24 Nov, 2011
2 commits
-
From mhalcrow's original commit message:
Characters with ASCII values greater than the size of
filename_rev_map[] are valid filename characters.
ecryptfs_decode_from_filename() will access kernel memory beyond
that array, and ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet() will then decrypt
those characters. The attacker, using the FNEK of the crafted file,
can then re-encrypt the characters to reveal the kernel memory past
the end of the filename_rev_map[] array. I expect low security
impact since this array is statically allocated in the text area,
and the amount of memory past the array that is accessible is
limited by the largest possible ASCII filename character.This patch solves the issue reported by mhalcrow but with an
implementation suggested by Linus to simply extend the length of
filename_rev_map[] to 256. Characters greater than 0x7A are mapped to
0x00, which is how invalid characters less than 0x7A were previously
being handled.Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
Reported-by: Michael Halcrow
Cc: stable@kernel.org -
The file creation path prematurely called d_instantiate() and
unlock_new_inode() before the eCryptfs inode info was fully
allocated and initialized and before the eCryptfs metadata was written
to the lower file.This could result in race conditions in subsequent file and inode
operations leading to unexpected error conditions or a null pointer
dereference while attempting to use the unallocated memory.https://launchpad.net/bugs/813146
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
Cc: stable@kernel.org
30 May, 2011
4 commits
-
Now that ecryptfs_lookup_interpose() is no longer using
ecryptfs_header_cache_2 to read in metadata, the kmem_cache can be
removed and the ecryptfs_header_cache_1 kmem_cache can be renamed to
ecryptfs_header_cache.Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
-
ecryptfs_lookup_interpose() has turned into spaghetti code over the
years. This is an effort to clean it up.- Shorten overly descriptive variable names such as ecryptfs_dentry
- Simplify gotos and error paths
- Create helper function for reading plaintext i_size from metadataIt also includes an optimization when reading i_size from the metadata.
A complete page-sized kmem_cache_alloc() was being done to read in 16
bytes of metadata. The buffer for that is now statically declared.Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
-
Instead of having the calling functions translate the true/false return
code to either 0 or -EINVAL, have contains_ecryptfs_marker() return 0 or
-EINVAL so that the calling functions can just reuse the return code.Also, rename the function to ecryptfs_validate_marker() to avoid callers
mistakenly thinking that it returns true/false codes.Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
-
Only unlock and d_add() new inodes after the plaintext inode size has
been read from the lower filesystem. This fixes a race condition that
was sometimes seen during a multi-job kernel build in an eCryptfs mount.https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=36002
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
Reported-by: David
Tested-by: David
26 Apr, 2011
1 commit
-
When failing to read the lower file's crypto metadata during a lookup,
eCryptfs must continue on without throwing an error. For example, there
may be a plaintext file in the lower mount point that the user wants to
delete through the eCryptfs mount.If an error is encountered while reading the metadata in lookup(), the
eCryptfs inode's size could be incorrect. We must be sure to reread the
plaintext inode size from the metadata when performing an open() or
setattr(). The metadata is already being read in those paths, so this
adds minimal performance overhead.This patch introduces a flag which will track whether or not the
plaintext inode size has been read so that an incorrect i_size can be
fixed in the open() or setattr() paths.https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/509180
Cc:
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
28 Mar, 2011
2 commits
-
This patch removes the 'num_global_auth_toks' field of the
ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat structure, used to count the number of items in
the 'global_auth_tok_list' list. This variable is not needed because there
are no checks based upon it.Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks -
When creating a new eCryptfs file, the crypto metadata is written out
and then the lower file was being "grown" with 4 kB of encrypted zeroes.
I suspect that growing the encrypted file was to prevent an information
leak that the unencrypted file was empty. However, the unencrypted file
size is stored, in plaintext, in the metadata so growing the file is
unnecessary.Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
18 Jan, 2011
2 commits
-
Commit cb55d21f6fa19d8c6c2680d90317ce88c1f57269 revealed a number of
missing 'z' length modifiers in calls to ecryptfs_printk() when
printing variables of type size_t. This patch fixes those compiler
warnings.Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
-
Add __attribute__((format... to __ecryptfs_printk
Make formats and arguments match.
