Eric Lee / smarc-fsl-linux-kernel

26 Nov, 2006

1 commit

  • dc9b33462   [NET]: Re-fix of doc-comment in sock.h ... Browse Code »

    Restoring old, correct comment for sk_filter_release, moving it to
    where it should actually be, and changing new comment into proper
    comment for sk_filter_rcu_free, where it actually makes sense.

    The original fix submitted for this on Oct 23 mistakenly documented
    the wrong function.

    Signed-off-by: Paul Bonser
    Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

    Paul Bonser
     

10 Nov, 2006

1 commit

06 Nov, 2006

3 commits

23 Oct, 2006

1 commit

22 Oct, 2006

2 commits

20 Oct, 2006

1 commit

19 Oct, 2006

2 commits

17 Oct, 2006

1 commit

16 Oct, 2006

3 commits

12 Oct, 2006

5 commits

  • 42b6785ee   [NET]: Introduce protocol-specific destructor for time-wait sockets. ... Browse Code »

    Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki
    Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

    YOSHIFUJI Hideaki
     
  • 331c4ee7f   [SCTP]: Fix receive buffer accounting. ... Browse Code »

    When doing receiver buffer accounting, we always used skb->truesize.
    This is problematic when processing bundled DATA chunks because for
    every DATA chunk that could be small part of one large skb, we would
    charge the size of the entire skb. The new approach is to store the
    size of the DATA chunk we are accounting for in the sctp_ulpevent
    structure and use that stored value for accounting.

    Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich
    Signed-off-by: Sridhar Samudrala
    Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

    Vlad Yasevich
     
  • 5b368e61c   IPsec: correct semantics for SELinux policy matching ... Browse Code »

    Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security
    context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so
    the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would
    otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux
    policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled"
    IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added
    SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and
    so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable
    xfrm(s) applied.

    The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of
    "deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by
    default" in the above case.

    This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris
    was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
    confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
    appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.

    With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec
    policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context
    specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding
    SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context).

    Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
    security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied,
    such as -EINVAL. We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
    inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
    xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
    associated with an xfrm policy.

    The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are
    correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
    from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.

    Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
    fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
    cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
    indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future
    lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
    for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
    flow cache entry).

    This patch: Fix the selinux side of things.

    This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy
    rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated
    with the IPSec policy rule.

    Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to
    the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case
    is now handled properly.

    Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Venkat Yekkirala
     
  • 134b0fc54   IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup ... Browse Code »

    When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
    security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission
    (or other error). We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
    inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
    xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
    associated with an xfrm policy.

    The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
    confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
    appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.

    The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via
    flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because
    the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver.

    However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when
    calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is
    interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated
    policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without
    transformation.

    The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are
    correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
    from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.

    Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
    fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
    cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
    indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future
    lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
    for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
    flow cache entry).

    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    James Morris
     
  • ffb733c65   NetLabel: fix a cache race condition ... Browse Code »

    Testing revealed a problem with the NetLabel cache where a cached entry could
    be freed while in use by the LSM layer causing an oops and other problems.
    This patch fixes that problem by introducing a reference counter to the cache
    entry so that it is only freed when it is no longer in use.

    Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    paul.moore@hp.com
     

04 Oct, 2006

1 commit

01 Oct, 2006

2 commits

30 Sep, 2006

1 commit

  • 95d4e6be2   [NetLabel]: audit fixups due to delayed feedback ... Browse Code »

    Fix some issues Steve Grubb had with the way NetLabel was using the audit
    subsystem. This should make NetLabel more consistent with other kernel
    generated audit messages specifying configuration changes.

    Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
    Acked-by: Steve Grubb
    Signed-off-by: David S. Miller

    Paul Moore
     

29 Sep, 2006

16 commits