11 Jan, 2011
3 commits
-
…s/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (30 commits)
MAINTAINERS: Add tomoyo-dev-en ML.
SELinux: define permissions for DCB netlink messages
encrypted-keys: style and other cleanup
encrypted-keys: verify datablob size before converting to binary
trusted-keys: kzalloc and other cleanup
trusted-keys: additional TSS return code and other error handling
syslog: check cap_syslog when dmesg_restrict
Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories
selinux: cache sidtab_context_to_sid results
SELinux: do not compute transition labels on mountpoint labeled filesystems
This patch adds a new security attribute to Smack called SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is running.
SELinux: merge policydb_index_classes and policydb_index_others
selinux: convert part of the sym_val_to_name array to use flex_array
selinux: convert type_val_to_struct to flex_array
flex_array: fix flex_array_put_ptr macro to be valid C
SELinux: do not set automatic i_ino in selinuxfs
selinux: rework security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid
SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.c
SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.c
SELinux: standardize return code handling in policydb.c
... -
Remove kobject.h from files which don't need it, notably,
sched.h and fs.h.Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Remove path.h from sched.h and other files.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
10 Jan, 2011
2 commits
-
Conflicts:
security/smack/smack_lsm.cVerified and added fix by Stephen Rothwell
Ok'd by Casey SchauflerSigned-off-by: James Morris
08 Jan, 2011
1 commit
-
…t/npiggin/linux-npiggin
* 'vfs-scale-working' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/npiggin/linux-npiggin: (57 commits)
fs: scale mntget/mntput
fs: rename vfsmount counter helpers
fs: implement faster dentry memcmp
fs: prefetch inode data in dcache lookup
fs: improve scalability of pseudo filesystems
fs: dcache per-inode inode alias locking
fs: dcache per-bucket dcache hash locking
bit_spinlock: add required includes
kernel: add bl_list
xfs: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation
btrfs: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation
ext2,3,4: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation
fs: provide simple rcu-walk generic_check_acl implementation
fs: provide rcu-walk aware permission i_ops
fs: rcu-walk aware d_revalidate method
fs: cache optimise dentry and inode for rcu-walk
fs: dcache reduce branches in lookup path
fs: dcache remove d_mounted
fs: fs_struct use seqlock
fs: rcu-walk for path lookup
...
07 Jan, 2011
6 commits
-
Perform common cases of path lookups without any stores or locking in the
ancestor dentry elements. This is called rcu-walk, as opposed to the current
algorithm which is a refcount based walk, or ref-walk.This results in far fewer atomic operations on every path element,
significantly improving path lookup performance. It also avoids cacheline
bouncing on common dentries, significantly improving scalability.The overall design is like this:
* LOOKUP_RCU is set in nd->flags, which distinguishes rcu-walk from ref-walk.
* Take the RCU lock for the entire path walk, starting with the acquiring
of the starting path (eg. root/cwd/fd-path). So now dentry refcounts are
not required for dentry persistence.
* synchronize_rcu is called when unregistering a filesystem, so we can
access d_ops and i_ops during rcu-walk.
* Similarly take the vfsmount lock for the entire path walk. So now mnt
refcounts are not required for persistence. Also we are free to perform mount
lookups, and to assume dentry mount points and mount roots are stable up and
down the path.
* Have a per-dentry seqlock to protect the dentry name, parent, and inode,
so we can load this tuple atomically, and also check whether any of its
members have changed.
* Dentry lookups (based on parent, candidate string tuple) recheck the parent
sequence after the child is found in case anything changed in the parent
during the path walk.
* inode is also RCU protected so we can load d_inode and use the inode for
limited things.
* i_mode, i_uid, i_gid can be tested for exec permissions during path walk.
* i_op can be loaded.When we reach the destination dentry, we lock it, recheck lookup sequence,
and increment its refcount and mountpoint refcount. RCU and vfsmount locks
are dropped. This is termed "dropping rcu-walk". If the dentry refcount does
not match, we can not drop rcu-walk gracefully at the current point in the
lokup, so instead return -ECHILD (for want of a better errno). This signals the
path walking code to re-do the entire lookup with a ref-walk.Aside from the final dentry, there are other situations that may be encounted
where we cannot continue rcu-walk. In that case, we drop rcu-walk (ie. take
a reference on the last good dentry) and continue with a ref-walk. Again, if
we can drop rcu-walk gracefully, we return -ECHILD and do the whole lookup
using ref-walk. But it is very important that we can continue with ref-walk
for most cases, particularly to avoid the overhead of double lookups, and to
gain the scalability advantages on common path elements (like cwd and root).The cases where rcu-walk cannot continue are:
* NULL dentry (ie. any uncached path element)
* parent with d_inode->i_op->permission or ACLs
* dentries with d_revalidate
* Following linksIn future patches, permission checks and d_revalidate become rcu-walk aware. It
may be possible eventually to make following links rcu-walk aware.Uncached path elements will always require dropping to ref-walk mode, at the
very least because i_mutex needs to be grabbed, and objects allocated.Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin
-
dget_locked was a shortcut to avoid the lazy lru manipulation when we already
held dcache_lock (lru manipulation was relatively cheap at that point).
However, how that the lru lock is an innermost one, we never hold it at any
caller, so the lock cost can now be avoided. We already have well working lazy
dcache LRU, so it should be fine to defer LRU manipulations to scan time.Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin
-
dcache_lock no longer protects anything. remove it.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin
-
Protect d_subdirs and d_child with d_lock, except in filesystems that aren't
using dcache_lock for these anyway (eg. using i_mutex).Note: if we change the locking rule in future so that ->d_child protection is
provided only with ->d_parent->d_lock, it may allow us to reduce some locking.
But it would be an exception to an otherwise regular locking scheme, so we'd
have to see some good results. Probably not worthwhile.Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin
-
Protect d_unhashed(dentry) condition with d_lock. This means keeping
DCACHE_UNHASHED bit in synch with hash manipulations.Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin
-
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1436 commits)
cassini: Use local-mac-address prom property for Cassini MAC address
net: remove the duplicate #ifdef __KERNEL__
net: bridge: check the length of skb after nf_bridge_maybe_copy_header()
netconsole: clarify stopping message
netconsole: don't announce stopping if nothing happened
cnic: Fix the type field in SPQ messages
netfilter: fix export secctx error handling
netfilter: fix the race when initializing nf_ct_expect_hash_rnd
ipv4: IP defragmentation must be ECN aware
net: r6040: Return proper error for r6040_init_one
dcb: use after free in dcb_flushapp()
dcb: unlock on error in dcbnl_ieee_get()
net: ixp4xx_eth: Return proper error for eth_init_one
include/linux/if_ether.h: Add #define ETH_P_LINK_CTL for HPNA and wlan local tunnel
net: add POLLPRI to sock_def_readable()
af_unix: Avoid socket->sk NULL OOPS in stream connect security hooks.
net_sched: pfifo_head_drop problem
mac80211: remove stray extern
mac80211: implement off-channel TX using hw r-o-c offload
mac80211: implement hardware offload for remain-on-channel
...
06 Jan, 2011
1 commit
-
unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and
it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other"
during stream connects.However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned
to NULL under the unix_state_lock().Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead
of the forward mapping.Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
04 Jan, 2011
1 commit
-
If security_filter_rule_init() doesn't return a rule, then not everything
is as fine as the return code implies.This bug only occurs when the LSM (eg. SELinux) is disabled at runtime.
