27 Jul, 2016

1 commit

  • This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
    is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
    work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port
    from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel.

    This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when
    performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object
    being copied to/from:
    - address range doesn't wrap around
    - address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size)
    - if on the slab allocator:
    - object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is
    implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches)
    - otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved
    and CMA ranges)
    - if on the stack
    - object must not extend before/after the current process stack
    - object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is
    arch/build support for identifying stack frames)
    - object must not overlap with kernel text

    Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
    Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks
    Tested-by: Michael Ellerman

    Kees Cook