10 Sep, 2011
5 commits
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Fix several sparse warnings in the SELinux security server code.
Signed-off-by: James Morris
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Fix sparse warnings in SELinux Netlink code.
Signed-off-by: James Morris
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Fixes several sparse warnings for selinuxfs.c
Signed-off-by: James Morris
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Sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h
Signed-off-by: James Morris
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Sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
Signed-off-by: James Morris
02 Aug, 2011
1 commit
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My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is
necessary. My new email address is employer independent so we don't have
to worry about doing this again any time soon.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
24 May, 2011
1 commit
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Conflicts:
lib/flex_array.c
security/selinux/avc.c
security/selinux/hooks.c
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
security/smack/smack_lsm.cManually resolve conflicts.
Signed-off-by: James Morris
20 May, 2011
1 commit
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There is no point in counting hits - we can calculate it from the number
of lookups and misses.This makes the avc statistics a bit smaller, and makes the code
generation better too.Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
26 Apr, 2011
2 commits
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Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the
dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more
RCU friendly. The SELinux AVC and security server access decision
code is RCU safe. A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not
be RCU safe.This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU
safe chunk of code. It will normally just work under RCU. This is
done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the
avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue.Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Now that the security modules can decide whether they support the
dcache RCU walk or not it's possible to make selinux a bit more
RCU friendly. The SELinux AVC and security server access decision
code is RCU safe. A specific piece of the LSM audit code may not
be RCU safe.This patch makes the VFS RCU walk retry if it would hit the non RCU
safe chunk of code. It will normally just work under RCU. This is
done simply by passing the VFS RCU state as a flag down into the
avc_audit() code and returning ECHILD there if it would have an issue.Based-on-patch-by: Andi Kleen
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
25 Apr, 2011
1 commit
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The len should be an size_t but is a ssize_t. Easy enough fix to silence
build warnings. We have no need for signed-ness.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Reviewed-by: James Morris
02 Apr, 2011
1 commit
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The attached patch allows /selinux/create takes optional 4th argument
to support TYPE_TRANSITION with name extension for userspace object
managers.
If 4th argument is not supplied, it shall perform as existing kernel.
In fact, the regression test of SE-PostgreSQL works well on the patched
kernel.Thanks,
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei
[manually verify fuzz was not an issue, and it wasn't: eparis]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
29 Mar, 2011
1 commit
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If kernel policy version is >= 26, then the binary representation of
the role_trans structure supports specifying the class for the current
subject or the newly created object.If kernel policy version is < 26, then the class field would be default
to the process class.Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
17 Mar, 2011
1 commit
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* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1480 commits)
bonding: enable netpoll without checking link status
xfrm: Refcount destination entry on xfrm_lookup
net: introduce rx_handler results and logic around that
bonding: get rid of IFF_SLAVE_INACTIVE netdev->priv_flag
bonding: wrap slave state work
net: get rid of multiple bond-related netdevice->priv_flags
bonding: register slave pointer for rx_handler
be2net: Bump up the version number
be2net: Copyright notice change. Update to Emulex instead of ServerEngines
e1000e: fix kconfig for crc32 dependency
netfilter ebtables: fix xt_AUDIT to work with ebtables
xen network backend driver
bonding: Improve syslog message at device creation time
bonding: Call netif_carrier_off after register_netdevice
bonding: Incorrect TX queue offset
net_sched: fix ip_tos2prio
xfrm: fix __xfrm_route_forward()
be2net: Fix UDP packet detected status in RX compl
Phonet: fix aligned-mode pipe socket buffer header reserve
netxen: support for GbE port settings
...Fix up conflicts in drivers/staging/brcm80211/brcmsmac/wl_mac80211.c
with the staging updates.
08 Mar, 2011
1 commit
04 Mar, 2011
1 commit
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The security_is_socket_class() is auto-generated by genheaders based
on classmap.h to reduce maintenance effort when a new class is defined
in SELinux kernel. The name for any socket class should be suffixed by
"socket" and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
26 Feb, 2011
1 commit
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These permissions are not used and can be dropped in the kernel
definitions.Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
23 Feb, 2011
1 commit
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Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
02 Feb, 2011
1 commit
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Currently SELinux has rules which label new objects according to 3 criteria.
The label of the process creating the object, the label of the parent
directory, and the type of object (reg, dir, char, block, etc.) This patch
adds a 4th criteria, the dentry name, thus we can distinguish between
creating a file in an etc_t directory called shadow and one called motd.There is no file globbing, regex parsing, or anything mystical. Either the
policy exactly (strcmp) matches the dentry name of the object or it doesn't.
This patch has no changes from today if policy does not implement the new
rules.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
11 Jan, 2011
2 commits
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…s/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (30 commits)
MAINTAINERS: Add tomoyo-dev-en ML.
SELinux: define permissions for DCB netlink messages
encrypted-keys: style and other cleanup
encrypted-keys: verify datablob size before converting to binary
trusted-keys: kzalloc and other cleanup
trusted-keys: additional TSS return code and other error handling
syslog: check cap_syslog when dmesg_restrict
Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories
selinux: cache sidtab_context_to_sid results
SELinux: do not compute transition labels on mountpoint labeled filesystems
This patch adds a new security attribute to Smack called SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is running.
SELinux: merge policydb_index_classes and policydb_index_others
selinux: convert part of the sym_val_to_name array to use flex_array
selinux: convert type_val_to_struct to flex_array
flex_array: fix flex_array_put_ptr macro to be valid C
SELinux: do not set automatic i_ino in selinuxfs
selinux: rework security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid
SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.c
SELinux: standardize return code handling in selinuxfs.c
SELinux: standardize return code handling in policydb.c
... -
Remove path.h from sched.h and other files.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
29 Nov, 2010
1 commit
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Privileged syslog operations currently require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Split
this off into a new CAP_SYSLOG privilege which we can sanely take away
from a container through the capability bounding set.With this patch, an lxc container can be prevented from messing with
the host's syslog (i.e. dmesg -c).Changelog: mar 12 2010: add selinux capability2:cap_syslog perm
Changelog: nov 22 2010:
. port to new kernel
. add a WARN_ONCE if userspace isn't using CAP_SYSLOGSigned-off-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-By: Kees Cook
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Michael Kerrisk
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: "Christopher J. PeBenito"
Cc: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
21 Oct, 2010
4 commits
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There is interest in being able to see what the actual policy is that was
loaded into the kernel. The patch creates a new selinuxfs file
/selinux/policy which can be read by userspace. The actual policy that is
loaded into the kernel will be written back out to userspace.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and
remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge
we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at
least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also
have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings)Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
This patch fixes up coding-style problem at this commit:
4f27a7d49789b04404eca26ccde5f527231d01d5
selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status)Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications
read-only mmap(2).
This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space.
struct selinux_kernel_status
{
u32 length; /* length of this structure */
u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */
u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */
u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */
u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */
};When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided
by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce
to keep consistency.
However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses
on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process.
In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of
making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call
to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache.
If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation
messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the
base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing
with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own
worker thread from the module.If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can
know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce.A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries
to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it
checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space.
Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing
mode, without any system call invocations.
This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need
to wait for a while if it is odd number.Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei
Acked-by: Eric Paris
--
security/selinux/include/security.h | 21 ++++++
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 56 +++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/Makefile | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +
security/selinux/ss/status.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris
02 Aug, 2010
3 commits
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execmod "could" show up on non regular files and non chr files. The current
implementation would actually make these checks against non-existant bits
since the code assumes the execmod permission is same for all file types.
To make this line up for chr files we had to define execute_no_trans and
entrypoint permissions. These permissions are unreachable and only existed
to to make FILE__EXECMOD and CHR_FILE__EXECMOD the same. This patch drops
those needless perms as well.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
kernel can dynamically remap perms. Drop the open lookup table and put open
in the common file perms.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Currently there are a number of applications (nautilus being the main one) which
calls access() on files in order to determine how they should be displayed. It
is normal and expected that nautilus will want to see if files are executable
or if they are really read/write-able. access() should return the real
permission. SELinux policy checks are done in access() and can result in lots
of AVC denials as policy denies RWX on files which DAC allows. Currently
SELinux must dontaudit actual attempts to read/write/execute a file in
order to silence these messages (and not flood the logs.) But dontaudit rules
like that can hide real attacks. This patch addes a new common file
permission audit_access. This permission is special in that it is meaningless
and should never show up in an allow rule. Instead the only place this
permission has meaning is in a dontaudit rule like so:dontaudit nautilus_t sbin_t:file audit_access
With such a rule if nautilus just checks access() we will still get denied and
thus userspace will still get the correct answer but we will not log the denial.
