17 Feb, 2016
1 commit
-
Before this commit, removing the access property of
a file, aka, the extended attribute security.SMACK64
was not effictive until the cache had been cleaned.This patch fixes that problem.
Signed-off-by: José Bollo
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
12 Feb, 2016
1 commit
-
Prior to the 4.2 kernel there no no harm in providing
a security module hook that does nothing, as the default
hook would get called if the module did not supply one.
With the list based infrastructure an empty hook adds
overhead. This patch removes the three Smack hooks that
don't actually do anything.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
21 Jan, 2016
1 commit
-
It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
all modes have flags ORed into them.Signed-off-by: Jann Horn
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Ingo Molnar
Cc: James Morris
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn"
Cc: Andy Shevchenko
Cc: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Al Viro
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Cc: Willy Tarreau
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
18 Jan, 2016
1 commit
-
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
(EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.- Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.- Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.
- Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
KEYS: refcount bug fix
ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
IMA: policy can be updated zero times
selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
selinux: export validatetrans decisions
gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
...
26 Dec, 2015
1 commit
25 Dec, 2015
2 commits
-
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we
can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore -
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecurity hook non-const so that
we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels.Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
18 Dec, 2015
1 commit
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Smack security handler for sendmsg() syscall
is vulnerable to type confusion issue what
can allow to privilege escalation into root
or cause denial of service.A malicious attacker can create socket of one
type for example AF_UNIX and pass is into
sendmsg() function ensuring that this is
AF_INET socket.Remedy
Do not trust user supplied data.
Proposed fix below.Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Fruba
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
14 Dec, 2015
1 commit
-
Add a nfs_listxattr operation. Move the call to security_inode_listsecurity
from list operation of the "security.*" xattr handler to nfs_listxattr.Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher
Cc: Trond Myklebust
Cc: Anna Schumaker
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
10 Dec, 2015
1 commit
-
The existing file receive hook checks for access on
the file inode even for UDS. This is not right, as
the inode is not used by Smack to make access checks
for sockets. This change checks for an appropriate
access relationship between the receiving (current)
process and the socket. If the process can't write
to the socket's send label or the socket's receive
label can't write to the process fail.This will allow the legitimate cases, where the
socket sender and socket receiver can freely communicate.
Only strangly set socket labels should cause a problem.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
20 Oct, 2015
1 commit
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This feature introduces new kernel interface:
- /relabel-self - for setting transition labels list
This list is used to control smack label transition mechanism.
List is set by, and per process. Process can transit to new label only if
label is on the list. Only process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability can add
labels to this list. With this list, process can change it's label without
CAP_MAC_ADMIN but only once. After label changing, list is unset.Changes in v2:
* use list_for_each_entry instead of _rcu during label write
* added missing description in security/Smack.txtChanges in v3:
* squashed into one commitChanges in v4:
* switch from global list to per-task list
* since the per-task list is accessed only by the task itself
there is no need to use synchronization mechanisms on itChanges in v5:
* change smackfs interface of relabel-self to the one used for onlycap
multiple labels are accepted, separated by space, which
replace the previous list upon writeSigned-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
10 Oct, 2015
3 commits
-
This fix writes the task label when
smack_d_instantiate is called, before the
label of the superblock was written on the
pipe's inode.Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler -
This change has two goals:
- delay the setting of 'smack_enabled' until
it will be really effective
- ensure that smackfs is valid only if 'smack_enabled'
is set (it is already the case in smack_netfilter.c)Signed-off-by: José Bollo
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler -
Fixes the following sparse warning:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:55:1: warning: symbol 'smk_ipv6_port_list'
was not declared. Should it be static?Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
13 Aug, 2015
1 commit
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The changes for mounting binary filesystems was allied
improperly, with the list of tokens being in an ifdef that
it shouldn't have been. Fix that, and a couple style issues
that were bothering me.Reported-by: Jim Davis
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
01 Aug, 2015
1 commit
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The kbuild test robot reported a couple of these,
and the third showed up by inspection. Making the
symbols static is proper.Reported-by: Fengguang Wu
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
28 Jul, 2015
1 commit
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IPv6 appears to be (finally) coming of age with the
influx of autonomous devices. In support of this, add
the ability to associate a Smack label with IPv6 addresses.This patch also cleans up some of the conditional
compilation associated with the introduction of
secmark processing. It's now more obvious which bit
of code goes with which feature.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
23 Jul, 2015
1 commit
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Add support for setting smack mount labels(using smackfsdef, smackfsroot,
smackfshat, smackfsfloor, smackfstransmute) for filesystems with binary
mount data like NFS.To achieve this, implement sb_parse_opts_str and sb_set_mnt_opts security
operations in smack LSM similar to SELinux.Signed-off-by: Vivek Trivedi
Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
15 May, 2015
2 commits
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This patch makes the following functions to use ERR_PTR() and related
macros to pass the appropriate error code through returned pointers:smk_parse_smack()
smk_import_entry()
smk_fetch()It also makes all the other functions that use them to handle the
error cases properly. This ways correct error codes from places
where they happened can be propagated to the user space if necessary.Doing this it fixes a bug in onlycap and unconfined files
handling. Previously their content was cleared on any error from
smk_import_entry/smk_parse_smack, be it EINVAL (as originally intended)
or ENOMEM. Right now it only reacts on EINVAL passing other codes
properly to userspace.Comments have been updated accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk
-
The dmabuf fd can be shared between processes via unix domain
socket. The file of dmabuf fd is came from anon_inode. The inode
has no set and get xattr operations, so it can not be shared
between processes with smack. This patch fixes just to ignore
private inode including anon_inode for smack_file_receive.Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim
12 May, 2015
2 commits
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Instead of using a vector of security operations
with explicit, special case stacking of the capability
and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and
yama hooks included as appropriate.The security_operations structure is no longer required.
Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that
allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for
list management while retaining typing. Each module
supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead
of a sparsely populated security_operations structure.
The description includes the element that gets put on
the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual
element allocation.The method for registering security modules is changed to
reflect the information available. The method for removing
a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed.
It should be generic now, however if there are potential
race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs
to be addressed by the calling module.The security hooks are called from the lists and the first
failure is returned.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: John Johansen
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Add a list header for each security hook. They aren't used until
later in the patch series. They are grouped together in a structure
so that there doesn't need to be an external address for each.Macro-ize the initialization of the security_operations
for each security module in anticipation of changing out
the security_operations structure.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: John Johansen
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris
27 Apr, 2015
1 commit
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Pull fourth vfs update from Al Viro:
"d_inode() annotations from David Howells (sat in for-next since before
the beginning of merge window) + four assorted fixes"* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
RCU pathwalk breakage when running into a symlink overmounting something
fix I_DIO_WAKEUP definition
direct-io: only inc/dec inode->i_dio_count for file systems
fs/9p: fix readdir()
VFS: assorted d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/inode.c helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/cachefiles: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs library helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: assorted weird filesystems: d_inode() annotations
VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: net/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: net/unix: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: kernel/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: audit: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: Fix up some ->d_inode accesses in the chelsio driver
VFS: Cachefiles should perform fs modifications on the top layer only
VFS: AF_UNIX sockets should call mknod on the top layer only
16 Apr, 2015
2 commits
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most of the ->d_inode uses there refer to the same inode IO would
go to, i.e. d_backing_inode()Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Al Viro -
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights for this window:- improved AVC hashing for SELinux by John Brooks and Stephen Smalley
- addition of an unconfined label to Smack
- Smack documentation update
- TPM driver updates"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits)
lsm: copy comm before calling audit_log to avoid race in string printing
tomoyo: Do not generate empty policy files
tomoyo: Use if_changed when generating builtin-policy.h
tomoyo: Use bin2c to generate builtin-policy.h
selinux: increase avtab max buckets
selinux: Use a better hash function for avtab
selinux: convert avtab hash table to flex_array
selinux: reconcile security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid() and mls_import_netlbl_cat()
selinux: remove unnecessary pointer reassignment
Smack: Updates for Smack documentation
tpm/st33zp24/spi: Add missing device table for spi phy.
tpm/st33zp24: Add proper wait for ordinal duration in case of irq mode
smack: Fix gcc warning from unused smack_syslog_lock mutex in smackfs.c
Smack: Allow an unconfined label in bringup mode
Smack: getting the Smack security context of keys
Smack: Assign smack_known_web as default smk_in label for kernel thread's socket
tpm/tpm_infineon: Use struct dev_pm_ops for power management
MAINTAINERS: Add Jason as designated reviewer for TPM
tpm: Update KConfig text to include TPM2.0 FIFO chips
tpm/st33zp24/dts/st33zp24-spi: Add dts documentation for st33zp24 spi phy
...
12 Apr, 2015
1 commit
-
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
24 Mar, 2015
3 commits
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I have vehemently opposed adding a "permissive" mode to Smack
for the simple reasons that it would be subject to massive abuse
and that developers refuse to turn it off come product release.
I still believe that this is true, and still refuse to add a
general "permissive mode". So don't ask again.Bumjin Im suggested an approach that addresses most of the concerns,
and I have implemented it here. I still believe that we'd be better
off without this sort of thing, but it looks like this minimizes the
abuse potential.Firstly, you have to configure Smack Bringup Mode. That allows
for "release" software to be ammune from abuse. Second, only one
label gets to be "permissive" at a time. You can use it for
debugging, but that's about it.A label written to smackfs/unconfined is treated specially.
If either the subject or object label of an access check
matches the "unconfined" label, and the access would not
have been allowed otherwise an audit record and a console
message are generated. The audit record "request" string is
marked with either "(US)" or "(UO)", to indicate that the
request was granted because of an unconfined label. The
fact that an inode was accessed by an unconfined label is
remembered, and subsequent accesses to that "impure"
object are noted in the log. The impurity is not stored in
the filesystem, so a file mislabled as a side effect of
using an unconfined label may still cause concern after
a reboot.So, it's there, it's dangerous, but so many application
developers seem incapable of living without it I have
given in. I've tried to make it as safe as I can, but
in the end it's still a chain saw.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
-
With this commit, the LSM Smack implements the LSM
side part of the system call keyctl with the action
code KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY.It is now possible to get the context of, for example,
the user session key using the command "keyctl security @s".The original patch has been modified for merge.
Signed-off-by: José Bollo
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler -
This change fixes the bug associated with sockets owned by kernel threads. These
sockets, created usually by network devices' drivers tasks, received smk_in
label from the task that created them - the "floor" label in the most cases. The
result was that they were not able to receive data packets because of missing
smack rules. The main reason of the access deny is that the socket smk_in label
is placed as the object during smk check, kernel thread's capabilities are
omitted.Signed-off-by: Marcin Lis
23 Feb, 2015
1 commit
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Use d_is_positive() rather than testing dentry->d_inode in Smack to get rid of
direct references to d_inode outside of the VFS.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
12 Feb, 2015
1 commit
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If the secmark is available us it on connection as
well as packet delivery.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
22 Jan, 2015
1 commit
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We hit use after free on dereferncing pointer to task_smack struct in
smk_of_task() called from smack_task_to_inode().task_security() macro uses task_cred_xxx() to get pointer to the task_smack.
task_cred_xxx() could be used only for non-pointer members of task's
credentials. It cannot be used for pointer members since what they point
to may disapper after dropping RCU read lock.Mainly task_security() used this way:
smk_of_task(task_security(p))Intead of this introduce function smk_of_task_struct() which
takes task_struct as argument and returns pointer to smk_known struct
and do this under RCU read lock.
Bogus task_security() macro is not used anymore, so remove it.KASan's report for this:
AddressSanitizer: use after free in smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70 at addr c4635600
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-64 (Tainted: PO): kasan error
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8 age=39 cpu=0 pid=1866
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x88/0x1bc
new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8
smack_cred_prepare+0x48/0x21c
security_prepare_creds+0x44/0x4c
prepare_creds+0xdc/0x110
smack_setprocattr+0x104/0x150
security_setprocattr+0x4c/0x54
proc_pid_attr_write+0x12c/0x194
vfs_write+0x1b0/0x370
SyS_write+0x5c/0x94
ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48
INFO: Freed in smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0 age=27 cpu=0 pid=1564
kfree+0x270/0x290
smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0
security_cred_free+0x34/0x3c
put_cred_rcu+0x58/0xcc
rcu_process_callbacks+0x738/0x998
__do_softirq+0x264/0x4cc
do_softirq+0x94/0xf4
irq_exit+0xbc/0x120
handle_IRQ+0x104/0x134
gic_handle_irq+0x70/0xac
__irq_svc+0x44/0x78
_raw_spin_unlock+0x18/0x48
sync_inodes_sb+0x17c/0x1d8
sync_filesystem+0xac/0xfc
vdfs_file_fsync+0x90/0xc0
vfs_fsync_range+0x74/0x7c
INFO: Slab 0xd3b23f50 objects=32 used=31 fp=0xc4635600 flags=0x4080
INFO: Object 0xc4635600 @offset=5632 fp=0x (null)Bytes b4 c46355f0: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
Object c4635600: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object c4635610: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object c4635620: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object c4635630: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
Redzone c4635640: bb bb bb bb ....
Padding c46356e8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
Padding c46356f8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
CPU: 5 PID: 834 Comm: launchpad_prelo Tainted: PBO 3.10.30 #1
Backtrace:
[] (dump_backtrace+0x0/0x158) from [] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
r7:c4634010 r6:d3b23f50 r5:c4635600 r4:d1002140
[] (show_stack+0x0/0x24) from [] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28)
[] (dump_stack+0x0/0x28) from [] (print_trailer+0x124/0x144)
[] (print_trailer+0x0/0x144) from [] (object_err+0x3c/0x44)
r7:c4635600 r6:d1002140 r5:d3b23f50 r4:c4635600
[] (object_err+0x0/0x44) from [] (kasan_report_error+0x2b8/0x538)
r6:d1002140 r5:d3b23f50 r4:c6429cf8 r3:c09e1aa7
[] (kasan_report_error+0x0/0x538) from [] (__asan_load4+0xd4/0xf8)
[] (__asan_load4+0x0/0xf8) from [] (smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70)
r5:c4635600 r4:ca9da000
[] (smack_task_to_inode+0x0/0x70) from [] (security_task_to_inode+0x3c/0x44)
r5:cca25e80 r4:c0ba9780
[] (security_task_to_inode+0x0/0x44) from [] (pid_revalidate+0x124/0x178)
r6:00000000 r5:cca25e80 r4:cbabe3c0 r3:00008124
[] (pid_revalidate+0x0/0x178) from [] (lookup_fast+0x35c/0x43y4)
r9:c6429efc r8:00000101 r7:c079d940 r6:c6429e90 r5:c6429ed8 r4:c83c4148
[] (lookup_fast+0x0/0x434) from [] (do_last.isra.24+0x1c0/0x1108)
[] (do_last.isra.24+0x0/0x1108) from [] (path_openat.isra.25+0xf4/0x648)
[] (path_openat.isra.25+0x0/0x648) from [] (do_filp_open+0x3c/0x88)
[] (do_filp_open+0x0/0x88) from [] (do_sys_open+0xf0/0x198)
r7:00000001 r6:c0ea2180 r5:0000000b r4:00000000
[] (do_sys_open+0x0/0x198) from [] (SyS_open+0x30/0x34)
[] (SyS_open+0x0/0x34) from [] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
Read of size 4 by thread T834:
Memory state around the buggy address:
c4635380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635500: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>c4635600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
c4635680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
c4635700: 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635780: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
c4635880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin
Cc:
21 Jan, 2015
3 commits
-
During UDS connection check, both sides are checked for write access to
the other side. But only the first check is performed with audit support.
The second one didn't produce any audit logs. This simple patch fixes that.Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa
-
Smack uses CIPSO to label internet packets and thus provide
for access control on delivery of packets. The netfilter facility
was not used to allow for Smack to work properly without netfilter
configuration. Smack does not need netfilter, however there are
cases where it would be handy.As a side effect, the labeling of local IPv4 packets can be optimized
and the handling of local IPv6 packets is just all out better.The best part is that the netfilter tools use "contexts" that
are just strings, and they work just as well for Smack as they
do for SELinux.All of the conditional compilation for IPv6 was implemented
by Rafal KrypaSigned-off-by: Casey Schaufler
-
This is one of those cases where you look at code you did
years ago and wonder what you might have been thinking.
There are a number of LSM hooks that work off of file pointers,
and most of them really want the security data from the inode.
Some, however, really want the security context that the process
had when the file was opened. The difference went undetected in
Smack until it started getting used in a real system with real
testing. At that point it was clear that something was amiss.This patch corrects the misuse of the f_security value in several
of the hooks. The behavior will not usually be any different, as
the process had to be able to open the file in the first place, and
the old check almost always succeeded, as will the new, but for
different reasons.Thanks to the Samsung Tizen development team that identified this.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
20 Jan, 2015
4 commits
-
The 54e70ec5eb090193b03e69d551fa6771a5a217c4 commit introduced a
bidirectional check that should have checked for mutual WRITE access
between two labels. Due to a typo subject's OUT label is checked with
object's OUT. Should be OUT to IN.Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski
-
Files created with __shmem_file_stup() appear to have somewhat fake
dentries which make them look like root directories and not get
the label the current process or ("*") star meant for tmpfs files.Signed-off-by: Łukasz Stelmach
-
In principle if this function was called with "value" == NULL and "len"
not NULL it could return different results for the "len" compared to a
case where "name" was not NULL. This is a hypothetical case that does
not exist in the kernel, but it's a logic bug nonetheless.Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk
-
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk
15 Dec, 2014
1 commit
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Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
SELinux, and integrity code.The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures. Support for reading
keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
selinux: Remove security_ops extern
security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
VFS: refactor vfs_read()
ima: require signature based appraisal
integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
ima: added error messages to template-related functions
ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
ima: report policy load status
ima: use path names cache
...