Adding an empty LSM rule causes ima_match_rules() to always succeed,
ignoring any remaining rules.default IMA TCB policy:
# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
# SYSFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
# TMPFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673< LSM specific rule >
dont_measure obj_type=var_log_tmeasure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0Thus without the patch, with the boot parameters 'tcb selinux=0', adding
the above 'dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t' rule to the default IMA TCB
measurement policy, would result in nothing being measured. The patch
prevents the default TCB policy from being replaced.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Cc: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: David Safford
Cc:
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
27 Dec, 2010
1 commit
-
Conflicts:
net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
24 Dec, 2010
1 commit
-
In construct_alloc_key(), up_write() is called in the error path if
__key_link_begin() fails, but this is incorrect as __key_link_begin() only
returns with the nominated keyring locked if it returns successfully.Without this patch, you might see the following in dmesg:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
mount.cifs/5769 is trying to release lock (&key->sem) at:
[] request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
but there are no more locks to release!other info that might help us debug this:
3 locks held by mount.cifs/5769:
#0: (&type->s_umount_key#41/1){+.+.+.}, at: [] sget+0x278/0x3e7
#1: (&ret_buf->session_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x35a/0x443 [cifs]
#2: (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [] request_key_and_link+0x10a/0x3fcstack backtrace:
Pid: 5769, comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 2.6.37-rc6+ #1
Call Trace:
[] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[] print_unlock_inbalance_bug+0xca/0xd5
[] lock_release_non_nested+0xc1/0x263
[] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[] lock_release+0x17d/0x1a4
[] up_write+0x23/0x3b
[] request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc
[] ? cifs_get_spnego_key+0x61/0x21f [cifs]
[] request_key+0x41/0x74
[] cifs_get_spnego_key+0x200/0x21f [cifs]
[] CIFS_SessSetup+0x55d/0x1273 [cifs]
[] cifs_setup_session+0x90/0x1ae [cifs]
[] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x37f/0x443 [cifs]
[] cifs_mount+0x1aa1/0x23f3 [cifs]
[] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xdb/0x120
[] ? cifs_get_spnego_key+0x1ef/0x21f [cifs]
[] cifs_do_mount+0x165/0x2b3 [cifs]
[] vfs_kern_mount+0xaf/0x1dc
[] do_kern_mount+0x4d/0xef
[] do_mount+0x6f4/0x733
[] sys_mount+0x88/0xc2
[] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1bReported-by: Jeff Layton
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-and-Tested-by: Jeff Layton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
17 Dec, 2010
1 commit
-
Commit 2f90b865 added two new netlink message types to the netlink route
socket. SELinux has hooks to define if netlink messages are allowed to
be sent or received, but it did not know about these two new message
types. By default we allow such actions so noone likely noticed. This
patch adds the proper definitions and thus proper permissions
enforcement.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
15 Dec, 2010
4 commits
-
Cleanup based on David Howells suggestions:
- use static const char arrays instead of #define
- rename init_sdesc to alloc_sdesc
- convert 'unsigned int' definitions to 'size_t'
- revert remaining 'const unsigned int' definitions to 'unsigned int'Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Verify the hex ascii datablob length is correct before converting the IV,
encrypted data, and HMAC to binary.Reported-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Cleanup based on David Howells suggestions:
- replace kzalloc, where possible, with kmalloc
- revert 'const unsigned int' definitions to 'unsigned int'Signed-off-by: David Safford
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Previously not all TSS return codes were tested, as they were all eventually
caught by the TPM. Now all returns are tested and handled immediately.This patch also fixes memory leaks in error and non-error paths.
Signed-off-by: David Safford
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris
08 Dec, 2010
2 commits
-
In a situation where Smack access rules allow processes
with multiple labels to write to a directory it is easy
to get into a situation where the directory gets cluttered
with files that the owner can't deal with because while
they could be written to the directory a process at the
label of the directory can't write them. This is generally
the desired behavior, but when it isn't it is a real
issue.This patch introduces a new attribute SMACK64TRANSMUTE that
instructs Smack to create the file with the label of the directory
under certain circumstances.A new access mode, "t" for transmute, is made available to
Smack access rules, which are expanded from "rwxa" to "rwxat".
If a file is created in a directory marked as transmutable
and if access was granted to perform the operation by a rule
that included the transmute mode, then the file gets the
Smack label of the directory instead of the Smack label of the
creating process.Note that this is equivalent to creating an empty file at the
label of the directory and then having the other process write
to it. The transmute scheme requires that both the access rule
allows transmutation and that the directory be explicitly marked.Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler -
sidtab_context_to_sid takes up a large share of time when creating large
numbers of new inodes (~30-40% in oprofile runs). This patch implements a
cache of 3 entries which is checked before we do a full context_to_sid lookup.
On one system this showed over a x3 improvement in the number of inodes that
could be created per second and around a 20% improvement on another system.Any time we look up the same context string sucessivly (imagine ls -lZ) we
should hit this cache hot. A cache miss should have a relatively minor affect
on performance next to doing the full table search.All operations on the cache are done COMPLETELY lockless. We know that all
struct sidtab_node objects created will never be deleted until a new policy is
loaded thus we never have to worry about a pointer being dereferenced. Since
we also know that pointer assignment is atomic we know that the cache will
always have valid pointers. Given this information we implement a FIFO cache
in an array of 3 pointers. Every result (whether a cache hit or table lookup)
will be places in the 0 spot of the cache and the rest of the entries moved
down one spot. The 3rd entry will be lost.Races are possible and are even likely to happen. Lets assume that 4 tasks
are hitting sidtab_context_to_sid. The first task checks against the first
entry in the cache and it is a miss. Now lets assume a second task updates
the cache with a new entry. This will push the first entry back to the second
spot. Now the first task might check against the second entry (which it
already checked) and will miss again. Now say some third task updates the
cache and push the second entry to the third spot. The first task my check
the third entry (for the third time!) and again have a miss. At which point
it will just do a full table lookup. No big deal!Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
03 Dec, 2010
1 commit
-
selinux_inode_init_security computes transitions sids even for filesystems
that use mount point labeling. It shouldn't do that. It should just use
the mount point label always and no matter what.This causes 2 problems. 1) it makes file creation slower than it needs to be
since we calculate the transition sid and 2) it allows files to be created
with a different label than the mount point!# id -Z
staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
# sesearch --type --class file --source sysadm_t --target tmp_t
Found 1 semantic te rules:
type_transition sysadm_t tmp_t : file user_tmp_t;# mount -o loop,context="system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0" /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp
# ls -lZ /mnt/tmp
drwx------. root root system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 lost+found
# touch /mnt/tmp/file1
# ls -lZ /mnt/tmp
-rw-r--r--. root root staff_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 file1
drwx------. root root system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 lost+foundWhoops, we have a mount point labeled filesystem tmp_t with a user_tmp_t
labeled file!Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Reviewed-by: Reviewed-by: James Morris
02 Dec, 2010
1 commit
-
SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is
running.Exception: in smack_task_wait() child task is checked
for write access to parent task using label inherited
from the task that forked it.Fixed issues from previous submit:
- SMACK64EXEC was not read when SMACK64 was not set.
- inode security blob was not updated after setting
SMACK64EXEC
- inode security blob was not updated when removing
SMACK64EXEC
01 Dec, 2010
8 commits
-
We duplicate functionality in policydb_index_classes() and
policydb_index_others(). This patch merges those functions just to make it
clear there is nothing special happening here.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
-
The sym_val_to_name type array can be quite large as it grows linearly with
the number of types. With known policies having over 5k types these
allocations are growing large enough that they are likely to fail. Convert
those to flex_array so no allocation is larger than PAGE_SIZESigned-off-by: Eric Paris
-
In rawhide type_val_to_struct will allocate 26848 bytes, an order 3
allocations. While this hasn't been seen to fail it isn't outside the
realm of possibiliy on systems with severe memory fragmentation. Convert
to flex_array so no allocation will ever be bigger than PAGE_SIZE.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
-
selinuxfs carefully uses i_ino to figure out what the inode refers to. The
VFS used to generically set this value and we would reset it to something
useable. After 85fe4025c616 each filesystem sets this value to a default
if needed. Since selinuxfs doesn't use the default value and it can only
lead to problems (I'd rather have 2 inodes with i_ino == 0 than one
pointing to the wrong data) lets just stop setting a default.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: James Morris -
security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid is difficult to follow, especially the
return codes. Try to make the function obvious.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
-
selinuxfs.c has lots of different standards on how to handle return paths on
error. For the most part transition torc=errno
if (failure)
goto out;
[...]
out:
cleanup()
return rc;Instead of doing cleanup mid function, or having multiple returns or other
options. This doesn't do that for every function, but most of the complex
functions which have cleanup routines on error.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
-
selinuxfs.c has lots of different standards on how to handle return paths on
error. For the most part transition torc=errno
if (failure)
goto out;
[...]
out:
cleanup()
return rc;Instead of doing cleanup mid function, or having multiple returns or other
options. This doesn't do that for every function, but most of the complex
functions which have cleanup routines on error.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
-
policydb.c has lots of different standards on how to handle return paths on
error. For the most part transition torc=errno
if (failure)
goto out;
[...]
