26 Jul, 2008
3 commits
-
- clean up set_majmin()
- use simple_strtoul() to parse major/minor[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix simple_strtoul() usage]
[kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: fix warnings]
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Paul Menage
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Balbir Singh
Cc: Paul Menage
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch converts devcgroup_access_write() from a raw file handler
into a handler for the cgroup write_string() method. This allows some
boilerplate copying/locking/checking to be removed and simplifies the
cleanup path, since these functions are performed by the cgroups
framework before calling the handler.Signed-off-by: Paul Menage
Cc: Paul Jackson
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov
Cc: Balbir Singh
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
25 Jul, 2008
2 commits
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Filesystem capabilities have come of age. Remove the experimental tag for
configuring filesystem capabilities.Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
When cap_bset suppresses some of the forced (fP) capabilities of a file,
it is generally only safe to execute the program if it understands how to
recognize it doesn't have enough privilege to work correctly. For legacy
applications (fE!=0), which have no non-destructive way to determine that
they are missing privilege, we fail to execute (EPERM) any executable that
requires fP capabilities, but would otherwise get pP' < fP. This is a
fail-safe permission check.For some discussion of why it is problematic for (legacy) privileged
applications to run with less than the set of capabilities requested for
them, see:http://userweb.kernel.org/~morgan/sendmail-capabilities-war-story.html
With this iteration of this support, we do not include setuid-0 based
privilege protection from the bounding set. That is, the admin can still
(ab)use the bounding set to suppress the privileges of a setuid-0 program.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
15 Jul, 2008
1 commit
-
This reverts commit 811f3799279e567aa354c649ce22688d949ac7a9.
From Eric Paris:
"Please drop this patch for now. It deadlocks on ntfs-3g. I need to
rework it to handle fuse filesystems better. (casey was right)"
14 Jul, 2008
27 commits
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The register security hook is no longer required, as the capability
module is always registered. LSMs wishing to stack capability as
a secondary module should do so explicitly.Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman -
Fix small oversight in "security: remove dummy module":
CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES doesn't depend on CONFIG_SECURITYSigned-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Remove the dummy module and make the "capability" module the default.
Compile and boot tested.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The sb_get_mnt_opts() hook is unused, and is superseded by the
sb_show_options() hook.Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Acked-by: James Morris -
This patch causes SELinux mount options to show up in /proc/mounts. As
with other code in the area seq_put errors are ignored. Other LSM's
will not have their mount options displayed until they fill in their own
security_sb_show_options() function.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Currently if a FS is mounted for which SELinux policy does not define an
fs_use_* that FS will either be genfs labeled or not labeled at all.
This decision is based on the existence of a genfscon rule in policy and
is irrespective of the capabilities of the filesystem itself. This
patch allows the kernel to check if the filesystem supports security
xattrs and if so will use those if there is no fs_use_* rule in policy.
An fstype with a no fs_use_* rule but with a genfs rule will use xattrs
if available and will follow the genfs rule.This can be particularly interesting for things like ecryptfs which
actually overlays a real underlying FS. If we define excryptfs in
policy to use xattrs we will likely get this wrong at times, so with
this path we just don't need to define it!Overlay ecryptfs on top of NFS with no xattr support:
SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses genfs_contexts
Overlay ecryptfs on top of ext4 with xattr support:
SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses xattrIt is also useful as the kernel adds new FS we don't need to add them in
policy if they support xattrs and that is how we want to handle them.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Fix several warnings generated by sparse of the form
"returning void-valued expression".Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn -
Use do_each_thread as a proper do/while block. Sparse complained.
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley -
Remove unused and shadowed addrlen variable. Picked up by sparse.
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Paul Moore -
I've gotten complaints and reports about people not understanding the
meaning of the current unknown class/perm handling the kernel emits on
every policy load. Hopefully this will make make it clear to everyone
the meaning of the message and won't waste a printk the user won't care
about anyway on systems where the kernel and the policy agree on
everything.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
On Mon, 2008-06-09 at 01:24 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> Getting a few of these with FC5:
>
> SELinux: context_struct_compute_av: unrecognized class 69
> SELinux: context_struct_compute_av: unrecognized class 69
>
> one came out when I logged in.
>
> No other symptoms, yet.Change handling of invalid classes by SELinux, reporting class values
unknown to the kernel as errors (w/ ratelimit applied) and handling
class values unknown to policy as normal denials.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
We used to protect against races of policy load in security_load_policy
by using the load_mutex. Since then we have added a new mutex,
sel_mutex, in sel_write_load() which is always held across all calls to
security_load_policy we are covered and can safely just drop this one.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The class_to_string array is referenced by tclass. My code mistakenly
was using tclass - 1. If the proceeding class is a userspace class
rather than kernel class this may cause a denial/EINVAL even if unknown
handling is set to allow. The bug shouldn't be allowing excess
privileges since those are given based on the contents of another array
which should be correctly referenced.At this point in time its pretty unlikely this is going to cause
problems. The most recently added kernel classes which could be
affected are association, dccp_socket, and peer. Its pretty unlikely
any policy with handle_unknown=allow doesn't have association and
dccp_socket undefined (they've been around longer than unknown handling)
and peer is conditionalized on a policy cap which should only be defined
if that class exists in policy.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Open code sidtab lock to make Andrew Morton happy.
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley -
Open code load_mutex as suggested by Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by: James Morris
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Open code policy_rwlock, as suggested by Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley -
Fix an endianness bug in the handling of network node addresses by
SELinux. This yields no change on little endian hardware but fixes
the incorrect handling on big endian hardware. The network node
addresses are stored in network order in memory by checkpolicy, not in
cpu/host order, and thus should not have cpu_to_le32/le32_to_cpu
conversions applied upon policy write/read unlike other data in the
policy.Bug reported by John Weeks of Sun, who noticed that binary policy
files built from the same policy source on x86 and sparc differed and
tracked it down to the ipv4 address handling in checkpolicy.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Simplify and improve the robustness of the SELinux ioctl checking by
using the "access mode" bits of the ioctl command to determine the
permission check rather than dealing with individual command values.
This removes any knowledge of specific ioctl commands from SELinux
and follows the same guidance we gave to Smack earlier.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Enable processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in policy
to get undefined contexts on inodes. This extends the support for
deferred mapping of security contexts in order to permit restorecon
and similar programs to see the raw file contexts unknown to the
system policy in order to check them.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
read access or full attach access is requested. This allows security
modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
full ptrace access. The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
to already be ptracing the target. The other ptrace checks within
proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
read mode instead of attach.In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label. This
enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit). At present we have to choose between
allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
(change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and
ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access
interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0
or -errno vs. 1 or 0). I retained this difference to avoid any
changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by
changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and
by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Chris Wright
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Remove inherit field from inode_security_struct, per Stephen Smalley:
"Let's just drop inherit altogether - dead field."Signed-off-by: James Morris
-
reorder inode_security_struct to remove padding on 64 bit builds
size reduced from 72 to 64 bytes increasing objects per slab to 64.
Signed-off-by: Richard Kennedy
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Formatting and syntax changes
whitespace, tabs to spaces, trailing space
put open { on same line as struct def
remove unneeded {} after if statements
change printk("Lu") to printk("llu")
convert asm/uaccess.h to linux/uaacess.h includes
remove unnecessary asm/bug.h includes
convert all users of simple_strtol to strict_strtolSigned-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Fix a sleeping function called from invalid context bug by moving allocation
to the callers prior to taking the policy rdlock.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Introduce SELinux support for deferred mapping of security contexts in
the SID table upon policy reload, and use this support for inode
security contexts when the context is not yet valid under the current
policy. Only processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in
policy can set undefined security contexts on inodes. Inodes with
such undefined contexts are treated as having the unlabeled context
until the context becomes valid upon a policy reload that defines the
context. Context invalidation upon policy reload also uses this
support to save the context information in the SID table and later
recover it upon a subsequent policy reload that defines the context
again.This support is to enable package managers and similar programs to set
down file contexts unknown to the system policy at the time the file
is created in order to better support placing loadable policy modules
in packages and to support build systems that need to create images of
different distro releases with different policies w/o requiring all of
the contexts to be defined or legal in the build host policy.With this patch applied, the following sequence is possible, although
in practice it is recommended that this permission only be allowed to
specific program domains such as the package manager.# rmdir baz
# rm bar
# touch bar
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined
chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# cat setundefined.te
policy_module(setundefined, 1.0)
require {
type unconfined_t;
type unlabeled_t;
}
files_type(unlabeled_t)
allow unconfined_t self:capability2 mac_admin;
# make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile setundefined.pp
# semodule -i setundefined.pp
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz
# cat foo.te
policy_module(foo, 1.0)
type foo_exec_t;
files_type(foo_exec_t)
# make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile foo.pp
# semodule -i foo.pp # defines foo_exec_t
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
# semodule -r foo
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz
# semodule -i foo.pp
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
# semodule -r setundefined foo
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # no longer defined and not allowed
chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# rmdir baz
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argumentSigned-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
# cat devices.list
c 1:3 r
# echo 'c 1:3 w' > sub/devices.allow
# cat sub/devices.list
c 1:3 wAs illustrated, the parent group has no write permission to /dev/null, so
it's child should not be allowed to add this write permission.Signed-off-by: Li Zefan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Paul Menage
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
# echo "b $((0x7fffffff)):$((0x80000000)) rwm" > devices.allow
# cat devices.list
b 214748364:-21474836 rwmthough a major/minor number of 0x800000000 is meaningless, we
should not cast it to a negative value.Signed-off-by: Li Zefan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Paul Menage
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
05 Jul, 2008
2 commits
-
# cat /devcg/devices.list
a *:* rwm
# echo a > devices.allow
# cat /devcg/devices.list
a *:* rwm
a 0:0 rwmThis is odd and maybe confusing. With this patch, writing 'a' to
devices.allow will add 'a *:* rwm' to the whitelist.Also a few fixes and updates to the document.
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Paul Menage
Cc: Balbir Singh
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
The filesystem capability support meaning for CAP_SETPCAP is less powerful
than the non-filesystem capability support. As such, when filesystem
capabilities are configured, we should not permit CAP_SETPCAP to 'enhance'
the current process through strace manipulation of a child process.Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
13 Jun, 2008
1 commit
-
The dummy module is used by folk that run security conscious code(!?). A
feature of such code (for example, dhclient) is that it tries to operate
with minimum privilege (dropping unneeded capabilities). While the dummy
module doesn't restrict code execution based on capability state, the user
code expects the kernel to appear to support it. This patch adds back
faked support for the PR_SET_KEEPCAPS etc., calls - making the kernel
behave as before 2.6.26.For details see: http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10748
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: Chris Wright
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
07 Jun, 2008
4 commits
-
This semaphore doesn't appear to be used, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Walker
Cc: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Consider you added a 'c foo:bar r' permission to some cgroup and then (a
bit later) 'c'foo:bar w' for it. After this you'll see thec foo:bar r
c foo:bar wlines in a devices.list file.
Another example - consider you added 10 'c foo:bar r' permissions to some
cgroup (e.g. by mistake). After this you'll see 10 c foo:bar r lines in
a list file.This is weird. This situation also has one more annoying consequence.
Having many items in a white list makes permissions checking slower, sine
it has to walk a longer list.The proposal is to merge permissions for items, that correspond to the
same device.Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Two functions, that need to get a device_cgroup from a task (they are
devcgroup_inode_permission and devcgroup_inode_mknod) make it in a strange
way:They get a css_set from task, then a subsys_state from css_set, then a
cgroup from the state and then a subsys_state again from the cgroup.
Besides, the devices_subsys_id is read from memory, whilst there's a
enum-ed constant for it.Optimize this part a bit:
1. Get the subsys_stats form the task and be done - no 2 extra
dereferences,
2. Use the device_subsys_id constant, not the value from memory
(i.e. one less dereference).Found while preparing 2.6.26 OpenVZ port.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: Paul Menage
Cc: Balbir Singh
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This is just picking the container_of out of cgroup_to_devcgroup into a
separate function.This new css_to_devcgroup will be used in the 2nd patch.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Paul Menage
Cc: Balbir Singh
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
