04 Sep, 2008
1 commit
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Fix a bug and a philosophical decision about who handles errors.
security_context_to_sid_core() was leaking a context in the common case.
This was causing problems on fedora systems which recently have started
making extensive use of this function.In discussion it was decided that if string_to_context_struct() had an
error it was its own responsibility to clean up any mess it created
along the way.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
03 Sep, 2008
1 commit
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During the use of a dev_cgroup, we should guarantee the corresponding
cgroup won't be deleted (i.e. via rmdir). This can be done through
css_get(&dev_cgroup->css), but here we can just get and use the dev_cgroup
under rcu_read_lock.And also remove checking NULL dev_cgroup, it won't be NULL since a task
always belongs to a cgroup.Signed-off-by: Li Zefan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Paul Menage
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
14 Aug, 2008
1 commit
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Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
change its own flags in a different way at the same time.__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags. This
patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:
(1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one
process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
current is the parent.(2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child.In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
been changed to calls to capable().Of the places that were using __capable():
(1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
process. All of these now use has_capability().(2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above,
these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.(3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().
(4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
switched and capable() is used instead.(5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.(6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: James Morris
30 Jul, 2008
1 commit
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Given a hosed SELinux config in which a system never loads policy or
disables SELinux we currently just return -EINVAL for anyone trying to
read /proc/mounts. This is a configuration problem but we can certainly
be more graceful. This patch just ignores -EINVAL when displaying LSM
options and causes /proc/mounts display everything else it can. If
policy isn't loaded the obviously there are no options, so we aren't
really loosing any information here.This is safe as the only other return of EINVAL comes from
security_sid_to_context_core() in the case of an invalid sid. Even if a
FS was mounted with a now invalidated context that sid should have been
remapped to unlabeled and so we won't hit the EINVAL and will work like
we should. (yes, I tested to make sure it worked like I thought)Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Tested-by: Marc Dionne
Signed-off-by: James Morris
27 Jul, 2008
6 commits
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* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (39 commits)
[PATCH] fix RLIM_NOFILE handling
[PATCH] get rid of corner case in dup3() entirely
[PATCH] remove remaining namei_{32,64}.h crap
[PATCH] get rid of indirect users of namei.h
[PATCH] get rid of __user_path_lookup_open
[PATCH] f_count may wrap around
[PATCH] dup3 fix
[PATCH] don't pass nameidata to __ncp_lookup_validate()
[PATCH] don't pass nameidata to gfs2_lookupi()
[PATCH] new (local) helper: user_path_parent()
[PATCH] sanitize __user_walk_fd() et.al.
[PATCH] preparation to __user_walk_fd cleanup
[PATCH] kill nameidata passing to permission(), rename to inode_permission()
[PATCH] take noexec checks to very few callers that care
Re: [PATCH 3/6] vfs: open_exec cleanup
[patch 4/4] vfs: immutable inode checking cleanup
[patch 3/4] fat: dont call notify_change
[patch 2/4] vfs: utimes cleanup
[patch 1/4] vfs: utimes: move owner check into inode_change_ok()
[PATCH] vfs: use kstrdup() and check failing allocation
... -
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6:
netns: fix ip_rt_frag_needed rt_is_expired
netfilter: nf_conntrack_extend: avoid unnecessary "ct->ext" dereferences
netfilter: fix double-free and use-after free
netfilter: arptables in netns for real
netfilter: ip{,6}tables_security: fix future section mismatch
selinux: use nf_register_hooks()
netfilter: ebtables: use nf_register_hooks()
Revert "pkt_sched: sch_sfq: dump a real number of flows"
qeth: use dev->ml_priv instead of dev->priv
syncookies: Make sure ECN is disabled
net: drop unused BUG_TRAP()
net: convert BUG_TRAP to generic WARN_ON
drivers/net: convert BUG_TRAP to generic WARN_ON -
The FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl() calls notify_change() to change
the file mode before changing the inode attributes. Replace with
explicit calls to security_inode_setattr(), fat_setattr() and
fsnotify_change().This is equivalent to the original. The reason it is needed, is that
later in the series we move the immutable check into notify_change().
That would break the FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, as it needs to
perform the mode change regardless of the immutability of the file.[Fix error if fat is built as a module. Thanks to OGAWA Hirofumi for
noticing.]Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi
Signed-off-by: Al Viro -
... and get rid of the last "let's deduce mask from nameidata->flags"
bit.Signed-off-by: Al Viro
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Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller -
This adds the tracehook_tracer_task() hook to consolidate all forms of
"Who is using ptrace on me?" logic. This is used for "TracerPid:" in
/proc and for permission checks. We also clean up the selinux code the
called an identical accessor.Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
26 Jul, 2008
3 commits
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- clean up set_majmin()
- use simple_strtoul() to parse major/minor[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix simple_strtoul() usage]
[kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: fix warnings]
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Paul Menage
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Balbir Singh
Cc: Paul Menage
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch converts devcgroup_access_write() from a raw file handler
into a handler for the cgroup write_string() method. This allows some
boilerplate copying/locking/checking to be removed and simplifies the
cleanup path, since these functions are performed by the cgroups
framework before calling the handler.Signed-off-by: Paul Menage
Cc: Paul Jackson
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov
Cc: Balbir Singh
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
25 Jul, 2008
2 commits
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Filesystem capabilities have come of age. Remove the experimental tag for
configuring filesystem capabilities.Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
When cap_bset suppresses some of the forced (fP) capabilities of a file,
it is generally only safe to execute the program if it understands how to
recognize it doesn't have enough privilege to work correctly. For legacy
applications (fE!=0), which have no non-destructive way to determine that
they are missing privilege, we fail to execute (EPERM) any executable that
requires fP capabilities, but would otherwise get pP' < fP. This is a
fail-safe permission check.For some discussion of why it is problematic for (legacy) privileged
applications to run with less than the set of capabilities requested for
them, see:http://userweb.kernel.org/~morgan/sendmail-capabilities-war-story.html
With this iteration of this support, we do not include setuid-0 based
privilege protection from the bounding set. That is, the admin can still
(ab)use the bounding set to suppress the privileges of a setuid-0 program.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
15 Jul, 2008
1 commit
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This reverts commit 811f3799279e567aa354c649ce22688d949ac7a9.
From Eric Paris:
"Please drop this patch for now. It deadlocks on ntfs-3g. I need to
rework it to handle fuse filesystems better. (casey was right)"
14 Jul, 2008
24 commits
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The register security hook is no longer required, as the capability
module is always registered. LSMs wishing to stack capability as
a secondary module should do so explicitly.Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman -
Fix small oversight in "security: remove dummy module":
CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES doesn't depend on CONFIG_SECURITYSigned-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Remove the dummy module and make the "capability" module the default.
Compile and boot tested.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The sb_get_mnt_opts() hook is unused, and is superseded by the
sb_show_options() hook.Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Acked-by: James Morris -
This patch causes SELinux mount options to show up in /proc/mounts. As
with other code in the area seq_put errors are ignored. Other LSM's
will not have their mount options displayed until they fill in their own
security_sb_show_options() function.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Currently if a FS is mounted for which SELinux policy does not define an
fs_use_* that FS will either be genfs labeled or not labeled at all.
This decision is based on the existence of a genfscon rule in policy and
is irrespective of the capabilities of the filesystem itself. This
patch allows the kernel to check if the filesystem supports security
xattrs and if so will use those if there is no fs_use_* rule in policy.
An fstype with a no fs_use_* rule but with a genfs rule will use xattrs
if available and will follow the genfs rule.This can be particularly interesting for things like ecryptfs which
actually overlays a real underlying FS. If we define excryptfs in
policy to use xattrs we will likely get this wrong at times, so with
this path we just don't need to define it!Overlay ecryptfs on top of NFS with no xattr support:
SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses genfs_contexts
Overlay ecryptfs on top of ext4 with xattr support:
SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses xattrIt is also useful as the kernel adds new FS we don't need to add them in
policy if they support xattrs and that is how we want to handle them.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Fix several warnings generated by sparse of the form
"returning void-valued expression".Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn -
Use do_each_thread as a proper do/while block. Sparse complained.
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley -
Remove unused and shadowed addrlen variable. Picked up by sparse.
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Paul Moore -
I've gotten complaints and reports about people not understanding the
meaning of the current unknown class/perm handling the kernel emits on
every policy load. Hopefully this will make make it clear to everyone
the meaning of the message and won't waste a printk the user won't care
about anyway on systems where the kernel and the policy agree on
everything.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
On Mon, 2008-06-09 at 01:24 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> Getting a few of these with FC5:
>
> SELinux: context_struct_compute_av: unrecognized class 69
> SELinux: context_struct_compute_av: unrecognized class 69
>
> one came out when I logged in.
>
> No other symptoms, yet.Change handling of invalid classes by SELinux, reporting class values
unknown to the kernel as errors (w/ ratelimit applied) and handling
class values unknown to policy as normal denials.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
We used to protect against races of policy load in security_load_policy
by using the load_mutex. Since then we have added a new mutex,
sel_mutex, in sel_write_load() which is always held across all calls to
security_load_policy we are covered and can safely just drop this one.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The class_to_string array is referenced by tclass. My code mistakenly
was using tclass - 1. If the proceeding class is a userspace class
rather than kernel class this may cause a denial/EINVAL even if unknown
handling is set to allow. The bug shouldn't be allowing excess
privileges since those are given based on the contents of another array
which should be correctly referenced.At this point in time its pretty unlikely this is going to cause
problems. The most recently added kernel classes which could be
affected are association, dccp_socket, and peer. Its pretty unlikely
any policy with handle_unknown=allow doesn't have association and
dccp_socket undefined (they've been around longer than unknown handling)
and peer is conditionalized on a policy cap which should only be defined
if that class exists in policy.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Open code sidtab lock to make Andrew Morton happy.
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley -
Open code load_mutex as suggested by Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by: James Morris
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Open code policy_rwlock, as suggested by Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley -
Fix an endianness bug in the handling of network node addresses by
SELinux. This yields no change on little endian hardware but fixes
the incorrect handling on big endian hardware. The network node
addresses are stored in network order in memory by checkpolicy, not in
cpu/host order, and thus should not have cpu_to_le32/le32_to_cpu
conversions applied upon policy write/read unlike other data in the
policy.Bug reported by John Weeks of Sun, who noticed that binary policy
files built from the same policy source on x86 and sparc differed and
tracked it down to the ipv4 address handling in checkpolicy.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Simplify and improve the robustness of the SELinux ioctl checking by
using the "access mode" bits of the ioctl command to determine the
permission check rather than dealing with individual command values.
This removes any knowledge of specific ioctl commands from SELinux
and follows the same guidance we gave to Smack earlier.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Enable processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in policy
to get undefined contexts on inodes. This extends the support for
deferred mapping of security contexts in order to permit restorecon
and similar programs to see the raw file contexts unknown to the
system policy in order to check them.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
read access or full attach access is requested. This allows security
modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
full ptrace access. The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
to already be ptracing the target. The other ptrace checks within
proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
read mode instead of attach.In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label. This
enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit). At present we have to choose between
allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
(change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and
ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access
interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0
or -errno vs. 1 or 0). I retained this difference to avoid any
changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by
changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and
by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Chris Wright
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Remove inherit field from inode_security_struct, per Stephen Smalley:
"Let's just drop inherit altogether - dead field."Signed-off-by: James Morris
-
reorder inode_security_struct to remove padding on 64 bit builds
size reduced from 72 to 64 bytes increasing objects per slab to 64.
Signed-off-by: Richard Kennedy
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Formatting and syntax changes
whitespace, tabs to spaces, trailing space
put open { on same line as struct def
remove unneeded {} after if statements
change printk("Lu") to printk("llu")
convert asm/uaccess.h to linux/uaacess.h includes
remove unnecessary asm/bug.h includes
convert all users of simple_strtol to strict_strtolSigned-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Fix a sleeping function called from invalid context bug by moving allocation
to the callers prior to taking the policy rdlock.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
