10 Aug, 2011

1 commit

  • fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function ‘ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set’:
    fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1991:28: warning: ‘payload_len’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized]
    fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1976:9: note: ‘payload_len’ was declared here

    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks

    Tyler Hicks
     

29 Jul, 2011

1 commit

  • Fixes a regression caused by b5695d04634fa4ccca7dcbc05bb4a66522f02e0b

    Kernel keyring keys containing eCryptfs authentication tokens should not
    be write locked when calling out to ecryptfsd to wrap and unwrap file
    encryption keys. The eCryptfs kernel code can not hold the key's write
    lock because ecryptfsd needs to request the key after receiving such a
    request from the kernel.

    Without this fix, all file opens and creates will timeout and fail when
    using the eCryptfs PKI infrastructure. This is not an issue when using
    passphrase-based mount keys, which is the most widely deployed eCryptfs
    configuration.

    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
    Acked-by: Roberto Sassu
    Tested-by: Roberto Sassu
    Tested-by: Alexis Hafner1
    Cc: [2.6.39+]

    Tyler Hicks
     

28 Jul, 2011

1 commit

  • …s/security-testing-2.6

    * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (54 commits)
    tpm_nsc: Fix bug when loading multiple TPM drivers
    tpm: Move tpm_tis_reenable_interrupts out of CONFIG_PNP block
    tpm: Fix compilation warning when CONFIG_PNP is not defined
    TOMOYO: Update kernel-doc.
    tpm: Fix a typo
    tpm_tis: Probing function for Intel iTPM bug
    tpm_tis: Fix the probing for interrupts
    tpm_tis: Delay ACPI S3 suspend while the TPM is busy
    tpm_tis: Re-enable interrupts upon (S3) resume
    tpm: Fix display of data in pubek sysfs entry
    tpm_tis: Add timeouts sysfs entry
    tpm: Adjust interface timeouts if they are too small
    tpm: Use interface timeouts returned from the TPM
    tpm_tis: Introduce durations sysfs entry
    tpm: Adjust the durations if they are too small
    tpm: Use durations returned from TPM
    TOMOYO: Enable conditional ACL.
    TOMOYO: Allow using argv[]/envp[] of execve() as conditions.
    TOMOYO: Allow using executable's realpath and symlink's target as conditions.
    TOMOYO: Allow using owner/group etc. of file objects as conditions.
    ...

    Fix up trivial conflict in security/tomoyo/realpath.c

    Linus Torvalds
     

22 Jul, 2011

1 commit


27 Jun, 2011

1 commit


28 May, 2011

1 commit

  • The buffers allocated while encrypting and decrypting long filenames can
    sometimes straddle two pages. In this situation, virt_to_scatterlist()
    will return -ENOMEM, causing the operation to fail and the user will get
    scary error messages in their logs:

    kernel: ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet: Internal error whilst attempting
    to convert filename memory to scatterlist; expected rc = 1; got rc =
    [-12]. block_aligned_filename_size = [272]
    kernel: ecryptfs_encrypt_filename: Error attempting to generate tag 70
    packet; rc = [-12]
    kernel: ecryptfs_encrypt_and_encode_filename: Error attempting to
    encrypt filename; rc = [-12]
    kernel: ecryptfs_lookup: Error attempting to encrypt and encode
    filename; rc = [-12]

    The solution is to allow up to 2 scatterlist entries to be used.

    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
    Cc:

    Tyler Hicks
     

28 Mar, 2011

6 commits


18 Jan, 2011

2 commits


29 Oct, 2010

3 commits

  • This patch adds a new mount parameter 'ecryptfs_mount_auth_tok_only' to
    force ecryptfs to use only authentication tokens which signature has
    been specified at mount time with parameters 'ecryptfs_sig' and
    'ecryptfs_fnek_sig'. In this way, after disabling the passthrough and
    the encrypted view modes, it's possible to make available to users only
    files encrypted with the specified authentication token.

    Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu
    Cc: Dustin Kirkland
    Cc: James Morris
    [Tyler: Clean up coding style errors found by checkpatch]
    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks

    Roberto Sassu
     
  • This patch replaces the check of the 'matching_auth_tok' pointer with
    the exit status of ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig().
    This avoids to use authentication tokens obtained through the function
    ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig which are not valid.

    Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu
    Cc: Dustin Kirkland
    Cc: James Morris
    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks

    Roberto Sassu
     
  • This patch allows keys requested in the function
    ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig()to be released when they are no
    longer required. In particular keys are directly released in the same
    function if the obtained authentication token is not valid.

    Further, a new function parameter 'auth_tok_key' has been added to
    ecryptfs_find_auth_tok_for_sig() in order to provide callers the key
    pointer to be passed to key_put().

    Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu
    Cc: Dustin Kirkland
    Cc: James Morris
    [Tyler: Initialize auth_tok_key to NULL in ecryptfs_parse_packet_set]
    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks

    Roberto Sassu
     

27 Aug, 2010

1 commit

  • In this code, 0 is returned on memory allocation failure, even though other
    failures return -ENOMEM or other similar values.

    A simplified version of the semantic match that finds this problem is as
    follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)

    //
    @@
    expression ret;
    expression x,e1,e2,e3;
    @@

    ret = 0
    ... when != ret = e1
    *x = \(kmalloc\|kcalloc\|kzalloc\)(...)
    ... when != ret = e2
    if (x == NULL) { ... when != ret = e3
    return ret;
    }
    //

    Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall
    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks

    Julia Lawall
     

30 Mar, 2010

1 commit

  • …it slab.h inclusion from percpu.h

    percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
    included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
    in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
    universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.

    percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
    this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
    headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
    needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
    used as the basis of conversion.

    http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py

    The script does the followings.

    * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
    only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
    gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.

    * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
    blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
    to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
    core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
    alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
    doesn't seem to be any matching order.

    * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
    because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
    an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
    file.

    The conversion was done in the following steps.

    1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
    over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
    and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
    files.

    2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
    some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
    embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
    inclusions to around 150 files.

    3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
    from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.

    4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
    e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
    APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.

    5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
    editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
    files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
    inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
    wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
    slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
    necessary.

    6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.

    7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
    were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
    distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
    more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
    build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).

    * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
    * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
    * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
    * ia64 SMP allmodconfig
    * s390 SMP allmodconfig
    * alpha SMP allmodconfig
    * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig

    8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
    a separate patch and serve as bisection point.

    Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
    6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
    If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
    headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
    the specific arch.

    Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
    Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
    Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
    Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>

    Tejun Heo
     

23 Sep, 2009

4 commits

  • When searching through the global authentication tokens for a given key
    signature, verify that a matching key has not been revoked and has not
    expired. This allows the `keyctl revoke` command to be properly used on
    keys in use by eCryptfs.

    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
    Cc: stable
    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks

    Tyler Hicks
     
  • Returns -ENOTSUPP when attempting to use filename encryption with
    something other than a password authentication token, such as a private
    token from openssl. Using filename encryption with a userspace eCryptfs
    key module is a future goal. Until then, this patch handles the
    situation a little better than simply using a BUG_ON().

    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
    Cc: stable
    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks

    Tyler Hicks
     
  • Returns an error when an unrecognized cipher code is present in a tag 3
    packet or an ecryptfs_crypt_stat cannot be initialized. Also sets an
    crypt_stat->tfm error pointer to NULL to ensure that it will not be
    incorrectly freed in ecryptfs_destroy_crypt_stat().

    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net
    Cc: stable
    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks

    Tyler Hicks
     
  • Lockdep reports the following valid-looking possible AB-BA deadlock with
    global_auth_tok_list_mutex and keysig_list_mutex:

    ecryptfs_new_file_context() ->
    ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() ->
    mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);
    -> ecryptfs_add_keysig() ->
    mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);

    vs

    ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set() ->
    mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex);
    -> ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig() ->
    mutex_lock(&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex);

    ie the two mutexes are taken in opposite orders in the two different
    code paths. I'm not sure if this is a real bug where two threads could
    actually hit the two paths in parallel and deadlock, but it at least
    makes lockdep impossible to use with ecryptfs since this report triggers
    every time and disables future lockdep reporting.

    Since ecryptfs_add_keysig() is called only from the single callsite in
    ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(), the simplest fix seems to
    be to move the lock of keysig_list_mutex back up outside of the where
    global_auth_tok_list_mutex is taken. This patch does that, and fixes
    the lockdep report on my system (and ecryptfs still works OK).

    The full output of lockdep fixed by this patch is:

    =======================================================
    [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
    2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd2
    -------------------------------------------------------
    gdm/2640 is trying to acquire lock:
    (&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90

    but task is already holding lock:
    (&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x58/0x2b0

    which lock already depends on the new lock.

    the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

    -> #1 (&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}:
    [] check_prev_add+0x2a7/0x370
    [] validate_chain+0x661/0x750
    [] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430
    [] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150
    [] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0
    [] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60
    [] ecryptfs_add_keysig+0x5a/0xb0
    [] ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs+0x59/0xb0
    [] ecryptfs_new_file_context+0xa6/0x1a0
    [] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x4a/0x140
    [] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60
    [] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0
    [] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110
    [] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0
    [] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140
    [] sys_open+0x20/0x30
    [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
    [] 0xffffffffffffffff

    -> #0 (&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex){+.+.+.}:
    [] check_prev_add+0x85/0x370
    [] validate_chain+0x661/0x750
    [] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430
    [] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150
    [] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0
    [] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60
    [] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
    [] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x105/0x2b0
    [] ecryptfs_write_headers_virt+0xc9/0x120
    [] ecryptfs_write_metadata+0xcd/0x200
    [] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x6b/0x140
    [] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60
    [] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0
    [] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110
    [] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0
    [] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140
    [] sys_open+0x20/0x30
    [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
    [] 0xffffffffffffffff

    other info that might help us debug this:

    2 locks held by gdm/2640:
    #0: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#11){+.+.+.}, at: [] do_filp_open+0x3cb/0xae0
    #1: (&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x58/0x2b0

    stack backtrace:
    Pid: 2640, comm: gdm Tainted: G C 2.6.31-2-generic #14~rbd2
    Call Trace:
    [] print_circular_bug_tail+0xa8/0xf0
    [] check_prev_add+0x85/0x370
    [] ? __module_text_address+0x12/0x60
    [] validate_chain+0x661/0x750
    [] ? print_context_stack+0x85/0x140
    [] ? find_usage_backwards+0x38/0x160
    [] __lock_acquire+0x237/0x430
    [] lock_acquire+0xa5/0x150
    [] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
    [] ? check_usage_backwards+0x0/0xb0
    [] __mutex_lock_common+0x4d/0x3d0
    [] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
    [] ? ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
    [] ? mark_held_locks+0x6c/0xa0
    [] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xfd/0x1a0
    [] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x14d/0x190
    [] mutex_lock_nested+0x46/0x60
    [] ecryptfs_find_global_auth_tok_for_sig+0x2e/0x90
    [] ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set+0x105/0x2b0
    [] ecryptfs_write_headers_virt+0xc9/0x120
    [] ecryptfs_write_metadata+0xcd/0x200
    [] ? ecryptfs_init_persistent_file+0x60/0xe0
    [] ecryptfs_initialize_file+0x6b/0x140
    [] ecryptfs_create+0x2d/0x60
    [] vfs_create+0xb4/0xe0
    [] __open_namei_create+0xc4/0x110
    [] do_filp_open+0xa01/0xae0
    [] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x5e/0xb0
    [] ? _spin_unlock+0x2b/0x40
    [] ? getname+0x3b/0x240
    [] ? alloc_fd+0xfa/0x140
    [] do_sys_open+0x69/0x140
    [] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
    [] sys_open+0x20/0x30
    [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

    Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier
    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks

    Roland Dreier
     

29 Jul, 2009

2 commits

  • The parse_tag_3_packet function does not check if the tag 3 packet contains a
    encrypted key size larger than ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES.

    Signed-off-by: Ramon de Carvalho Valle
    [tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com: Added printk newline and changed goto to out_free]
    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
    Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.27 and 30)
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Ramon de Carvalho Valle
     
  • Tag 11 packets are stored in the metadata section of an eCryptfs file to
    store the key signature(s) used to encrypt the file encryption key.
    After extracting the packet length field to determine the key signature
    length, a check is not performed to see if the length would exceed the
    key signature buffer size that was passed into parse_tag_11_packet().

    Thanks to Ramon de Carvalho Valle for finding this bug using fsfuzzer.

    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
    Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.27 and 30)
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Tyler Hicks
     

01 Apr, 2009

1 commit


15 Mar, 2009

1 commit

  • eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption
    keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is
    encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the
    encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the
    FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than
    their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the
    FNEK.

    This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from
    being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK
    from being encrypted with a FNEK.

    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
    Cc: Serge Hallyn
    Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Tyler Hicks
     

07 Jan, 2009

4 commits

  • Kerneldoc updates for ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet().

    Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
    Cc: Dustin Kirkland
    Cc: Eric Sandeen
    Cc: Tyler Hicks
    Cc: David Kleikamp
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Michael Halcrow
     
  • Correct several format string data type specifiers. Correct filename size
    data types; they should be size_t rather than int when passed as
    parameters to some other functions (although note that the filenames will
    never be larger than int).

    Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
    Cc: Dustin Kirkland
    Cc: Eric Sandeen
    Cc: Tyler Hicks
    Cc: David Kleikamp
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Michael Halcrow
     
  • %Z is a gcc-ism. Using %z instead.

    Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
    Cc: Dustin Kirkland
    Cc: Eric Sandeen
    Cc: Tyler Hicks
    Cc: David Kleikamp
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Michael Halcrow
     
  • This patchset implements filename encryption via a passphrase-derived
    mount-wide Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) specified as a mount parameter.
    Each encrypted filename has a fixed prefix indicating that eCryptfs should
    try to decrypt the filename. When eCryptfs encounters this prefix, it
    decodes the filename into a tag 70 packet and then decrypts the packet
    contents using the FNEK, setting the filename to the decrypted filename.
    Both unencrypted and encrypted filenames can reside in the same lower
    filesystem.

    Because filename encryption expands the length of the filename during the
    encoding stage, eCryptfs will not properly handle filenames that are
    already near the maximum filename length.

    In the present implementation, eCryptfs must be able to produce a match
    against the lower encrypted and encoded filename representation when given
    a plaintext filename. Therefore, two files having the same plaintext name
    will encrypt and encode into the same lower filename if they are both
    encrypted using the same FNEK. This can be changed by finding a way to
    replace the prepended bytes in the blocked-aligned filename with random
    characters; they are hashes of the FNEK right now, so that it is possible
    to deterministically map from a plaintext filename to an encrypted and
    encoded filename in the lower filesystem. An implementation using random
    characters will have to decode and decrypt every single directory entry in
    any given directory any time an event occurs wherein the VFS needs to
    determine whether a particular file exists in the lower directory and the
    decrypted and decoded filenames have not yet been extracted for that
    directory.

    Thanks to Tyler Hicks and David Kleikamp for assistance in the development
    of this patchset.

    This patch:

    A tag 70 packet contains a filename encrypted with a Filename Encryption
    Key (FNEK). This patch implements functions for writing and parsing tag
    70 packets. This patch also adds definitions and extends structures to
    support filename encryption.

    Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
    Cc: Dustin Kirkland
    Cc: Eric Sandeen
    Cc: Tyler Hicks
    Cc: David Kleikamp
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Michael Halcrow
     

20 Nov, 2008

1 commit

  • I have received some reports of out-of-memory errors on some older AMD
    architectures. These errors are what I would expect to see if
    crypt_stat->key were split between two separate pages. eCryptfs should
    not assume that any of the memory sent through virt_to_scatterlist() is
    all contained in a single page, and so this patch allocates two
    scatterlist structs instead of one when processing keys. I have received
    confirmation from one person affected by this bug that this patch resolves
    the issue for him, and so I am submitting it for inclusion in a future
    stable release.

    Note that virt_to_scatterlist() runs sg_init_table() on the scatterlist
    structs passed to it, so the calls to sg_init_table() in
    decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key() are redundant.

    Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
    Reported-by: Paulo J. S. Silva
    Cc: "Leon Woestenberg"
    Cc: Tim Gardner
    Cc:
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Michael Halcrow
     

17 Oct, 2008

1 commit

  • The netlink transport code has not worked for a while and the miscdev
    transport is a simpler solution. This patch removes the netlink code and
    makes the miscdev transport the only eCryptfs kernel to userspace
    transport.

    Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks
    Cc: Michael Halcrow
    Cc: Dustin Kirkland
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Tyler Hicks
     

25 Jul, 2008

1 commit

  • Mounting with invalid key signatures should probably fail, if they were
    specifically requested but not available.

    Also fix case checks in process_request_key_err() for the right sign of
    the errnos, as spotted by Jan Tluka.

    Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen
    Reviewed-by: Jan Tluka
    Acked-by: Michael Halcrow
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Eric Sandeen
     

29 Apr, 2008

1 commit

  • Update the versioning information. Make the message types generic. Add an
    outgoing message queue to the daemon struct. Make the functions to parse
    and write the packet lengths available to the rest of the module. Add
    functions to create and destroy the daemon structs. Clean up some of the
    comments and make the code a little more consistent with itself.

    [akpm@linux-foundation.org: printk fixes]
    Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Michael Halcrow
     

07 Feb, 2008

1 commit


18 Dec, 2007

1 commit

  • ecryptfs_destroy_mount_crypt_stat() checks whether each
    auth_tok->global_auth_tok_key is nonzero and if so puts that key. However,
    in some early mount error paths nothing has initialized the pointer, and we
    try to key_put() garbage. Running the bad cipher tests in the testsuite
    exposes this, and it's happy with the following change.

    Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen
    Cc: Michael Halcrow
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Eric Sandeen
     

23 Oct, 2007

1 commit


17 Oct, 2007

2 commits