23 Oct, 2020
1 commit
-
…cm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt") into android-mainline
Steps on the way to 5.10-rc1
Change-Id: Ifceecc1b9f94ea893484002c69aeb7b82d246f64
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
22 Sep, 2020
1 commit
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fscrypt_get_encryption_info() has never actually been safe to call in a
context that needs GFP_NOFS, since it calls crypto_alloc_skcipher().crypto_alloc_skcipher() isn't GFP_NOFS-safe, even if called under
memalloc_nofs_save(). This is because it may load kernel modules, and
also because it internally takes crypto_alg_sem. Other tasks can do
GFP_KERNEL allocations while holding crypto_alg_sem for write.The use of fscrypt_init_mutex isn't GFP_NOFS-safe either.
So, stop pretending that fscrypt_get_encryption_info() is nofs-safe.
I.e., when it allocates memory, just use GFP_KERNEL instead of GFP_NOFS.Note, another reason to do this is that GFP_NOFS is deprecated in favor
of using memalloc_nofs_save() in the proper places.Acked-by: Jeff Layton
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917041136.178600-10-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
08 Aug, 2020
2 commits
-
…kernel/git/sre/linux-power-supply") into android-mainline
Merges along the way to 5.9-rc1
resolves conflicts in:
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-power
drivers/power/supply/power_supply_sysfs.c
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.cSigned-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: Ia087834f54fb4e5269d68c3c404747ceed240701 -
As said by Linus:
A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
Otherwise it's actively misleading.In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
caller wants.In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]Suggested-by: Joe Perches
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Acked-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Michal Hocko
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: James Morris
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn"
Cc: Joe Perches
Cc: Matthew Wilcox
Cc: David Rientjes
Cc: Dan Carpenter
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld"
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
05 Aug, 2020
1 commit
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…pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jlayton/linux") into android-mainline
Resolve merge conflicts in fs/crypto/ caused by the non-upstream changes
for metadata encryption support [1] and wrapped key support [2].[1] https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common-patches/+/refs/heads/master/android-mainline/ANDROID-dm-add-dm-default-key-target-for-metadata-encryption.patch
[2] https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common-patches/+/refs/heads/master/android-mainline/ANDROID-fscrypt-add-support-for-hardware-wrapped-keys.patchConflicts:
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c
fs/crypto/keysetup.c
fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c
fs/f2fs/data.c
include/linux/fscrypt.hBug: 160885805
Bug: 160883801
Test: kvm-xfstests -c ext4,f2fs -g encrypt
Change-Id: Icdc9e61b2286c78ba04cec1c9dca421bff545716
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
21 Jul, 2020
1 commit
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The name "FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE" is a bit outdated since due to
the addition of FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY, the file nonce may now
be used as a tweak instead of for key derivation. Also, we're now
prefixing the fscrypt constants with "FSCRYPT_" instead of "FS_".Therefore, rename this constant to FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200708215722.147154-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
09 Jul, 2020
1 commit
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Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline
encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part
of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via
Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of
the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs.To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with
'-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional
filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents
of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key
and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same;
therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification
tests.Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and
also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt,
this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline
encryption hardware.Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when
submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This
patch just adds the common code.Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala
Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com
Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
18 Jun, 2020
1 commit
-
The block layer patches for inline encryption are now in upstream, so
update Android to the upstream version of inline encryption. The
fscrypt/f2fs/ext4 patches are also updated to the latest version sent
upstream (since they can't be updated separately from the block layer
patches).Changes v6 => v7:
- Keyslot management is now done on a per-request basis rather than a
per-bio basis.
- Storage drivers can now specify the maximum number of bytes they
can accept for the data unit number (DUN) for each crypto algorithm,
and upper layers can specify the minimum number of bytes of DUN they
want with the blk_crypto_key they send with the bio - a driver is
only considered to support a blk_crypto_key if the driver supports at
least as many DUN bytes as the upper layer wants. This is necessary
because storage drivers may not support as many bytes as the
algorithm specification dictates (for e.g. UFS only supports 8 byte
DUNs for AES-256-XTS, even though the algorithm specification
says DUNs are 16 bytes long).
- Introduce SB_INLINECRYPT to keep track of whether inline encryption
is enabled for a filesystem (instead of using an fscrypt_operation).
- Expose keyslot manager declaration and embed it within ufs_hba to
clean up code.
- Make blk-crypto preclude blk-integrity.
- Some bug fixes
- Introduce UFSHCD_QUIRK_BROKEN_CRYPTO for UFS drivers that don't
support inline encryption (yet)Changes v7 => v8:
- Pass a struct blk_ksm_keyslot * around instead of slot numbers which
simplifies some functions and passes around arguments with better types
- Make bios with no encryption context avoid making calls into blk-crypto
by checking for the presence of bi_crypt_context before making the call
- Make blk-integrity preclude inline encryption support at probe time
- Many many cleanupsChanges v8 => v9:
- Don't open code bio_has_crypt_ctx into callers of blk-crypto functions.
- Lots of cleanupsChanges v9 => v10:
- Incorporate Eric's fix for allowing en/decryption to happen as usual via
fscrypt in the case that hardware doesn't support the desired crypto
configuration, but blk-crypto-fallback is disabled. (Introduce
struct blk_crypto_config and blk_crypto_config_supported for fscrypt
to call, to check that either blk-crypto-fallback is enabled or the
device supports the crypto configuration).
- Update docs
- Lots of cleanupsChanges v10 => v11:
- We now allocate a new bio_crypt_ctx for each request instead of
pulling and reusing the one in the bio inserted into the request. The
bio_crypt_ctx of a bio is freed after the bio is ended.
- Make each blk_ksm_keyslot store a pointer to the blk_crypto_key
instead of a copy of the blk_crypto_key, so that each blk_crypto_key
will have its own keyslot. We also won't need to compute the siphash
for a blk_crypto_key anymore.
- Minor cleanupsChanges v11 => v12:
- Inlined some fscrypt functions
- Minor cleanups and improved commentsChanges v12 => v13:
- Updated docs
- Minor cleanups
- rebased onto linux-block/for-nextChanges v13 => fscrypt/f2fs/ext4 upstream patch series
- rename struct fscrypt_info::ci_key to ci_enc_key
- set dun bytes more precisely in fscrypt
- cleanupsBug: 137270441
Test: Test cuttlefish boots both with and without inlinecrypt mount
option specified in fstab, while using both F2FS and EXT4 for
userdata.img. Also verified ciphertext via
"atest -v vts_kernel_encryption_test"
Also tested by running gce-xfstests on both the
auto and encrypt test groups on EXT4 and F2FS both with and
without the inlinecrypt mount option. The UFS changes were
tested on a Pixel 4 device.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20200514003727.69001-1-satyat@google.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fscrypt/20200617075732.213198-1-satyat@google.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-scsi/20200617081841.218985-1-satyat@google.com/
Change-Id: I57c10d370bf006c9dfcf173f21a720413017761e
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
13 Feb, 2020
1 commit
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blk-crypto-fallback does not support wrapped keys, hence
prevent falling back when program_key fails. Add 'is_hw_wrapped'
flag to blk-crypto-key to mention if the key is wrapped
when the key is initialized.Bug: 147209885
Test: Validate FBE, simulate a failure in the underlying blk
device and ensure the call fails without falling back
to blk-crypto-fallback.Change-Id: I8bc301ca1ac9e55ba6ab622e8325486916b45c56
Signed-off-by: Barani Muthukumaran
31 Jan, 2020
1 commit
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…cm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt") into android-mainline
Merge the upstream merge of fscrypt-for-linus, to resolve conflicts
between the fscrypt changes that went upstream in 5.6 and the inline
crypto and hardware-wrapped key support that is currently being carried
in the Android common kernels.Conflicts:
fs/crypto/Kconfig
fs/crypto/bio.c
fs/crypto/fname.c
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
fs/crypto/keyring.c
fs/crypto/keysetup.c
include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.hMerge resolution notes:
- In fscrypt_zeroout_range(), split the inline crypto case into a
separate function fscrypt_zeroout_range_inlinecrypt(), as mixing the
two cases together became much harder due to the upstream changes.- Allow the size of fscrypt-provisioning keys to be up to
FSCRYPT_MAX_HW_WRAPPED_KEY_SIZE rather than FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE.Change-Id: Ib1e6b9eda8fb5dcfc6bdc8fa89d93f72b088c5f6
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
23 Jan, 2020
1 commit
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Now that there's sometimes a second type of per-file key (the dirhash
key), clarify some function names, macros, and documentation that
specifically deal with per-file *encryption* keys.Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rosenberg
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
21 Jan, 2020
1 commit
-
To prevent keys from being compromised if an attacker acquires read
access to kernel memory, some inline encryption hardware supports
protecting the keys in hardware without software having access to or the
ability to set the plaintext keys. Instead, software only sees "wrapped
keys", which may differ on every boot. The keys can be initially
generated either by software (in which case they need to be imported to
hardware to be wrapped), or directly by the hardware.Add support for this type of hardware by allowing keys to be flagged as
hardware-wrapped and encryption policies to be flagged as needing a
hardware-wrapped key. When used, fscrypt will pass the wrapped key
directly to the inline encryption hardware to encrypt file contents.
The hardware is responsible for internally unwrapping the key and
deriving the actual file contents encryption key.fscrypt also asks the inline encryption hardware to derive a
cryptographically isolated software "secret", which fscrypt then uses as
the master key for all other purposes besides file contents encryption,
e.g. to derive filenames encryption keys and the key identifier.Bug: 147209885
Change-Id: I58d1a37f5ba8cf178b80036b813e0bc99512ef3b
Co-developed-by: Gaurav Kashyap
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Kashyap
Signed-off-by: Barani Muthukumaran
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
13 Jan, 2020
1 commit
-
Changes v5 => v6:
- Blk-crypto's kernel crypto API fallback is no longer restricted to
8-byte DUNs. It's also now separately configurable from blk-crypto, and
can be disabled entirely, while still allowing the kernel to use inline
encryption hardware. Further, struct bio_crypt_ctx takes up less space,
and no longer contains the information needed by the crypto API
fallback - the fallback allocates the required memory when necessary.
- Blk-crypto now supports all file content encryption modes supported by
fscrypt.
- Fixed bio merging logic in blk-merge.c
- Fscrypt now supports inline encryption with the direct key policy, since
blk-crypto now has support for larger DUNs.
- Keyslot manager now uses a hashtable to lookup which keyslot contains
any particular key (thanks Eric!)
- Fscrypt support for inline encryption now handles filesystems with
multiple underlying block devices (thanks Eric!)
- Numerous cleanupsBug: 137270441
Test: refer to I26376479ee38259b8c35732cb3a1d7e15f9b05a3
Change-Id: I13e2e327e0b4784b394cb1e7cf32a04856d95f01
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20191218145136.172774-1-satyat@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala
01 Jan, 2020
1 commit
-
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY is currently only allowed with Adiantum
encryption. But FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY allowed it in combination
with other encryption modes, and an error wasn't reported until later
when the encrypted directory was actually used.Fix it to report the error earlier by validating the correct use of the
DIRECT_KEY flag in fscrypt_supported_policy(), similar to how we
validate the IV_INO_LBLK_64 flag.Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209211829.239800-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
31 Oct, 2019
1 commit
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Instead of open-coding the calculations for ESSIV handling, use an ESSIV
skcipher which does all of this under the hood. ESSIV was added to the
crypto API in v5.4.This is based on a patch from Ard Biesheuvel, but reworked to apply
after all the fscrypt changes that went into v5.4.Tested with 'kvm-xfstests -c ext4,f2fs -g encrypt', including the
ciphertext verification tests for v1 and v2 encryption policies.Change-Id: I1b09160c0135a2d8b16db7b4139d22b903ec6a8e
Originally-from: Ard Biesheuvel
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala
Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11182383/
22 Oct, 2019
1 commit
-
Instead of open-coding the calculations for ESSIV handling, use an ESSIV
skcipher which does all of this under the hood. ESSIV was added to the
crypto API in v5.4.This is based on a patch from Ard Biesheuvel, but reworked to apply
after all the fscrypt changes that went into v5.4.Tested with 'kvm-xfstests -c ext4,f2fs -g encrypt', including the
ciphertext verification tests for v1 and v2 encryption policies.Originally-from: Ard Biesheuvel
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
13 Aug, 2019
2 commits
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Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes
from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*):- Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as
input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and
it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF.
Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined:- Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF.
- Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY
flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly.
These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when
support for it is added.- Key identifiers (see below).
- Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier,
which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents
users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or
directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which
identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor.- The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a
process-subscribed keyring.The following UAPI additions are made:
- The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a
fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated
from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix.- A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows
getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or
directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not
be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which
policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so
it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions.- The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2
encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys
for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather
than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when
adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway.This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the
same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys:
capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take
advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow
non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full
replacement for v1 policies.(*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk
fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense
to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the
numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk.Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers -
In preparation for introducing v2 encryption policies which will find
and derive encryption keys differently from the current v1 encryption
policies, move the v1 policy-specific key setup code from keyinfo.c into
keysetup_v1.c.Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers