29 Mar, 2011
1 commit
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Commit 6f5317e730505d5cbc851c435a2dfe3d5a21d343 introduced a bug in the
handling of userspace object classes that is causing breakage for Xorg
when XSELinux is enabled. Fix the bug by changing map_class() to return
SECCLASS_NULL when the class cannot be mapped to a kernel object class.Reported-by: "Justin P. Mattock"
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
08 Mar, 2011
2 commits
04 Mar, 2011
1 commit
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The socket SID would be computed on creation and no longer inherit
its creator's SID by default. Socket may have a different type but
needs to retain the creator's role and MLS attribute in order not
to break labeled networking and network access control.The kernel value for a class would be used to determine if the class
if one of socket classes. If security_compute_sid is called from
userspace the policy value for a class would be mapped to the relevant
kernel value first.Signed-off-by: Harry Ciao
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
02 Feb, 2011
1 commit
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Currently SELinux has rules which label new objects according to 3 criteria.
The label of the process creating the object, the label of the parent
directory, and the type of object (reg, dir, char, block, etc.) This patch
adds a 4th criteria, the dentry name, thus we can distinguish between
creating a file in an etc_t directory called shadow and one called motd.There is no file globbing, regex parsing, or anything mystical. Either the
policy exactly (strcmp) matches the dentry name of the object or it doesn't.
This patch has no changes from today if policy does not implement the new
rules.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
24 Jan, 2011
2 commits
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Return -ENOMEM when memory allocation fails in cond_init_bool_indexes,
correctly propagating error code to caller.Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Kill unused MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK and ebitmap_startbit.
Signed-off-by: Shan Wei
Signed-off-by: James Morris
08 Dec, 2010
1 commit
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sidtab_context_to_sid takes up a large share of time when creating large
numbers of new inodes (~30-40% in oprofile runs). This patch implements a
cache of 3 entries which is checked before we do a full context_to_sid lookup.
On one system this showed over a x3 improvement in the number of inodes that
could be created per second and around a 20% improvement on another system.Any time we look up the same context string sucessivly (imagine ls -lZ) we
should hit this cache hot. A cache miss should have a relatively minor affect
on performance next to doing the full table search.All operations on the cache are done COMPLETELY lockless. We know that all
struct sidtab_node objects created will never be deleted until a new policy is
loaded thus we never have to worry about a pointer being dereferenced. Since
we also know that pointer assignment is atomic we know that the cache will
always have valid pointers. Given this information we implement a FIFO cache
in an array of 3 pointers. Every result (whether a cache hit or table lookup)
will be places in the 0 spot of the cache and the rest of the entries moved
down one spot. The 3rd entry will be lost.Races are possible and are even likely to happen. Lets assume that 4 tasks
are hitting sidtab_context_to_sid. The first task checks against the first
entry in the cache and it is a miss. Now lets assume a second task updates
the cache with a new entry. This will push the first entry back to the second
spot. Now the first task might check against the second entry (which it
already checked) and will miss again. Now say some third task updates the
cache and push the second entry to the third spot. The first task my check
the third entry (for the third time!) and again have a miss. At which point
it will just do a full table lookup. No big deal!Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
01 Dec, 2010
6 commits
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We duplicate functionality in policydb_index_classes() and
policydb_index_others(). This patch merges those functions just to make it
clear there is nothing special happening here.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
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The sym_val_to_name type array can be quite large as it grows linearly with
the number of types. With known policies having over 5k types these
allocations are growing large enough that they are likely to fail. Convert
those to flex_array so no allocation is larger than PAGE_SIZESigned-off-by: Eric Paris
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In rawhide type_val_to_struct will allocate 26848 bytes, an order 3
allocations. While this hasn't been seen to fail it isn't outside the
realm of possibiliy on systems with severe memory fragmentation. Convert
to flex_array so no allocation will ever be bigger than PAGE_SIZE.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
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security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid is difficult to follow, especially the
return codes. Try to make the function obvious.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
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selinuxfs.c has lots of different standards on how to handle return paths on
error. For the most part transition torc=errno
if (failure)
goto out;
[...]
out:
cleanup()
return rc;Instead of doing cleanup mid function, or having multiple returns or other
options. This doesn't do that for every function, but most of the complex
functions which have cleanup routines on error.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
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policydb.c has lots of different standards on how to handle return paths on
error. For the most part transition torc=errno
if (failure)
goto out;
[...]
out:
cleanup()
return rc;Instead of doing cleanup mid function, or having multiple returns or other
options. This doesn't do that for every function, but most of the complex
functions which have cleanup routines on error.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
21 Oct, 2010
10 commits
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Include vmalloc.h for vmalloc_user (fixes ppc build warning).
Acked-by: Eric ParisSigned-off-by: James Morris
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/selinux/policy allows a user to copy the policy back out of the kernel.
This patch allows userspace to actually mmap that file and use it directly.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
There is interest in being able to see what the actual policy is that was
loaded into the kernel. The patch creates a new selinuxfs file
/selinux/policy which can be read by userspace. The actual policy that is
loaded into the kernel will be written back out to userspace.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
AVTAB_MAX_SIZE was a define which was supposed to be used in userspace to
define a maximally sized avtab when userspace wasn't sure how big of a table
it needed. It doesn't make sense in the kernel since we always know our table
sizes. The only place it is used we have a more appropiately named define
called AVTAB_MAX_HASH_BUCKETS, use that instead.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Range transition rules are placed in the hash table in an (almost)
arbitrary order. This patch inserts them in a fixed order to make policy
retrival more predictable.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
With the (long ago) interface change to have the secid_to_secctx functions
do the string allocation instead of having the caller do the allocation we
lost the ability to query the security server for the length of the
upcoming string. The SECMARK code would like to allocate a netlink skb
with enough length to hold the string but it is just too unclean to do the
string allocation twice or to do the allocation the first time and hold
onto the string and slen. This patch adds the ability to call
security_secid_to_secctx() with a NULL data pointer and it will just set
the slen pointer.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
This patch fixes up coding-style problem at this commit:
4f27a7d49789b04404eca26ccde5f527231d01d5
selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status)Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
While the previous change to the selinux Makefile reduced the window
significantly for this failure, it is still possible to see a compile
failure where cpp starts processing selinux files before the auto
generated flask.h file is completed. This is easily reproduced by
adding the following temporary change to expose the issue everytime:- cmd_flask = scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders ...
+ cmd_flask = sleep 30 ; scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders ...This failure happens because the creation of the object files in the ss
subdir also depends on flask.h. So simply incorporate them into the
parent Makefile, as the ss/Makefile really doesn't do anything unique.With this change, compiling of all selinux files is dependent on
completion of the header file generation, and this test case with
the "sleep 30" now confirms it is functioning as expected.Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications
read-only mmap(2).
This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space.
struct selinux_kernel_status
{
u32 length; /* length of this structure */
u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */
u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */
u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */
u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */
};When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided
by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce
to keep consistency.
However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses
on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process.
In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of
making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call
to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache.
If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation
messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the
base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing
with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own
worker thread from the module.If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can
know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce.A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries
to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it
checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space.
Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing
mode, without any system call invocations.
This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need
to wait for a while if it is odd number.Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei
Acked-by: Eric Paris
--
security/selinux/include/security.h | 21 ++++++
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 56 +++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/Makefile | 2 +-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +
security/selinux/ss/status.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
type is not used at all, stop declaring and assigning it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
02 Aug, 2010
11 commits
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Current selinux policy can have over 3000 types. The type_attr_map in
policy is an array sized by the number of types times sizeof(struct ebitmap)
(12 on x86_64). Basic math tells us the array is going to be of length
3000 x 12 = 36,000 bytes. The largest 'safe' allocation on a long running
system is 16k. Most of the time a 32k allocation will work. But on long
running systems a 64k allocation (what we need) can fail quite regularly.
In order to deal with this I am converting the type_attr_map to use
flex_arrays. Let the library code deal with breaking this into PAGE_SIZE
pieces.-v2
rework some of the if(!obj) BUG() to be BUG_ON(!obj)
drop flex_array_put() calls and just use a _get() object directly-v3
make apply to James' tree (drop the policydb_write changes)Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Move the reading of ocontext type data out of policydb_read() in a separate
function ocontext_read()Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
move genfs read functionality out of policydb_read() and into a new
function called genfs_read()Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
hashtab_create() only returns NULL on allocation failures to -ENOMEM is
appropriate here.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The original code always returned -1 (-EPERM) on error. The new code
returns either -ENOMEM, or -EINVAL or it propagates the error codes from
lower level functions next_entry() or hashtab_insert().next_entry() returns -EINVAL.
hashtab_insert() returns -EINVAL, -EEXIST, or -ENOMEM.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
It's better to propagate the error code from avtab_init() instead of
returning -1 (-EPERM). It turns out that avtab_init() never fails so
this patch doesn't change how the code runs but it's still a clean up.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Originally cond_read_node() returned -1 (-EPERM) on errors which was
incorrect. Now it either propagates the error codes from lower level
functions next_entry() or cond_read_av_list() or it returns -ENOMEM or
-EINVAL.next_entry() returns -EINVAL.
cond_read_av_list() returns -EINVAL or -ENOMEM.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
After this patch cond_read_av_list() no longer returns -1 for any
errors. It just propagates error code back from lower levels. Those can
either be -EINVAL or -ENOMEM.I also modified cond_insertf() since cond_read_av_list() passes that as a
function pointer to avtab_read_item(). It isn't used anywhere else.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
These are passed back when the security module gets loaded.
The original code always returned -1 (-EPERM) on error but after this
patch it can return -EINVAL, or -ENOMEM or propagate the error code from
cond_read_node(). cond_read_node() still returns -1 all the time, but I
fix that in a later patch.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
The avtab_read_item() function tends to return -1 as a default error
code which is wrong (-1 means -EPERM). I modified it to return
appropriate error codes which is -EINVAL or the error code from
next_entry() or insertf().next_entry() returns -EINVAL.
insertf() is a function pointer to either avtab_insert() or
cond_insertf().
avtab_insert() returns -EINVAL, -ENOMEM, and -EEXIST.
cond_insertf() currently returns -1, but I will fix it in a later patch.There is code in avtab_read() which translates the -1 returns from
avtab_read_item() to -EINVAL. The translation is no longer needed, so I
removed it.Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Move the range transition rule to a separate function, range_read(), rather
than doing it all in policydb_read()Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
17 May, 2010
1 commit
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Use kstrdup when the goal of an allocation is copy a string into the
allocated region.The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)//
@@
expression from,to;
expression flag,E1,E2;
statement S;
@@- to = kmalloc(strlen(from) + 1,flag);
+ to = kstrdup(from, flag);
... when != \(from = E1 \| to = E1 \)
if (to==NULL || ...) S
... when != \(from = E2 \| to = E2 \)
- strcpy(to, from);
//Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
21 Apr, 2010
1 commit
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policy load failure always return EINVAL even if the failure was for some
other reason (usually ENOMEM). This patch passes error codes back up the
stack where they will make their way to userspace. This might help in
debugging future problems with policy load.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
09 Apr, 2010
1 commit
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Fix coding style in security/
Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang
Signed-off-by: James Morris
16 Mar, 2010
1 commit
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Reduce MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS so that the avtab allocation is an order 2
allocation rather than an order 4 allocation on x86_64. This
addresses reports of page allocation failures:
http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=126757230625867&w=2
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=570433Reported-by: Russell Coker
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
09 Mar, 2010
1 commit