09 Jan, 2012

1 commit


20 Dec, 2011

2 commits


08 Dec, 2011

2 commits


09 Nov, 2011

1 commit

  • This patch adds support for digital signature verification to EVM.
    With this feature file metadata can be protected using digital
    signature instead of an HMAC. When building an image,
    which has to be flashed to different devices, an HMAC cannot
    be used to sign file metadata, because the HMAC key should be
    different on every device.

    Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
    Acked-by: Mimi Zohar

    Dmitry Kasatkin
     

15 Sep, 2011

4 commits

  • Before permitting 'security.evm' to be updated, 'security.evm' must
    exist and be valid. In the case that there are no existing EVM protected
    xattrs, it is safe for posix acls to update the mode bits.

    To differentiate between no 'security.evm' xattr and no xattrs used to
    calculate 'security.evm', this patch defines INTEGRITY_NOXATTR.

    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

    Mimi Zohar
     
  • The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not
    affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
    acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.

    This patch updates security.evm when posix xattr acls are written.

    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

    Mimi Zohar
     
  • evm_protect_xattr unnecessarily validates the current security.evm
    integrity, before updating non-evm protected extended attributes
    and other file metadata. This patch limits validating the current
    security.evm integrity to evm protected metadata.

    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

    Mimi Zohar
     
  • All tristates selected by EVM(boolean) are forced to be builtin, except
    in the TCG_TPM(tristate) dependency case. Arnaud Lacombe summarizes the
    Kconfig bug as, "So it would seem direct dependency state influence the
    state of reverse dependencies.." For a detailed explanation, refer to
    Arnaud Lacombe's posting http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/23/498.

    With the "encrypted-keys: remove trusted-keys dependency" patch, EVM
    can now be built without a dependency on TCG_TPM. The trusted-keys
    dependency requires trusted-keys to either be builtin or not selected.
    This dependency will prevent the boolean/tristate mismatch from
    occuring.

    Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell ,
    Randy Dunlap
    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

    Mimi Zohar
     

18 Aug, 2011

1 commit

  • Although the EVM encrypted-key should be encrypted/decrypted using a
    trusted-key, a user-defined key could be used instead. When using a user-
    defined key, a TCG_TPM dependency should not be required. Unfortunately,
    the encrypted-key code needs to be refactored a bit in order to remove
    this dependency.

    This patch adds the TCG_TPM dependency.

    Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell ,
    Randy Dunlap
    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Mimi Zohar
     

11 Aug, 2011

1 commit


09 Aug, 2011

1 commit


19 Jul, 2011

10 commits

  • Permit changing of security.evm only when valid, unless in fixmode.

    Reported-by: Roberto Sassu
    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

    Mimi Zohar
     
  • In addition to requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN permission to modify/delete
    security.evm, prohibit invalid security.evm xattrs from changing,
    unless in fixmode. This patch prevents inadvertent 'fixing' of
    security.evm to reflect offline modifications.

    Changelog v7:
    - rename boot paramater 'evm_mode' to 'evm'

    Reported-by: Roberto Sassu
    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

    Mimi Zohar
     
  • We will use digital signatures in addtion to hmac.

    Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

    Dmitry Kasatkin
     
  • If EVM is not supported or enabled, evm_verify_hmac() returns
    INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN, which ima_appraise_measurement() ignores and sets
    the appraisal status based solely on the security.ima verification.

    evm_verify_hmac() also returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN for other failures, such
    as temporary failures like -ENOMEM, resulting in possible attack vectors.
    This patch changes the default return code for temporary/unexpected
    failures, like -ENOMEM, from INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN to INTEGRITY_FAIL, making
    evm_verify_hmac() fail safe.

    As a result, failures need to be re-evaluated in order to catch both
    temporary errors, such as the -ENOMEM, as well as errors that have been
    resolved in fix mode.

    Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

    Dmitry Kasatkin
     
  • Additional iint parameter allows to skip lookup in the cache.

    Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

    Dmitry Kasatkin
     
  • Using shash is more efficient, because the algorithm is allocated only
    once. Only the descriptor to store the hash state needs to be allocated
    for every operation.

    Changelog v6:
    - check for crypto_shash_setkey failure

    Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

    Dmitry Kasatkin
     
  • Initialize 'security.evm' for new files.

    Changelog v7:
    - renamed evm_inode_post_init_security to evm_inode_init_security
    - moved struct xattr definition to earlier patch
    - allocate xattr name
    Changelog v6:
    - Use 'struct evm_ima_xattr_data'

    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

    Mimi Zohar
     
  • Imbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(),
    evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr()
    protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and
    evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode.

    (Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.)

    Changelog:
    - Don't define evm_verifyxattr(), unless CONFIG_INTEGRITY is enabled.
    - xattr_name is a 'const', value is 'void *'

    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn

    Mimi Zohar
     
  • EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity
    attacks. The current patchset maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security
    xattrs, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. We
    anticipate other methods for protecting the security extended attributes.
    This patch reserves the first byte of 'security.evm' as a place holder for
    the type of method.

    Changelog v6:
    - move evm_ima_xattr_type definition to security/integrity/integrity.h
    - defined a structure for the EVM xattr called evm_ima_xattr_data
    (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion)
    - removed unnecessary memset

    Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin
    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn

    Dmitry Kasatkin
     
  • EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity
    attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The
    initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended
    attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
    Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted
    separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures).

    While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and
    cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other
    directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify
    the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately
    (eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the
    proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper:
    http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf.

    EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a
    trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the
    root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has
    been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > /evm), EVM can
    not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.
    Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally
    this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the
    trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing
    trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A
    sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is
    available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.

    Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined
    at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks:
    evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To
    initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three
    calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and
    evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security
    xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr().

    Changelog v7:
    - Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation

    Changelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review)
    - fix URL in patch description
    - remove evm_hmac_size definition
    - use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size)
    - moved linux include before other includes
    - test for crypto_hash_setkey failure
    - fail earlier for invalid key
    - clear entire encrypted key, even on failure
    - check xattr name length before comparing xattr names

    Changelog:
    - locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex
    - using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1
    operation.
    - replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin)
    - support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs
    (Dmitry Kasatkin)
    - iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised
    - Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin
    - Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM

    Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn

    Mimi Zohar