08 Sep, 2016
2 commits
-
Pull more hardened usercopyfixes from Kees Cook:
- force check_object_size() to be inline too
- move page-spanning check behind a CONFIG since it's triggering false
positives[ Changed the page-spanning config option to depend on EXPERT in the
merge. That way it still gets build testing, and you can enable it if
you want to, but is never enabled for "normal" configurations ]* tag 'usercopy-v4.8-rc6-part2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
usercopy: remove page-spanning test for now
usercopy: force check_object_size() inline -
A custom allocator without __GFP_COMP that copies to userspace has been
found in vmw_execbuf_process[1], so this disables the page-span checker
by placing it behind a CONFIG for future work where such things can be
tracked down later.[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1373326
Reported-by: Vinson Lee
Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
20 Aug, 2016
1 commit
-
The kernel test robot reported a usercopy failure in the new hardened
sanity checks, due to a page-crossing copy of the FPU state into the
task structure.This happened because the kernel test robot was testing with SLOB, which
doesn't actually do the required book-keeping for slab allocations, and
as a result the hardening code didn't realize that the task struct
allocation was one single allocation - and the sanity checks fail.Since SLOB doesn't even claim to support hardening (and you really
shouldn't use it), the straightforward solution is to just make the
usercopy hardening code depend on the allocator supporting it.Reported-by: kernel test robot
Cc: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
27 Jul, 2016
1 commit
-
This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This
is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The
work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port
from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel.This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when
performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object
being copied to/from:
- address range doesn't wrap around
- address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size)
- if on the slab allocator:
- object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is
implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches)
- otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved
and CMA ranges)
- if on the stack
- object must not extend before/after the current process stack
- object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is
arch/build support for identifying stack frames)
- object must not overlap with kernel textSigned-off-by: Kees Cook
Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman
21 Apr, 2016
1 commit
-
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris
28 Jul, 2015
1 commit
-
Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded
config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main
Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since
distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively
a no-op change.Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: James Morris
16 Apr, 2015
1 commit
-
There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their
functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems,
supporting multiple users is not necessary.This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for
non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled
under CONFIG_EXPERT menu.When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case
and processes always have all capabilities.The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid,
setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups,
getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset.Also, groups.c is compiled out completely.
In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid
adding two ifdef blocks.This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal
kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than
low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much.The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work.
Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS.Bloat-o-meter output:
add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650)[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
05 Feb, 2014
1 commit
-
Binaries compiled for arm may run on arm64 if CONFIG_COMPAT is
selected. Set LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR to 32768 if ARM64 && COMPAT to
prevent selinux failures launching 32-bit static executables that
are mapped at 0x8000.Signed-off-by: Colin Cross
Acked-by: Will Deacon
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Acked-by: James Morris
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas
11 May, 2012
1 commit
-
Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig as there are going to be a lot
of key-related options.Signed-off-by: David Howells
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar
10 Feb, 2012
1 commit
-
This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security
improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have
existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the
mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.Signed-off-by: Kees Cook
Acked-by: John Johansen
Signed-off-by: James Morris
15 Sep, 2011
1 commit
-
Encrypted keys are decrypted/encrypted using either a trusted-key or,
for those systems without a TPM, a user-defined key. This patch
removes the trusted-keys and TCG_TPM dependencies.Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
19 Jul, 2011
1 commit
-
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory
in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.Changelog:
- don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
- rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs,
locks, etc to 'integrity_'
- replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles
- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0
- rebased on current ima_iint.c
- define integrity_iint_store/lock as staticThere should be no other functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
22 Mar, 2011
1 commit
-
The default for this is universally set to 64k, but the help says:
For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.The text is right, in that we are seeing selinux-enabled ARM targets
that fail to launch /sbin/init because selinux blocks a memory map.
So select the right value if we know we are building ARM.Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker
Signed-off-by: James Morris
29 Nov, 2010
2 commits
-
Define a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys are kernel
generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'trusted'
symmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel.
Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.Changelog:
- bug fix: replaced master-key rcu based locking with semaphore
(reported by David Howells)
- Removed memset of crypto_shash_digest() digest output
- Replaced verification of 'key-type:key-desc' using strcspn(), with
one based on string constants.
- Moved documentation to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Replace hash with shash (based on comments by David Howells)
- Make lengths/counts size_t where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
Could not convert most lengths, as crypto expects 'unsigned int'
(size_t: on 32 bit is defined as unsigned int, but on 64 bit is unsigned long)
- Add 'const' where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
- allocate derived_buf dynamically to support arbitrary length master key
(fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered
- cleanup security/Kconfig
- Add missing 'update' keyword (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Free epayload on failure to create key (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Increase the data size limit (requested by Roberto Sassu)
- Crypto return codes are always 0 on success and negative on failure,
remove unnecessary tests.
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc()Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: David Safford
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Define a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are random
number symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM
only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria match.
Userspace can only ever see encrypted blobs.Based on suggestions by Jason Gunthorpe, several new options have been
added to support additional usages.The new options are:
migratable= designates that the key may/may not ever be updated
(resealed under a new key, new pcrinfo or new auth.)pcrlock=n extends the designated PCR 'n' with a random value,
so that a key sealed to that PCR may not be unsealed
again until after a reboot.keyhandle= specifies the sealing/unsealing key handle.
keyauth= specifies the sealing/unsealing key auth.
blobauth= specifies the sealed data auth.
Implementation of a kernel reserved locality for trusted keys will be
investigated for a possible future extension.Changelog:
- Updated and added examples to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Moved generic TPM constants to include/linux/tpm_command.h
(David Howell's suggestion.)
- trusted_defined.c: replaced kzalloc with kmalloc, added pcrlock failure
error handling, added const qualifiers where appropriate.
- moved to late_initcall
- updated from hash to shash (suggestion by David Howells)
- reduced worst stack usage (tpm_seal) from 530 to 312 bytes
- moved documentation to Documentation directory (suggestion by David Howells)
- all the other code cleanups suggested by David Howells
- Add pcrlock CAP_SYS_ADMIN dependency (based on comment by Jason Gunthorpe)
- New options: migratable, pcrlock, keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth (based on
discussions with Jason Gunthorpe)
- Free payload on failure to create key(reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Updated Kconfig and other descriptions (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion)
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() (reported by Serge Hallyn)Signed-off-by: David Safford
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: James Morris
12 Nov, 2010
1 commit
-
The kernel syslog contains debugging information that is often useful
during exploitation of other vulnerabilities, such as kernel heap
addresses. Rather than futilely attempt to sanitize hundreds (or
thousands) of printk statements and simultaneously cripple useful
debugging functionality, it is far simpler to create an option that
prevents unprivileged users from reading the syslog.This patch, loosely based on grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_DMESG, creates the
dmesg_restrict sysctl. When set to "0", the default, no restrictions are
enforced. When set to "1", only users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can read the
kernel syslog via dmesg(8) or other mechanisms.[akpm@linux-foundation.org: explain the config option in kernel.txt]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar
Acked-by: Eugene Teo
Acked-by: Kees Cook
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
02 Aug, 2010
1 commit
-
Kconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen
Signed-off-by: James Morris
24 Nov, 2009
1 commit
-
As far as I know, all distros currently ship kernels with default
CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y. Since having the option on
leaves a 'no_file_caps' option to boot without file capabilities,
the main reason to keep the option is that turning it off saves
you (on my s390x partition) 5k. In particular, vmlinux sizes
came to:without patch fscaps=n: 53598392
without patch fscaps=y: 53603406
with this patch applied: 53603342with the security-next tree.
Against this we must weigh the fact that there is no simple way for
userspace to figure out whether file capabilities are supported,
while things like per-process securebits, capability bounding
sets, and adding bits to pI if CAP_SETPCAP is in pE are not supported
with SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n, leaving a bit of a problem for
applications wanting to know whether they can use them and/or why
something failed.It also adds another subtly different set of semantics which we must
maintain at the risk of severe security regressions.So this patch removes the SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile
option. It drops the kernel size by about 50k over the stock
SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y kernel, by removing the
cap_limit_ptraced_target() function.Changelog:
Nov 20: remove cap_limit_ptraced_target() as it's logic
was ifndef'ed.Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan"
Signed-off-by: James Morris
09 Nov, 2009
1 commit
-
The LSM currently requires setting a kernel parameter at boot to select
a specific LSM. This adds a config option that allows specifying a default
LSM that is used unless overridden with the security= kernel parameter.
If the the config option is not set the current behavior of first LSM
to register is used.Signed-off-by: John Johansen
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris
20 Oct, 2009
1 commit
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Remove the root_plug example LSM code. It's unmaintained and
increasingly broken in various ways.Made at the 2009 Kernel Summit in Tokyo!
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Signed-off-by: James Morris
02 Sep, 2009
2 commits
-
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
security/KconfigMerge reason: resolve the conflicts, bump up from rc3 to rc8.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar
-
Move tboot.h from asm to linux to fix the build errors of intel_txt
patch on non-X86 platforms. Remove the tboot code from generic code
init/main.c and kernel/cpu.c.Signed-off-by: Shane Wang
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin
19 Aug, 2009
2 commits
-
Fix prompt for LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.
(Verbs are cool!)
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schwab
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Commit 788084aba2ab7348257597496befcbccabdc98a3 added the LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
option, whose help text states "For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots
of address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems."
Which implies that it's default setting was typoed.Signed-off-by: Dave Jones
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
17 Aug, 2009
1 commit
-
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory
is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to
ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how
much space the LSM should protect.The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux
permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by
CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason
being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux
controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to
map some area of low memory.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
15 Aug, 2009
1 commit
-
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin
22 Jul, 2009
1 commit
-
This patch adds kernel configuration and boot support for Intel Trusted
Execution Technology (Intel TXT).Intel's technology for safer computing, Intel Trusted Execution
Technology (Intel TXT), defines platform-level enhancements that
provide the building blocks for creating trusted platforms.Intel TXT was formerly known by the code name LaGrande Technology (LT).
Intel TXT in Brief:
o Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM)
o Data protection in case of improper shutdown
o Measurement and verification of launched environmentIntel TXT is part of the vPro(TM) brand and is also available some
non-vPro systems. It is currently available on desktop systems based on
the Q35, X38, Q45, and Q43 Express chipsets (e.g. Dell Optiplex 755, HP
dc7800, etc.) and mobile systems based on the GM45, PM45, and GS45
Express chipsets.For more information, see http://www.intel.com/technology/security/.
This site also has a link to the Intel TXT MLE Developers Manual, which
has been updated for the new released platforms.A much more complete description of how these patches support TXT, how to
configure a system for it, etc. is in the Documentation/intel_txt.txt file
in this patch.This patch provides the TXT support routines for complete functionality,
documentation for TXT support and for the changes to the boot_params structure,
and boot detection of a TXT launch. Attempts to shutdown (reboot, Sx) the system
will result in platform resets; subsequent patches will support these shutdown modes
properly.Documentation/intel_txt.txt | 210 +++++++++++++++++++++
Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 1
arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h | 3
arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 3
arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 4
arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c | 379 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/Kconfig | 30 +++
9 files changed, 827 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)Signed-off-by: Joseph Cihula
Signed-off-by: Shane Wang
Signed-off-by: Gang Wei
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin
04 Jun, 2009
1 commit
-
This patch removes the dependency of mmap_min_addr on CONFIG_SECURITY.
It also sets a default mmap_min_addr of 4096.mmapping of addresses below 4096 will only be possible for processes
with CAP_SYS_RAWIO.Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Looks-ok-by: Linus Torvalds
Signed-off-by: James Morris
12 Feb, 2009
1 commit
-
TOMOYO uses LSM hooks for pathname based access control and securityfs support.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris
06 Feb, 2009
2 commits
-
Conflicts:
fs/namei.cManually merged per:
diff --cc fs/namei.c
index 734f2b5,bbc15c2..0000000
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@@ -860,9 -848,8 +849,10 @@@ static int __link_path_walk(const char
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_CONTINUE;
err = exec_permission_lite(inode);
if (err == -EAGAIN)
- err = vfs_permission(nd, MAY_EXEC);
+ err = inode_permission(nd->path.dentry->d_inode,
+ MAY_EXEC);
+ if (!err)
+ err = ima_path_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC);
if (err)
break;@@@ -1525,14 -1506,9 +1509,14 @@@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc
flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
}- error = vfs_permission(nd, acc_mode);
+ error = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode);
if (error)
return error;
+
- error = ima_path_check(&nd->path,
++ error = ima_path_check(path,
+ acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
+ if (error)
+ return error;
/*
* An append-only file must be opened in append mode for writing.
*/Signed-off-by: James Morris
-
IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for
file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires,
IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the
integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap
hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the
TPM, measurements can not be removed.In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which
can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM. The
TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to
itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that
cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software.- alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template()
- log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure
- removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN
- replaced hard coded string length with #define nameSigned-off-by: Mimi Zohar
Signed-off-by: James Morris
01 Jan, 2009
1 commit
-
Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying
operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved.Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada
Signed-off-by: Al Viro
28 Aug, 2008
1 commit
-
Add a new Kconfig option SECURITYFS which will build securityfs support
but does not require CONFIG_SECURITY. The only current user of
securityfs does not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY and there is no reason the
full LSM needs to be built to build this fs.Signed-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
25 Jul, 2008
1 commit
-
Filesystem capabilities have come of age. Remove the experimental tag for
configuring filesystem capabilities.Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
14 Jul, 2008
2 commits
-
Fix small oversight in "security: remove dummy module":
CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES doesn't depend on CONFIG_SECURITYSigned-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Remove the dummy module and make the "capability" module the default.
Compile and boot tested.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn
Signed-off-by: James Morris
18 Apr, 2008
1 commit
-
Got burned by setting the proposed default of 65536
across all Debian archs.Thus proposing to be more specific on which archs you may
set this. Also propose a value for arm and friends that
doesn't break sshd.Reword to mention working archs ia64 and ppc64 too.
Signed-off-by: maximilian attems
Cc: Martin Michlmayr
Cc: Gordon Farquharson
Acked-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris
06 Feb, 2008
2 commits
-
Since it was decided that low memory protection from userspace couldn't
be turned on by default add a Kconfig option to allow users/distros to
set a default at compile time. This value is still tunable after boot
in /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addrDiscussion:
http://www.mail-archive.com/linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org/msg02543.htmlSigned-off-by: Eric Paris
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available onhttp://www.schaufler-ca.com
Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.
Smack defines and uses these labels:
"*" - pronounced "star"
"_" - pronounced "floor"
"^" - pronounced "hat"
"?" - pronounced "huh"The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:
1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.Some practical use cases:
Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:C Unclass rx
S C rx
S Unclass rx
TS S rx
TS C rx
TS Unclass rxA TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:
ESPN ABC r
ABC ESPN rOn my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.Another case that I especially like:
SatData Guard w
Guard Publish wA program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler
Cc: Joshua Brindle
Cc: Paul Moore
Cc: Stephen Smalley
Cc: Chris Wright
Cc: James Morris
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish"
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds
30 Jan, 2008
1 commit
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Capabilities have long been the default when CONFIG_SECURITY=n,
and its help text suggests turning it on when CONFIG_SECURITY=y.
But it is set to default n.Default it to y instead.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn
Acked-by: Matt LaPlante
Signed-off-by: James Morris
