for audit by executable
audit: add syscall information to FEATURE_CHANGE records
10 May, 2018
1 commit
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Fix some typos, improve formulations, end sentences with a fullstop.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
08 May, 2018
1 commit
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Seccomp logging for "handled" actions such as RET_TRAP, RET_TRACE, or
RET_ERRNO can be very noisy for processes that are being audited. This
patch modifies the seccomp logging behavior to treat processes that are
being inspected via the audit subsystem the same as processes that
aren't under inspection. Handled actions will no longer be logged just
because the process is being inspected. Since v4.14, applications have
the ability to request logging of handled actions by using the
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag when loading seccomp filters.With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is:
if action == RET_ALLOW:
do not log
else if action not in actions_logged:
do not log
else if action == RET_KILL:
log
else if action == RET_LOG:
log
else if filter-requests-logging:
log
else:
do not logReported-by: Steve Grubb
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
05 May, 2018
1 commit
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For certain use cases it is desired to enforce mitigations so they cannot
be undone afterwards. That's important for loader stubs which want to
prevent a child from disabling the mitigation again. Will also be used for
seccomp(). The extra state preserving of the prctl state for SSB is a
preparatory step for EBPF dymanic speculation control.Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
03 May, 2018
1 commit
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Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites
and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance
impacting mitigations.PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with
the following meaning:Bit Define Description
0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
disabled
2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
enabledIf all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is
available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
misfeature will fail.PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the
control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.The common return values are:
EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl()
arguments are not 0
ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeaturePR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values:
ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE
ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabledThe first supported controlable speculation misfeature is
PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between
architectures.Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
15 Aug, 2017
5 commits
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Right now, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD (neé SECCOMP_RET_KILL) kills the
current thread. There have been a few requests for this to kill the entire
process (the thread group). This cannot be just changed (discovered when
adding coredump support since coredumping kills the entire process)
because there are userspace programs depending on the thread-kill
behavior.Instead, implement SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS, which is 0x80000000, and can
be processed as "-1" by the kernel, below the existing RET_KILL that is
ABI-set to "0". For userspace, SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL is added to expand
the mask to the signed bit. Old userspace using the SECCOMP_RET_ACTION
mask will see SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS as 0 still, but this would only
be visible when examining the siginfo in a core dump from a RET_KILL_*,
where it will think it was thread-killed instead of process-killed.Attempts to introduce this behavior via other ways (filter flags,
seccomp struct flags, masked RET_DATA bits) all come with weird
side-effects and baggage. This change preserves the central behavioral
expectations of the seccomp filter engine without putting too great
a burden on changes needed in userspace to use the new action.The new action is discoverable by userspace through either the new
actions_avail sysctl or through the SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL seccomp
operation. If used without checking for availability, old kernels
will treat RET_KILL_PROCESS as RET_KILL_THREAD (since the old mask
will produce RET_KILL_THREAD).Cc: Paul Moore
Cc: Fabricio Voznika
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook -
In preparation for adding SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS, rename SECCOMP_RET_KILL
to the more accurate SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD.The existing selftest values are intentionally left as SECCOMP_RET_KILL
just to be sure we're exercising the alias.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
-
Add a new action, SECCOMP_RET_LOG, that logs a syscall before allowing
the syscall. At the implementation level, this action is identical to
the existing SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW action. However, it can be very useful when
initially developing a seccomp filter for an application. The developer
can set the default action to be SECCOMP_RET_LOG, maybe mark any
obviously needed syscalls with SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, and then put the
application through its paces. A list of syscalls that triggered the
default action (SECCOMP_RET_LOG) can be easily gleaned from the logs and
that list can be used to build the syscall whitelist. Finally, the
developer can change the default action to the desired value.This provides a more friendly experience than seeing the application get
killed, then updating the filter and rebuilding the app, seeing the
application get killed due to a different syscall, then updating the
filter and rebuilding the app, etc.The functionality is similar to what's supported by the various LSMs.
SELinux has permissive mode, AppArmor has complain mode, SMACK has
bring-up mode, etc.SECCOMP_RET_LOG is given a lower value than SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW as allow
while logging is slightly more restrictive than quietly allowing.Unfortunately, the tests added for SECCOMP_RET_LOG are not capable of
inspecting the audit log to verify that the syscall was logged.With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is:
if action == RET_ALLOW:
do not log
else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged:
log
else if action == RET_LOG && RET_LOG in actions_logged:
log
else if filter-requests-logging && action in actions_logged:
log
else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited:
log
else:
do not logSigned-off-by: Tyler Hicks
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook -
Adminstrators can write to this sysctl to set the seccomp actions that
are allowed to be logged. Any actions not found in this sysctl will not
be logged.For example, all SECCOMP_RET_KILL, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, and
SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO actions would be loggable if "kill trap errno" were
written to the sysctl. SECCOMP_RET_TRACE actions would not be logged
since its string representation ("trace") wasn't present in the sysctl
value.The path to the sysctl is:
/proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged
The actions_avail sysctl can be read to discover the valid action names
that can be written to the actions_logged sysctl with the exception of
"allow". SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW actions cannot be configured for logging.The default setting for the sysctl is to allow all actions to be logged
except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW. While only SECCOMP_RET_KILL actions are
currently logged, an upcoming patch will allow applications to request
additional actions to be logged.There's one important exception to this sysctl. If a task is
specifically being audited, meaning that an audit context has been
allocated for the task, seccomp will log all actions other than
SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW despite the value of actions_logged. This exception
preserves the existing auditing behavior of tasks with an allocated
audit context.With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is:
if action == RET_ALLOW:
do not log
else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged:
log
else if audit_enabled && task-is-being-audited:
log
else:
do not logSigned-off-by: Tyler Hicks
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook -
This patch creates a read-only sysctl containing an ordered list of
seccomp actions that the kernel supports. The ordering, from left to
right, is the lowest action value (kill) to the highest action value
(allow). Currently, a read of the sysctl file would return "kill trap
errno trace allow". The contents of this sysctl file can be useful for
userspace code as well as the system administrator.The path to the sysctl is:
/proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_avail
libseccomp and other userspace code can easily determine which actions
the current kernel supports. The set of actions supported by the current
kernel may be different than the set of action macros found in kernel
headers that were installed where the userspace code was built.In addition, this sysctl will allow system administrators to know which
actions are supported by the kernel and make it easier to configure
exactly what seccomp logs through the audit subsystem. Support for this
level of logging configuration will come in a future patch.Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
19 May, 2017
3 commits
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This updates no_new_privs documentation to ReST markup and adds it to
the user-space API documentation.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet -
This updates seccomp_filter.txt for ReST markup, and moves it under the
user-space API index, since it describes how application author can use
seccomp.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet -
The asterisk of the pointer is interpreted as a start tag for inline
emphasis. Asterisks which are not Sphinx markup need to be quoted in
rst-files. This fixes the Sphinx warning:Documentation/userspace-api/unshare.rst:108: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
Signed-off-by: Markus Heiser
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet
03 Apr, 2017
2 commits
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This is a straightforward conversion, without any real textual changes.
Since this document has seen no substantive changes since its addition in
2006, some such changes are probably warranted.Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet
-
This is meant to be the place for documentation relevant to application
developers. It's empty for the moment, but at least we have a place now!Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet
