19 Apr, 2008
2 commits
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…s/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
security: fix up documentation for security_module_enable
Security: Introduce security= boot parameter
Audit: Final renamings and cleanup
SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports
Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks
SELinux: remove redundant exports
Netlink: Use generic LSM hook
Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports
SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooks
LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks -
Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM
registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module.User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no
security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM
asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security
module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen.LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register
by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux
and SMACK to do so.Do not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on
boot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and
the initial task security setup (swapper->security) is done.Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish
Acked-by: James Morris
13 Apr, 2008
1 commit
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Smack doesn't have the need to create a private copy of the LSM "domain" when
setting NetLabel security attributes like SELinux, however, the current
NetLabel code requires a private copy of the LSM "domain". This patches fixes
that by letting the LSM determine how it wants to pass the domain value.* NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY
The current behavior, NetLabel assumes that the domain value is a copy and
frees it when done* NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN
New, Smack-friendly behavior, NetLabel assumes that the domain value is a
reference to a string managed by the LSM and does not free it when doneSigned-off-by: Paul Moore
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller
21 Mar, 2008
1 commit
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The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases
are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
as per the check in check_kill_permission().One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.
This patch removes cap_task_kill().
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Earlier-version-tested-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
20 Mar, 2008
1 commit
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In the SYSV ipc msgctl(),semctl(),shmctl() family, if the user passed *_INFO
as the desired operation, no specific object is meant to be controlled and
only system-wide information is returned. This leads to a NULL IPC object in
the LSM hooks if the _INFO flag is given.Avoid dereferencing this NULL pointer in Smack ipc *ctl() methods.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
06 Mar, 2008
1 commit
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Introduce new LSM interfaces to allow an FS to deal with their own mount
options. This includes a new string parsing function exported from the
LSM that an FS can use to get a security data blob and a new security
data blob. This is particularly useful for an FS which uses binary
mount data, like NFS, which does not pass strings into the vfs to be
handled by the loaded LSM. Also fix a BUG() in both SELinux and SMACK
when dealing with binary mount data. If the binary mount data is less
than one page the copy_page() in security_sb_copy_data() can cause an
illegal page fault and boom. Remove all NFSisms from the SELinux code
since they were broken by past NFS changes.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Signed-off-by: James Morris
24 Feb, 2008
1 commit
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Update the Smack LSM to allow the registration of the capability "module"
as a secondary LSM. Integrate the new hooks required for file based
capabilities.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: Paul Moore
Cc: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
19 Feb, 2008
1 commit
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Smack uses CIPSO labeling, but allows for unlabeled packets by
specifying an "ambient" label that is applied to incoming unlabeled
packets.Because the other end of the connection may dislike IP options, and ssh
is one know application that behaves thus, it is prudent to respond in
kind.This patch changes the network labeling behavior such that an outgoing
packet that would be given a CIPSO label that matches the ambient label
is left unlabeled. An "unlbl" domain is added and the netlabel
defaulting mechanism invoked rather than assuming that everything is
CIPSO. Locking has been added around changes to the ambient label as
the mechanisms used to do so are more involved.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Acked-by: Paul Moore
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
15 Feb, 2008
1 commit
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This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:without patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinuxwith patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinuxThis patch:
Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig
Cc: Al Viro
Cc: Casey Schaufler
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
14 Feb, 2008
1 commit
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There's a small problem with smack and NFS. A similar report was also
sent here: http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/10/27/85I've also added similar checks in inode_{get/set}security(). Cheating from
SELinux post_create_socket(), it does the same.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove uneeded BUG_ON()]
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
06 Feb, 2008
1 commit
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Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available onhttp://www.schaufler-ca.com
Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.
Smack defines and uses these labels:
"*" - pronounced "star"
"_" - pronounced "floor"
"^" - pronounced "hat"
"?" - pronounced "huh"The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:
1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.Some practical use cases:
Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:C Unclass rx
S C rx
S Unclass rx
TS S rx
TS C rx
TS Unclass rxA TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:
ESPN ABC r
ABC ESPN rOn my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.Another case that I especially like:
SatData Guard w
Guard Publish wA program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Joshua Brindle
Cc: Paul Moore
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: James Morris
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish"
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds