Eric Lee / smarc-fsl-linux-kernel

27 Aug, 2010

1 commit

09 Aug, 2010

1 commit

29 Jul, 2010

1 commit

  • a6f80fb7b   ecryptfs: Bugfix for error related to ecryptfs_hash_buckets ... Browse Code »

    The function ecryptfs_uid_hash wrongly assumes that the
    second parameter to hash_long() is the number of hash
    buckets instead of the number of hash bits.
    This patch fixes that and renames the variable
    ecryptfs_hash_buckets to ecryptfs_hash_bits to make it
    clearer.

    Fixes: CVE-2010-2492

    Signed-off-by: Andre Osterhues
    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Andre Osterhues
     

30 Mar, 2010

1 commit

  • 5a0e3ad6a   include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implic… ... Browse Code »

    …it slab.h inclusion from percpu.h

    percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
    included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
    in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
    universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.

    percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
    this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
    headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
    needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
    used as the basis of conversion.

    http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py

    The script does the followings.

    * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
    only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
    gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.

    * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
    blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
    to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
    core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
    alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
    doesn't seem to be any matching order.

    * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
    because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
    an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
    file.

    The conversion was done in the following steps.

    1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
    over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
    and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
    files.

    2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
    some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
    embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
    inclusions to around 150 files.

    3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
    from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.

    4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
    e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
    APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.

    5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
    editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
    files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
    inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
    wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
    slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
    necessary.

    6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.

    7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
    were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
    distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
    more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
    build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).

    * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
    * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
    * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
    * ia64 SMP allmodconfig
    * s390 SMP allmodconfig
    * alpha SMP allmodconfig
    * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig

    8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
    a separate patch and serve as bisection point.

    Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
    6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
    If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
    headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
    the specific arch.

    Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
    Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
    Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
    Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>

    Tejun Heo
     

22 Apr, 2009

1 commit

  • 57ea34d19   eCryptfs: NULL pointer dereference in ecryptfs_send_miscdev() ... Browse Code »

    If data is NULL, msg_ctx->msg is set to NULL and then dereferenced
    afterwards. ecryptfs_send_raw_message() is the only place that
    ecryptfs_send_miscdev() is called with data being NULL, but the only
    caller of that function (ecryptfs_process_helo()) is never called. In
    short, there is currently no way to trigger the NULL pointer
    dereference.

    This patch removes the two unused functions and modifies
    ecryptfs_send_miscdev() to remove the NULL dereferences.

    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks

    Tyler Hicks
     

01 Apr, 2009

1 commit

07 Jan, 2009

1 commit

25 Nov, 2008

1 commit

  • 18b6e0414   User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2) ... Browse Code »

    The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct
    cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise
    would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are
    here as well.

    Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply:
    1. The task pins the user struct.
    2. The user struct pins its user namespace.
    3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it.

    User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns
    is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code
    duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user
    namespaces).

    When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty
    keyrings and a clean group_info.

    This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here
    is his original patch description:

    >I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following
    >changes:
    >
    > (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user
    > namespace.
    >
    > (2) Fixes eCryptFS.
    >
    > (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent
    > with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is
    > superfluous.
    >
    > (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the
    > beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts
    > at allocation.
    >
    > (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds
    > to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine
    > the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred
    > struct.
    >
    > This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the
    > reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be
    > transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer.
    >
    > (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under
    > preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds().
    >
    >David

    >Signed-off-by: David Howells

    Changelog:
    Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments
    1. leave thread_keyring alone
    2. use current_user_ns() in set_user()

    Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn

    Serge Hallyn
     

14 Nov, 2008

1 commit

  • 4eea03539   CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the eCryptFS filesystem ... Browse Code »

    Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
    the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

    Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

    Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more
    sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
    addressed by later patches.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells
    Reviewed-by: James Morris
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Cc: Mike Halcrow
    Cc: Phillip Hellewell
    Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    David Howells
     

17 Oct, 2008

1 commit

  • 624ae5284   eCryptfs: remove netlink transport ... Browse Code »

    The netlink transport code has not worked for a while and the miscdev
    transport is a simpler solution. This patch removes the netlink code and
    makes the miscdev transport the only eCryptfs kernel to userspace
    transport.

    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
    Cc: Michael Halcrow
    Cc: Dustin Kirkland
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Tyler Hicks
     

29 Apr, 2008

2 commits

  • 6a3fd92e7   eCryptfs: make key module subsystem respect namespaces ... Browse Code »

    Make eCryptfs key module subsystem respect namespaces.

    Since I will be removing the netlink interface in a future patch, I just made
    changes to the netlink.c code so that it will not break the build. With my
    recent patches, the kernel module currently defaults to the device handle
    interface rather than the netlink interface.

    [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export free_user_ns()]
    Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Michael Halcrow
     
  • f66e883eb   eCryptfs: integrate eCryptfs device handle into the module. ... Browse Code »

    Update the versioning information. Make the message types generic. Add an
    outgoing message queue to the daemon struct. Make the functions to parse
    and write the packet lengths available to the rest of the module. Add
    functions to create and destroy the daemon structs. Clean up some of the
    comments and make the code a little more consistent with itself.

    [akpm@linux-foundation.org: printk fixes]
    Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Michael Halcrow
     

24 Dec, 2007

1 commit

  • c8161f64c   ecryptfs: fix unlocking in error paths ... Browse Code »

    Thanks to Josef Bacik for finding these.

    A couple of ecryptfs error paths don't properly unlock things they locked.

    Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen
    Cc: Josef Bacik
    Cc: Michael Halcrow
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Eric Sandeen
     

17 Oct, 2007

1 commit

22 May, 2007

1 commit

  • e8edc6e03   Detach sched.h from mm.h ... Browse Code »

    First thing mm.h does is including sched.h solely for can_do_mlock() inline
    function which has "current" dereference inside. By dealing with can_do_mlock()
    mm.h can be detached from sched.h which is good. See below, why.

    This patch
    a) removes unconditional inclusion of sched.h from mm.h
    b) makes can_do_mlock() normal function in mm/mlock.c
    c) exports can_do_mlock() to not break compilation
    d) adds sched.h inclusions back to files that were getting it indirectly.
    e) adds less bloated headers to some files (asm/signal.h, jiffies.h) that were
    getting them indirectly

    Net result is:
    a) mm.h users would get less code to open, read, preprocess, parse, ... if
    they don't need sched.h
    b) sched.h stops being dependency for significant number of files:
    on x86_64 allmodconfig touching sched.h results in recompile of 4083 files,
    after patch it's only 3744 (-8.3%).

    Cross-compile tested on

    all arm defconfigs, all mips defconfigs, all powerpc defconfigs,
    alpha alpha-up
    arm
    i386 i386-up i386-defconfig i386-allnoconfig
    ia64 ia64-up
    m68k
    mips
    parisc parisc-up
    powerpc powerpc-up
    s390 s390-up
    sparc sparc-up
    sparc64 sparc64-up
    um-x86_64
    x86_64 x86_64-up x86_64-defconfig x86_64-allnoconfig

    as well as my two usual configs.

    Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Alexey Dobriyan
     

17 Feb, 2007

1 commit

13 Feb, 2007

3 commits

  • dd2a3b7ad   [PATCH] eCryptfs: Generalize metadata read/write ... Browse Code »

    Generalize the metadata reading and writing mechanisms, with two targets for
    now: metadata in file header and metadata in the user.ecryptfs xattr of the
    lower file.

    [akpm@osdl.org: printk warning fix]
    [bunk@stusta.de: make some needlessly global code static]
    Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Michael Halcrow
     
  • dddfa461f   [PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet management ... Browse Code »

    Public key support code. This reads and writes packets in the header that
    contain public key encrypted file keys. It calls the messaging code in the
    previous patch to send and receive encryption and decryption request
    packets from the userspace daemon.

    [akpm@osdl.org: cleab fix]
    Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
    Cc: David Howells
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Michael Halcrow
     
  • 88b4a07e6   [PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key transport mechanism ... Browse Code »

    This is the transport code for public key functionality in eCryptfs. It
    manages encryption/decryption request queues with a transport mechanism.
    Currently, netlink is the only implemented transport.

    Each inode has a unique File Encryption Key (FEK). Under passphrase, a File
    Encryption Key Encryption Key (FEKEK) is generated from a salt/passphrase
    combo on mount. This FEKEK encrypts each FEK and writes it into the header of
    each file using the packet format specified in RFC 2440. This is all
    symmetric key encryption, so it can all be done via the kernel crypto API.

    These new patches introduce public key encryption of the FEK. There is no
    asymmetric key encryption support in the kernel crypto API, so eCryptfs pushes
    the FEK encryption and decryption out to a userspace daemon. After
    considering our requirements and determining the complexity of using various
    transport mechanisms, we settled on netlink for this communication.

    eCryptfs stores authentication tokens into the kernel keyring. These tokens
    correlate with individual keys. For passphrase mode of operation, the
    authentication token contains the symmetric FEKEK. For public key, the
    authentication token contains a PKI type and an opaque data blob managed by
    individual PKI modules in userspace.

    Each user who opens a file under an eCryptfs partition mounted in public key
    mode must be running a daemon. That daemon has the user's credentials and has
    access to all of the keys to which the user should have access. The daemon,
    when started, initializes the pluggable PKI modules available on the system
    and registers itself with the eCryptfs kernel module. Userspace utilities
    register public key authentication tokens into the user session keyring.
    These authentication tokens correlate key signatures with PKI modules and PKI
    blobs. The PKI blobs contain PKI-specific information necessary for the PKI
    module to carry out asymmetric key encryption and decryption.

    When the eCryptfs module parses the header of an existing file and finds a Tag
    1 (Public Key) packet (see RFC 2440), it reads in the public key identifier
    (signature). The asymmetrically encrypted FEK is in the Tag 1 packet;
    eCryptfs puts together a decrypt request packet containing the signature and
    the encrypted FEK, then it passes it to the daemon registered for the
    current->euid via a netlink unicast to the PID of the daemon, which was
    registered at the time the daemon was started by the user.

    The daemon actually just makes calls to libecryptfs, which implements request
    packet parsing and manages PKI modules. libecryptfs grabs the public key
    authentication token for the given signature from the user session keyring.
    This auth tok tells libecryptfs which PKI module should receive the request.
    libecryptfs then makes a decrypt() call to the PKI module, and it passes along
    the PKI block from the auth tok. The PKI uses the blob to figure out how it
    should decrypt the data passed to it; it performs the decryption and passes
    the decrypted data back to libecryptfs. libecryptfs then puts together a
    reply packet with the decrypted FEK and passes that back to the eCryptfs
    module.

    The eCryptfs module manages these request callouts to userspace code via
    message context structs. The module maintains an array of message context
    structs and places the elements of the array on two lists: a free and an
    allocated list. When eCryptfs wants to make a request, it moves a msg ctx
    from the free list to the allocated list, sets its state to pending, and fires
    off the message to the user's registered daemon.

    When eCryptfs receives a netlink message (via the callback), it correlates the
    msg ctx struct in the alloc list with the data in the message itself. The
    msg->index contains the offset of the array of msg ctx structs. It verifies
    that the registered daemon PID is the same as the PID of the process that sent
    the message. It also validates a sequence number between the received packet
    and the msg ctx. Then, it copies the contents of the message (the reply
    packet) into the msg ctx struct, sets the state in the msg ctx to done, and
    wakes up the process that was sleeping while waiting for the reply.

    The sleeping process was whatever was performing the sys_open(). This process
    originally called ecryptfs_send_message(); it is now in
    ecryptfs_wait_for_response(). When it wakes up and sees that the msg ctx
    state was set to done, it returns a pointer to the message contents (the reply
    packet) and returns. If all went well, this packet contains the decrypted
    FEK, which is then copied into the crypt_stat struct, and life continues as
    normal.

    The case for creation of a new file is very similar, only instead of a decrypt
    request, eCryptfs sends out an encrypt request.

    > - We have a great clod of key mangement code in-kernel. Why is that
    > not suitable (or growable) for public key management?

    eCryptfs uses Howells' keyring to store persistent key data and PKI state
    information. It defers public key cryptographic transformations to userspace
    code. The userspace data manipulation request really is orthogonal to key
    management in and of itself. What eCryptfs basically needs is a secure way to
    communicate with a particular daemon for a particular task doing a syscall,
    based on the UID. Nothing running under another UID should be able to access
    that channel of communication.

    > - Is it appropriate that new infrastructure for public key
    > management be private to a particular fs?

    The messaging.c file contains a lot of code that, perhaps, could be extracted
    into a separate kernel service. In essence, this would be a sort of
    request/reply mechanism that would involve a userspace daemon. I am not aware
    of anything that does quite what eCryptfs does, so I was not aware of any
    existing tools to do just what we wanted.

    > What happens if one of these daemons exits without sending a quit
    > message?

    There is a stale uidpid association in the hash table for that user. When
    the user registers a new daemon, eCryptfs cleans up the old association and
    generates a new one. See ecryptfs_process_helo().

    > - _why_ does it use netlink?

    Netlink provides the transport mechanism that would minimize the complexity of
    the implementation, given that we can have multiple daemons (one per user). I
    explored the possibility of using relayfs, but that would involve having to
    introduce control channels and a protocol for creating and tearing down
    channels for the daemons. We do not have to worry about any of that with
    netlink.

    Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
    Cc: David Howells
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Michael Halcrow