28 Mar, 2016
1 commit
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro
12 Oct, 2012
1 commit
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro
01 Mar, 2012
1 commit
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Userspace can pass in arbitrary combinations of MS_* flags to mount().
If both MS_BIND and one of MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE are
passed, device name which should be checked for MS_BIND was not checked because
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE had higher priority than MS_BIND.If both one of MS_BIND/MS_MOVE and MS_REMOUNT are passed, device name which
should not be checked for MS_REMOUNT was checked because MS_BIND/MS_MOVE had
higher priority than MS_REMOUNT.Fix these bugs by changing priority to MS_REMOUNT -> MS_BIND ->
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE -> MS_MOVE as with do_mount() does.Also, unconditionally return -EINVAL if more than one of
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE is passed so that TOMOYO will not
generate inaccurate audit logs, for commit 7a2e8a8f "VFS: Sanity check mount
flags passed to change_mnt_propagation()" clarified that these flags must be
exclusively passed.Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris
14 Jul, 2011
1 commit
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Update comments for scripts/kernel-doc and fix some of errors reported by
scripts/checkpatch.pl .Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris
11 Jul, 2011
1 commit
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Enable conditional ACL by passing object's pointers.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris
30 Jun, 2011
1 commit
29 Jun, 2011
5 commits
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Add /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit interface. This interface generates audit
logs in the form of domain policy so that /usr/sbin/tomoyo-auditd can reuse
audit logs for appending to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
interface.Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Use structure for passing ACL line, in preparation for supporting policy
namespace and conditional parameters.Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Use common structure for ACL with "struct list_head" + "atomic_t".
Use array/struct where possible.
Remove is_group from "struct tomoyo_name_union"/"struct tomoyo_number_union".
Pass "struct file"->private_data rather than "struct file".
Update some of comments.
Bring tomoyo_same_acl_head() from common.h to domain.c .
Bring tomoyo_invalid()/tomoyo_valid() from common.h to util.c .Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Update (or temporarily remove) comments.
Remove or replace some of #define lines.Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
In order to synchronize with TOMOYO 1.8's syntax,
(1) Remove special handling for allow_read/write permission.
(2) Replace deny_rewrite/allow_rewrite permission with allow_append permission.
(3) Remove file_pattern keyword.
(4) Remove allow_read permission from exception policy.
(5) Allow creating domains in enforcing mode without calling supervisor.
(6) Add permission check for opening directory for reading.
(7) Add permission check for stat() operation.
(8) Make "cat < /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain" behave as if
"cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain".Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris
14 Jun, 2011
1 commit
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In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, kern_path() was called without checking
dev_name != NULL. As a result, an unprivileged user can trigger oops by issuing
mount(NULL, "/", "ext3", 0, NULL) request.
Fix this by checking dev_name != NULL before calling kern_path(dev_name).Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris
20 Apr, 2011
1 commit
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In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, reference to device file (e.g. /dev/sda1)
was leaking.Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris
02 Aug, 2010
11 commits
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Commit c9e69318 "TOMOYO: Allow wildcard for execute permission." changed execute
permission and domainname to accept wildcards. But tomoyo_find_next_domain()
was using pathname passed to execve() rather than pathname specified by the
execute permission. As a result, processes were not able to transit to domains
which contain wildcards in their domainnames.This patch passes pathname specified by the execute permission back to
tomoyo_find_next_domain() so that processes can transit to domains which
contain wildcards in their domainnames.Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Use shorter name in order to make it easier to fit 80 columns limit.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
If invalid combination of mount flags are given, it will be rejected later.
Thus, no need for TOMOYO to reject invalid combination of mount flags.Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Use shorter name in order to make it easier to fix 80 columns limit.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
We can use callback function since parameters are passed via
"const struct tomoyo_request_info".Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
To make it possible to use callback function, pass parameters via
"struct tomoyo_request_info".Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Use common "struct list_head" + "bool" + "u8" structure and
use common code for elements using that structure.Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
This patch allows users to change access control mode for per-operation basis.
This feature comes from non LSM version of TOMOYO which is designed for
permitting users to use SELinux and TOMOYO at the same time.SELinux does not care filename in a directory whereas TOMOYO does. Change of
filename can change how the file is used. For example, renaming index.txt to
.htaccess will change how the file is used. Thus, letting SELinux to enforce
read()/write()/mmap() etc. restriction and letting TOMOYO to enforce rename()
restriction is an example usage of this feature.What is unfortunate for me is that currently LSM does not allow users to use
SELinux and LSM version of TOMOYO at the same time...Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Allow pathnames longer than 4000 bytes.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
Since the behavior of the system is restricted by policy, we may need to update
policy when you update packages.We need to update policy in the following cases.
* The pathname of files has changed.
* The dependency of files has changed.
* The access permissions required has increased.The ideal way to update policy is to rebuild from the scratch using learning
mode. But it is not desirable to change from enforcing mode to other mode if
the system has once entered in production state. Suppose MAC could support
per-application enforcing mode, the MAC becomes useless if an application that
is not running in enforcing mode was cracked. For example, the whole system
becomes vulnerable if only HTTP server application is running in learning mode
to rebuild policy for the application. So, in TOMOYO Linux, updating policy is
done while the system is running in enforcing mode.This patch implements "interactive enforcing mode" which allows administrators
to judge whether to accept policy violation in enforcing mode or not.
A demo movie is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9q1Jo25LPA .Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris -
mount(2) has three string and one numeric parameters.
Split mount restriction code from security/tomoyo/file.c .Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa
Signed-off-by: James Morris