31 Oct, 2011
1 commit
-
The changed files were only including linux/module.h for the
EXPORT_SYMBOL infrastructure, and nothing else. Revector them
onto the isolated export header for faster compile times.Nothing to see here but a whole lot of instances of:
-#include
+#includeThis commit is only changing the kernel dir; next targets
will probably be mm, fs, the arch dirs, etc.Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker
14 Jan, 2011
1 commit
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Currently on 64-bit arch the user_namespace is 2096 and when being
kmalloc-ed it resides on a 4k slab wasting 2003 bytes.If we allocate a separate cache for it and reduce the hash size from 128
to 64 chains the packaging becomes *much* better - the struct is 1072
bytes and the hole between is 98 bytes.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/__initcall/module_init/]
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
17 Jun, 2010
1 commit
-
Define what happens when a we view a uid from one user_namespace
in another user_namepece.- If the user namespaces are the same no mapping is necessary.
- For most cases of difference use overflowuid and overflowgid,
the uid and gid currently used for 16bit apis when we have a 32bit uid
that does fit in 16bits. Effectively the situation is the same,
we want to return a uid or gid that is not assigned to any user.- For the case when we happen to be mapping the uid or gid of the
creator of the target user namespace use uid 0 and gid as confusing
that user with root is not a problem.Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
22 May, 2010
1 commit
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Of the three uses of kref_set in the kernel:
One really should be kref_put as the code is letting go of a
reference,
Two really should be kref_init because the kref is being
initialised.This suggests that making kref_set available encourages bad code.
So fix the three uses and remove kref_set completely.Signed-off-by: NeilBrown
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
28 Feb, 2009
1 commit
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free_uid() and free_user_ns() are corecursive when CONFIG_USER_SCHED=n,
but free_user_ns() is called from free_uid() by way of uid_hash_remove(),
which requires uidhash_lock to be held. free_user_ns() then calls
free_uid() to complete the destruction.Fix this by deferring the destruction of the user_namespace.
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
25 Nov, 2008
1 commit
-
The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct
cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise
would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are
here as well.Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply:
1. The task pins the user struct.
2. The user struct pins its user namespace.
3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it.User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns
is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code
duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user
namespaces).When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty
keyrings and a clean group_info.This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here
is his original patch description:>I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following
>changes:
>
> (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user
> namespace.
>
> (2) Fixes eCryptFS.
>
> (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent
> with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is
> superfluous.
>
> (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the
> beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts
> at allocation.
>
> (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds
> to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine
> the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred
> struct.
>
> This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the
> reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be
> transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer.
>
> (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under
> preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds().
>
>David>Signed-off-by: David Howells
Changelog:
Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments
1. leave thread_keyring alone
2. use current_user_ns() in set_user()Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn
14 Nov, 2008
2 commits
-
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().
Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Reviewed-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Al Viro
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris
24 Aug, 2008
1 commit
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This patch lets the files using linux/version.h match the files that
#include it.Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
29 Apr, 2008
2 commits
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Make eCryptfs key module subsystem respect namespaces.
Since I will be removing the netlink interface in a future patch, I just made
changes to the netlink.c code so that it will not break the build. With my
recent patches, the kernel module currently defaults to the device handle
interface rather than the netlink interface.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export free_user_ns()]
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Following an experimental deletion of the unnecessary directive
#include
from the header file , these files under kernel/ were exposed
as needing to include one of or , so explicit
includes were added where necessary.Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
09 Feb, 2008
1 commit
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Make the user_namespace.o compilation depend on this option and move the
init_user_ns into user.c file to make the kernel compile and work without the
namespaces support. This make the user namespace code be organized similar to
other namespaces'.Also mask the USER_NS option as "depend on NAMESPACES".
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Cedric Le Goater
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Cc: Herbert Poetzl
Cc: Kirill Korotaev
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
20 Sep, 2007
2 commits
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It turned out, that the user namespace is released during the do_exit() in
exit_task_namespaces(), but the struct user_struct is released only during the
put_task_struct(), i.e. MUCH later.On debug kernels with poisoned slabs this will cause the oops in
uid_hash_remove() because the head of the chain, which resides inside the
struct user_namespace, will be already freed and poisoned.Since the uid hash itself is required only when someone can search it, i.e.
when the namespace is alive, we can safely unhash all the user_struct-s from
it during the namespace exiting. The subsequent free_uid() will complete the
user_struct destruction.For example simple program
#include
char stack[2 * 1024 * 1024];
int f(void *foo)
{
return 0;
}int main(void)
{
clone(f, stack + 1 * 1024 * 1024, 0x10000000, 0);
return 0;
}run on kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS turned on will oops the
kernel immediately.This was spotted during OpenVZ kernel testing.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Surprisingly, but (spotted by Alexey Dobriyan) the uid hash still uses
list_heads, thus occupying twice as much place as it could. Convert it to
hlist_heads.Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
31 Aug, 2007
1 commit
-
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
Acked-by: Cedric Le Goater
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
17 Jul, 2007
3 commits
-
dup_mnt_ns() and clone_uts_ns() return NULL on failure. This is wrong,
create_new_namespaces() uses ERR_PTR() to catch an error. This means that the
subsequent create_new_namespaces() will hit BUG_ON() in copy_mnt_ns() or
copy_utsname().Modify create_new_namespaces() to also use the errors returned by the
copy_*_ns routines and not to systematically return ENOMEM.[oleg@tv-sign.ru: better changelog]
Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Badari Pulavarty
Cc: Pavel Emelianov
Cc: Herbert Poetzl
Cc: Eric W. Biederman
Cc: Oleg Nesterov
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
This patch enables the unshare of user namespaces.
It adds a new clone flag CLONE_NEWUSER and implements copy_user_ns() which
resets the current user_struct and adds a new root user (uid == 0)For now, unsharing the user namespace allows a process to reset its
user_struct accounting and uid 0 in the new user namespace should be contained
using appropriate means, for instance selinuxThe plan, when the full support is complete (all uid checks covered), is to
keep the original user's rights in the original namespace, and let a process
become uid 0 in the new namespace, with full capabilities to the new
namespace.Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater
Acked-by: Pavel Emelianov
Cc: Herbert Poetzl
Cc: Kirill Korotaev
Cc: Eric W. Biederman
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Andrew Morgan
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Basically, it will allow a process to unshare its user_struct table,
resetting at the same time its own user_struct and all the associated
accounting.A new root user (uid == 0) is added to the user namespace upon creation.
Such root users have full privileges and it seems that theses privileges
should be controlled through some means (process capabilities ?)The unshare is not included in this patch.
Changes since [try #4]:
- Updated get_user_ns and put_user_ns to accept NULL, and
get_user_ns to return the namespace.Changes since [try #3]:
- moved struct user_namespace to files user_namespace.{c,h}Changes since [try #2]:
- removed struct user_namespace* argument from find_user()Changes since [try #1]:
- removed struct user_namespace* argument from find_user()
- added a root_user per user namespaceSigned-off-by: Cedric Le Goater
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Acked-by: Pavel Emelianov
Cc: Herbert Poetzl
Cc: Kirill Korotaev
Cc: Eric W. Biederman
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Andrew Morgan
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
