Eric Lee / smarc-fsl-linux-kernel

04 Jan, 2012

2 commits

01 Nov, 2011

1 commit

  • b9075fa96   treewide: use __printf not __attribute__((format(printf,...))) ... Browse Code »

    Standardize the style for compiler based printf format verification.
    Standardized the location of __printf too.

    Done via script and a little typing.

    $ grep -rPl --include=*.[ch] -w "__attribute__" * | \
    grep -vP "^(tools|scripts|include/linux/compiler-gcc.h)" | \
    xargs perl -n -i -e 'local $/; while (<>) { s/\b__attribute__\s*\(\s*\(\s*format\s*\(\s*printf\s*,\s*(.+)\s*,\s*(.+)\s*\)\s*\)\s*\)/__printf($1, $2)/g ; print; }'

    [akpm@linux-foundation.org: revert arch bits]
    Signed-off-by: Joe Perches
    Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov"
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Joe Perches
     

30 Jun, 2011

1 commit

  • 131ad62d8   netfilter: add SELinux context support to AUDIT target ... Browse Code »

    In this revision the conversion of secid to SELinux context and adding it
    to the audit log is moved from xt_AUDIT.c to audit.c with the aid of a
    separate helper function - audit_log_secctx - which does both the conversion
    and logging of SELinux context, thus also preventing internal secid number
    being leaked to userspace. If conversion is not successful an error is raised.

    With the introduction of this helper function the work done in xt_AUDIT.c is
    much more simplified. It also opens the possibility of this helper function
    being used by other modules (including auditd itself), if desired. With this
    addition, typical (raw auditd) output after applying the patch would be:

    type=NETFILTER_PKT msg=audit(1305852240.082:31012): action=0 hook=1 len=52 inif=? outif=eth0 saddr=10.1.1.7 daddr=10.1.2.1 ipid=16312 proto=6 sport=56150 dport=22 obj=system_u:object_r:ssh_client_packet_t:s0
    type=NETFILTER_PKT msg=audit(1306772064.079:56): action=0 hook=3 len=48 inif=eth0 outif=? smac=00:05:5d:7c:27:0b dmac=00:02:b3:0a:7f:81 macproto=0x0800 saddr=10.1.2.1 daddr=10.1.1.7 ipid=462 proto=6 sport=22 dport=3561 obj=system_u:object_r:ssh_server_packet_t:s0

    Acked-by: Eric Paris
    Signed-off-by: Mr Dash Four
    Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy

    Mr Dash Four
     

20 Jan, 2011

1 commit

17 Jan, 2011

2 commits

  • fbabf31e4   netfilter: create audit records for x_tables replaces ... Browse Code »

    The setsockopt() syscall to replace tables is already recorded
    in the audit logs. This patch stores additional information
    such as table name and netfilter protocol.

    Cc: Patrick McHardy
    Cc: Eric Paris
    Cc: Al Viro
    Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf
    Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy

    Thomas Graf
     
  • 43f393cae   netfilter: audit target to record accepted/dropped packets ... Browse Code »

    This patch adds a new netfilter target which creates audit records
    for packets traversing a certain chain.

    It can be used to record packets which are rejected administraively
    as follows:

    -N AUDIT_DROP
    -A AUDIT_DROP -j AUDIT --type DROP
    -A AUDIT_DROP -j DROP

    a rule which would typically drop or reject a packet would then
    invoke the new chain to record packets before dropping them.

    -j AUDIT_DROP

    The module is protocol independant and works for iptables, ip6tables
    and ebtables.

    The following information is logged:
    - netfilter hook
    - packet length
    - incomming/outgoing interface
    - MAC src/dst/proto for ethernet packets
    - src/dst/protocol address for IPv4/IPv6
    - src/dst port for TCP/UDP/UDPLITE
    - icmp type/code

    Cc: Patrick McHardy
    Cc: Eric Paris
    Cc: Al Viro
    Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf
    Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy

    Thomas Graf
     

11 Jan, 2011

1 commit

30 Oct, 2010

1 commit

  • 120a795da   audit mmap ... Browse Code »

    Normal syscall audit doesn't catch 5th argument of syscall. It also
    doesn't catch the contents of userland structures pointed to be
    syscall argument, so for both old and new mmap(2) ABI it doesn't
    record the descriptor we are mapping. For old one it also misses
    flags.

    Signed-off-by: Al Viro

    Al Viro
     

08 Aug, 2010

1 commit

09 Feb, 2010

1 commit

24 Jun, 2009

1 commit

  • 9d9609851   Audit: clean up all op= output to include string quoting ... Browse Code »

    A number of places in the audit system we send an op= followed by a string
    that includes spaces. Somehow this works but it's just wrong. This patch
    moves all of those that I could find to be quoted.

    Example:

    Change From: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1244666690.117:31): auid=0 ses=1
    subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:auditctl_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=remove rule
    key="number2" list=4 res=0

    Change To: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1244666690.117:31): auid=0 ses=1
    subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:auditctl_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op="remove rule"
    key="number2" list=4 res=0

    Signed-off-by: Eric Paris

    Eric Paris
     

12 Feb, 2009

1 commit

  • 523979adf   integrity: audit update ... Browse Code »

    Based on discussions on linux-audit, as per Steve Grubb's request
    http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/2/6/269, the following changes were made:
    - forced audit result to be either 0 or 1.
    - made template names const
    - Added new stand-alone message type: AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE

    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
    Acked-by: Steve Grubb
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Mimi Zohar
     

06 Feb, 2009

2 commits

  • cb5629b10   Merge branch 'master' into next ... Browse Code »

    Conflicts:
    fs/namei.c

    Manually merged per:

    diff --cc fs/namei.c
    index 734f2b5,bbc15c2..0000000
    --- a/fs/namei.c
    +++ b/fs/namei.c
    @@@ -860,9 -848,8 +849,10 @@@ static int __link_path_walk(const char
    nd->flags |= LOOKUP_CONTINUE;
    err = exec_permission_lite(inode);
    if (err == -EAGAIN)
    - err = vfs_permission(nd, MAY_EXEC);
    + err = inode_permission(nd->path.dentry->d_inode,
    + MAY_EXEC);
    + if (!err)
    + err = ima_path_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC);
    if (err)
    break;

    @@@ -1525,14 -1506,9 +1509,14 @@@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc
    flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
    }

    - error = vfs_permission(nd, acc_mode);
    + error = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode);
    if (error)
    return error;
    +
    - error = ima_path_check(&nd->path,
    ++ error = ima_path_check(path,
    + acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
    + if (error)
    + return error;
    /*
    * An append-only file must be opened in append mode for writing.
    */

    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    James Morris
     
  • 3323eec92   integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider ... Browse Code »

    IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for
    file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires,
    IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the
    integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap
    hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the
    TPM, measurements can not be removed.

    In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which
    can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM. The
    TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to
    itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that
    cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software.

    - alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template()
    - log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure
    - removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN
    - replaced hard coded string length with #define name

    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Mimi Zohar
     

05 Jan, 2009

12 commits

25 Dec, 2008

1 commit

09 Dec, 2008

2 commits

14 Nov, 2008

2 commits

  • a6f76f23d   CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials ... Browse Code »

    Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
    up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
    of no return.

    This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
    testsuite.

    This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

    (1) execve().

    The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
    replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that
    all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
    of no return with no possibility of failure.

    I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:

    cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)

    but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
    (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
    be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).

    The following sequence of events now happens:

    (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
    locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
    creds that we make.

    (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
    task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to
    bprm->cred.

    This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
    unnecessary, and so they've been removed.

    (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
    after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in
    bprm->unsafe for future reference.

    (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.

    (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
    attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded,
    but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
    fail.

    (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should
    calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.

    This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
    security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
    Anything that might fail must be done at this point.

    (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.

    bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
    calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux
    in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
    not on the interpreter.

    (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This
    performs the following steps with regard to credentials:

    (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
    may not be covered by commit_creds().

    (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
    (c.i).

    (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
    new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to
    credentials:

    (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
    requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
    must be done before the credentials are changed.

    This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
    security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
    This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
    must have been done in (c.ii).

    (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
    assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
    should be part of struct creds.

    (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
    PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.

    (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
    are now immutable.

    (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
    alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
    SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.

    (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
    to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
    cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been
    made.

    (2) LSM interface.

    A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

    (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
    (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()

    Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.

    (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
    (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()

    Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
    security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().

    (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()

    Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().

    (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()

    New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
    as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
    second and subsequent calls.

    (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
    (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()

    New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This
    includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not
    fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
    to the process; when the latter is called, they have.

    The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.

    (3) SELinux.

    SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
    interface changes mentioned above:

    (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
    the credentials-under-construction approach.

    (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
    to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Acked-by: James Morris
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    David Howells
     
  • d84f4f992   CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials ... Browse Code »

    Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
    credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
    A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
    access or modify its own credentials.

    A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
    of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
    execve().

    With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
    changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
    and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

    struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
    int ret = blah(new);
    if (ret < 0) {
    abort_creds(new);
    return ret;
    }
    return commit_creds(new);

    There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
    credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
    COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
    the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

    To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
    the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
    discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
    credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
    modified, except under special circumstances:

    (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

    (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

    The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
    using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
    added by a later patch).

    This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
    testsuite.

    This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

    (1) execve().

    This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
    security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

    (2) Temporary credential overrides.

    do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
    temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
    preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
    on the thread being dumped.

    This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
    credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
    the task's objective credentials.

    (3) LSM interface.

    A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

    (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
    (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()

    Removed in favour of security_capset().

    (*) security_capset(), ->capset()

    New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
    creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
    creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
    new creds, are now const.

    (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()

    Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
    killed if it's an error.

    (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()

    Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

    (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()

    New. Free security data attached to cred->security.

    (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()

    New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.

    (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()

    New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
    security by commit_creds().

    (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()

    Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

    (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()

    Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
    cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
    setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
    than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

    (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()

    Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
    directly to init's credentials.

    NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
    longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

    (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
    (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()

    Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
    refer to the security context.

    (4) sys_capset().

    This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
    calls have been merged.

    (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

    This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
    commit_thread() to point that way.

    (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

    __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
    beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
    user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
    successful.

    switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
    folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
    __sigqueue_alloc().

    (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

    The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
    abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
    it.

    security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
    guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

    The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

    Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
    commit_creds().

    The get functions all simply access the data directly.

    (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

    security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
    want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
    rather than through an argument.

    Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
    if it doesn't end up using it.

    (9) Keyrings.

    A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

    (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
    all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
    They may want separating out again later.

    (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
    rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

    (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
    thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
    keyring.

    (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
    the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

    (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
    credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
    process or session keyrings (they're shared).

    (10) Usermode helper.

    The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
    subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
    of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
    after it has been cloned.

    call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
    call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
    special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
    specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

    call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
    supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

    (11) SELinux.

    SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
    interface changes mentioned above:

    (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
    current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
    that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
    the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
    until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
    lock.

    (12) is_single_threaded().

    This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
    a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
    wants to use it too.

    The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
    with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
    to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

    (13) nfsd.

    The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
    credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
    down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
    in this series have been applied.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Acked-by: James Morris
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    David Howells
     

11 Nov, 2008

2 commits

  • e68b75a02   When the capset syscall is used it is not possible for audit to record the ... Browse Code »

    actual capbilities being added/removed. This patch adds a new record type
    which emits the target pid and the eff, inh, and perm cap sets.

    example output if you audit capset syscalls would be:

    type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): arch=c000003e syscall=126 success=yes exit=0 a0=17f2014 a1=17f201c a2=80000000 a3=7fff2ab7f060 items=0 ppid=2160 pid=2223 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="setcap" exe="/usr/sbin/setcap" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
    type=UNKNOWN[1322] msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): pid=0 cap_pi=ffffffffffffffff cap_pp=ffffffffffffffff cap_pe=ffffffffffffffff

    Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Eric Paris
     
  • 3fc689e96   Any time fcaps or a setuid app under SECURE_NOROOT is used to result in a ... Browse Code »

    non-zero pE we will crate a new audit record which contains the entire set
    of known information about the executable in question, fP, fI, fE, fversion
    and includes the process's pE, pI, pP. Before and after the bprm capability
    are applied. This record type will only be emitted from execve syscalls.

    an example of making ping use fcaps instead of setuid:

    setcap "cat_net_raw+pe" /bin/ping

    type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=1457f30 a1=14606b0 a2=1463940 a3=321b770a70 items=2 ppid=2929 pid=2963 auid=0 uid=500 gid=500 euid=500 suid=500 fsuid=500 egid=500 sgid=500 fsgid=500 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
    type=UNKNOWN[1321] msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): fver=2 fp=0000000000002000 fi=0000000000000000 fe=1 old_pp=0000000000000000 old_pi=0000000000000000 old_pe=0000000000000000 new_pp=0000000000002000 new_pi=0000000000000000 new_pe=0000000000002000
    type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="127.0.0.1"
    type=CWD msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): cwd="/home/test"
    type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2
    type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0

    Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Eric Paris
     

25 Jul, 2008

1 commit

  • f606ddf42   remove the v850 port ... Browse Code »

    Trying to compile the v850 port brings many compile errors, one of them exists
    since at least kernel 2.6.19.

    There also seems to be noone willing to bring this port back into a usable
    state.

    This patch therefore removes the v850 port.

    If anyone ever decides to revive the v850 port the code will still be
    available from older kernels, and it wouldn't be impossible for the port to
    reenter the kernel if it would become actively maintained again.

    Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk
    Acked-by: Greg Ungerer
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Adrian Bunk
     

25 Jun, 2008

1 commit

28 Apr, 2008

4 commits

  • 8b67dca94   [PATCH] new predicate - AUDIT_FILETYPE ... Browse Code »

    Argument is S_IF... | , where index is normally 0 or 1.
    Triggers if chosen element of ctx->names[] is present and the
    mode of object in question matches the upper bits of argument.
    I.e. for things like "is the argument of that chmod a directory",
    etc.

    Signed-off-by: Al Viro

    Al Viro
     
  • a42da93c8   Audit: increase the maximum length of the key field ... Browse Code »

    Key lengths were arbitrarily limited to 32 characters. If userspace is going
    to start using the single kernel key field as multiple virtual key fields
    (example key=key1,key2,key3,key4) we should give them enough room to work.

    Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
    Signed-off-by: Al Viro

    Eric Paris
     
  • b556f8ad5   Audit: standardize string audit interfaces ... Browse Code »

    This patch standardized the string auditing interfaces. No userspace
    changes will be visible and this is all just cleanup and consistancy
    work. We have the following string audit interfaces to use:

    void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);

    void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf, size_t n);
    void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf);

    void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string, size_t n);
    void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string);

    This may be the first step to possibly fixing some of the issues that
    people have with the string output from the kernel audit system. But we
    still don't have an agreed upon solution to that problem.

    Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
    Signed-off-by: Al Viro

    Eric Paris
     
  • 2532386f4   Audit: collect sessionid in netlink messages ... Browse Code »

    Previously I added sessionid output to all audit messages where it was
    available but we still didn't know the sessionid of the sender of
    netlink messages. This patch adds that information to netlink messages
    so we can audit who sent netlink messages.

    Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
    Signed-off-by: Al Viro

    Eric Paris