Add casts to (unsigned long long) for %llu.Signed-off-by: Joe Perches
[tyhicks: 80 columns cleanup and fixed typo]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
27 Aug, 2010
2 commits
-
Fixes a regression caused by 21edad32205e97dc7ccb81a85234c77e760364c8
When file name encryption was enabled, ecryptfs_lookup() failed to use
the encrypted and encoded version of the upper, plaintext, file name
when performing a lookup in the lower file system. This made it
impossible to lookup existing encrypted file names and any newly created
files would have plaintext file names in the lower file system.https://bugs.launchpad.net/ecryptfs/+bug/623087
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
-
Some ecryptfs init functions are not prefixed by __init and thus not
freed after initialization. This patch saved about 1kB in ecryptfs
module.Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
17 Jun, 2010
1 commit
-
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina
20 Apr, 2010
1 commit
-
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ecryptfs/ecryptfs-2.6:
eCryptfs: Turn lower lookup error messages into debug messages
eCryptfs: Copy lower directory inode times and size on link
ecryptfs: fix use with tmpfs by removing d_drop from ecryptfs_destroy_inode
ecryptfs: fix error code for missing xattrs in lower fs
eCryptfs: Decrypt symlink target for stat size
eCryptfs: Strip metadata in xattr flag in encrypted view
eCryptfs: Clear buffer before reading in metadata xattr
eCryptfs: Rename ecryptfs_crypt_stat.num_header_bytes_at_front
eCryptfs: Fix metadata in xattr feature regression
30 Mar, 2010
1 commit
-
…it slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
24 Mar, 2010
4 commits
-
The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option provides a unified way of
viewing encrypted eCryptfs files. If the metadata is stored in a xattr,
the metadata is moved to the file header when the file is read inside
the eCryptfs mount. Because of this, we should strip the
ECRYPTFS_METADATA_IN_XATTR flag from the header's flag section. This
allows eCryptfs to treat the file as an eCryptfs file with a header
at the front.Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks -
We initially read in the first PAGE_CACHE_SIZE of a file to if the
eCryptfs header marker can be found. If it isn't found and
ecryptfs_xattr_metadata was given as a mount option, then the
user.ecryptfs xattr is read into the same buffer. Since the data from
the first page of the file wasn't cleared, it is possible that we think
we've found a second tag 3 or tag 1 packet and then error out after the
packet contents aren't as expected. This patch clears the buffer before
filling it with metadata from the user.ecryptfs xattr.Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks -
This patch renames the num_header_bytes_at_front variable to
metadata_size since it now contains the max size of the metadata.Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks -
Fixes regression in 8faece5f906725c10e7a1f6caf84452abadbdc7b
When using the ecryptfs_xattr_metadata mount option, eCryptfs stores the
metadata (normally stored at the front of the file) in the user.ecryptfs
xattr. This causes ecryptfs_crypt_stat.num_header_bytes_at_front to be
0, since there is no header data at the front of the file. This results
in too much memory being requested and ENOMEM being returned from
ecryptfs_write_metadata().This patch fixes the problem by using the num_header_bytes_at_front
variable for specifying the max size of the metadata, despite whether it
is stored in the header or xattr.Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
20 Jan, 2010
1 commit
-
The "full_alg_name" variable is used on a couple error paths, so we
shouldn't free it until the end.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
23 Sep, 2009
6 commits
-
Errors returned from vfs_read() and vfs_write() calls to the lower
filesystem were being masked as -EINVAL. This caused some confusion to
users who saw EINVAL instead of ENOSPC when the disk was full, for
instance.Also, the actual bytes read or written were not accessible by callers to
ecryptfs_read_lower() and ecryptfs_write_lower(), which may be useful in
some cases. This patch updates the error handling logic where those
functions are called in order to accept positive return codes indicating
success.Cc: Eric Sandeen
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks -
Returns -ENOTSUPP when attempting to use filename encryption with
something other than a password authentication token, such as a private
token from openssl. Using filename encryption with a userspace eCryptfs
key module is a future goal. Until then, this patch handles the
situation a little better than simply using a BUG_ON().Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Cc: stable
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks -
Returns an error when an unrecognized cipher code is present in a tag 3
packet or an ecryptfs_crypt_stat cannot be initialized. Also sets an
crypt_stat->tfm error pointer to NULL to ensure that it will not be
incorrectly freed in ecryptfs_destroy_crypt_stat().Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Cc: stable
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks -
So, I compiled a 2.6.31-rc5 kernel with ecryptfs and loaded its module.
When it came time to mount my filesystem, I got this in dmesg, and it
refused to mount:[93577.776637] Unable to allocate crypto cipher with name [aes]; rc = [-2]
[93577.783280] Error attempting to initialize key TFM cipher with name = [aes]; rc = [-2]
[93577.791183] Error attempting to initialize cipher with name = [aes] and key size = [32]; rc = [-2]
[93577.800113] Error parsing options; rc = [-22]I figured from the error message that I'd either forgotten to load "aes"
or that my key size was bogus. Neither one of those was the case. In
fact, I was missing the CRYPTO_ECB config option and the 'ecb' module.
Unfortunately, there's no trace of 'ecb' in that error message.I've done two things to fix this. First, I've modified ecryptfs's
Kconfig entry to select CRYPTO_ECB and CRYPTO_CBC. I also took CRYPTO
out of the dependencies since the 'select' will take care of it for us.I've also modified the error messages to print a string that should
contain both 'ecb' and 'aes' in my error case. That will give any
future users a chance of finding the right modules and Kconfig options.I also wonder if we should:
select CRYPTO_AES if !EMBEDDED
since I think most ecryptfs users are using AES like me.
Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dustin Kirkland
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen
[tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com: Removed extra newline, 80-char violation]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks -
Lockdep reports the following valid-looking possible AB-BA deadlock with
global_auth_tok_list_mutex and keysig_list_mutex:ecryptfs_new_file_context() ->
ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() ->
mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
-> ecryptfs_add_keysig() ->
mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);vs
ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set() ->
mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
-> ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig() ->
mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);ie the two mutexes are taken in opposite orders in the two different
code paths. I'm not sure if this is a real bug where two threads could
actually hit the two paths in parallel and deadlock, but it at least
makes lockdep impossible to use with ecryptfs since this report triggers
every time and disables future lockdep reporting.Since ecryptfs_add_keysig() is called only from the single callsite in
ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(), the simplest fix seems to
be to move the lock of keysig_list_mutex back up outside of the where
global_auth_tok_list_mutex is taken. This patch does that, and fixes
the lockdep report on my system (and ecryptfs still works OK).The full output of lockdep fixed by this patch is:
=======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd2
-------------------------------------------------------
gdm/2640 is trying to acquire lock:
(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90but task is already holding lock:
(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x58/0x2b0which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}:
[] check_prev_add+0x2a7/0x370
[] validate_chain+0x661/0x750
[] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430
[] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150
[] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0
[] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60
[] ecryptfs_add_keysig+0x5a/0xb0
[] ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs+0x59/0xb0
[] ecryptfs_new_file_context+0xa6/0x1a0
[] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x4a/0x140
[] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60
[] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0
[] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110
[] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0
[] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140
[] sys_open+0x20/0x30
[] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[] 0xffffffffffffffff-> #0 (&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex){+.+.+.}:
[] check_prev_add+0x85/0x370
[] validate_chain+0x661/0x750
[] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430
[] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150
[] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0
[] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60
[] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
[] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x105/0x2b0
[] ecryptfs_write_headers_virt+0xc9/0x120
[] ecryptfs_write_metadata+0xcd/0x200
[] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x6b/0x140
[] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60
[] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0
[] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110
[] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0
[] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140
[] sys_open+0x20/0x30
[] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[] 0xffffffffffffffffother info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by gdm/2640:
#0: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#11){+.+.+.}, at: [] do_filp_open+0x3cb/0xae0
#1: (&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x58/0x2b0stack backtrace:
Pid: 2640, comm: gdm Tainted: G C 2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd2
Call Trace:
[] print_circular_bug_tail+0xa8/0xf0
[] check_prev_add+0x85/0x370
[] ? __module_text_address+0x12/0x60
[] validate_chain+0x661/0x750
[] ? print_context_stack+0x85/0x140
[] ? find_usage_backwards+0x38/0x160
[] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430
[] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150
[] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
[] ? check_usage_backwards+0x0/0xb0
[] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0
[] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
[] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
[] ? mark_held_locks+0x6c/0xa0
[] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xfd/0x1a0
[] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x14d/0x190
[] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60
[] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
[] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x105/0x2b0
[] ecryptfs_write_headers_virt+0xc9/0x120
[] ecryptfs_write_metadata+0xcd/0x200
[] ? ecryptfs_init_persistent_file+0x60/0xe0
[] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x6b/0x140
[] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60
[] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0
[] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110
[] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0
[] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x5e/0xb0
[] ? _spin_unlock+0x2b/0x40
[] ? getname+0x3b/0x240
[] ? alloc_fd+0xfa/0x140
[] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140
[] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
[] sys_open+0x20/0x30
[] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1bSigned-off-by: Roland Dreier
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks -
In ecryptfs_destroy_inode(), inode_info->lower_file_mutex is locked,
and just after the mutex is unlocked, the code does:kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_inode_info_cache, inode_info);
This means that if another context could possibly try to take the same
mutex as ecryptfs_destroy_inode(), then it could end up getting the
mutex just before the data structure containing the mutex is freed.
So any such use would be an obvious use-after-free bug (catchable with
slab poisoning or mutex debugging), and therefore the locking in
ecryptfs_destroy_inode() is not needed and can be dropped.Similarly, in ecryptfs_destroy_crypt_stat(), crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex
is locked, and then the mutex is unlocked just before the code does:memset(crypt_stat, 0, sizeof(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat));
Therefore taking this mutex is similarly not necessary.
Removing this locking fixes false-positive lockdep reports such as the
following (and they are false-positives for exactly the same reason
that the locking is not needed):=================================
[ INFO: inconsistent lock state ]
2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd3
---------------------------------
inconsistent {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} -> {IN-RECLAIM_FS-W} usage.
kswapd0/323 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
(&inode_info->lower_file_mutex){+.+.?.}, at: [] ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100
{RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} state was registered at:
[] mark_held_locks+0x6c/0xa0
[] lockdep_trace_alloc+0xaf/0xe0
[] kmem_cache_alloc+0x41/0x1a0
[] get_empty_filp+0x7a/0x1a0
[] dentry_open+0x36/0xc0
[] ecryptfs_privileged_open+0x5c/0x2e0
[] ecryptfs_init_persistent_file+0xa3/0xe0
[] ecryptfs_lookup_and_interpose_lower+0x278/0x380
[] ecryptfs_lookup+0x12a/0x250
[] real_lookup+0xea/0x160
[] do_lookup+0xb8/0xf0
[] __link_path_walk+0x518/0x870
[] path_walk+0x5c/0xc0
[] do_path_lookup+0x5b/0xa0
[] user_path_at+0x57/0xa0
[] vfs_fstatat+0x3c/0x80
[] vfs_stat+0x1b/0x20
[] sys_newstat+0x24/0x50
[] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[] 0xffffffffffffffff
irq event stamp: 7811
hardirqs last enabled at (7811): [] call_rcu+0x5f/0x90
hardirqs last disabled at (7810): [] call_rcu+0x33/0x90
softirqs last enabled at (3764): [] __do_softirq+0x14a/0x220
softirqs last disabled at (3751): [] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by kswapd0/323:
#0: (shrinker_rwsem){++++..}, at: [] shrink_slab+0x3d/0x190
#1: (&type->s_umount_key#35){.+.+..}, at: [] prune_dcache+0xd1/0x1b0stack backtrace:
Pid: 323, comm: kswapd0 Tainted: G C 2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd3
Call Trace:
[] print_usage_bug+0x18c/0x1a0
[] ? check_usage_forwards+0x0/0xc0
[] mark_lock_irq+0xf2/0x280
[] mark_lock+0x137/0x1d0
[] ? fsnotify_clear_marks_by_inode+0x30/0xf0
[] mark_irqflags+0xc6/0x1a0
[] __lock_acquire+0x287/0x430
[] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150
[] ? ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100
[] ? __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430
[] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0
[] ? ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100
[] ? fsnotify_clear_marks_by_inode+0x30/0xf0
[] ? ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100
[] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x5e/0xb0
[] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60
[] ecryptfs_destroy_inode+0x34/0x100
[] destroy_inode+0x87/0xd0
[] generic_delete_inode+0x12c/0x1a0
[] iput+0x62/0x70
[] dentry_iput+0x98/0x110
[] d_kill+0x50/0x80
[] prune_one_dentry+0xa3/0xc0
[] __shrink_dcache_sb+0x271/0x290
[] prune_dcache+0x109/0x1b0
[] shrink_dcache_memory+0x3f/0x50
[] shrink_slab+0x12d/0x190
[] balance_pgdat+0x4d7/0x640
[] ? finish_task_switch+0x40/0x150
[] ? isolate_pages_global+0x0/0x60
[] kswapd+0x117/0x170
[] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40
[] ? kswapd+0x0/0x170
[] kthread+0x9e/0xb0
[] child_rip+0xa/0x20
[] ? restore_args+0x0/0x30
[] ? kthread+0x0/0xb0
[] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
22 Apr, 2009
1 commit
-
ecryptfs_passthrough is a mount option that allows eCryptfs to allow
data to be written to non-eCryptfs files in the lower filesystem. The
passthrough option was causing data corruption due to it not always
being treated as a non-eCryptfs file.The first 8 bytes of an eCryptfs file contains the decrypted file size.
This value was being written to the non-eCryptfs files, too. Also,
extra 0x00 characters were being written to make the file size a
multiple of PAGE_CACHE_SIZE.Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
23 Mar, 2009
2 commits
-
If ecryptfs_encrypted_view or ecryptfs_xattr_metadata were being
specified as mount options, a NULL pointer dereference of crypt_stat
was possible during lookup.This patch moves the crypt_stat assignment into
ecryptfs_lookup_and_interpose_lower(), ensuring that crypt_stat
will not be NULL before we attempt to dereference it.Thanks to Dan Carpenter and his static analysis tool, smatch, for
finding this bug.Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland
Cc: Dan Carpenter
Cc: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
When allocating the memory used to store the eCryptfs header contents, a
single, zeroed page was being allocated with get_zeroed_page().
However, the size of an eCryptfs header is either PAGE_CACHE_SIZE or
ECRYPTFS_MINIMUM_HEADER_EXTENT_SIZE (8192), whichever is larger, and is
stored in the file's private_data->crypt_stat->num_header_bytes_at_front
field.ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_contents() was using
num_header_bytes_at_front to decide how many bytes should be written to
the lower filesystem for the file header. Unfortunately, at least 8K
was being written from the page, despite the chance of the single,
zeroed page being smaller than 8K. This resulted in random areas of
kernel memory being written between the 0x1000 and 0x1FFF bytes offsets
in the eCryptfs file headers if PAGE_SIZE was 4K.This patch allocates a variable number of pages, calculated with
num_header_bytes_at_front, and passes the number of allocated pages
along to ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_contents().Thanks to Florian Streibelt for reporting the data leak and working with
me to find the problem. 2.6.28 is the only kernel release with this
vulnerability. Corresponds to CVE-2009-0787Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen
Reviewed-by: Eugene Teo
Cc: Greg KH
Cc: dann frazier
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Florian Streibelt
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
15 Mar, 2009
1 commit
-
eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption
keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is
encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the
encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the
FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than
their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the
FNEK.This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from
being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK
from being encrypted with a FNEK.Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
Cc: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
07 Feb, 2009
1 commit
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The addition of filename encryption caused a regression in unencrypted
filename symlink support. ecryptfs_copy_filename() is used when dealing
with unencrypted filenames and it reported that the new, copied filename
was a character longer than it should have been.This caused the return value of readlink() to count the NULL byte of the
symlink target. Most applications don't care about the extra NULL byte,
but a version control system (bzr) helped in discovering the bug.Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
07 Jan, 2009
7 commits
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Flesh out the comments for ecryptfs_decode_from_filename(). Remove the
return condition, since it is always 0.Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
Cc: Dustin Kirkland
Cc: Eric Sandeen
Cc: Tyler Hicks
Cc: David Kleikamp
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Correct several format string data type specifiers. Correct filename size
data types; they should be size_t rather than int when passed as
parameters to some other functions (although note that the filenames will
never be larger than int).Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
Cc: Dustin Kirkland
Cc: Eric Sandeen
Cc: Tyler Hicks
Cc: David Kleikamp
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
%Z is a gcc-ism. Using %z instead.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
Cc: Dustin Kirkland
Cc: Eric Sandeen
Cc: Tyler Hicks
Cc: David Kleikamp
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Make the requisite modifications to ecryptfs_filldir(), ecryptfs_lookup(),
and ecryptfs_readlink() to call out to filename encryption functions.
Propagate filename encryption policy flags from mount-wide crypt_stat to
inode crypt_stat.Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
Cc: Dustin Kirkland
Cc: Eric Sandeen
Cc: Tyler Hicks
Cc: David Kleikamp
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
These functions support encrypting and encoding the filename contents.
The encrypted filename contents may consist of any ASCII characters. This
patch includes a custom encoding mechanism to map the ASCII characters to
a reduced character set that is appropriate for filenames.Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
Cc: Dustin Kirkland
Cc: Eric Sandeen
Cc: Tyler Hicks
Cc: David Kleikamp
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Extensions to the header file to support filename encryption.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
Cc: Dustin Kirkland
Cc: Eric Sandeen
Cc: Tyler Hicks
Cc: David Kleikamp
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patchset implements filename encryption via a passphrase-derived
mount-wide Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) specified as a mount parameter.
Each encrypted filename has a fixed prefix indicating that eCryptfs should
try to decrypt the filename. When eCryptfs encounters this prefix, it
decodes the filename into a tag 70 packet and then decrypts the packet
contents using the FNEK, setting the filename to the decrypted filename.
Both unencrypted and encrypted filenames can reside in the same lower
filesystem.Because filename encryption expands the length of the filename during the
encoding stage, eCryptfs will not properly handle filenames that are
already near the maximum filename length.In the present implementation, eCryptfs must be able to produce a match
against the lower encrypted and encoded filename representation when given
a plaintext filename. Therefore, two files having the same plaintext name
will encrypt and encode into the same lower filename if they are both
encrypted using the same FNEK. This can be changed by finding a way to
replace the prepended bytes in the blocked-aligned filename with random
characters; they are hashes of the FNEK right now, so that it is possible
to deterministically map from a plaintext filename to an encrypted and
encoded filename in the lower filesystem. An implementation using random
characters will have to decode and decrypt every single directory entry in
any given directory any time an event occurs wherein the VFS needs to
determine whether a particular file exists in the lower directory and the
decrypted and decoded filenames have not yet been extracted for that
directory.Thanks to Tyler Hicks and David Kleikamp for assistance in the development
of this patchset.This patch:
A tag 70 packet contains a filename encrypted with a Filename Encryption
Key (FNEK). This patch implements functions for writing and parsing tag
70 packets. This patch also adds definitions and extends structures to
support filename encryption.Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
Cc: Dustin Kirkland
Cc: Eric Sandeen
Cc: Tyler Hicks
Cc: David Kleikamp
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
31 Oct, 2008
1 commit
-
When ecryptfs allocates space to write crypto headers into, before copying
it out to file headers or to xattrs, it looks at the value of
crypt_stat->num_header_bytes_at_front to determine how much space it
needs. This is also used as the file offset to the actual encrypted data,
so for xattr-stored crypto info, the value was zero.So, we kzalloc'd 0 bytes, and then ran off to write to that memory.
(Which returned as ZERO_SIZE_PTR, so we explode quickly).The right answer is to always allocate a page to write into; the current
code won't ever write more than that (this is enforced by the
(PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset) length in the call to
ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set). To be explicit about this, we now send
in a "max" parameter, rather than magically using PAGE_CACHE_SIZE there.Also, since the pointer we pass down the callchain eventually gets the
virt_to_page() treatment, we should be using a alloc_page variant, not
kzalloc (see also 7fcba054373d5dfc43d26e243a5c9b92069972ee)Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
