08 Oct, 2016
1 commit
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Current supplementary groups code can massively overallocate memory and
is implemented in a way so that access to individual gid is done via 2D
array.If number of gids is
Cc: Vasily Kulikov
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
18 Jul, 2014
1 commit
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sparse says:
fs/nfsd/auth.c:31:38: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces)
fs/nfsd/auth.c:31:38: expected struct cred const *cred
fs/nfsd/auth.c:31:38: got struct cred const [noderef] *real_credAdd a new accessor for the ->real_cred and use that to fetch the
pointer. Accessing current->real_cred directly is actually quite safe
since we know that they can't go away so this is mostly a cosmetic fixup
to silence sparse.Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields
31 May, 2014
2 commits
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Commit 8f6c5ffc8987 ("kernel/groups.c: remove return value of
set_groups") removed the last use of "ret".Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields -
After commit 4c1e1b34d5c8 ("nfsd: Store ex_anon_uid and ex_anon_gid as
kuids and kgids") using kuid/kgid for ex_anon_uid/ex_anon_gid,
user_namespace.h is not needed.Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields
04 Apr, 2014
1 commit
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After commit 6307f8fee295 ("security: remove dead hook task_setgroups"),
set_groups will always return zero, so we could just remove return value
of set_groups.This patch reduces code size, and simplfies code to use set_groups,
because we don't need to check its return value any more.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove obsolete claims from set_groups() comment]
Signed-off-by: Wang YanQing
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman"
Cc: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
13 Feb, 2013
2 commits
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Use uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) instead of !uid.
Use gid_eq(gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID) instead of !gid.
Use uid_eq(uid, INVALID_UID) instead of uid == -1
Use gid_eq(uid, INVALID_GID) instead of gid == -1
Use uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID instead of uid = 0;
Use gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID instead of gid = 0;
Use !uid_eq(uid1, uid2) instead of uid1 != uid2.
Use !gid_eq(gid1, gid2) instead of gid1 != gid2.
Use uid_eq(uid1, uid2) instead of uid1 == uid2.Cc: "J. Bruce Fields"
Cc: Trond Myklebust
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" -
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields"
Cc: Trond Myklebust
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"
01 Jun, 2012
2 commits
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Pull the rest of the nfsd commits from Bruce Fields:
"... and then I cherry-picked the remainder of the patches from the
head of my previous branch"This is the rest of the original nfsd branch, rebased without the
delegation stuff that I thought really needed to be redone.I don't like rebasing things like this in general, but in this situation
this was the lesser of two evils.* 'for-3.5' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (50 commits)
nfsd4: fix, consolidate client_has_state
nfsd4: don't remove rebooted client record until confirmation
nfsd4: remove some dprintk's and a comment
nfsd4: return "real" sequence id in confirmed case
nfsd4: fix exchange_id to return confirm flag
nfsd4: clarify that renewing expired client is a bug
nfsd4: simpler ordering of setclientid_confirm checks
nfsd4: setclientid: remove pointless assignment
nfsd4: fix error return in non-matching-creds case
nfsd4: fix setclientid_confirm same_cred check
nfsd4: merge 3 setclientid cases to 2
nfsd4: pull out common code from setclientid cases
nfsd4: merge last two setclientid cases
nfsd4: setclientid/confirm comment cleanup
nfsd4: setclientid remove unnecessary terms from a logical expression
nfsd4: move rq_flavor into svc_cred
nfsd4: stricter cred comparison for setclientid/exchange_id
nfsd4: move principal name into svc_cred
nfsd4: allow removing clients not holding state
nfsd4: rearrange exchange_id logic to simplify
... -
Move the rq_flavor into struct svc_cred, and use it in setclientid and
exchange_id comparisons as well.Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields
03 May, 2012
1 commit
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As a first step to converting struct cred to be all kuid_t and kgid_t
values convert the group values stored in group_info to always be
kgid_t values. Unless user namespaces are used this change should
have no effect.Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman
16 Dec, 2009
1 commit
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The new .h files have paths at the top that are now out of date. While
we're here, just remove all of those from fs/nfsd; they never served any
purpose.Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields
15 Dec, 2009
2 commits
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Lots of include/linux/nfsd/* headers are only used by
nfsd module. Move them to the source directorySigned-off-by: Boaz Harrosh
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields -
Now that the headers are fixed and carry their own wait, all fs/nfsd/
source files can include a minimal set of headers. and still compile just
fine.This patch should improve the compilation speed of the nfsd module.
Signed-off-by: Boaz Harrosh
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields
02 Sep, 2009
1 commit
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Add a config option (CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS) to turn on some debug checking
for credential management. The additional code keeps track of the number of
pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that
this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct (which includes
all references, not just those from task_structs).Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, the code also checks that the security
pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid.This attempts to catch the bug whereby inode_has_perm() faults in an nfsd
kernel thread on seeing cred->security be a NULL pointer (it appears that the
credential struct has been previously released):http://www.kerneloops.org/oops.php?number=252883
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris
28 Jan, 2009
2 commits
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Since override_creds() took its own reference on new, we need to release
our own reference.(Note the put_cred on the return value puts the *old* value of
current->creds, not the new passed-in value).Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields
-
We're forgetting to check the return value from groups_alloc().
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields
08 Jan, 2009
1 commit
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Fix a regression in NFSD's permission checking introduced by the credentials
patches. There are two parts to the problem, both in nfsd_setuser():(1) The return value of set_groups() is -ve if in error, not 0, and should be
checked appropriately. 0 indicates success.(2) The UID to use for fs accesses is in new->fsuid, not new->uid (which is
0). This causes CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE to always be set, rather than being
cleared if the UID is anything other than 0 after squashing.Reported-by: J. Bruce Fields
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields
14 Nov, 2008
3 commits
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Differentiate the objective and real subjective credentials from the effective
subjective credentials on a task by introducing a second credentials pointer
into the task_struct.task_struct::real_cred then refers to the objective and apparent real
subjective credentials of a task, as perceived by the other tasks in the
system.task_struct::cred then refers to the effective subjective credentials of a
task, as used by that task when it's actually running. These are not visible
to the other tasks in the system.__task_cred(task) then refers to the objective/real credentials of the task in
question.current_cred() refers to the effective subjective credentials of the current
task.prepare_creds() uses the objective creds as a base and commit_creds() changes
both pointers in the task_struct (indeed commit_creds() requires them to be the
same).override_creds() and revert_creds() change the subjective creds pointer only,
and the former returns the old subjective creds. These are used by NFSD,
faccessat() and do_coredump(), and will by used by CacheFiles.In SELinux, current_has_perm() is provided as an alternative to
task_has_perm(). This uses the effective subjective context of current,
whereas task_has_perm() uses the objective/real context of the subject.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: James Morris
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris
24 Apr, 2008
1 commit
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Add extern to nfsd/nfsd.h
fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c:146:5: warning: symbol 'nfsd_nrthreads' was not declared. Should it be static?
fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c:261:5: warning: symbol 'nfsd_nrpools' was not declared. Should it be static?
fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c:269:5: warning: symbol 'nfsd_get_nrthreads' was not declared. Should it be static?
fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c:281:5: warning: symbol 'nfsd_set_nrthreads' was not declared. Should it be static?
fs/nfsd/export.c:1534:23: warning: symbol 'nfs_exports_op' was not declared. Should it be static?Add include of auth.h
fs/nfsd/auth.c:27:5: warning: symbol 'nfsd_setuser' was not declared. Should it be static?Make static, move forward declaration closer to where it's needed.
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c:1877:1: warning: symbol 'laundromat_main' was not declared. Should it be static?Make static, forward declaration was already marked static.
fs/nfsd/nfs4idmap.c:206:1: warning: symbol 'idtoname_parse' was not declared. Should it be static?
fs/nfsd/vfs.c:1156:1: warning: symbol 'nfsd_create_setattr' was not declared. Should it be static?Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields
06 Feb, 2008
1 commit
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The patch supports legacy (32-bit) capability userspace, and where possible
translates 32-bit capabilities to/from userspace and the VFS to 64-bit
kernel space capabilities. If a capability set cannot be compressed into
32-bits for consumption by user space, the system call fails, with -ERANGE.FWIW libcap-2.00 supports this change (and earlier capability formats)
http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-syle fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_task_comm()]
[ezk@cs.sunysb.edu: build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: do not initialise statics to 0 or NULL]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unused var]
[serue@us.ibm.com: export __cap_ symbols]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: James Morris
Cc: Casey Schaufler
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
20 Jul, 2007
1 commit
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Share a little common code, reverse the arguments for consistency, drop the
unnecessary "inline", and lowercase the name.Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields"
Acked-by: Neil Brown
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
18 Jul, 2007
1 commit
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Allow root squashing to vary per-pseudoflavor, so that you can (for example)
allow root access only when sufficiently strong security is in use.Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields"
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
11 Apr, 2006
1 commit
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In addition to setting the processes filesystem id's, nfsd_setuser also
modifies the value of the rq_cred which stores the id's that originally came
from the rpc call, for example to reflect root squashing.There's no real reason to do that--the only case where rqstp->rq_cred is
actually used later on is in the NFSv4 SETCLIENTID/SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM
operations, and there the results are the opposite of what we want--those two
operations don't deal with the filesystem at all, they only record the
credentials used with the rpc call for later reference (so that we may require
the same credentials be used on later operations), and the credentials
shouldn't vary just because there was or wasn't a previous operation in the
compound that referred to some exportThis fixes a bug which caused mounts from Solaris clients to fail.
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
17 Apr, 2005
1 commit
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Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.Let it rip!