If nautilus attempted to actually perform one of the forbidden actions
(rather than just querying access(2) about it) we would still log a denial.
This type of dontaudit rule should be used sparingly, as it could be a
method for an attacker to probe the system permissions without detection.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
22 May, 2010
1 commit
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... kill their private list, while we are at it
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
08 Apr, 2010
1 commit
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trying to grep everything that messes with a sk_security_struct isn't easy
since we don't always call it sksec. Just rename everything sksec.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
09 Mar, 2010
1 commit
08 Mar, 2010
1 commit
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Several places strings tables are used that should be declared
const.Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger
Signed-off-by: James Morris
04 Feb, 2010
1 commit
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Allow runtime switching between different policy types (e.g. from a MLS/MCS
policy to a non-MLS/non-MCS policy or viceversa).Signed-off-by: Guido Trentalancia
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
18 Jan, 2010
1 commit
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If allow_unknown==deny, SELinux treats an undefined kernel security
class as an error condition rather than as a typical permission denial
and thus does not allow permissions on undefined classes even when in
permissive mode. Change the SELinux logic so that this case is handled
as a typical permission denial, subject to the usual permissive mode and
permissive domain handling.Also drop the 'requested' argument from security_compute_av() and
helpers as it is a legacy of the original security server interface and
is unused.Changes:
- Handle permissive domains consistently by moving up the test for a
permissive domain.
- Make security_compute_av_user() consistent with security_compute_av();
the only difference now is that security_compute_av() performs mapping
between the kernel-private class and permission indices and the policy
values. In the userspace case, this mapping is handled by libselinux.
- Moved avd_init inside the policy lock.Based in part on a patch by Paul Moore .
Reported-by: Andrew Worsley
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris
07 Oct, 2009
2 commits
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Add a simple utility (scripts/selinux/genheaders) and invoke it to
generate the kernel-private class and permission indices in flask.h
and av_permissions.h automatically during the kernel build from the
security class mapping definitions in classmap.h. Adding new kernel
classes and permissions can then be done just by adding them to classmap.h.Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values
upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery
logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private
class and permission indices used outside the security server and the
policy values used within the security server.The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations;
similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers
is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The
interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel
vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user
suffix.The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy
values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes;
thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h
definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from
refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going
forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and
classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer
tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to
automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the
classmap.h definitions.The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and
replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at
policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation
logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic.The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled
when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old
handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled
when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able
to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is
automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able
to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions
are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1.avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the
class and permission names from the kernel-private indices.The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the
class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the
kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any
userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel
classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match
the kernel-private indices).Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
01 Sep, 2009
1 commit
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Add support for the new TUN LSM hooks: security_tun_dev_create(),
security_tun_dev_post_create() and security_tun_dev_attach(). This includes
the addition of a new object class, tun_socket, which represents the socks
associated with TUN devices. The _tun_dev_create() and _tun_dev_post_create()
hooks are fairly similar to the standard socket functions but _tun_dev_attach()
is a bit special. The _tun_dev_attach() is unique because it involves a
domain attaching to an existing TUN device and its associated tun_socket
object, an operation which does not exist with standard sockets and most
closely resembles a relabel operation.Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
17 Aug, 2009
1 commit
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Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h,
for better maintainability.- changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of
avc_audit_data
- eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead.Had to add a LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to lsm_audit.h so that avc_audit
can call common_lsm_audit and do the pre and post callbacks without
doing the actual dump. This makes it so that the patched version
behaves the same way as the unpatched version.Also added a denied field to the selinux_audit_data private space,
once again to make it so that the patched version behaves like the
unpatched.I've tested and confirmed that AVCs look the same before and after
this patch.Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
14 Aug, 2009
1 commit
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This patch adds a new selinux hook so SELinux can arbitrate if a given
process should be allowed to trigger a request for the kernel to try to
load a module. This is a different operation than a process trying to load
a module itself, which is already protected by CAP_SYS_MODULE.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris