19 Jun, 2020
1 commit
-
* tag 'v5.4.47': (2193 commits)
Linux 5.4.47
KVM: arm64: Save the host's PtrAuth keys in non-preemptible context
KVM: arm64: Synchronize sysreg state on injecting an AArch32 exception
...Conflicts:
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi
arch/arm/mach-imx/Kconfig
arch/arm/mach-imx/common.h
arch/arm/mach-imx/suspend-imx6.S
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8qxp-mek.dts
arch/powerpc/include/asm/cacheflush.h
drivers/cpufreq/imx6q-cpufreq.c
drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c
drivers/edac/synopsys_edac.c
drivers/firmware/imx/imx-scu.c
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec.h
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_platform.c
drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c
drivers/perf/fsl_imx8_ddr_perf.c
drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c
include/uapi/linux/dma-buf.hSigned-off-by: Jason Liu
23 Apr, 2020
1 commit
-
commit d3ec10aa95819bff18a0d936b18884c7816d0914 upstream.
A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a
keyutils test:[12537.027242] ======================================================
[12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE --------- - -
[12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------
[12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock:
[12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12537.208365]
[12537.208365] but task is already holding lock:
[12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12537.270476]
[12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[12537.270476]
[12537.307209]
[12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[12537.340754]
[12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}:
[12537.367434] down_write+0x4d/0x110
[12537.385202] __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280
[12537.405232] request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70
[12537.427221] request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.444839] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.468445] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.496731] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.519418] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.546263] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.573551] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.601045] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.617906] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.636225]
[12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}:
[12537.664525] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.683734] request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70
[12537.705640] request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.723304] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.746773] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.775607] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.798322] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.823369] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.847262] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.873477] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.890281] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.908649]
[12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}:
[12537.935225] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.954450] cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs]
[12537.977250] smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs]
[12538.000659] cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs]
[12538.023920] read_pages+0xf5/0x560
[12538.041583] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0
[12538.067047] ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10
[12538.092069] filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830
[12538.111637] __do_fault+0x82/0x260
[12538.129216] do_fault+0x419/0xfb0
[12538.146390] __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0
[12538.167408] handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550
[12538.187401] __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60
[12538.207395] do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0
[12538.225777] page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[12538.243010]
[12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}:
[12538.267875] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12538.286848] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12538.306006] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12538.327936] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12538.352154] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12538.370558] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12538.391470] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12538.410511] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
[12538.435535]
[12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this:
[12538.435535]
[12538.472829] Chain exists of:
[12538.472829] &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class
[12538.472829]
[12538.524820] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[12538.524820]
[12538.551431] CPU0 CPU1
[12538.572654] ---- ----
[12538.595865] lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.613737] lock(root_key_user.cons_lock);
[12538.644234] lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.672410] lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
[12538.687758]
[12538.687758] *** DEADLOCK ***
[12538.687758]
[12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598:
[12538.732097] #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12538.770573]
[12538.770573] stack backtrace:
[12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
[12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015
[12538.881963] Call Trace:
[12538.892897] dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0
[12538.907908] print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279
[12538.932891] ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250
[12538.948979] check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0
[12538.971643] ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190
[12538.992738] ? check_usage+0x550/0x550
[12539.009845] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
[12539.025484] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0
[12539.043555] __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0
[12539.061551] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10
[12539.080554] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12539.100330] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.119079] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12539.135869] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.153234] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12539.172787] ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110
[12539.190059] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12539.211526] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12539.227561] ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0
[12539.249076] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12539.266660] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12539.283091] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdfOne way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not
allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead,
an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the
read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding
the lock.That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant
read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace
write helpers. That is,1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy.
2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy().
3) All the fault handling code is removed.Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is
reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch.Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
25 Nov, 2019
1 commit
-
Secure keys are derieved using CAAM crypto block.
Secure keys derieved are the random number symmetric keys from CAAM.
Blobs corresponding to the key are formed using CAAM. User space
will only be able to view the blob of the key.Signed-off-by: Udit Agarwal
Reviewed-by: Sahil Malhotra
09 Jul, 2019
1 commit
-
Pull request_key improvements from David Howells:
"These are all request_key()-related, including a fix and some improvements:- Fix the lack of a Link permission check on a key found by
request_key(), thereby enabling request_key() to link keys that
don't grant this permission to the target keyring (which must still
grant Write permission).Note that the key must be in the caller's keyrings already to be
found.- Invalidate used request_key authentication keys rather than
revoking them, so that they get cleaned up immediately rather than
hanging around till the expiry time is passed.- Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so
that a request_key_rcu() can be provided. This can be called in RCU
mode, so it can't sleep and can't upcall - but it can be called
from LOOKUP_RCU pathwalk mode.- Cache the latest positive result of request_key*() temporarily in
task_struct so that filesystems that make a lot of request_key()
calls during pathwalk can take advantage of it to avoid having to
redo the searching. This requires CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE=y.It is assumed that the key just found is likely to be used multiple
times in each step in an RCU pathwalk, and is likely to be reused
for the next step too.Note that the cleanup of the cache is done on TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME,
just before userspace resumes, and on exit"* tag 'keys-request-20190626' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Kill off request_key_async{,_with_auxdata}
keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct
keys: Provide request_key_rcu()
keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions
keys: Invalidate used request_key authentication keys
keys: Fix request_key() lack of Link perm check on found key
19 Jun, 2019
1 commit
-
Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so that it
will become possible to provide an RCU-capable partial request_key()
function in a later commit.Signed-off-by: David Howells
05 Jun, 2019
1 commit
-
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation version 2 of the licenseextracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
31 May, 2019
1 commit
-
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later versionextracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
24 May, 2019
1 commit
-
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at
your option any later versionextracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
09 Apr, 2019
1 commit
-
Fixes the warning reported by Clang:
security/keys/trusted.c:146:17: warning: passing an object that
undergoes default
argument promotion to 'va_start' has undefined behavior [-Wvarargs]
va_start(argp, h3);
^
security/keys/trusted.c:126:37: note: parameter of type 'unsigned
char' is declared here
unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...)
^
Specifically, it seems that both the C90 (4.8.1.1) and C11 (7.16.1.4)
standards explicitly call this out as undefined behavior:The parameter parmN is the identifier of the rightmost parameter in
the variable parameter list in the function definition (the one just
before the ...). If the parameter parmN is declared with ... or with a
type that is not compatible with the type that results after
application of the default argument promotions, the behavior is
undefined.Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/41
Link: https://www.eskimo.com/~scs/cclass/int/sx11c.html
Suggested-by: David Laight
Suggested-by: Denis Kenzior
Suggested-by: James Bottomley
Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
Signed-off-by: James Morris
11 Mar, 2019
1 commit
-
…morris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"Mimi Zohar says:'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
verifying the PE kernel image signature.Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
The remaining patches are cleanup'"* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation
ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call
evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr'
encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1
kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
23 Feb, 2019
1 commit
-
Align the payload of "user" and "logon" keys so that users of the
keyrings service can access it as a struct that requires more than
2-byte alignment. fscrypt currently does this which results in the read
of fscrypt_key::size being misaligned as it needs 4-byte alignment.Align to __alignof__(u64) rather than __alignof__(long) since in the
future it's conceivable that people would use structs beginning with
u64, which on some platforms would require more than 'long' alignment.Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen
Fixes: 2aa349f6e37c ("[PATCH] Keys: Export user-defined keyring operations")
Fixes: 88bd6ccdcdd6 ("ext4 crypto: add encryption key management facilities")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
Tested-by: Aaro Koskinen
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
16 Feb, 2019
1 commit
-
In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if
a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side
manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal
construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned.Fix this by the following changes:
(1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead.
(2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the
payload available outside of security/keys/.(3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons
record and operation name.Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the
keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked.Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key")
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
05 Feb, 2019
1 commit
-
commit 9dc92c45177a ("integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring")
introduced a .platform keyring for storing preboot keys, used for
verifying kernel image signatures. Currently only IMA-appraisal is able
to use the keyring to verify kernel images that have their signature
stored in xattr.This patch exposes the .platform keyring, making it accessible for
verifying PE signed kernel images as well.Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song
Cc: David Howells
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: fixed checkpatch errors, squashed with patch fix]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
26 Oct, 2018
2 commits
-
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Provide the missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops. This
include query, encrypt, decrypt and create signature. Verify signature
already exists. Also provided are accessor functions for this:int query_asymmetric_key(const struct key *key,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info);int encrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *data, void *enc);
int decrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *enc, void *data);
int create_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *data, void *enc);The public_key_signature struct gains an encoding field to carry the
encoding for verify_signature().Signed-off-by: David Howells
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior
Signed-off-by: James Morris
16 Jun, 2018
1 commit
-
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of
them via this script:
./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fixManually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few
false-positives.Acked-by: Takashi Iwai
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu
Acked-by: Stephen Boyd
Acked-by: Charles Keepax
Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier
Reviewed-by: Coly Li
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet
02 Nov, 2017
1 commit
-
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
29 Aug, 2017
1 commit
-
Since the 'expiry' variable of 'struct key_preparsed_payload' has been
changed to 'time64_t' type, which is year 2038 safe on 32bits system.In net/rxrpc subsystem, we need convert 'u32' type to 'time64_t' type
when copying ticket expires time to 'prep->expiry', then this patch
introduces two helper functions to help convert 'u32' to 'time64_t'
type.This patch also uses ktime_get_real_seconds() to get current time instead
of get_seconds() which is not year 2038 safe on 32bits system.Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang
Signed-off-by: David Howells
04 Apr, 2017
1 commit
-
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring
pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this
argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature
expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring.Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key
pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that
decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth
argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring.Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau
03 Apr, 2017
1 commit
-
Add the following:
(1) A new system keyring that is used to store information about
blacklisted certificates and signatures.(2) A new key type (called 'blacklist') that is used to store a
blacklisted hash in its description as a hex string. The key accepts
no payload.(3) The ability to configure a list of blacklisted hashes into the kernel
at build time. This is done by setting
CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST to the filename of a list of hashes
that are in the form:"", "", ..., ""
where each is a hex string representation of the hash and must
include all necessary leading zeros to pad the hash to the right size.The above are enabled with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING.
Once the kernel is booted, the blacklist keyring can be listed:
root@andromeda ~]# keyctl show %:.blacklist
Keyring
723359729 ---lswrv 0 0 keyring: .blacklist
676257228 ---lswrv 0 0 \_ blacklist: 123412341234c55c1dcc601ab8e172917706aa32fb5eaf826813547fdf02dd46The blacklist cannot currently be modified by userspace, but it will be
possible to load it, for example, from the UEFI blacklist database.A later commit will make it possible to load blacklisted asymmetric keys in
here too.Signed-off-by: David Howells
02 Mar, 2017
1 commit
-
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:(1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
to protect the key.(2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
used to protect the key and the may be being modified.Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:
(1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:
dereference_key_locked()
user_key_payload_locked()(2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:
dereference_key_rcu()
user_key_payload_rcu()This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W
-------------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
__rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
_nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
do_mount+0x254/0xf70
SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
system_call+0x38/0xe0Reported-by: Jan Stancek
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Tested-by: Jan Stancek
Signed-off-by: James Morris
14 Jun, 2016
1 commit
-
Strip some trailing spaces.
Signed-off-by: David Howells
12 Apr, 2016
6 commits
-
Add a config option (IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY)
that, when enabled, allows keys to be added to the IMA keyrings by
userspace - with the restriction that each must be signed by a key in the
system trusted keyrings.EPERM will be returned if this option is disabled, ENOKEY will be returned if
no authoritative key can be found and EKEYREJECTED will be returned if the
signature doesn't match. Other errors such as ENOPKG may also be returned.If this new option is enabled, the builtin system keyring is searched, as is
the secondary system keyring if that is also enabled. Intermediate keys
between the builtin system keyring and the key being added can be added to
the secondary keyring (which replaces .ima_mok) to form a trust chain -
provided they are also validly signed by a key in one of the trusted keyrings.The .ima_mok keyring is then removed and the IMA blacklist keyring gets its
own config option (IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING).Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar -
Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to by root whilst the
system is running - provided the key being added is vouched for by a key
built into the kernel or already added to the secondary keyring.Rename .system_keyring to .builtin_trusted_keys to distinguish it more
obviously from the new keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys).The new keyring needs to be enabled with CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING.
If the secondary keyring is enabled, a link is created from that to
.builtin_trusted_keys so that the the latter will automatically be searched
too if the secondary keyring is searched.Signed-off-by: David Howells
-
Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer
meaningful. Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure.Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to
restrict_link().Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also.
Signed-off-by: David Howells
-
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.
Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.Signed-off-by: David Howells
-
Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key(). It doesn't really have any
dependencies on X.509 features as it uses generalised IDs and the
public_key structs that contain data extracted from X.509.Signed-off-by: David Howells
-
Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c so that it can be
generalised.Signed-off-by: David Howells
06 Apr, 2016
2 commits
-
Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
through a callback. This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside
this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key.If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the
function. If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL.The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with
verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into
linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum.Signed-off-by: David Howells
-
Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key in the 4th
element of the key payload and provide a way for it to be destroyed.For the public key subtype, this will be a public_key_signature struct.
Signed-off-by: David Howells
10 Feb, 2016
1 commit
-
In my original patch sealing with policy was done with dynamically
allocated buffer that I changed later into an array so the checks in
tpm2-cmd.c became invalid. This patch fixes the issue.Fixes: 5beb0c435bdd ("keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
Acked-by: Peter Huewe
26 Dec, 2015
1 commit
20 Dec, 2015
2 commits
-
TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially
combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data
can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use
authorization policies to seal trusted keys.Two following new options have been added for trusted keys:
* 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing.
* 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing.If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this
will result an error because the state of the option would become
mixed.Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
Tested-by: Colin Ian King
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: Peter Huewe -
Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key()
syscall and documentation for it.Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support
TPM_ALG_SM3_256:* hash_algo_name
* hash_digest_sizeIncludes support for the following hash algorithms:
* sha1
* sha256
* sha384
* sha512
* sm3-256Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
Tested-by: Colin Ian King
Reviewed-by: James Morris
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: Peter Huewe
15 Dec, 2015
1 commit
-
This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an
intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings,
effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a key
into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring.
On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in
either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot.IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted
before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested
operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller.Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
21 Oct, 2015
1 commit
-
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.Signed-off-by: David Howells
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
19 Oct, 2015
2 commits
-
Added tpm_trusted_seal() and tpm_trusted_unseal() API for sealing
trusted keys.This patch implements basic sealing and unsealing functionality for
TPM 2.0:* Seal with a parent key using a 20 byte auth value.
* Unseal with a parent key using a 20 byte auth value.Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe -
Moved struct trusted_key_options to trustes-type.h so that the fields
can be accessed from drivers/char/tpm.Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe
13 Aug, 2015
1 commit
-
A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes
that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that
signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself
signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then
contributes to the signature.Further, we already require the master message content type to be
pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data
itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the
authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1].We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them
entirely as appropriate. To this end:(1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one
signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one
that does not.(2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them.
Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are
rejected:(a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the
content type in the SignedData object.(b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data.
(c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable
UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within
the validity window of the matching X.509 cert.(d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents.
(e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents.
(f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents.
The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is
an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if
not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present.The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed
to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only
affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP).The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or
if it contains more than one element in its set of values.(3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following
restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers:(*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and
forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more
flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal
content.(*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and
requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute
holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set.(*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but
allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set.(*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE
This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type
and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the
minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and
an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't
remove these).(*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE
(*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATUREThese are invalid in this context but are included for later use
when limiting the use of X.509 certs.(4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between
the above options for testing purposes. For example:echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage
keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse
07 Aug, 2015
1 commit
-
Extract the function that drives the PKCS#7 signature verification given a
data blob and a PKCS#7 blob out from the module signing code and lump it with
the system keyring code as it's generic. This makes it independent of module
config options and opens it to use by the firmware loader.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez
Cc: Rusty Russell
Cc: Ming Lei
Cc: Seth Forshee
Cc: Kyle McMartin