26 Mar, 2020

1 commit


14 Feb, 2020

1 commit

  • John Johansen will take over as the process ambassador for Canonical
    when dealing with embargoed hardware issues.

    Cc: John Johansen
    Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
    Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
    Cc: Alex Shi
    Cc: Harry Wei
    Cc: Thomas Gleixner
    Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman
    Cc: Jonathan Corbet
    Acked-by: John Johansen
    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200213214842.21312-1-tyhicks@canonical.com
    Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

    Tyler Hicks
     

11 Feb, 2020

3 commits


30 Jan, 2020

1 commit

  • Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
    "It has been a relatively quiet cycle for documentation, but there's
    still a couple of things of note:

    - Conversion of the NFS documentation to RST

    - A new document on how to help with documentation (and a maintainer
    profile entry too)

    Plus the usual collection of typo fixes, etc"

    * tag 'docs-5.6' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (40 commits)
    docs: filesystems: add overlayfs to index.rst
    docs: usb: remove some broken references
    scripts/find-unused-docs: Fix massive false positives
    docs: nvdimm: use ReST notation for subsection
    zram: correct documentation about sysfs node of huge page writeback
    Documentation: zram: various fixes in zram.rst
    Add a maintainer entry profile for documentation
    Add a document on how to contribute to the documentation
    docs: Keep up with the location of NoUri
    Documentation: Call out example SYM_FUNC_* usage as x86-specific
    Documentation: nfs: fault_injection: convert to ReST
    Documentation: nfs: pnfs-scsi-server: convert to ReST
    Documentation: nfs: convert pnfs-block-server to ReST
    Documentation: nfs: idmapper: convert to ReST
    Documentation: convert nfsd-admin-interfaces to ReST
    Documentation: nfs-rdma: convert to ReST
    Documentation: nfsroot.rst: COSMETIC: refill a paragraph
    Documentation: nfsroot.txt: convert to ReST
    Documentation: convert nfs.txt to ReST
    Documentation: filesystems: convert vfat.txt to RST
    ...

    Linus Torvalds
     

14 Jan, 2020

1 commit


31 Dec, 2019

1 commit

  • Embargoed hardware issues is a necessary process guide, but leak of
    Chinese version, since there is more Chinese hardware vendors in market.
    We'd better have a Chinese version of this guide.

    This patch translate the guide, add it into toctree. and also add a link
    stub for the original doc.

    Signed-off-by: Alex Shi
    Cc: Fengguang Wu
    Cc: lizefan@huawei.com
    Cc: Jonathan Corbet
    Cc: Harry Wei
    Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman
    Cc: Sasha Levin
    Cc: Dave Hansen
    Cc: Thomas Gleixner
    Cc: Ben Hutchings
    Cc: Tom Lendacky
    Cc: Tony Luck
    Cc: Kees Cook
    Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
    Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1576811085-30544-1-git-send-email-alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com
    Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

    Alex Shi
     

20 Dec, 2019

1 commit

  • Fill in "..." stubs with proper links to the mailing lists's encryption
    keys and service description URLs. Similarly, fix wording to specify
    that multiple members of Linux Foundation's IT team have access to
    internal kernel.org infrastructure, and that all of them have similar
    confidentiality obligations as the IT team director.

    Signed-off-by: Konstantin Ryabitsev
    Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209192611.GA1688548@chatter.i7.local
    Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet

    Konstantin Ryabitsev
     

12 Nov, 2019

1 commit


29 Sep, 2019

1 commit

  • The role of the contact list provided by the disclosing party and how it
    affects the disclosure process and the ability to include experts into
    the development process is not really well explained.

    Neither is it entirely clear when the disclosing party will be informed
    about the fact that a developer who is not covered by an employer NDA needs
    to be brought in and disclosed.

    Explain the role of the contact list and the information policy along with
    an eventual conflict resolution better.

    Reported-by: Dave Hansen
    Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Acked-by: Dave Hansen
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1909251028390.10825@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
    Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

    Thomas Gleixner
     

11 Sep, 2019

1 commit

  • Cc: Jonathan Corbet
    Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman
    Cc: Sasha Levin
    Cc: Ben Hutchings
    Cc: Thomas Gleixner
    Cc: Laura Abbott
    Cc: Andrew Cooper
    Cc: Trilok Soni
    Cc: Kees Cook
    Cc: Tony Luck
    Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
    Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
    Cc: Dan Williams
    Signed-off-by: Tony Luck
    Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190910172646.25BFCE7B@viggo.jf.intel.com
    Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

    Tony Luck
     

08 Sep, 2019

1 commit


06 Sep, 2019

1 commit


05 Sep, 2019

2 commits


29 Aug, 2019

1 commit

  • To address the requirements of embargoed hardware issues, like Meltdown,
    Spectre, L1TF etc. it is necessary to define and document a process for
    handling embargoed hardware security issues.

    Following the discussion at the maintainer summit 2018 in Edinburgh
    (https://lwn.net/Articles/769417/) the volunteered people have worked
    out a process and a Memorandum of Understanding. The latter addresses
    the fact that the Linux kernel community cannot sign NDAs for various
    reasons.

    The initial contact point for hardware security issues is different from
    the regular kernel security contact to provide a known and neutral
    interface for hardware vendors and researchers. The initial primary
    contact team is proposed to be staffed by Linux Foundation Fellows, who
    are not associated to a vendor or a distribution and are well connected
    in the industry as a whole.

    The process is designed with the experience of the past incidents in
    mind and tries to address the remaining gaps, so future (hopefully rare)
    incidents can be handled more efficiently. It won't remove the fact,
    that most of this has to be done behind closed doors, but it is set up
    to avoid big bureaucratic hurdles for individual developers.

    The process is solely for handling hardware security issues and cannot
    be used for regular kernel (software only) security bugs.

    This memo can help with hardware companies who, and I quote, "[my
    manager] doesn't want to bet his job on the list keeping things secret."
    This despite numerous leaks directly from that company over the years,
    and none ever so far from the kernel security team. Cognitive
    dissidence seems to be a requirement to be a good manager.

    To accelerate the adoption of this process, we introduce the concept of
    ambassadors in participating companies. The ambassadors are there to
    guide people to comply with the process, but are not automatically
    involved in the disclosure of a particular incident.

    Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
    Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
    Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf
    Acked-by: Laura Abbott
    Acked-by: Ben Hutchings
    Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks
    Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
    Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190815212505.GC12041@kroah.com
    Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

    Thomas Gleixner