17 May, 2007
1 commit
-
SLAB_CTOR_CONSTRUCTOR is always specified. No point in checking it.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter
Cc: David Howells
Cc: Jens Axboe
Cc: Steven French
Cc: Michael Halcrow
Cc: OGAWA Hirofumi
Cc: Miklos Szeredi
Cc: Steven Whitehouse
Cc: Roman Zippel
Cc: David Woodhouse
Cc: Dave Kleikamp
Cc: Trond Myklebust
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields"
Cc: Anton Altaparmakov
Cc: Mark Fasheh
Cc: Paul Mackerras
Cc: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Jan Kara
Cc: David Chinner
Cc: "David S. Miller"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
09 May, 2007
18 commits
-
/proc/pid/clear_refs is only defined in the CONFIG_MMU case, so make sure we
don't have any references to clear_refs_smap() in generic procfs code.Signed-off-by: David Rientjes
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Cleanup using simple_read_from_buffer() in procfs.
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
notify_change() already calls security_inode_setattr() before
calling iop->setattr.Alan sayeth
This is a behaviour change on all of these and limits some behaviour of
existing established security modulesWhen inode_change_ok is called it has side effects. This includes
clearing the SGID bit on attribute changes caused by chmod. If you make
this change the results of some rulesets may be different before or after
the change is made.I'm not saying the change is wrong but it does change behaviour so that
needs looking at closely (ditto all other attribute twiddles)Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher
Signed-off-by: John Johansen
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: Alan Cox
Cc: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
notify_change() already calls security_inode_setattr() before
calling iop->setattr.Signed-off-by: Tony Jones
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher
Signed-off-by: John Johansen
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
We can save some lines of code by using seq_release_private().
Signed-off-by: Martin Peschke
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
kallsyms_lookup() can go iterating over modules list unprotected which is OK
for emergency situations (oops), but not OK for regular stuff like
/proc/*/wchan.Introduce lookup_symbol_name()/lookup_module_symbol_name() which copy symbol
name into caller-supplied buffer or return -ERANGE. All copying is done with
module_mutex held, so...Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Cc: Rusty Russell
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Several kallsyms_lookup() pass dummy arguments but only need, say, module's
name. Make kallsyms_lookup() accept NULLs where possible.Also, makes picture clearer about what interfaces are needed for all symbol
resolving business.Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Cc: Rusty Russell
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Remove includes of where it is not used/needed.
Suggested by Al Viro.Builds cleanly on x86_64, i386, alpha, ia64, powerpc, sparc,
sparc64, and arm (all 59 defconfigs).Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Additions and removal from tty_drivers list were just done as well as
iterating on it for /proc/tty/drivers generation.testing: modprobe/rmmod loop of simple module which does nothing but
tty_register_driver() vs cat /proc/tty/drivers loopBUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 6b6b6b6b
printing eip:
c01cefa7
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1]
PREEMPT
last sysfs file: devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1d.7/usb5/5-0:1.0/bInterfaceProtocol
Modules linked in: ohci_hcd af_packet e1000 ehci_hcd uhci_hcd usbcore xfs
CPU: 0
EIP: 0060:[] Not tainted VLI
EFLAGS: 00010297 (2.6.21-rc4-mm1 #4)
EIP is at vsnprintf+0x3a4/0x5fc
eax: 6b6b6b6b ebx: f6cb50f2 ecx: 6b6b6b6b edx: fffffffe
esi: c0354700 edi: f6cb6000 ebp: 6b6b6b6b esp: f31f5e68
ds: 007b es: 007b fs: 00d8 gs: 0033 ss: 0068
Process cat (pid: 31864, ti=f31f4000 task=c1998030 task.ti=f31f4000)
Stack: 00000000 c0103f20 c013003a c0103f20 00000000 f6cb50da 0000000a 00000f0e
f6cb50f2 00000010 00000014 ffffffff ffffffff 00000007 c0354753 f6cb50f2
f73e39dc f73e39dc 00000001 c0175416 f31f5ed8 f31f5ed4 0ee00000 f32090bc
Call Trace:
[] restore_nocheck+0x12/0x15
[] mark_held_locks+0x6d/0x86
[] restore_nocheck+0x12/0x15
[] seq_printf+0x2e/0x52
[] show_tty_range+0x35/0x1f3
[] seq_printf+0x2e/0x52
[] show_tty_driver+0x8a/0x1d9
[] seq_read+0x70/0x2ba
[] seq_read+0x0/0x2ba
[] proc_reg_read+0x63/0x9f
[] vfs_read+0x7d/0xb5
[] proc_reg_read+0x0/0x9f
[] sys_read+0x41/0x6a
[] sysenter_past_esp+0x5f/0x99
=======================
Code: 00 8b 4d 04 e9 44 ff ff ff 8d 4d 04 89 4c 24 50 8b 6d 00 81 fd ff 0f 00 00 b8 a4 c1 35 c0 0f 46 e8 8b 54 24 2c 89 e9 89 c8 eb 06 38 00 74 07 40 4a 83 fa ff 75 f4 29 c8 89 c6 8b 44 24 28 89
EIP: [] vsnprintf+0x3a4/0x5fc SS:ESP 0068:f31f5e68Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Cc: Alan Cox
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Eternal quest to make
while true; do cat /proc/fs/xfs/stat >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; done
while true; do find /proc -type f 2>/dev/null | xargs cat >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; done
while true; do modprobe xfs; rmmod xfs; donework reliably continues and now kernel oopses in the following way:
BUG: unable to handle ... at virtual address 6b6b6b6b
EIP is at badness
process: cat
proc_oom_score
proc_info_read
sys_fstat64
vfs_read
proc_info_read
sys_readFailing code is prefetch hidden in list_for_each_entry() in badness().
badness() is reachable from two points. One is proc_oom_score, another
is out_of_memory() => select_bad_process() => badness().Second path grabs tasklist_lock, while first doesn't.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Add support for finding out the current file position, open flags and
possibly other info in the future.These new entries are added:
/proc/PID/fdinfo/FD
/proc/PID/task/TID/fdinfo/FDFor each fd the information is provided in the following format:
pos: 1234
flags: 0100002[bunk@stusta.de: make struct proc_fdinfo_file_operations static]
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Change the order of fields of struct pid_entry (file fs/proc/base.c) in order
to avoid a hole on 64bit archs. (8 bytes saved per object)Also change all pid_entry arrays to be const qualified, to make clear they
must not be modified.Before (on x86_64) :
# size fs/proc/base.o
text data bss dec hex filename
15549 2192 0 17741 454d fs/proc/base.oAfter :
# size fs/proc/base.o
text data bss dec hex filename
17229 176 0 17405 43fd fs/proc/base.oThats 336 bytes saved on kernel size on x86_64
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
The /proc/pid/ "maps", "smaps", and "numa_maps" files contain sensitive
information about the memory location and usage of processes. Issues:- maps should not be world-readable, especially if programs expect any
kind of ASLR protection from local attackers.
- maps cannot just be 0400 because "-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -O2" makes glibc
check the maps when %n is in a *printf call, and a setuid(getuid())
process wouldn't be able to read its own maps file. (For reference
see http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/1/22/150)
- a system-wide toggle is needed to allow prior behavior in the case of
non-root applications that depend on access to the maps contents.This change implements a check using "ptrace_may_attach" before allowing
access to read the maps contents. To control this protection, the new knob
/proc/sys/kernel/maps_protect has been added, with corresponding updates to
the procfs documentation.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: New sysctl numbers are old hat]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Cc: Arjan van de Ven
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
WARN_ON(de && de->deleted); is sooo unreliable. Why?
proc_lookup remove_proc_entry
=========== =================
lock_kernel();
spin_lock(&proc_subdir_lock);
[find proc entry]
spin_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
spin_lock(&proc_subdir_lock);
[find proc entry]proc_get_inode
==============
WARN_ON(de && de->deleted); ...if (!atomic_read(&de->count))
free_proc_entry(de);
else
de->deleted = 1;So, if you have some strange oops [1], and doesn't see this WARN_ON it means
nothing.[1] try_module_get() of module which doesn't exist, two lines below
should suffice, or not?Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Fix the following race:
proc_readdir remove_proc_entry
============ =================spin_lock(&proc_subdir_lock);
[choose PDE to start filldir from]
spin_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
spin_lock(&proc_subdir_lock);
[find PDE]
[free PDE, refcount is 0]
spin_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
/* boom */
if (filldir(dirent, de->name, ...[de_put on error path --adobriyan]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
proc_lookup remove_proc_entry
=========== =================lock_kernel();
spin_lock(&proc_subdir_lock);
[find PDE with refcount 0]
spin_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
spin_lock(&proc_subdir_lock);
[find PDE with refcount 0]
[check refcount and free PDE]
spin_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
proc_get_inode:
de_get(de); /* boom */Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This past week I was playing around with that pahole tool
(http://oops.ghostprotocols.net:81/acme/dwarves/) and looking at the size
of various struct in the kernel. I was surprised by the size of the
task_struct on x86_64, approaching 4K. I looked through the fields in
task_struct and found that a number of them were declared as "unsigned
long" rather than "unsigned int" despite them appearing okay as 32-bit
sized fields. On x86_64 "unsigned long" ends up being 8 bytes in size and
forces 8 byte alignment. Is there a reason there a reason they are
"unsigned long"?The patch below drops the size of the struct from 3808 bytes (60 64-byte
cachelines) to 3760 bytes (59 64-byte cachelines). A couple other fields
in the task struct take a signficant amount of space:struct thread_struct thread; 688
struct held_lock held_locks[30]; 1680CONFIG_LOCKDEP is turned on in the .config
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix printk warnings]
Cc:
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
/proc/$PID/fd has r-x------ permissions, so if process does setuid(), it
will not be able to access /proc/*/fd/. This breaks fstatat() emulation
in glibc.open("foo", O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY) = 4
setuid32(65534) = 0
stat64("/proc/self/fd/4/bar", 0xbfafb298) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: Ulrich Drepper
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Acked-By: Kirill Korotaev
Cc: Al Viro
Cc: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
08 May, 2007
5 commits
-
I have never seen a use of SLAB_DEBUG_INITIAL. It is only supported by
SLAB.I think its purpose was to have a callback after an object has been freed
to verify that the state is the constructor state again? The callback is
performed before each freeing of an object.I would think that it is much easier to check the object state manually
before the free. That also places the check near the code object
manipulation of the object.Also the SLAB_DEBUG_INITIAL callback is only performed if the kernel was
compiled with SLAB debugging on. If there would be code in a constructor
handling SLAB_DEBUG_INITIAL then it would have to be conditional on
SLAB_DEBUG otherwise it would just be dead code. But there is no such code
in the kernel. I think SLUB_DEBUG_INITIAL is too problematic to make real
use of, difficult to understand and there are easier ways to accomplish the
same effect (i.e. add debug code before kfree).There is a related flag SLAB_CTOR_VERIFY that is frequently checked to be
clear in fs inode caches. Remove the pointless checks (they would even be
pointless without removeal of SLAB_DEBUG_INITIAL) from the fs constructors.This is the last slab flag that SLUB did not support. Remove the check for
unimplemented flags from SLUB.Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Adds /proc/pid/clear_refs. When any non-zero number is written to this file,
pte_mkold() and ClearPageReferenced() is called for each pte and its
corresponding page, respectively, in that task's VMAs. This file is only
writable by the user who owns the task.It is now possible to measure _approximately_ how much memory a task is using
by clearing the reference bits withecho 1 > /proc/pid/clear_refs
and checking the reference count for each VMA from the /proc/pid/smaps output
at a measured time interval. For example, to observe the approximate change
in memory footprint for a task, write a script that clears the references
(echo 1 > /proc/pid/clear_refs), sleeps, and then greps for Pgs_Referenced and
extracts the size in kB. Add the sizes for each VMA together for the total
referenced footprint. Moments later, repeat the process and observe the
difference.For example, using an efficient Mozilla:
accumulated time referenced memory
---------------- -----------------
0 s 408 kB
1 s 408 kB
2 s 556 kB
3 s 1028 kB
4 s 872 kB
5 s 1956 kB
6 s 416 kB
7 s 1560 kB
8 s 2336 kB
9 s 1044 kB
10 s 416 kBThis is a valuable tool to get an approximate measurement of the memory
footprint for a task.Cc: Hugh Dickins
Cc: Paul Mundt
Cc: Christoph Lameter
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fixes]
[mpm@selenic.com: rename for_each_pmd]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Adds an additional unsigned long field to struct mem_size_stats called
'referenced'. For each pte walked in the smaps code, this field is
incremented by PAGE_SIZE if it has pte-reference bits.An additional line was added to the /proc/pid/smaps output for each VMA to
indicate how many pages within it are currently marked as referenced or
accessed.Cc: Hugh Dickins
Cc: Paul Mundt
Cc: Christoph Lameter
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Extracts the pmd walker from smaps-specific code in fs/proc/task_mmu.c.
The new struct pmd_walker includes the struct vm_area_struct of the memory to
walk over. Iteration begins at the vma->vm_start and completes at
vma->vm_end. A pointer to another data structure may be stored in the private
field such as struct mem_size_stats, which acts as the smaps accumulator. For
each pmd in the VMA, the action function is called with a pointer to its
struct vm_area_struct, a pointer to the pmd_t, its start and end addresses,
and the private field.The interface for walking pmd's in a VMA for fs/proc/task_mmu.c is now:
void for_each_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
void (*action)(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end,
void *private),
void *private);Since the pmd walker is now extracted from the smaps code, smaps_one_pmd() is
invoked for each pmd in the VMA. Its behavior and efficiency is identical to
the existing implementation.Cc: Hugh Dickins
Cc: Paul Mundt
Cc: Christoph Lameter
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Add proper prototypes in include/linux/slab.h.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
03 May, 2007
1 commit
-
The specific case I am encountering is kdump under Xen with a 64 bit
hypervisor and 32 bit kernel/userspace. The dump created is 64 bit due to
the hypervisor but the dump kernel is 32 bit for maximum compatibility.It's possibly less likely to be useful in a purely native scenario but I
see no reason to disallow it.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix]
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal
Cc: Horms
Cc: Magnus Damm
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Cc: Andi Kleen
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
13 Apr, 2007
1 commit
-
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras
03 Apr, 2007
1 commit
-
We're using #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL, but we should be using CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL,
so we getfs/built-in.o: In function `proc_root_init':
/usr/src/linux/fs/proc/root.c:83: undefined reference to `proc_sys_init'Fix that up and remove an ifdef-in-C.