out:
cleanup()
return rc;Instead of doing cleanup mid function, or having multiple returns or other
options. This doesn't do that for every function, but most of the complex
functions which have cleanup routines on error.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
30 Nov, 2010
1 commit
-
This patch fixes the linux-next powerpc build errors as reported by
Stephen Rothwell.Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Tested-by: Rajiv Andrade
Signed-off-by: James Morris
29 Nov, 2010
4 commits
-
This patch addresses a number of long standing issues
with the way Smack treats UNIX domain sockets.All access control was being done based on the label of
the file system object. This is inconsistant with the
internet domain, in which access is done based on the
IPIN and IPOUT attributes of the socket. As a result
of the inode label policy it was not possible to use
a UDS socket for label cognizant services, including
dbus and the X11 server.Support for SCM_PEERSEC on UDS sockets is also provided.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Define a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys are kernel
generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'trusted'
symmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel.
Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.Changelog:
- bug fix: replaced master-key rcu based locking with semaphore
(reported by David Howells)
- Removed memset of crypto_shash_digest() digest output
- Replaced verification of 'key-type:key-desc' using strcspn(), with
one based on string constants.
- Moved documentation to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Replace hash with shash (based on comments by David Howells)
- Make lengths/counts size_t where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
Could not convert most lengths, as crypto expects 'unsigned int'
(size_t: on 32 bit is defined as unsigned int, but on 64 bit is unsigned long)
- Add 'const' where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
- allocate derived_buf dynamically to support arbitrary length master key
(fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered
- cleanup security/Kconfig
- Add missing 'update' keyword (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Free epayload on failure to create key (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Increase the data size limit (requested by Roberto Sassu)
- Crypto return codes are always 0 on success and negative on failure,
remove unnecessary tests.
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc()Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: David Safford
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Define a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are random
number symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM
only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria match.
Userspace can only ever see encrypted blobs.Based on suggestions by Jason Gunthorpe, several new options have been
added to support additional usages.The new options are:
migratable= designates that the key may/may not ever be updated
(resealed under a new key, new pcrinfo or new auth.)pcrlock=n extends the designated PCR 'n' with a random value,
so that a key sealed to that PCR may not be unsealed
again until after a reboot.keyhandle= specifies the sealing/unsealing key handle.
keyauth= specifies the sealing/unsealing key auth.
blobauth= specifies the sealed data auth.
Implementation of a kernel reserved locality for trusted keys will be
investigated for a possible future extension.Changelog:
- Updated and added examples to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Moved generic TPM constants to include/linux/tpm_command.h
(David Howell's suggestion.)
- trusted_defined.c: replaced kzalloc with kmalloc, added pcrlock failure
error handling, added const qualifiers where appropriate.
- moved to late_initcall
- updated from hash to shash (suggestion by David Howells)
- reduced worst stack usage (tpm_seal) from 530 to 312 bytes
- moved documentation to Documentation directory (suggestion by David Howells)
- all the other code cleanups suggested by David Howells
- Add pcrlock CAP_SYS_ADMIN dependency (based on comment by Jason Gunthorpe)
- New options: migratable, pcrlock, keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth (based on
discussions with Jason Gunthorpe)
- Free payload on failure to create key(reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Updated Kconfig and other descriptions (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion)
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() (reported by Serge Hallyn)Signed-off-by: David Safford
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Privileged syslog operations currently require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Split
this off into a new CAP_SYSLOG privilege which we can sanely take away
from a container through the capability bounding set.With this patch, an lxc container can be prevented from messing with
the host's syslog (i.e. dmesg -c).Changelog: mar 12 2010: add selinux capability2:cap_syslog perm
Changelog: nov 22 2010:
. port to new kernel
. add a WARN_ONCE if userspace isn't using CAP_SYSLOGSigned-off-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-By: Kees Cook
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Michael Kerrisk
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: "Christopher J. PeBenito"
Cc: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
24 Nov, 2010
2 commits
-
The SELinux ip postroute code indicates when policy rejected a packet and
passes the error back up the stack. The compat code does not. This patch
sends the same kind of error back up the stack in the compat code.Based-on-patch-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -
Some of the SELinux netlink code returns a fatal error when the error might
actually be transient. This patch just silently drops packets on
potentially transient errors but continues to return a permanant error
indicator when the denial was because of policy.Based-on-comments-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller