07 Jul, 2009
1 commit
-
do_execve() and ptrace_attach() return -EINTR if
mutex_lock_interruptible(->cred_guard_mutex) fails.This is not right, change the code to return ERESTARTNOINTR.
Perhaps we should also change proc_pid_attr_write().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: David Howells
Acked-by: Roland McGrath
Cc: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
19 Jun, 2009
5 commits
-
Change ptrace_getsiginfo/ptrace_setsiginfo to use lock_task_sighand()
without tasklist_lock. Perhaps it makes sense to make a single helper
with "bool rw" argument.Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Acked-by: Roland McGrath
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
- Use rcu_read_lock() instead of tasklist_lock to find/get the task
in ptrace_get_task_struct().- Make it static, it has no callers outside of ptrace.c.
- The comment doesn't match the reality, this helper does not do
any checks. Beacuse it is really trivial and static I removed the
whole comment.Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Acked-by: Roland McGrath
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Remove the "Nasty, nasty" lock dance in ptrace_attach()/ptrace_traceme() -
from now task_lock() has nothing to do with ptrace at all.With the recent changes nobody uses task_lock() to serialize with ptrace,
but in fact it was never needed and it was never used consistently.However ptrace_attach() calls __ptrace_may_access() and needs task_lock()
to pin task->mm for get_dumpable(). But we can call __ptrace_may_access()
before we take tasklist_lock, ->cred_exec_mutex protects us against
do_execve() path which can change creds and MMF_DUMP* flags.(ugly, but we can't use ptrace_may_access() because it hides the error
code, so we have to take task_lock() and use __ptrace_may_access()).NOTE: this change assumes that LSM hooks, security_ptrace_may_access() and
security_ptrace_traceme(), can be called without task_lock() held.Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Chris Wright
Acked-by: Roland McGrath
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
ptrace_attach() and ptrace_traceme() are the last functions which look as
if the untraced task can have task->ptrace != 0, this must not be
possible. Change the code to just check ->ptrace != 0 and s/|=/=/ to set
PT_PTRACED.Also, a couple of trivial whitespace cleanups in ptrace_attach().
And move ptrace_traceme() up near ptrace_attach() to keep them close to
each other.Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Chris Wright
Acked-by: Roland McGrath
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
- Add PF_KTHREAD check to prevent attaching to the kernel thread
with a borrowed ->mm.With or without this change we can race with daemonize() which
can set PF_KTHREAD or clear ->mm after ptrace_attach() does the
check, but this doesn't matter because reparent_to_kthreadd()
does ptrace_unlink().- Kill "!task->mm" check. We don't really care about ->mm != NULL,
and the task can call exit_mm() right after we drop task_lock().
What we need is to make sure we can't attach after exit_notify(),
check task->exit_state != 0 instead.Also, move the "already traced" check down for cosmetic reasons.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Chris Wright
Acked-by: Roland McGrath
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
12 Jun, 2009
1 commit
-
…s/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (44 commits)
nommu: Provide mmap_min_addr definition.
TOMOYO: Add description of lists and structures.
TOMOYO: Remove unused field.
integrity: ima audit dentry_open failure
TOMOYO: Remove unused parameter.
security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models
TOMOYO: Simplify policy reader.
TOMOYO: Remove redundant markers.
SELinux: define audit permissions for audit tree netlink messages
TOMOYO: Remove unused mutex.
tomoyo: avoid get+put of task_struct
smack: Remove redundant initialization.
integrity: nfsd imbalance bug fix
rootplug: Remove redundant initialization.
smack: do not beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data
integrity: move ima_counts_get
integrity: path_check update
IMA: Add __init notation to ima functions
IMA: Minimal IMA policy and boot param for TCB IMA policy
selinux: remove obsolete read buffer limit from sel_read_bool
...
11 Jun, 2009
1 commit
-
* 'tracing-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (244 commits)
Revert "x86, bts: reenable ptrace branch trace support"
tracing: do not translate event helper macros in print format
ftrace/documentation: fix typo in function grapher name
tracing/events: convert block trace points to TRACE_EVENT(), fix !CONFIG_BLOCK
tracing: add protection around module events unload
tracing: add trace_seq_vprint interface
tracing: fix the block trace points print size
tracing/events: convert block trace points to TRACE_EVENT()
ring-buffer: fix ret in rb_add_time_stamp
ring-buffer: pass in lockdep class key for reader_lock
tracing: add annotation to what type of stack trace is recorded
tracing: fix multiple use of __print_flags and __print_symbolic
tracing/events: fix output format of user stack
tracing/events: fix output format of kernel stack
tracing/trace_stack: fix the number of entries in the header
ring-buffer: discard timestamps that are at the start of the buffer
ring-buffer: try to discard unneeded timestamps
ring-buffer: fix bug in ring_buffer_discard_commit
ftrace: do not profile functions when disabled
tracing: make trace pipe recognize latency format flag
...
09 Jun, 2009
1 commit
05 Jun, 2009
1 commit
-
Commit 95a3540da9c81a5987be810e1d9a83640a366bd5 ("ptrace_detach: the wrong
wakeup breaks the ERESTARTxxx logic") removed the "extra"
wake_up_process() from ptrace_detach(), but as Jan pointed out this breaks
the compatibility.I believe the changelog is right and this wake_up() is wrong in many
ways, but GDB assumes that ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, child, 0, 0) always
wakes up the tracee.Despite the fact this breaks SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED/group_stop_count logic,
and despite the fact this wake_up_process() can break another
assumption: PTRACE_DETACH with SIGSTOP should leave the tracee in
TASK_STOPPED case. Because the untraced child can dequeue SIGSTOP and
call do_signal_stop() before ptrace_detach() calls wake_up_process().Revert this change for now. We need some fixes even if we we want to keep
the current behaviour, but these fixes are not for 2.6.30.Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Acked-by: Roland McGrath
Cc: Jan Kratochvil
Cc: Denys Vlasenko
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
11 May, 2009
1 commit
-
Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against foreign
intervention on a process's credential state, such as is made by ptrace(). The
attachment of a debugger to a process affects execve()'s calculation of the new
credential state - _and_ also setprocattr()'s calculation of that state.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
07 May, 2009
1 commit
-
Merge reason: this topic is ready for upstream now. It passed
Oleg's review and Andrew had no further mm/*
objections/observations either.Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar
27 Apr, 2009
1 commit
-
ptrace_attach() needs task->cred_exec_mutex, not current->cred_exec_mutex.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Acked-by: Roland McGrath
Acked-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
24 Apr, 2009
1 commit
-
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.cMerge reason: fix the conflict above, and also pick up the CONFIG_BROKEN
dependency change from upstream so that we can remove it
here.Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar
14 Apr, 2009
1 commit
-
Pointed out by Roland. The bug was recently introduced by me in
"forget_original_parent: split out the un-ptrace part", commit
39c626ae47c469abdfd30c6e42eff884931380d6.Since that patch we have a window after exit_ptrace() drops tasklist and
before forget_original_parent() takes it again. In this window the child
can do ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME) and nobody can untrace this child after
that.Change ptrace_traceme() to not attach to the exiting ->real_parent. We
don't report the error in this case, we pretend we attach right before
->real_parent calls exit_ptrace() which should untrace us anyway.Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Acked-by: Roland McGrath
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
09 Apr, 2009
1 commit
-
This fixes all the checkpatch --file complaints about kernel/ptrace.c
and also removes an unused #include. I've verified that there are no
changes to the compiled code on x86_64.Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath
[ Removed the parts that just split a line - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
07 Apr, 2009
1 commit
-
Add the ptrace bts context field to task_struct unconditionally.
Initialize the field directly in copy_process().
Remove all the unneeded functionality used to initialize that field.Signed-off-by: Markus Metzger
Cc: roland@redhat.com
Cc: eranian@googlemail.com
Cc: oleg@redhat.com
Cc: juan.villacis@intel.com
Cc: ak@linux.jf.intel.com
LKML-Reference:
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar
04 Apr, 2009
1 commit
-
…nel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'core-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
ptrace: remove a useless goto
03 Apr, 2009
5 commits
-
This bug is ancient too. ptrace_untrace() must not resume the task
if the group stop in progress, we should set TASK_STOPPED instead.Unfortunately, we still have problems here:
- if the process/thread was traced, SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED
does not necessary means this thread group is stopped.- ptrace breaks the bookkeeping of ->group_stop_count.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Jerome Marchand
Cc: Roland McGrath
Cc: Denys Vlasenko
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Another ancient bug. Consider this trivial test-case,
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();if (pid) {
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, NULL, NULL);
wait(NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, NULL, NULL);
} else {
pause();
printf("WE HAVE A KERNEL BUG!!!\n");
}return 0;
}the child must not "escape" for sys_pause(), but it can and this was seen
in practice.This is because ptrace_detach does:
if (!child->exit_state)
wake_up_process(child);this wakeup can happen after this child has already restarted sys_pause(),
because it gets another wakeup from ptrace_untrace().With or without this patch, perhaps sys_pause() needs a fix. But this
wakeup also breaks the SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED logic in ptrace_untrace().Remove this wakeup. The caller saw this task in TASK_TRACED state, and
unless it was SIGKILL'ed in between __ptrace_unlink()->ptrace_untrace()
should handle this case correctly. If it was SIGKILL'ed, we don't need to
wakup the dying tracee too.Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Jerome Marchand
Acked-by: Roland McGrath
Cc: Denys Vlasenko
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
By discussion with Roland.
- Rename ptrace_exit() to exit_ptrace(), and change it to do all the
necessary work with ->ptraced list by its own.- Move this code from exit.c to ptrace.c
- Update the comment in ptrace_detach() to explain the rechecking of
the child->ptrace.Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Cc: "Metzger, Markus T"
Cc: Roland McGrath
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
When ptrace_detach() takes tasklist, the tracee can be SIGKILL'ed. If it
has already passed exit_notify() we can leak a zombie, because a) ptracing
disables the auto-reaping logic, and b) ->real_parent was not notified
about the child's death.ptrace_detach() should follow the ptrace_exit's logic, change the code
accordingly.Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Jerome Marchand
Cc: Roland McGrath
Tested-by: Denys Vlasenko
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Move the code from __ptrace_detach() to its single caller and kill this
helper.Also, fix the ->exit_state check, we shouldn't wake up EXIT_DEAD tasks.
Actually, I think task_is_stopped_or_traced() makes more sense, but this
needs another patch.Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Jerome Marchand
Cc: Roland McGrath
Cc: Denys Vlasenko
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
10 Mar, 2009
1 commit
-
Impact: cleanup
Obviously, this goto is useless. Remove it.
Signed-off-by: WANG Cong
Cc: Andrew Morton
Cc: Roland McGrath
LKML-Reference:
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar
14 Jan, 2009
1 commit
-
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens
29 Dec, 2008
1 commit
-
…el/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'tracing-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (241 commits)
sched, trace: update trace_sched_wakeup()
tracing/ftrace: don't trace on early stage of a secondary cpu boot, v3
Revert "x86: disable X86_PTRACE_BTS"
ring-buffer: prevent false positive warning
ring-buffer: fix dangling commit race
ftrace: enable format arguments checking
x86, bts: memory accounting
x86, bts: add fork and exit handling
ftrace: introduce tracing_reset_online_cpus() helper
tracing: fix warnings in kernel/trace/trace_sched_switch.c
tracing: fix warning in kernel/trace/trace.c
tracing/ring-buffer: remove unused ring_buffer size
trace: fix task state printout
ftrace: add not to regex on filtering functions
trace: better use of stack_trace_enabled for boot up code
trace: add a way to enable or disable the stack tracer
x86: entry_64 - introduce FTRACE_ frame macro v2
tracing/ftrace: add the printk-msg-only option
tracing/ftrace: use preempt_enable_no_resched_notrace in ring_buffer_time_stamp()
x86, bts: correctly report invalid bts records
...Fixed up trivial conflict in scripts/recordmcount.pl due to SH bits
being already partly merged by the SH merge.
20 Dec, 2008
1 commit
-
Impact: introduce new ptrace facility
Add arch_ptrace_untrace() function that is called when the tracer
detaches (either voluntarily or when the tracing task dies);
ptrace_disable() is only called on a voluntary detach.Add ptrace_fork() and arch_ptrace_fork(). They are called when a
traced task is forked.Clear DS and BTS related fields on fork.
Release DS resources and reclaim memory in ptrace_untrace(). This
releases resources already when the tracing task dies. We used to do
that when the traced task dies.Signed-off-by: Markus Metzger
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar
04 Dec, 2008
1 commit
-
Conflicts:
fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.cManually fixed above to use new creds API functions, e.g.
nfs4_save_creds().Signed-off-by: James Morris
01 Dec, 2008
1 commit
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All architectures now use the generic compat_sys_ptrace, as should every
new architecture that needs 32bit compat (if we'll ever get another).Remove the now superflous __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_PTRACE define, and also
kill a comment about __ARCH_SYS_PTRACE that was added after
__ARCH_SYS_PTRACE was already gone.Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig
Acked-by: David S. Miller
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
14 Nov, 2008
4 commits
-
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().
Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Al Viro
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris
20 Oct, 2008
1 commit
-
ptrace_untrace() can now become static.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Cc: Roland McGrath
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
14 Aug, 2008
1 commit
-
Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
change its own flags in a different way at the same time.__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags. This
patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:
(1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one
process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
current is the parent.(2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child.In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
been changed to calls to capable().Of the places that were using __capable():
(1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
process. All of these now use has_capability().(2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above,
these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.(3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().
(4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
switched and capable() is used instead.(5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.(6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-by: Al Viro
Signed-off-by: James Morris
27 Jul, 2008
1 commit
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This extends wait_task_inactive() with a new argument so it can be used in
a "soft" mode where it will check for the task changing state unexpectedly
and back off. There is no change to existing callers. This lays the
groundwork to allow robust, noninvasive tracing that can try to sample a
blocked thread but back off safely if it wakes up.Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
17 Jul, 2008
1 commit
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ptrace no longer fiddles with the children/sibling links, and the
old ptrace_children list is gone. Now ptrace, whether of one's own
children or another's via PTRACE_ATTACH, just uses the new ptraced
list instead.There should be no user-visible difference that matters. The only
change is the order in which do_wait() sees multiple stopped
children and stopped ptrace attachees. Since wait_task_stopped()
was changed earlier so it no longer reorders the children list, we
already know this won't cause any new problems.Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath
14 Jul, 2008
1 commit
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Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
read access or full attach access is requested. This allows security
modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
full ptrace access. The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
to already be ptracing the target. The other ptrace checks within
proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
read mode instead of attach.In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label. This
enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit). At present we have to choose between
allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
(change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and
ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access
interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0
or -errno vs. 1 or 0). I retained this difference to avoid any
changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by
changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and
by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Chris Wright
Signed-off-by: James Morris
02 May, 2008
1 commit
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With s390 the last arch switched to the generic sys_ptrace yesterday so
we can now kill the ifdef around it to enforce every new port it using
it instead of introducing new weirdo versions.Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
30 Apr, 2008
1 commit
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Afaics, currently there are no kernel problems with ptracing init, it can't
lose SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE flag and be killed/stopped by accident.The ability to strace/debug init can be very useful if you try to figure out
why it does not work as expected.However, admin should know what he does, "gdb /sbin/init 1" stops init, it
can't reap orphaned zombies or take care of /etc/inittab until continued. It
is even possible to crash init (and thus the whole system) if you wish,
ptracer has full control.See also the long discussion: http://marc.info/?t=120628018600001
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov
Acked-by: Roland McGrath
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
