20 Dec, 2011
2 commits
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There is a small chance of racing during tfm allocation.
This patch fixes it.Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
On multi-core systems, setting of the key before every caclculation,
causes invalid HMAC calculation for other tfm users, because internal
state (ipad, opad) can be invalid before set key call returns.
It needs to be set only once during initialization.Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: James Morris
03 Nov, 2011
1 commit
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* 'for-linus' of git://github.com/richardweinberger/linux: (90 commits)
um: fix ubd cow size
um: Fix kmalloc argument order in um/vdso/vma.c
um: switch to use of drivers/Kconfig
UserModeLinux-HOWTO.txt: fix a typo
UserModeLinux-HOWTO.txt: remove ^H characters
um: we need sys/user.h only on i386
um: merge delay_{32,64}.c
um: distribute exports to where exported stuff is defined
um: kill system-um.h
um: generic ftrace.h will do...
um: segment.h is x86-only and needed only there
um: asm/pda.h is not needed anymore
um: hw_irq.h can go generic as well
um: switch to generic-y
um: clean Kconfig up a bit
um: a couple of missing dependencies...
um: kill useless argument of free_chan() and free_one_chan()
um: unify ptrace_user.h
um: unify KSTK_...
um: fix gcov build breakage
...
02 Nov, 2011
1 commit
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger
15 Sep, 2011
5 commits
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When allocating from slab, initialization is done the first time in
init_once() and subsequently on free. Because evm_status was not
re-initialized on free, evm_verify_hmac() skipped verifications.This patch re-initializes evm_status.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar -
Before permitting 'security.evm' to be updated, 'security.evm' must
exist and be valid. In the case that there are no existing EVM protected
xattrs, it is safe for posix acls to update the mode bits.To differentiate between no 'security.evm' xattr and no xattrs used to
calculate 'security.evm', this patch defines INTEGRITY_NOXATTR.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
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The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not
affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.This patch updates security.evm when posix xattr acls are written.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
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evm_protect_xattr unnecessarily validates the current security.evm
integrity, before updating non-evm protected extended attributes
and other file metadata. This patch limits validating the current
security.evm integrity to evm protected metadata.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
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All tristates selected by EVM(boolean) are forced to be builtin, except
in the TCG_TPM(tristate) dependency case. Arnaud Lacombe summarizes the
Kconfig bug as, "So it would seem direct dependency state influence the
state of reverse dependencies.." For a detailed explanation, refer to
Arnaud Lacombe's posting http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/23/498.With the "encrypted-keys: remove trusted-keys dependency" patch, EVM
can now be built without a dependency on TCG_TPM. The trusted-keys
dependency requires trusted-keys to either be builtin or not selected.
This dependency will prevent the boolean/tristate mismatch from
occuring.Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell ,
Randy Dunlap
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
10 Sep, 2011
3 commits
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Fixes sparse warnings:
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:105:6: warning: symbol 'ima_file_free' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:167:5: warning: symbol 'ima_file_mmap' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:192:5: warning: symbol 'ima_bprm_check' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:211:5: warning: symbol 'ima_file_check' was not declared. Should it be static?Signed-off-by: James Morris
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Fixes sparse warning:
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c:290:5: warning: symbol 'ima_open_policy' was not declared. Should it be static?Signed-off-by: James Morris
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Sparse fix: move iint_initialized to integrity.h
Signed-off-by: James Morris
18 Aug, 2011
1 commit
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Although the EVM encrypted-key should be encrypted/decrypted using a
trusted-key, a user-defined key could be used instead. When using a user-
defined key, a TCG_TPM dependency should not be required. Unfortunately,
the encrypted-key code needs to be refactored a bit in order to remove
this dependency.This patch adds the TCG_TPM dependency.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell ,
Randy Dunlap
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: James Morris
11 Aug, 2011
1 commit
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evm_inode_init_security() should return 0, when EVM is not enabled.
(Returning an error is a remnant of evm_inode_post_init_security.)Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: James Morris
09 Aug, 2011
2 commits
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Select trusted and encrypted keys if EVM is selected, to ensure
the requisite symbols are available. Otherwise, these can be
selected as modules while EVM is static, leading to a kernel
build failure.Signed-off-by: James Morris
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Conflicts:
fs/attr.cResolve conflict manually.
Signed-off-by: James Morris
27 Jul, 2011
1 commit
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro
19 Jul, 2011
11 commits
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Permit changing of security.evm only when valid, unless in fixmode.
Reported-by: Roberto Sassu
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar -
In addition to requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN permission to modify/delete
security.evm, prohibit invalid security.evm xattrs from changing,
unless in fixmode. This patch prevents inadvertent 'fixing' of
security.evm to reflect offline modifications.Changelog v7:
- rename boot paramater 'evm_mode' to 'evm'Reported-by: Roberto Sassu
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar -
We will use digital signatures in addtion to hmac.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar -
If EVM is not supported or enabled, evm_verify_hmac() returns
INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN, which ima_appraise_measurement() ignores and sets
the appraisal status based solely on the security.ima verification.evm_verify_hmac() also returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN for other failures, such
as temporary failures like -ENOMEM, resulting in possible attack vectors.
This patch changes the default return code for temporary/unexpected
failures, like -ENOMEM, from INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN to INTEGRITY_FAIL, making
evm_verify_hmac() fail safe.As a result, failures need to be re-evaluated in order to catch both
temporary errors, such as the -ENOMEM, as well as errors that have been
resolved in fix mode.Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar -
Additional iint parameter allows to skip lookup in the cache.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar -
Using shash is more efficient, because the algorithm is allocated only
once. Only the descriptor to store the hash state needs to be allocated
for every operation.Changelog v6:
- check for crypto_shash_setkey failureSigned-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar -
Initialize 'security.evm' for new files.
Changelog v7:
- renamed evm_inode_post_init_security to evm_inode_init_security
- moved struct xattr definition to earlier patch
- allocate xattr name
Changelog v6:
- Use 'struct evm_ima_xattr_data'Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
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Imbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(),
evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr()
protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and
evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode.(Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.)
Changelog:
- Don't define evm_verifyxattr(), unless CONFIG_INTEGRITY is enabled.
- xattr_name is a 'const', value is 'void *'Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn -
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity
attacks. The current patchset maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security
xattrs, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. We
anticipate other methods for protecting the security extended attributes.
This patch reserves the first byte of 'security.evm' as a place holder for
the type of method.Changelog v6:
- move evm_ima_xattr_type definition to security/integrity/integrity.h
- defined a structure for the EVM xattr called evm_ima_xattr_data
(based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion)
- removed unnecessary memsetSigned-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn -
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity
attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The
initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended
attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted
separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures).While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and
cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other
directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify
the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately
(eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the
proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper:
http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf.EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a
trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the
root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has
been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > /evm), EVM can
not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.
Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally
this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the
trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing
trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A
sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is
available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined
at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks:
evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To
initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three
calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and
evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security
xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr().Changelog v7:
- Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentationChangelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review)
- fix URL in patch description
- remove evm_hmac_size definition
- use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size)
- moved linux include before other includes
- test for crypto_hash_setkey failure
- fail earlier for invalid key
- clear entire encrypted key, even on failure
- check xattr name length before comparing xattr namesChangelog:
- locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex
- using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1
operation.
- replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs
(Dmitry Kasatkin)
- iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised
- Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin
- Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVMSigned-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn -
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory
in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.Changelog:
- don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
- rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs,
locks, etc to 'integrity_'
- replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles
- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0
- rebased on current ima_iint.c
- define integrity_iint_store/lock as staticThere should be no other functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
24 Feb, 2011
1 commit
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The original ima_must_measure() function based its results on cached
iint information, which required an iint be allocated for all files.
Currently, an iint is allocated only for files in policy. As a result,
for those files in policy, ima_must_measure() is now called twice: once
to determine if the inode is in the measurement policy and, the second
time, to determine if it needs to be measured/re-measured.The second call to ima_must_measure() unnecessarily checks to see if
the file is in policy. As we already know the file is in policy, this
patch removes the second unnecessary call to ima_must_measure(), removes
the vestige iint parameter, and just checks the iint directly to determine
if the inode has been measured or needs to be measured/re-measured.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: Eric Paris
10 Feb, 2011
3 commits
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Now that i_readcount is maintained by the VFS layer, remove the
imbalance checking in IMA. Cleans up the IMA code nicely.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: Eric Paris -
ima_counts_get() updated the readcount and invalidated the PCR,
as necessary. Only update the i_readcount in the VFS layer.
Move the PCR invalidation checks to ima_file_check(), where it
belongs.Maintaining the i_readcount in the VFS layer, will allow other
subsystems to use i_readcount.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: Eric Paris -
Convert the inode's i_readcount from an unsigned int to atomic.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: Eric Paris
04 Jan, 2011
1 commit
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If security_filter_rule_init() doesn't return a rule, then not everything
is as fine as the return code implies.This bug only occurs when the LSM (eg. SELinux) is disabled at runtime.
Adding an empty LSM rule causes ima_match_rules() to always succeed,
ignoring any remaining rules.default IMA TCB policy:
# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
# SYSFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
# TMPFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673< LSM specific rule >
dont_measure obj_type=var_log_tmeasure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0Thus without the patch, with the boot parameters 'tcb selinux=0', adding
the above 'dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t' rule to the default IMA TCB
measurement policy, would result in nothing being measured. The patch
prevents the default TCB policy from being replaced.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Cc: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: David Safford
Cc:
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
27 Oct, 2010
7 commits
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Current logic looks like this:
rc = ima_must_measure(NULL, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
if (inode->i_readcount)
send_tomtou = true;
goto out;
}if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
send_writers = true;Lets assume we have a policy which states that all files opened for read
by root must be measured.Lets assume the file has permissions 777.
Lets assume that root has the given file open for read.
Lets assume that a non-root process opens the file write.
The non-root process will get to ima_counts_get() and will check the
ima_must_measure(). Since it is not supposed to measure it will goto
out.We should check the i_readcount no matter what since we might be causing
a ToMToU voilation!This is close to correct, but still not quite perfect. The situation
could have been that root, which was interested in the mesurement opened
and closed the file and another process which is not interested in the
measurement is the one holding the i_readcount ATM. This is just overly
strict on ToMToU violations, which is better than not strict enough...Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Currently for every removed inode IMA must take a global lock and search
the IMA rbtree looking for an associated integrity structure. Instead
we explicitly mark an inode when we add an integrity structure so we
only have to take the global lock and do the removal if it exists.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Since finding a struct ima_iint_cache requires a valid struct inode, and
the struct ima_iint_cache is supposed to have the same lifetime as a
struct inode (technically they die together but don't need to be created
at the same time) we don't have to worry about the ima_iint_cache
outliving or dieing before the inode. So the refcnt isn't useful. Just
get rid of it and free the structure when the inode is freed.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
IMA always allocates an integrity structure to hold information about
every inode, but only needed this structure to track the number of
readers and writers currently accessing a given inode. Since that
information was moved into struct inode instead of the integrity struct
this patch stops allocating the integrity stucture until it is needed.
Thus greatly reducing memory usage.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
IMA currently allocated an inode integrity structure for every inode in
core. This stucture is about 120 bytes long. Most files however
(especially on a system which doesn't make use of IMA) will never need
any of this space. The problem is that if IMA is enabled we need to
know information about the number of readers and the number of writers
for every inode on the box. At the moment we collect that information
in the per inode iint structure and waste the rest of the space. This
patch moves those counters into the struct inode so we can eventually
stop allocating an IMA integrity structure except when absolutely
needed.This patch does the minimum needed to move the location of the data.
Further cleanups, especially the location of counter updates, may still
be possible.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
IMA tracks the number of struct files which are holding a given inode
readonly and the number which are holding the inode write or r/w. It
needs this information so when a new reader or writer comes in it can
tell if this new file will be able to invalidate results it already made
about existing files.aka if a task is holding a struct file open RO, IMA measured the file
and recorded those measurements and then a task opens the file RW IMA
needs to note in the logs that the old measurement may not be correct.
It's called a "Time of Measure Time of Use" (ToMToU) issue. The same is
true is a RO file is opened to an inode which has an open writer. We
cannot, with any validity, measure the file in question since it could
be changing.This patch attempts to use the i_writecount field to track writers. The
i_writecount field actually embeds more information in it's value than
IMA needs but it should work for our purposes and allow us to shrink the
struct inode even more.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Currently IMA used the iint->mutex to protect the i_readcount and
i_writecount. This patch uses the inode->i_lock since we are going to
start using in inode objects and that is the most appropriate lock.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
