26 Oct, 2010
1 commit
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Instead of always assigning an increasing inode number in new_inode
move the call to assign it into those callers that actually need it.
For now callers that need it is estimated conservatively, that is
the call is added to all filesystems that do not assign an i_ino
by themselves. For a few more filesystems we can avoid assigning
any inode number given that they aren't user visible, and for others
it could be done lazily when an inode number is actually needed,
but that's left for later patches.Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
21 Oct, 2010
14 commits
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Include vmalloc.h for vmalloc_user (fixes ppc build warning).
Acked-by: Eric ParisSigned-off-by: James Morris
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/selinux/policy allows a user to copy the policy back out of the kernel.
This patch allows userspace to actually mmap that file and use it directly.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
There is interest in being able to see what the actual policy is that was
loaded into the kernel. The patch creates a new selinuxfs file
/selinux/policy which can be read by userspace. The actual policy that is
loaded into the kernel will be written back out to userspace.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
AVTAB_MAX_SIZE was a define which was supposed to be used in userspace to
define a maximally sized avtab when userspace wasn't sure how big of a table
it needed. It doesn't make sense in the kernel since we always know our table
sizes. The only place it is used we have a more appropiately named define
called AVTAB_MAX_HASH_BUCKETS, use that instead.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Range transition rules are placed in the hash table in an (almost)
arbitrary order. This patch inserts them in a fixed order to make policy
retrival more predictable.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
With the (long ago) interface change to have the secid_to_secctx functions
do the string allocation instead of having the caller do the allocation we
lost the ability to query the security server for the length of the
upcoming string. The SECMARK code would like to allocate a netlink skb
with enough length to hold the string but it is just too unclean to do the
string allocation twice or to do the allocation the first time and hold
onto the string and slen. This patch adds the ability to call
security_secid_to_secctx() with a NULL data pointer and it will just set
the slen pointer.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and
remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge
we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at
least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also
have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings)Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of
security_task_setscheduler(). This is not only meaningless, but also
make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable.This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from
security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is
using it.Cc: James Morris
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
This patch fixes up coding-style problem at this commit:
4f27a7d49789b04404eca26ccde5f527231d01d5
selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status)Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Replace EXTRA_CFLAGS with ccflags-y.
Signed-off-by: matt mooney
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
While the previous change to the selinux Makefile reduced the window
significantly for this failure, it is still possible to see a compile
failure where cpp starts processing selinux files before the auto
generated flask.h file is completed. This is easily reproduced by
adding the following temporary change to expose the issue everytime:- cmd_flask = scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders ...
+ cmd_flask = sleep 30 ; scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders ...This failure happens because the creation of the object files in the ss
subdir also depends on flask.h. So simply incorporate them into the
parent Makefile, as the ss/Makefile really doesn't do anything unique.With this change, compiling of all selinux files is dependent on
completion of the header file generation, and this test case with
the "sleep 30" now confirms it is functioning as expected.Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Selinux has an autogenerated file, "flask.h" which is included by
two other selinux files. The current makefile has a single dependency
on the first object file in the selinux-y list, assuming that will get
flask.h generated before anyone looks for it, but that assumption breaks
down in a "make -jN" situation and you get:selinux/selinuxfs.c:35: fatal error: flask.h: No such file or directory
compilation terminated.
remake[9]: *** [security/selinux/selinuxfs.o] Error 1Since flask.h is included by security.h which in turn is included
nearly everywhere, make the dependency apply to all of the selinux-y
list of objs.Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications
read-only mmap(2).
This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space.
struct selinux_kernel_status
{
u32 length; /* length of this structure */
u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */
u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */
u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */
u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */
};When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided
by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce
to keep consistency.
However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses
on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process.
In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of
making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call
to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache.
If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation
messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the
base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing
with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own
worker thread from the module.If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can
know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce.A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries
to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it
checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space.
Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing
mode, without any system call invocations.
This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need
to wait for a while if it is odd number.Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei
Acked-by: Eric Paris
--
security/selinux/include/security.h | 21 ++++++
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 56 +++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/Makefile | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +
security/selinux/ss/status.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
type is not used at all, stop declaring and assigning it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
18 Aug, 2010
2 commits
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tty: fix fu_list abuse
tty code abuses fu_list, which causes a bug in remount,ro handling.
If a tty device node is opened on a filesystem, then the last link to the inode
removed, the filesystem will be allowed to be remounted readonly. This is
because fs_may_remount_ro does not find the 0 link tty inode on the file sb
list (because the tty code incorrectly removed it to use for its own purpose).
This can result in a filesystem with errors after it is marked "clean".Taking idea from Christoph's initial patch, allocate a tty private struct
at file->private_data and put our required list fields in there, linking
file and tty. This makes tty nodes behave the same way as other device nodes
and avoid meddling with the vfs, and avoids this bug.The error handling is not trivial in the tty code, so for this bugfix, I take
the simple approach of using __GFP_NOFAIL and don't worry about memory errors.
This is not a problem because our allocator doesn't fail small allocs as a rule
anyway. So proper error handling is left as an exercise for tty hackers.[ Arguably filesystem's device inode would ideally be divorced from the
driver's pseudo inode when it is opened, but in practice it's not clear whether
that will ever be worth implementing. ]Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Alan Cox
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin
Signed-off-by: Al Viro -
fs: cleanup files_lock locking
Lock tty_files with a new spinlock, tty_files_lock; provide helpers to
manipulate the per-sb files list; unexport the files_lock spinlock.Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Alan Cox
Acked-by: Andi Kleen
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
11 Aug, 2010
1 commit
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* 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linux:
unistd: add __NR_prlimit64 syscall numbers
rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall
rlimits: switch more rlimit syscalls to do_prlimit
rlimits: redo do_setrlimit to more generic do_prlimit
rlimits: add rlimit64 structure
rlimits: do security check under task_lock
rlimits: allow setrlimit to non-current tasks
rlimits: split sys_setrlimit
rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lock
rlimits: make sure ->rlim_max never grows in sys_setrlimit
rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpu
rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimitFix up various system call number conflicts. We not only added fanotify
system calls in the meantime, but asm-generic/unistd.h added a wait4
along with a range of reserved per-architecture system calls.
07 Aug, 2010
1 commit
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Fix build error caused by a stale security/selinux/av_permissions.h in the $(src)
directory which will override a more recent version in $(obj) that is it
appears to strike only when building with a separate object directory.Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
02 Aug, 2010
21 commits
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Current selinux policy can have over 3000 types. The type_attr_map in
policy is an array sized by the number of types times sizeof(struct ebitmap)
(12 on x86_64). Basic math tells us the array is going to be of length
3000 x 12 = 36,000 bytes. The largest 'safe' allocation on a long running
system is 16k. Most of the time a 32k allocation will work. But on long
running systems a 64k allocation (what we need) can fail quite regularly.
In order to deal with this I am converting the type_attr_map to use
flex_arrays. Let the library code deal with breaking this into PAGE_SIZE
pieces.-v2
rework some of the if(!obj) BUG() to be BUG_ON(!obj)
drop flex_array_put() calls and just use a _get() object directly-v3
make apply to James' tree (drop the policydb_write changes)Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
execmod "could" show up on non regular files and non chr files. The current
implementation would actually make these checks against non-existant bits
since the code assumes the execmod permission is same for all file types.
To make this line up for chr files we had to define execute_no_trans and
entrypoint permissions. These permissions are unreachable and only existed
to to make FILE__EXECMOD and CHR_FILE__EXECMOD the same. This patch drops
those needless perms as well.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
kernel can dynamically remap perms. Drop the open lookup table and put open
in the common file perms.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Currently there are a number of applications (nautilus being the main one) which
calls access() on files in order to determine how they should be displayed. It
is normal and expected that nautilus will want to see if files are executable
or if they are really read/write-able. access() should return the real
permission. SELinux policy checks are done in access() and can result in lots
of AVC denials as policy denies RWX on files which DAC allows. Currently
SELinux must dontaudit actual attempts to read/write/execute a file in
order to silence these messages (and not flood the logs.) But dontaudit rules
like that can hide real attacks. This patch addes a new common file
permission audit_access. This permission is special in that it is meaningless
and should never show up in an allow rule. Instead the only place this
permission has meaning is in a dontaudit rule like so:dontaudit nautilus_t sbin_t:file audit_access
With such a rule if nautilus just checks access() we will still get denied and
thus userspace will still get the correct answer but we will not log the denial.
If nautilus attempted to actually perform one of the forbidden actions
(rather than just querying access(2) about it) we would still log a denial.
This type of dontaudit rule should be used sparingly, as it could be a
method for an attacker to probe the system permissions without detection.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
SELinux needs to pass the MAY_ACCESS flag so it can handle auditting
correctly. Presently the masking of MAY_* flags is done in the VFS. In
order to allow LSMs to decide what flags they care about and what flags
they don't just pass them all and the each LSM mask off what they don't
need. This patch should contain no functional changes to either the VFS or
any LSM.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Move the reading of ocontext type data out of policydb_read() in a separate
function ocontext_read()Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
move genfs read functionality out of policydb_read() and into a new
function called genfs_read()Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
hashtab_create() only returns NULL on allocation failures to -ENOMEM is
appropriate here.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The original code always returned -1 (-EPERM) on error. The new code
returns either -ENOMEM, or -EINVAL or it propagates the error codes from
lower level functions next_entry() or hashtab_insert().next_entry() returns -EINVAL.
hashtab_insert() returns -EINVAL, -EEXIST, or -ENOMEM.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
It's better to propagate the error code from avtab_init() instead of
returning -1 (-EPERM). It turns out that avtab_init() never fails so
this patch doesn't change how the code runs but it's still a clean up.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Originally cond_read_node() returned -1 (-EPERM) on errors which was
incorrect. Now it either propagates the error codes from lower level
functions next_entry() or cond_read_av_list() or it returns -ENOMEM or
-EINVAL.next_entry() returns -EINVAL.
cond_read_av_list() returns -EINVAL or -ENOMEM.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
After this patch cond_read_av_list() no longer returns -1 for any
errors. It just propagates error code back from lower levels. Those can
either be -EINVAL or -ENOMEM.I also modified cond_insertf() since cond_read_av_list() passes that as a
function pointer to avtab_read_item(). It isn't used anywhere else.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
These are passed back when the security module gets loaded.
The original code always returned -1 (-EPERM) on error but after this
patch it can return -EINVAL, or -ENOMEM or propagate the error code from
cond_read_node(). cond_read_node() still returns -1 all the time, but I
fix that in a later patch.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The avtab_read_item() function tends to return -1 as a default error
code which is wrong (-1 means -EPERM). I modified it to return
appropriate error codes which is -EINVAL or the error code from
next_entry() or insertf().next_entry() returns -EINVAL.
insertf() is a function pointer to either avtab_insert() or
cond_insertf().
avtab_insert() returns -EINVAL, -ENOMEM, and -EEXIST.
cond_insertf() currently returns -1, but I will fix it in a later patch.There is code in avtab_read() which translates the -1 returns from
avtab_read_item() to -EINVAL. The translation is no longer needed, so I
removed it.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The default for llseek will change to no_llseek,
so selinuxfs needs to add explicit .llseek
assignments. Since we're dealing with regular
files from a VFS perspective, use generic_file_llseek.Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Make the security extended attributes names global. Updated to move
the remaining Smack xattrs.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
There were a number of places using the following code pattern:
struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;... which were simplified to the following:
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
At present, the socket related access controls use a mix of inode and
socket labels; while there should be no practical difference (they
_should_ always be the same), it makes the code more confusing. This
patch attempts to convert all of the socket related access control
points (with the exception of some of the inode/fd based controls) to
use the socket's own label. In the process, I also converted the
socket_has_perm() function to take a 'sock' argument instead of a
'socket' since that was adding a bit more overhead in some cases.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The sk_alloc_security() and sk_free_security() functions were only being
called by the selinux_sk_alloc_security() and selinux_sk_free_security()
functions so we just move the guts of the alloc/free routines to the
callers and eliminate a layer of indirection.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Consolidate the basic sockcreate_sid logic into a single helper function
which allows us to do some cleanups in the related code.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Correct a problem where we weren't setting the peer label correctly on
the client end of a pair of connected UNIX sockets.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