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Cc: Helge Hafting
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
28 Mar, 2007
1 commit
-
Without attached patch against current -git I get following with
!PROC_SYSCTL (with EMBEDDED and PROC_FS set):CC init/version.o
LD init/built-in.o
LD vmlinux
fs/built-in.o: In function `do_proc_sys_lookup':
proc_sysctl.c:(.text+0x26583): undefined reference to `sysctl_head_next'
fs/built-in.o: In function `proc_sys_revalidate':
proc_sysctl.c:(.text+0x265bb): undefined reference to `sysctl_head_finish'
fs/built-in.o: In function `proc_sys_readdir':
proc_sysctl.c:(.text+0x26720): undefined reference to `sysctl_head_next'
proc_sysctl.c:(.text+0x267d8): undefined reference to `sysctl_head_finish'
proc_sysctl.c:(.text+0x268e7): undefined reference to `sysctl_head_next'
proc_sysctl.c:(.text+0x26910): undefined reference to `sysctl_head_finish'
fs/built-in.o: In function `proc_sys_write':
proc_sysctl.c:(.text+0x2695d): undefined reference to `sysctl_perm'
proc_sysctl.c:(.text+0x2699c): undefined reference to `sysctl_head_finish'
fs/built-in.o: In function `proc_sys_read':
proc_sysctl.c:(.text+0x269e9): undefined reference to `sysctl_perm'
proc_sysctl.c:(.text+0x26a25): undefined reference to `sysctl_head_finish'
fs/built-in.o: In function `proc_sys_permission':
proc_sysctl.c:(.text+0x26ad1): undefined reference to `sysctl_perm'
proc_sysctl.c:(.text+0x26adb): undefined reference to `sysctl_head_finish'
fs/built-in.o: In function `proc_sys_lookup':
proc_sysctl.c:(.text+0x26b39): undefined reference to `sysctl_head_finish'
make: *** [vmlinux] Virhe 1All those functions are in fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c, which has no CONFIG_
#define's in it, so the patch makes the compilation of that file to depend
on CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL (the simplest choice).Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
15 Mar, 2007
1 commit
-
have it return the buffer it had allocated
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
21 Feb, 2007
1 commit
-
Pointers to user data should be marked with a __user hint. This one is
missing.Signed-off-by: Glauber de Oliveira Costa
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
15 Feb, 2007
3 commits
-
Since the security checks are applied on each read and write of a sysctl file,
just like they are applied when calling sys_sysctl, they are redundant on the
standard VFS constructs. Since it is difficult to compute the security labels
on the standard VFS constructs we just mark the sysctl inodes in proc private
so selinux won't even bother with them.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
With this change the sysctl inodes can be cached and nothing needs to be done
when removing a sysctl table.For a cost of 2K code we will save about 4K of static tables (when we remove
de from ctl_table) and 70K in proc_dir_entries that we will not allocate, or
about half that on a 32bit arch.The speed feels about the same, even though we can now cache the sysctl
dentries :(We get the core advantage that we don't need to have a 1 to 1 mapping between
ctl table entries and proc files. Making it possible to have /proc/sys vary
depending on the namespace you are in. The currently merged namespaces don't
have an issue here but the network namespace under /proc/sys/net needs to have
different directories depending on which network adapters are visible. By
simply being a cache different directories being visible depending on who you
are is trivial to implement.[akpm@osdl.org: fix uninitialised var]
[akpm@osdl.org: fix ARM build]
[bunk@stusta.de: make things static]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Cc: Russell King
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
binfmt_misc has a mount point in the middle of the sysctl and that mount point
is created as a proc_generic directory.Doing it that way gets in the way of cleaning up the sysctl proc support as it
continues the existence of a horrible hack. So instead simply create the
directory as an ordinary sysctl directory. At least that removes the magic
special case.[akpm@osdl.org: warning fix]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
13 Feb, 2007
4 commits
-
This patch is inspired by Arjan's "Patch series to mark struct
file_operations and struct inode_operations const".Compile tested with gcc & sparse.
Signed-off-by: Josef 'Jeff' Sipek
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Many struct inode_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Many struct file_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const
moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential
dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to
these shared resources.Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Of kernel subsystems that work with pids the tty layer is probably the largest
consumer. But it has the nice virtue that the assiation with a session only
lasts until the session leader exits. Which means that no reference counting
is required. So using struct pid winds up being a simple optimization to
avoid hash table lookups.In the long term the use of pid_nr also ensures that when we have multiple pid
spaces mixed everything will work correctly.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Cc: Alan Cox
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
12 Feb, 2007
3 commits
-
They are fat: 4x8 bytes in task_struct.
They are uncoditionally updated in every fork, read, write and sendfile.
They are used only if you have some "extended acct fields feature".And please, please, please, read(2) knows about bytes, not characters,
why it is called "rchar"?Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Cc: Jay Lan
Cc: Balbir Singh
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
fs/proc/proc_misc.c: In function 'proc_misc_init':
fs/proc/proc_misc.c:764: warning: unused variable 'entry'Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Values are available via ZVC sums.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
