Eric Lee / smarc-fsl-linux-kernel

14 May, 2010

1 commit

  • 4ae69e6b7   mmap_min_addr check CAP_SYS_RAWIO only for write ... Browse Code »

    Redirecting directly to lsm, here's the patch discussed on lkml:
    http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/4/22/219

    The mmap_min_addr value is useful information for an admin to see without
    being root ("is my system vulnerable to kernel NULL pointer attacks?") and
    its setting is trivially easy for an attacker to determine by calling
    mmap() in PAGE_SIZE increments starting at 0, so trying to keep it private
    has no value.

    Only require CAP_SYS_RAWIO if changing the value, not reading it.

    Comment from Serge :

    Me, I like to write my passwords with light blue pen on dark blue
    paper, pasted on my window - if you're going to get my password, you're
    gonna get a headache.

    Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Signed-off-by: James Morris
    (cherry picked from commit 822cceec7248013821d655545ea45d1c6a9d15b3)

    Kees Cook
     

17 Dec, 2009

1 commit

09 Nov, 2009

1 commit

  • 0e1a6ef2d   sysctl: require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to set mmap_min_addr ... Browse Code »

    Currently the mmap_min_addr value can only be bypassed during mmap when
    the task has CAP_SYS_RAWIO. However, the mmap_min_addr sysctl value itself
    can be adjusted to 0 if euid == 0, allowing a bypass without CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
    This patch adds a check for the capability before allowing mmap_min_addr to
    be changed.

    Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Kees Cook
     

24 Sep, 2009

1 commit

  • 8d65af789   sysctl: remove "struct file *" argument of ->proc_handler ... Browse Code »

    It's unused.

    It isn't needed -- read or write flag is already passed and sysctl
    shouldn't care about the rest.

    It _was_ used in two places at arch/frv for some reason.

    Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan
    Cc: David Howells
    Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
    Cc: Al Viro
    Cc: Ralf Baechle
    Cc: Martin Schwidefsky
    Cc: Ingo Molnar
    Cc: "David S. Miller"
    Cc: James Morris
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

    Alexey Dobriyan
     

17 Aug, 2009

1 commit

  • 788084aba   Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr ... Browse Code »

    Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory
    is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to
    ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how
    much space the LSM should protect.

    The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux
    permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by
    CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.

    This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason
    being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux
    controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to
    map some area of low memory.

    Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
    Signed-off-by: James Morris

    Eric Paris