11 Jul, 2019
1 commit
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…el/git/dhowells/linux-fs"
This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus
effectively commits7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION")
2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")that the merge brought in).
It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric
biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of
in-kernel X.509 certificates [2].The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells
is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in
order to not impact the rest of the merge window.[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
09 Jul, 2019
2 commits
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Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
"This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
based on an internal ACL by the following means:- Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
tags/namespaces.Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
acquiring use of possessor permits.- Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL -
…/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring namespacing from David Howells:
"These patches help make keys and keyrings more namespace aware.Firstly some miscellaneous patches to make the process easier:
- Simplify key index_key handling so that the word-sized chunks
assoc_array requires don't have to be shifted about, making it
easier to add more bits into the key.- Cache the hash value in the key so that we don't have to calculate
on every key we examine during a search (it involves a bunch of
multiplications).- Allow keying_search() to search non-recursively.
Then the main patches:
- Make it so that keyring names are per-user_namespace from the point
of view of KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING so that they're not
accessible cross-user_namespace.keyctl_capabilities() shows KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEYRING_NAME for this.
- Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace
rather than the user_struct. This prevents them propagating
directly across user_namespaces boundaries (ie. the KEY_SPEC_*
flags will only pick from the current user_namespace).- Make it possible to include the target namespace in which the key
shall operate in the index_key. This will allow the possibility of
multiple keys with the same description, but different target
domains to be held in the same keyring.keyctl_capabilities() shows KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEY_TAG for this.
- Make it so that keys are implicitly invalidated by removal of a
domain tag, causing them to be garbage collected.- Institute a network namespace domain tag that allows keys to be
differentiated by the network namespace in which they operate. New
keys that are of a type marked 'KEY_TYPE_NET_DOMAIN' are assigned
the network domain in force when they are created.- Make it so that the desired network namespace can be handed down
into the request_key() mechanism. This allows AFS, NFS, etc. to
request keys specific to the network namespace of the superblock.This also means that the keys in the DNS record cache are
thenceforth namespaced, provided network filesystems pass the
appropriate network namespace down into dns_query().For DNS, AFS and NFS are good, whilst CIFS and Ceph are not. Other
cache keyrings, such as idmapper keyrings, also need to set the
domain tag - for which they need access to the network namespace of
the superblock"* tag 'keys-namespace-20190627' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism
keys: Network namespace domain tag
keys: Garbage collect keys for which the domain has been removed
keys: Include target namespace in match criteria
keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace
keys: Namespace keyring names
keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches
keys: Cache the hash value to avoid lots of recalculation
keys: Simplify key description management
28 Jun, 2019
1 commit
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Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.============
WHY DO THIS?
============The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyoneNote that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyringThe KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.=======
TESTING
=======This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.Signed-off-by: David Howells
27 Jun, 2019
1 commit
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Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches so that the flag can be omitted
and recursion disabled, thereby allowing just the nominated keyring to be
searched and none of the children.Signed-off-by: David Howells
05 Jun, 2019
1 commit
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation version 2 of the licenseextracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
25 Apr, 2019
1 commit
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The flags field in 'struct shash_desc' never actually does anything.
The only ostensibly supported flag is CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
However, no shash algorithm ever sleeps, making this flag a no-op.With this being the case, inevitably some users who can't sleep wrongly
pass MAY_SLEEP. These would all need to be fixed if any shash algorithm
actually started sleeping. For example, the shash_ahash_*() functions,
which wrap a shash algorithm with the ahash API, pass through MAY_SLEEP
from the ahash API to the shash API. However, the shash functions are
called under kmap_atomic(), so actually they're assumed to never sleep.Even if it turns out that some users do need preemption points while
hashing large buffers, we could easily provide a helper function
crypto_shash_update_large() which divides the data into smaller chunks
and calls crypto_shash_update() and cond_resched() for each chunk. It's
not necessary to have a flag in 'struct shash_desc', nor is it necessary
to make individual shash algorithms aware of this at all.Therefore, remove shash_desc::flags, and document that the
crypto_shash_*() functions can be called from any context.Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu
13 Oct, 2017
1 commit
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digsig_verify() requests a user key, then accesses its payload.
However, a revoked key has a NULL payload, and we failed to check for
this. request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a
window where the key can be revoked before we acquire its semaphore.Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was
already revoked at the time it was requested.Fixes: 051dbb918c7f ("crypto: digital signature verification support")
Reviewed-by: James Morris
Cc: [v3.3+]
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers
Signed-off-by: David Howells
02 Mar, 2017
1 commit
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rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:(1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
to protect the key.(2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
used to protect the key and the may be being modified.Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:
(1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:
dereference_key_locked()
user_key_payload_locked()(2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:
dereference_key_rcu()
user_key_payload_rcu()This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W
-------------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
__rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
_nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
do_mount+0x254/0xf70
SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
system_call+0x38/0xe0Reported-by: Jan Stancek
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Tested-by: Jan Stancek
Signed-off-by: James Morris
31 May, 2016
2 commits
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Currently, if digsig_verify_rsa() detects that the modulo's length is zero,
i.e. mlen == 0, it returns -ENOMEM which doesn't really fit here.Make digsig_verify_rsa() return -EINVAL upon mlen == 0.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu -
mpi_read_from_buffer() reads a MPI from a buffer into a newly allocated
MPI instance. It expects the buffer's leading two bytes to contain the
number of bits, followed by the actual payload.On failure, it returns NULL and updates the in/out argument ret_nread
somewhat inconsistently:
- If the given buffer is too short to contain the leading two bytes
encoding the number of bits or their value is unsupported, then
ret_nread will be cleared.
- If the allocation of the resulting MPI instance fails, ret_nread is left
as is.The only user of mpi_read_from_buffer(), digsig_verify_rsa(), simply checks
for a return value of NULL and returns -ENOMEM if that happens.While this is all of cosmetic nature only, there is another error condition
which currently isn't detectable by the caller of mpi_read_from_buffer():
if the given buffer is too small to hold the number of bits as encoded in
its first two bytes, the return value will be non-NULL and *ret_nread > 0.In preparation of communicating this condition to the caller, let
mpi_read_from_buffer() return error values by means of the ERR_PTR()
mechanism.Make the sole caller of mpi_read_from_buffer(), digsig_verify_rsa(),
check the return value for IS_ERR() rather than == NULL. If IS_ERR() is
true, return the associated error value rather than the fixed -ENOMEM.Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu
21 Oct, 2015
1 commit
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Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.Signed-off-by: David Howells
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
05 Jun, 2014
1 commit
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Small typo and @return: -> Returns ...
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick
Cc: Duan Jiong
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
13 Nov, 2013
1 commit
-
Signed-off-by: Duan Jiong
Cc: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
22 Feb, 2013
1 commit
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Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"This is basically a maintenance update for the TPM driver and EVM/IMA"Fix up conflicts in lib/digsig.c and security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (45 commits)
tpm/ibmvtpm: build only when IBM pseries is configured
ima: digital signature verification using asymmetric keys
ima: rename hash calculation functions
ima: use new crypto_shash API instead of old crypto_hash
ima: add policy support for file system uuid
evm: add file system uuid to EVM hmac
tpm_tis: check pnp_acpi_device return code
char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: drop temporary variable for return value
char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: remove dead assignment in tpm_st33_i2c_probe
char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Remove __devexit attribute
char/tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Don't use memcpy for one byte assignment
tpm_i2c_stm_st33: removed unused variables/code
TPM: Wait for TPM_ACCESS tpmRegValidSts to go high at startup
tpm: Fix cancellation of TPM commands (interrupt mode)
tpm: Fix cancellation of TPM commands (polling mode)
tpm: Store TPM vendor ID
TPM: Work around buggy TPMs that block during continue self test
tpm_i2c_stm_st33: fix oops when i2c client is unavailable
char/tpm: Use struct dev_pm_ops for power management
TPM: STMicroelectronics ST33 I2C BUILD STUFF
...
01 Feb, 2013
2 commits
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In existing use case, copying of the decoded data is unnecessary in
pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa. It is just enough to get pointer to the message.
Removing copying and extra buffer allocation.Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
digsig_verify_rsa() does not free kmalloc'ed buffer returned by
mpi_get_buffer().Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris
13 Sep, 2012
1 commit
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When pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa() returns without error and hash sizes do
not match, hash comparision is not done and digsig_verify_rsa() returns
no error. This is a bug and this patch fixes it.The bug was introduced in v3.3 by commit b35e286a640f ("lib/digsig:
pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa cleanup").Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
01 Feb, 2012
3 commits
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mpi_read_from_buffer() return value must not be NULL.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Removed useless 'is_valid' variable in pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa(),
which was inhereted from original code. Client now uses return value
to check for an error.Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Added sanity checks for possible wrongly formatted key payload data:
- minimum key payload size
- zero modulus length
- corrected upper key payload boundary.Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Reviewed-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris
09 Nov, 2011
1 commit
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This patch implements RSA digital signature verification using GnuPG library.
The format of the signature and the public key is defined by their respective
headers. The signature header contains version information, algorithm,
and keyid, which was used to generate the signature.
The key header contains version and algorythim type.
The payload of the signature and the key are multi-precision integers.The signing and key management utilities evm-utils provide functionality
to generate signatures and load keys into the kernel keyring.
When the key is added to the kernel keyring, the keyid defines the name
of the key.Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar