22 Jan, 2011

2 commits

  • Fix up comments in the key management code. No functional changes.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    David Howells
     
  • Do a bit of a style clean up in the key management code. No functional
    changes.

    Done using:

    perl -p -i -e 's!^/[*]*/\n!!' security/keys/*.c
    perl -p -i -e 's!} /[*] end [a-z0-9_]*[(][)] [*]/\n!}\n!' security/keys/*.c
    sed -i -s -e ": next" -e N -e 's/^\n[}]$/}/' -e t -e P -e 's/^.*\n//' -e "b next" security/keys/*.c

    To remove /*****/ lines, remove comments on the closing brace of a
    function to name the function and remove blank lines before the closing
    brace of a function.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    David Howells
     

23 Apr, 2010

1 commit


27 Feb, 2009

1 commit


14 Nov, 2008

3 commits

  • Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
    credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
    A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
    access or modify its own credentials.

    A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
    of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
    execve().

    With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
    changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
    and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

    struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
    int ret = blah(new);
    if (ret < 0) {
    abort_creds(new);
    return ret;
    }
    return commit_creds(new);

    There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
    credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
    COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
    the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

    To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
    the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
    discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
    credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
    modified, except under special circumstances:

    (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

    (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

    The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
    using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
    added by a later patch).

    This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
    testsuite.

    This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

    (1) execve().

    This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
    security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

    (2) Temporary credential overrides.

    do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
    temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
    preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
    on the thread being dumped.

    This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
    credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
    the task's objective credentials.

    (3) LSM interface.

    A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

    (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
    (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()

    Removed in favour of security_capset().

    (*) security_capset(), ->capset()

    New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
    creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
    creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
    new creds, are now const.

    (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()

    Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
    killed if it's an error.

    (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()

    Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

    (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()

    New. Free security data attached to cred->security.

    (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()

    New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.

    (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()

    New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
    security by commit_creds().

    (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()

    Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

    (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()

    Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
    cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
    setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
    than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

    (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()

    Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
    directly to init's credentials.

    NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
    longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

    (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
    (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()

    Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
    refer to the security context.

    (4) sys_capset().

    This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
    calls have been merged.

    (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

    This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
    commit_thread() to point that way.

    (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

    __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
    beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
    user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
    successful.

    switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
    folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
    __sigqueue_alloc().

    (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

    The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
    abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
    it.

    security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
    guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

    The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

    Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
    commit_creds().

    The get functions all simply access the data directly.

    (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

    security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
    want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
    rather than through an argument.

    Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
    if it doesn't end up using it.

    (9) Keyrings.

    A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

    (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
    all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
    They may want separating out again later.

    (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
    rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

    (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
    thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
    keyring.

    (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
    the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

    (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
    credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
    process or session keyrings (they're shared).

    (10) Usermode helper.

    The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
    subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
    of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
    after it has been cloned.

    call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
    call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
    special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
    specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

    call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
    supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

    (11) SELinux.

    SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
    interface changes mentioned above:

    (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
    current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
    that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
    the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
    until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
    lock.

    (12) is_single_threaded().

    This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
    a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
    wants to use it too.

    The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
    with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
    to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

    (13) nfsd.

    The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
    credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
    down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
    in this series have been applied.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Acked-by: James Morris
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    David Howells
     
  • Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
    This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
    replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
    seeing deallocated memory.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Acked-by: James Morris
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    David Howells
     
  • Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
    security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
    pointing to it.

    Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
    entry.S via asm-offsets.

    With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Acked-by: James Morris
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    David Howells
     

09 Jan, 2006

1 commit

  • Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to
    instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4.

    The patch makes the following changes:

    (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type
    to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be
    spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the
    rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance.

    The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation
    name are passed to the method.

    (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key
    to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in
    /proc/pid/cmdline.

    This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the
    patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no
    longer there.

    A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow.

    (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this
    key will retrieve the information.

    (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the
    authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here
    for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the
    lowest level of the session keyring.

    This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to
    switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and
    so is usable in multithreaded programs.

    The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec.

    (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that
    permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated
    key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated
    with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings.

    This function can also clear the assumption.

    (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently
    assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY).

    (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is
    assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if
    instantiation is successful.

    (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the
    file of permissions functions.

    (9) The documentation is updated.

    From:

    Build fix.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Cc: Trond Myklebust
    Cc: Alexander Zangerl
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    David Howells
     

31 Oct, 2005

1 commit

  • The attached patch adds LSM hooks for key management facilities. The notable
    changes are:

    (1) The key struct now supports a security pointer for the use of security
    modules. This will permit key labelling and restrictions on which
    programs may access a key.

    (2) Security modules get a chance to note (or abort) the allocation of a key.

    (3) The key permission checking can now be enhanced by the security modules;
    the permissions check consults LSM if all other checks bear out.

    (4) The key permissions checking functions now return an error code rather
    than a boolean value.

    (5) An extra permission has been added to govern the modification of
    attributes (UID, GID, permissions).

    Note that there isn't an LSM hook specifically for each keyctl() operation,
    but rather the permissions hook allows control of individual operations based
    on the permission request bits.

    Key management access control through LSM is enabled by automatically if both
    CONFIG_KEYS and CONFIG_SECURITY are enabled.

    This should be applied on top of the patch ensubjected:

    [PATCH] Keys: Possessor permissions should be additive

    Signed-Off-By: David Howells
    Signed-off-by: Chris Wright
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    David Howells
     

09 Oct, 2005

2 commits

  • This patch makes the possessor permissions on a key additive with
    user/group/other permissions on the same key.

    This permits extra rights to be granted to the possessor of a key without
    taking away any rights conferred by them owning the key or having common group
    membership.

    Signed-Off-By: David Howells
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    David Howells
     
  • The attached patch splits key permissions checking out of key-ui.h and
    moves it into a .c file. It's quite large and called quite a lot, and
    it's about to get bigger with the addition of LSM support for keys...

    key_any_permission() is also discarded as it's no longer used.

    Signed-Off-By: David Howells
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    David Howells