06 Feb, 2008
2 commits
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The security_get_policycaps() functions has a couple of bugs in it and it
isn't currently used by any in-tree code, so get rid of it and all of it's
bugginess.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function
return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters
instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized
buffer.Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the
release_secctx LSM hook. This alleviates the problem of the caller having to
guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be
used elsewhere for Labeled NFS.The patch also removed the unused err parameter. The conversion is similar to
the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook.Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: Chris Wright
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Al Viro
Cc: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
02 Feb, 2008
2 commits
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In order to correlate audit records to an individual login add a session
id. This is incremented every time a user logs in and is included in
almost all messages which currently output the auid. The field is
labeled ses= or oses=Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
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all callers pass something->audit_context
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
01 Feb, 2008
1 commit
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As pointed out by Adrian Bunk, commit
45c950e0f839fded922ebc0bfd59b1081cc71b70 ("fix memory leak in netlabel
code") caused a double-free when security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr()
fails. This patch fixes this by removing the netlbl_secattr_destroy()
call from that function since we are already releasing the secattr
memory in selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid().Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
30 Jan, 2008
13 commits
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selinux_set_mnt_opts() can become static.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Currently network traffic can be sliently dropped due to non-avc errors which
can lead to much confusion when trying to debug the problem. This patch adds
warning messages so that when these events occur there is a user visible
notification.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
This patch implements packet ingress/egress controls for SELinux which allow
SELinux security policy to control the flow of all IPv4 and IPv6 packets into
and out of the system. Currently SELinux does not have proper control over
forwarded packets and this patch corrects this problem.Special thanks to Venkat Yekkirala whose earlier
work on this topic eventually led to this patch.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Now that the SELinux NetLabel "base SID" is always the netmsg initial SID we
can do a big optimization - caching the SID and not just the MLS attributes.
This not only saves a lot of per-packet memory allocations and copies but it
has a nice side effect of removing a chunk of code.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
This patch introduces a mechanism for checking when labeled IPsec or SECMARK
are in use by keeping introducing a configuration reference counter for each
subsystem. In the case of labeled IPsec, whenever a labeled SA or SPD entry
is created the labeled IPsec/XFRM reference count is increased and when the
entry is removed it is decreased. In the case of SECMARK, when a SECMARK
target is created the reference count is increased and later decreased when the
target is removed. These reference counters allow SELinux to quickly determine
if either of these subsystems are enabled.NetLabel already has a similar mechanism which provides the netlbl_enabled()
function.This patch also renames the selinux_relabel_packet_permission() function to
selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission() as the original name and
description were misleading in that they referenced a single packet label which
is not the case.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Rework the handling of network peer labels so that the different peer labeling
subsystems work better together. This includes moving both subsystems to a
single "peer" object class which involves not only changes to the permission
checks but an improved method of consolidating multiple packet peer labels.
As part of this work the inbound packet permission check code has been heavily
modified to handle both the old and new behavior in as sane a fashion as
possible.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Add additional Flask definitions to support the new "peer" object class and
additional permissions to the netif, node, and packet object classes. Also,
bring the kernel Flask definitions up to date with the Fedora SELinux policies
by adding the "flow_in" and "flow_out" permissions to the "packet" class.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22. This bitmap
will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features
it supports.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar to the
sel_netif_*() functions. The node SID queries in the SELinux hooks files are
also modified to take advantage of this new functionality. In addition, remove
the address length information from the sk_buff parsing routines as it is
redundant since we already have the address family.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex. This
allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit
record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to
bother with this at all.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The current SELinux netif code requires the caller have a valid net_device
struct pointer to lookup network interface information. However, we don't
always have a valid net_device pointer so convert the netif code to use
the ifindex values we always have as part of the sk_buff. This patch also
removes the default message SID from the network interface record, it is
not being used and therefore is "dead code".Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
In order to do any sort of IP header inspection of incoming packets we need to
know which address family, AF_INET/AF_INET6/etc., it belongs to and since the
sk_buff structure does not store this information we need to pass along the
address family separate from the packet itself.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
This patch adds support to the NetLabel LSM secattr struct for a secid token
and a type field, paving the way for full LSM/SELinux context support and
"static" or "fallback" labels. In addition, this patch adds a fair amount
of documentation to the core NetLabel structures used as part of the
NetLabel kernel API.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris
29 Jan, 2008
1 commit
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The IPv4 and IPv6 hook values are identical, yet some code tries to figure
out the "correct" value by looking at the address family. Introduce NF_INET_*
values for both IPv4 and IPv6. The old values are kept in a #ifndef __KERNEL__
section for userspace compatibility.Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy
Acked-by: Herbert Xu
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
26 Jan, 2008
1 commit
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The proc net rewrite had a side effect on selinux, leading it to mislabel
the /proc/net inodes, thereby leading to incorrect denials. Fix
security_genfs_sid to ignore extra leading / characters in the path supplied
by selinux_proc_get_sid since we now get "//net/..." rather than "/net/...".Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
25 Jan, 2008
5 commits
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This patch removes the requirement that the new and related object types
differ in order to polyinstantiate by MLS level. This allows MLS
polyinstantiation to occur in the absence of explicit type_member rules or
when the type has not changed.Potential users of this support include pam_namespace.so (directory
polyinstantiation) and the SELinux X support (property polyinstantiation).Signed-off-by: Eamon Walsh
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Constify function pointer tables and fields.
Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes the SELinux
implementation for this hook.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and
security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow
filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they
so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so
it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future.Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of
them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with
SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume
future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use
text mount data and thus must make use of this interface.An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time
options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no
mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops
take care of things.An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in
security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would
need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This
is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to
understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in
the FS which owns the options.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Add missing space.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches
Signed-off-by: James Morris
22 Jan, 2008
1 commit
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Fix a memory leak in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() as reported here:
* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=352281Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris
05 Dec, 2007
2 commits
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Instead of using f_op to detect dead booleans, check the inode index
against the number of booleans and check the dentry name against the
boolean name for that index on reads and writes. This prevents
incorrect use of a boolean file opened prior to a policy reload while
allowing valid use of it as long as it still corresponds to the same
boolean in the policy.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Do not clear f_op when removing entries since it isn't safe to do.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
08 Nov, 2007
3 commits
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Add more validity checks at policy load time to reject malformed
policies and prevent subsequent out-of-range indexing when in permissive
mode. Resolves the NULL pointer dereference reported in
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=357541.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The "e_iter = e_iter->next;" statement in the inner for loop is primally
bug. It should be moved to outside of the for loop.Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
On PowerPC allmodconfig build we get this:
security/selinux/xfrm.c:214: warning: comparison is always false due to limited range of data type
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell
Signed-off-by: James Morris
23 Oct, 2007
1 commit
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When checking if we can wait on a child we were looking at
p->exit_signal and trying to make the decision based on if the signal
would eventually be allowed. One big flaw is that p->exit_signal is -1
for NPTL threads and so aignal_to_av was not actually checking SIGCHLD
which is what would have been sent. Even is exit_signal was set to
something strange it wouldn't change the fact that the child was there
and needed to be waited on. This patch just assumes wait is based on
SIGCHLD. Specific permission checks are made when the child actually
attempts to send a signal.This resolves the problem of things like using GDB on confined domains
such as in RH BZ 232371. The confined domain did not have permission to
send a generic signal (exit_signal == -1) back to the unconfined GDB.
With this patch the GDB wait works and since the actual signal sent is
allowed everything functions as it should.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
19 Oct, 2007
1 commit
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Get rid of sparse related warnings from places that use integer as NULL
pointer.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger
Cc: Andi Kleen
Cc: Jeff Garzik
Cc: Matt Mackall
Cc: Ian Kent
Cc: Arnd Bergmann
Cc: Davide Libenzi
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
17 Oct, 2007
7 commits
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This patch contains the following cleanups that are now possible:
- remove the unused security_operations->inode_xattr_getsuffix
- remove the no longer used security_operations->unregister_security
- remove some no longer required exit code
- remove a bunch of no longer used exportsSigned-off-by: Adrian Bunk
Acked-by: James Morris
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimitAug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: Andrew Morgan
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security
module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the
overall security architecture.Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API
abuse.Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified
at boot.The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.
In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface
is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree
modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and
dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix]
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc]
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Chris Wright
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn"
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch kills ugly warnings when the "Improve SELinux performance
when ACV misses" patch.Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
* We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on
any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance
using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h.
In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination
of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse
in performance aspect.
This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry,
so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen.
* struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get
suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of
shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated
from general purpose slab.
* Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation
in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are
changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous
version.
* The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars.The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we
access many files which have different security context one after
another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so
any access always causes AVC misses.selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap
AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s]
STD: 0.265 0.019
------------------------------------------
1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s]
2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s]
3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s]
4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s]
5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s]
6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s]
7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s]
8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s]Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Allow policy to select, in much the same way as it selects MLS support, how
the kernel should handle access decisions which contain either unknown
classes or unknown permissions in known classes. The three choices for the
policy flags are0 - Deny unknown security access. (default)
2 - reject loading policy if it does not contain all definitions
4 - allow unknown security accessThe policy's choice is exported through 2 booleans in
selinuxfs. /selinux/deny_unknown and /selinux/reject_unknown.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating
permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have
changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check. A new LSM
hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at open
time to allow this optimization.(see http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=118972995207740&w=2)
Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
