20 Sep, 2016
1 commit
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Right now LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH type contains "struct path" in union "u"
of common_audit_data. This information is used to print path of file
at the same time it is also used to get to dentry and inode. And this
inode information is used to get to superblock and device and print
device information.This does not work well for layered filesystems like overlay where dentry
contained in path is overlay dentry and not the real dentry of underlying
file system. That means inode retrieved from dentry is also overlay
inode and not the real inode.SELinux helpers like file_path_has_perm() are doing checks on inode
retrieved from file_inode(). This returns the real inode and not the
overlay inode. That means we are doing check on real inode but for audit
purposes we are printing details of overlay inode and that can be
confusing while debugging.Hence, introduce a new type LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE which carries file
information and inode retrieved is real inode using file_inode(). That
way right avc denied information is given to user.For example, following is one example avc before the patch.
type=AVC msg=audit(1473360868.399:214): avc: denied { read open } for
pid=1765 comm="cat"
path="/root/.../overlay/container1/merged/readfile"
dev="overlay" ino=21443
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_overlay_client_t:s0:c10,c20
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:test_overlay_files_ro_t:s0
tclass=file permissive=0It looks as follows after the patch.
type=AVC msg=audit(1473360017.388:282): avc: denied { read open } for
pid=2530 comm="cat"
path="/root/.../overlay/container1/merged/readfile"
dev="dm-0" ino=2377915
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_overlay_client_t:s0:c10,c20
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:test_overlay_files_ro_t:s0
tclass=file permissive=0Notice that now dev information points to "dm-0" device instead of
"overlay" device. This makes it clear that check failed on underlying
inode and not on the overlay inode.Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal
[PM: slight tweaks to the description to make checkpatch.pl happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
14 Jul, 2015
1 commit
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Add information about ioctl calls to the LSM audit data. Log the
file path and command number.Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
10 Apr, 2012
3 commits
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It isn't needed. If you don't set the type of the data associated with
that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug. So why waste the cycles?Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
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There are no legitimate users. Always use current and get back some stack
space for the common_audit_data.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
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Just open code it so grep on the source code works better.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
04 Apr, 2012
3 commits
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It just bloats the audit data structure for no good reason, since the
only time those fields are filled are just before calling the
common_lsm_audit() function, which is also the only user of those
fields.So just make them be the arguments to common_lsm_audit(), rather than
bloating that structure that is passed around everywhere, and is
initialized in hot paths.Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
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After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm
not going to shrink the data union. To do this I'm going to move anything
larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared
separately on the calling stack. Thus hot paths which don't need more than
a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded
structures. I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key
struct and the struct path. We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of
networking.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds -
Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch
requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than
doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their
portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a
bigger space requirement.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
29 Mar, 2012
1 commit
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Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h preparatory to splitting and killing
it. Performed with the following command:perl -p -i -e 's!^#\s*include\s*.*\n!!' `grep -Irl '^#\s*include\s*' *`
Signed-off-by: David Howells
26 Apr, 2011
2 commits
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This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from
one that contains a full path. This allows us to make it harder to
misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler -
The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces
of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or
inode. Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code
complexity.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
02 Aug, 2010
2 commits
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Update lsm_audit for AppArmor specific data, and add the core routines for
AppArmor uses for auditing.Signed-off-by: John Johansen
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Currently there are a number of applications (nautilus being the main one) which
calls access() on files in order to determine how they should be displayed. It
is normal and expected that nautilus will want to see if files are executable
or if they are really read/write-able. access() should return the real
permission. SELinux policy checks are done in access() and can result in lots
of AVC denials as policy denies RWX on files which DAC allows. Currently
SELinux must dontaudit actual attempts to read/write/execute a file in
order to silence these messages (and not flood the logs.) But dontaudit rules
like that can hide real attacks. This patch addes a new common file
permission audit_access. This permission is special in that it is meaningless
and should never show up in an allow rule. Instead the only place this
permission has meaning is in a dontaudit rule like so:dontaudit nautilus_t sbin_t:file audit_access
With such a rule if nautilus just checks access() we will still get denied and
thus userspace will still get the correct answer but we will not log the denial.
If nautilus attempted to actually perform one of the forbidden actions
(rather than just querying access(2) about it) we would still log a denial.
This type of dontaudit rule should be used sparingly, as it could be a
method for an attacker to probe the system permissions without detection.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
28 Apr, 2010
1 commit
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Most of the LSM common audit work uses LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* for the naming.
This was not so for LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT which means the generic initializer
cannot be used. This patch just renames the flag so the generic
initializer can be used.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
10 Nov, 2009
1 commit
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For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the
module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request.Example output:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc: denied { module_request } for pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=systemSigned-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
17 Aug, 2009
1 commit
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Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h,
for better maintainability.- changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of
avc_audit_data
- eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead.Had to add a LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to lsm_audit.h so that avc_audit
can call common_lsm_audit and do the pre and post callbacks without
doing the actual dump. This makes it so that the patched version
behaves the same way as the unpatched version.Also added a denied field to the selinux_audit_data private space,
once again to make it so that the patched version behaves like the
unpatched.I've tested and confirmed that AVCs look the same before and after
this patch.Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley
Signed-off-by: James Morris
10 Jul, 2009
3 commits
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Wrapped the smack_audit_data and selinux_audit_data
structs in include/linux/lsm_audit.h in ifdefs so that the
union will always be the correct size.Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Made the lsm_priv union in include/linux/lsm_audit.h
anonymous.Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Moved variable function in include/linux/lsm_audit.h into the
smack_audit_data struct since it is never used outside of it.Also removed setting of function in the COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT
macro because that variable is now private to SMACK.Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu
Acked-by: Eric Paris
I-dont-see-any-problems-with-it: Casey Schaufler
Signed-off-by: James Morris
14 Apr, 2009
1 commit
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This patch creates auditing functions usable by LSM to audit security
events. It provides standard dumping of FS, NET, task etc ... events
(code borrowed from SELinux)
and provides 2 callbacks to define LSM specific auditing, which should be
flexible enough to convert SELinux too.Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler
cked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
