21 May, 2019
1 commit
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Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:
- Have no license information of any form
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
09 Jan, 2019
1 commit
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This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler
19 Oct, 2018
2 commits
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LoadPin's "enabled" setting is really about enforcement, not whether
or not the LSM is using LSM hooks. Instead, split this out so that LSM
enabling can be logically distinct from whether enforcement is happening
(for example, the pinning happens when the LSM is enabled, but the pin
is only checked when "enforce" is set). This allows LoadPin to continue
to operate sanely in test environments once LSM enable/disable is
centrally handled (i.e. we want LoadPin to be enabled separately from
its enforcement).Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler
Reviewed-by: John Johansen -
Instead of only reporting major/minor, include the actual block device
name, at least as seen by the kernel.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
17 Jul, 2018
1 commit
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Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly
or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch
replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new
security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes
in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep
Cc: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Jessica Yu
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris
23 Feb, 2018
1 commit
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro
06 Mar, 2017
1 commit
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Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the
__lsm_ro_after_init macro).Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Kees Cook
19 Jan, 2017
1 commit
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I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: John Johansen
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris
17 May, 2016
1 commit
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Instead of being enabled by default when SECURITY_LOADPIN is selected,
provide an additional (default off) config to determine the boot time
behavior. As before, the "loadpin.enabled=0/1" kernel parameter remains
available.Suggested-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris
21 Apr, 2016
1 commit
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This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris